

Carlos Marichal

SPAIN (1834-1844)

A New Society

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*In memory
of
my brother*

**Miguel Marichal
(1949-1975)**

Preface

The interpretation of modern Spanish history is still often seen in the light of a superficial "romantic" view of the historical process. The stereotypes created by many foreign writers in the 19th century, and subsequently reinforced by numerous Spanish historians have not yet died. The Spain of Bizet's Carmen remains a compelling popular view which distorts the reality. It was in the Europe of the 1830's and 1840's that these views became current, chiefly because of the lack of accurate knowledge of the actual social and political developments of Spain. Thereafter, Spanish politics were generally explained as spasmodic series of "pronunciamientos", led by volatile generals, and with little or no popular participation. But as this study demonstrates, the generals and the army were only one of the elements in the political events. More important in the decade 1834-44 was the National Militia, largely composed of artisans. Equally significant were the young political parties, Progressives and Moderates, as well as the radical municipal governments.

If this study has a primary purpose it is to put the emphasis on the social and economic basis of Spanish political history. A better understanding of the social structure of early 19th century Spain and its relations to the political evolution may help to destroy some myths and to provide a more practical understanding of its often confusing and contradictory history. The transition from the absolute monarchy to the parliamentary system in Spain was not the same as in some other European countries, but there are parallels. The social classes had some different characteristics, but also many similarities. Until more social history (which is the bridge between pure political and pure economic history), is written, the true outlines of modern Spanish history will not become clear.

This study is largely based on primary sources, the newspapers, the transcriptions of the parliamentary debates, government publications, and foreign diplomatic correspondence. Most of the research was conducted in Madrid, although a couple of months were spent in London and in Paris. Considerable time was also spent using the magnificent resources of Widener Library at Harvard University. Thanks are due to the staffs of the following libraries: Biblioteca Nacional, Hemeroteca Municipal, and Academia de la Historia, at Madrid; the Bodleian Library at Oxford and the Public Record Office at London; the archives of the Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères at Paris; Widener Library at Harvard University, and the Ticknor Collection of the Boston Public Library.

My formal introduction to 19th century Spanish political history was provided by Professor Miguel Martínez Cuadrado. He urged me to begin this study, directed it, provided many fruitful ideas, and spent hours discussing different aspects of it. I am particularly grateful for his hav-

ing allowed me to work as an assistant in one of his courses at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Madrid. I am also particularly grateful to León Sánchez Cuesta, who allowed me the free use of his magnificent personal library. Other persons who provided helpful suggestions and encouragement are Vicente Llorens, Ramón Carande, and Joaquín Romero Maura. A fellow companion at the University of Madrid, Luis Lada read early versions and provided encouragement. Jaime Saunas taught me what I know about contemporary Spain, and taught me to be wary of absolutes. Finally, special acknowledgement is due to my parents and my wife Soledad González who have helped in many different ways. This study is theirs as much as it is mine.

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Introduction

“On this day, at a quarter to three in the afternoon, God has undertaken to call to his side the soul of my most beloved and cherished Husband, King Ferdinand VII...”

Madrid, September 29, 1833.

After a long and turbulent reign marked by bloody war and civil war, revolution and counter-revolution, Ferdinand VII of Spain had finally died. Immediately after his death, the monarch's widow, María Cristina, assumed the position of Queen-Regent. Breaking with the pattern of despotic rule of her dead husband, María Cristina initiated the transition from absolutism to parliamentary government, and decreed an amnesty for the thousands of Liberal exiles. Many of the exiles, such as Martínez de la Rosa —named Prime Minister in early 1834— returned to Spain to assume important political and administrative positions. But certain powerful social sectors, including aristocrats, ecclesiastics and generals identified with the Old Regime, reacted against the liberalization of the Spanish government. They banded together under the leadership of the brother of Ferdinand VII, Don Carlos, who disputed María Cristina's right to rule Spain. From 1833 Don Carlos and his followers initiated an open military rebellion against the Queen-Regent and the Liberals.

The year 1833 thus brought civil war to Spain. It was a war that was to ravage the land for six years and to divide the Spanish people in two main camps, Carlists and Liberals. Furthermore, the Spanish struggle soon became an international conflict, scene of the ideological battle between European absolutism, as represented by the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia, and European liberalism, led by the expansionist bourgeoisies of England and France. The British and French gave diplomatic and military support to María Cristina, while the Russian, Prussian and Austrian monarchs helped finance the troops of Don Carlos.

The civil war (1833-39) opened a decade of profound and violent changes. The long powerful absolute monarchy finally collapsed. The Spanish Catholic Church —proportionately the strongest and wealthiest of the European nations— came under vigorous attack and lost much of its most valuable property. The first political parties of modern Spanish history were born, and the electoral process became institutionalized at a national and local level. There were actually more national and local elections in the decade 1834-1844 than during any other period of modern Spanish history, except those of 1868-1874 and 1931-1936. The Army, which finally vanquished the Carlists in 1839, came to play an important political

role, as it would throughout the next century. The transformations in Spanish politics and society were profound.

Paradoxically, it was the forces of Spanish reaction and tradition that provoked revolution. The Carlist rebellion of 1833 finally destroyed what Napoleon had not been able to destroy: the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy. The civil war forced not only the Queen-Regent, but also the majority of the Spanish propertied classes to seek in liberalism and the alliance with France and England a way of preventing anarchy and the spread of incendiary rightwing terrorism. Without the upheaval caused by the civil war, there would not have been a revolutionary movement. In this sense, it was the feudalistic Right, led by the more fanatic and retrograde elements of the Church and aristocracy, rather than the bourgeoisie, which initiated this dramatic course of events.

The political developments of 1834-1844 represented the transition from the absolute monarchy to the Liberal "bourgeois" State. In the year 1834 the parliamentary system of government was re-established. A popularly-based National Militia was organized in most Spanish towns and cities to defend the Liberal regime against the Carlist assault. Three years later the Spanish legislature drafted and ratified the Constitution of 1837, setting down the legal basis of the constitutional monarchy. The deputies of 1836-1837 passed legislation to expropriate the huge properties of the Church and to reform the state administration. At the same time, the first political parties, the Progressives and the Moderates, were born and grew rapidly. On the local level there were frequent democratic municipal election between 1836 and 1844.

The predominance of the Liberal forces throughout much of the peninsula from 1834 onwards, unleashed a rapid mobilization and politization of the urban population. The urban residents organized governing juntas in all the principal cities, formed the corps of the National Militia, composed of bourgeois and artisans and from 1836 freely elected municipal governments which frequently reflected the political positions of the more radical sectors, including the first Republican groups.

The rapid politization of the urban workers and artisans led them to propose numerous revolutionary reforms which conflicted not only with the principles of the traditional ruling classes, the aristocracy and the clergy, but which also increasingly came into conflict with the Liberal but relatively weak commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. Consequently, the decade of 1834-1844 was marked by an increasing degree of class conflict, leading to repeated political crisis and popular rebellions. This period of social upheaval and political transformation finally drew to a close in 1843, when the military hero of the Progressive Party, General Espartero, Regent of Spain from 1841 to 1843, was forced into exile. The defeat of the more radical forces, including the Progressives, permitted the Moderate Party to assume power under the leadership of General Narváez, who established a harsh, repressive and conservative regime.

The underlying basis of much of the social and political conflicts of the decade 1834-1844 was the struggle for the control of the State apparatus. This struggle took place on several levels. On the one hand, a

sector of the old ruling classes led the Carlist rebellion with the intention of reestablishing the absolute monarchy. On the other hand, the professional and commercial bourgeoisie, led by the Liberal intelligentsia, moved quickly to take over the government positions offered them by the Queen-Regent, María Cristina, when she reestablished the parliamentary system of government. The Liberals were able to form an effective government and to carry out important reforms on the basis of a political compromise worked out between the commercial and professional bourgeoisie and a broad strata of the landed oligarchy. Among the principal reforms they carried out was the expropriation of the urban and rural properties of the Church. The transfer of these lands from the Church into the hands of both aristocrats and bourgeois was the economic underpinning on which was constructed the new constitutional government.

Without question it was the Liberal bourgeoisie that chiefly promoted the establishment of these important political and economic reforms. But the bourgeoisie alone was too weak to carry out the simultaneous tasks of defeating the Carlist troops and guaranteeing the new constitutional system of government: it was forced to forge an alliance with the urban masses, in particular with the artisans who composed the majority of the urban working population at that time. The result of this alliance between bourgeois and artisans was to speed and deepen the process of reform and revolution to a much greater degree than would have been possible to predict before 1833.

With the defeat of the Carlists in 1839, the struggle for the control of the State apparatus became essentially a battle between the Progressive Party and the Moderate Party, the first more radical than the second. Despite the fact that the Progressives were able to control the government between 1840 and 1843, internal divisions and the rapid radicalization of the urban masses undermined the party's power. The majority of the bourgeoisie, including much of the Liberal intelligentsia, came to fear the advance of the popular movement, in particular the establishment of numerous revolutionary town councils. The severe social and political conflicts split the Progressive Party and quickly led to its downfall.

From 1844 onwards the Moderate Party was able to exercise governmental power on the basis of a consensus forged between the traditional landed oligarchy and sectors of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. The consolidation of these groups as the ruling class of the new parliamentary regime coincided with the repression and dismemberment of the popular political organizations that had arisen in the previous decade: the National Militia, the democratic town councils, the republican committees and the more radical sectors of the Progressive Party.

The analysis of the events of the decade 1834-1844 is all the more complex because of the transitional nature of the period: the transition from the absolute monarchy to the parliamentary system of government, from the Old Regime to the new bourgeois society. The political and social changes, furthermore, did not take place with the same intensity throughout the Spanish peninsula or in the different social strata. In addition, the changes and reforms were not able to overcome all the

obstacles in the road towards the establishment of a new political, economic and social system. In 1833 the Spanish State was no longer but the rotten façade of the absolute monarchy; between 1834 and 1844 the Liberal governments attempted to tear down the old building to construct a new one, but they succeeded only in part. Many reforms only had a superficial effect, and many aspects of both the State and Spanish society, as a whole, remained largely unchanged.

It is worthwhile asking, then, whether or not the political transformations of this period constituted a bourgeois revolution which failed. In this sense, it is necessary to observe that while the Spanish revolutions of 1834-1844 had many parallels with other contemporary European revolutionary movements, it also had significant contrasts. Such is the lesson that can be drawn from the numerous studies of the French Revolution of 1789-1795, and in particular from the splendid study by George Lefebvre, *Quatre-Vingt-Neuf*, which has served in good measure as a model for our own study of Spanish political history. Lefebvre points out the several stages through which the French Revolution passed. He writes:

"Having paralyzed the royal power which had maintained its social preeminence, the aristocracy opened the way to the bourgeois revolution, later to the popular revolution in the cities, and finally to the revolution of the peasants, and found itself buried beneath the ruins of the Ancien Regime."

In Spain there was a bourgeois revolution between 1834 and 1844 which permitted the mobilization of the urban masses in numerous popular rebellions, but there was certainly no peasant revolution. The enigma of why there was no such peasant revolution despite the existence of favorable conditions, is a most important question which is still unanswered.

Our study indicates that one of the more singular characteristics of the changes in Spanish society between 1834 and 1844 is that they took place mainly in the cities and towns, but not in the countryside. The only sector of the peasantry which participated prominently in the political and military events of the period were the Carlist peasants of the north and northwestern Spain, who proved to be counter-revolutionary rather than revolutionary. Future studies should be directed to answering the question of why the majority of the Spanish peasants did not become politicized, why there was such a continuity of the traditional patterns of land tenure, and why there were so few changes in the relations between landlord and peasant in Spain in the early 19th century.

In summary, the new political and social system born in the period 1834-1844 was fundamentally the product of the mobilization and politization of the Spanish urban population. The diffusion of the ideology of Liberalism, the establishment of the parliamentary institutions and of the electoral process, constituted an important political revolution which

Spain (1834-1844)

served as the basis for the construction of a bourgeois parliamentary state. This new political state, however, was built upon a social structure which had undergone profound changes and reforms, but not a true social revolution, for in order to have been a revolution it would have had to radically transform the social relations of the rural population of Spain.

Spanish Society at the End of the Absolute Monarchy: 1830

Despite the havoc and destruction caused by the War of 1808-1814 and by subsequent events, the social and economic structure of Spain in 1830 appeared outwardly similar to that of the late 18th century. There was still little industry, agriculture was backward, and commerce was concentrated in the Mediterranean ports. Transport was difficult, roads were few and mostly bad, and there were virtually no canals, all of which impeded the development of internal trade and the commercialization of agriculture. Although there were signs of a gradual economic revival after 1820, the general economic picture was gloomy. With the independence of the American colonies, Spanish merchants and industrialists lost their chief foreign market, and both they and the State lost an irreplaceable source of bullion, chiefly silver. Furthermore Spain's traditional exports to other European countries such as wool declined after 1808; simultaneously huge quantities of contraband English and French manufactured goods inundated the peninsula, smothering the underdeveloped Spanish manufacturing industries. The monarchy could not collect enough revenue in the form of taxes to cover expenses, resulting in continued large deficits. The State became increasingly indebted to foreign financiers, mainly French and English.

The population growth of Spain was quite slow in this period. At the end of the 18th century the total population had been approximately 10.5 millions. It increased to some 13 millions by the 1830's, but the rate of growth was slow or negative until after 1815¹. The Napoleonic War had taken a heavy toll, as did recurrent plagues and famines in the early years of the century. Mesonero Romanos, historian and statistician of Madrid, calculated that 20,000 people died in Madrid alone in the great hunger of 1812²; that is to say more than 10% of the city's population. The epidemics and hunger were not limited to the capital, and a modest estimate of the national losses of 1812 would be at least one to two

¹ The most accurate estimates are those offered by FERMÍN CABALLERO, *Re-seña Estadística de España* (Madrid, 1868), pp. 44-45. He reports that the police estimates for 1826 were 13,712,000; those for 1832 were 14,660,000, but the first accurate census, that of 1857, reported a total population of 15,464,340. It is therefore unlikely that in the 1830's the Spanish population would have been much above 13 odd millions.

² R. MESONERO ROMANOS, *Memorias de un setentón* (Madrid, 1882).

hundred thousand deaths. After the War, however, and for at least 50 years the population grew rapidly.

Spain in the early 19th century remained essentially an agricultural nation. Estimates based on data from both 1797 and the 1820's indicate that the ratio of rural to urban production was as 4 to 1. Pascual Madoz estimated that there were approximately 8.6 million people in the agricultural sector, as opposed to 2.2 million in the urban sector in the 1820's³. The majority of the peasantry were extremely poor and brutally exploited. Only one fifth of the peasants owned the land they worked; about 30% rented land, and almost 50% were landless laborers⁴. This last group was the rural proletariat and was heavily concentrated in the provinces of Andalusia, although also to be found throughout the rest of the peninsula. The owners of the land that the peasants worked were principally the traditional classes of the aristocracy and clergy. In 1830 the clergy was considerably weaker than it had been three decades before, but the aristocracy conserved most of its property.

There were few large cities in Spain in this period. The largest was the capital, Madrid, with about 200,000 inhabitants; Barcelona had approximately 140,000, Valencia and Seville almost 100,000. There were four cities with between 50,000 and 70,000 inhabitants, namely Cádiz, Granada, Málaga, and Zaragoza⁵. Compared to the urban development of England whose capital, London, had more than a million people, or France whose capital had more than 600,000 residents, Spain was backward. The outward appearance of the Spanish cities was also different from the more advanced European centers. There were many huge monasteries and convents in every Spanish city and town, and there were few factories, few elegant residential districts, no hotels or department stores, even relatively few carriages. All Europeans who visited Spain in this period commented on the bad lodgings, the lack of sanitation, the provinciality.

Indeed, Spain was provincial in the literal sense of the word. Communications were so bad that there was little inter-regional trade, and therefore provinces were isolated. The Spanish population was more concentrated in the maritime regions than in the central meseta. According to a contemporary geographer, the average population per square league in the maritime provinces was almost double of those in the interior⁶. The population density was a measure of prosperity. Agriculture, commerce and industry were more vigorous in the coastal regions. In the Castilian meseta, on the other hand, there was little industry and not much trade except to and from Madrid. In spite of this contrast between coast and interior, the nation continued to be governed from the center. The Castilian aristocracy was the most powerful sector of the ruling

³ Speech by Pascual Madoz in the Chamber of Deputies. *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1838, p. 2533.

⁴ This data is according to the Census of 1797.

⁵ For data on the population of the cities in 1815, see ISIDORO ANTILLÓN, *Elementos de la Geografía de España y Portugal* (Valencia, 1815).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

CHART 1

Extracted from the Census of 1797:

Total of secular clergy	89,844
Total or regular clergy	92,727
Monks	61,327
Nuns	31,400
Total of the entire clergy	182,571
Grandeas and "Títulos"	1,323
* Nobles	402,059
Employed by the King	27,243
Employed in the "Cruzada" or Inquisition	4,738
Military	147,340
Dependents of the Tribunals	
Judges and Lawyers	4,346
Notaries	9,633
Attornies and Bailiffs	13,274
Professionals	
Doctors	4,346
Surgeons	9,272
Druggists	3,878
Veterinarians	5,706
University Students	29,812
Peasant Farmers	364,514
Tenants	507,423
Rural Workers (without land)	805,235
Cattle raisers	25,530
Shepherds	113,628
Wholesale merchants	6,824
Shopowners (not wholesalers)	18,861
Artists and Architects	6,824
Sailors	31,238
Fishermen	16,247
Hunters	2,686
Manufacturers, artisans, and industrial urban workers	498,493
Total of the population including women, children, and aged.	10,268,150

* The category of "noble" did not mean that the individual had a large amount of land. Recent historical studies have demonstrated that in the northern provinces, particularly Asturias, Santander, and the Basque provinces, where there

The War against Napoleon had decisively shaken the old society, violently battering the traditional pillars of the Court, the Church, the Aristocracy, and the Army. The French invaders had taken particular care to damage the Church, burning and ransacking hundreds of monasteries, and devouring the great flocks of the monastic orders. The monks and parish priests responded by taking up arms and leading the crusade against the atheist French. The majority of the Spanish aristocrats, on the other hand, (and as was noticed by many 19th century historians), did not play a major role in the war. They abdicated their responsibilities in hopes of surviving without significant personal or property losses. This caused a tremendous loss of prestige and power for the nobility; no Spaniard could consider a noble in the same light after the war as he had before. Furthermore, the peasantry took an active role throughout 1808-1814, in fact the principal fighting role and in addition in many instances began to refuse to obey traditional feudal or quasi-feudal practices. After 1814, for instance, the peasantry of many regions systematically refused to pay the tithe taxes to the Church, and also entered into many complicated legal battles with aristocrats over questions of legal jurisdiction and property ownership.

The War had shaken society, but it was not a complete revolution. When Ferdinand VII returned to the throne in 1814 he reestablished the Inquisition, he re-affirmed the authority of the clergy, helping them to build their monasteries, and he attempted to rebuild the aristocratic structure of 18th century society. He was not altogether successful, but it should be observed that the basic social structure appeared to continue to be stratified much as in the preceding century. There were about the same proportion of aristocrats, priests and monks, merchants, artisans, and peasants.

The relations between these different social sectors, however, were definitely changing. There was an increasing social and political polarization, clearly visible in the intense antagonism between the clergy and the commercial bourgeoisie led by the Liberals. The other social sectors, aristocrats and peasants, military officers and public employees also participated in the confusing political struggles during the reign of Ferdinand VII. The nation became increasingly divided by the issue of reaction or reform, Carlism or Liberalism. In order to explain the social and political contradictions it is necessary to briefly describe and analyze each of the major social groups: the aristocracy, the clergy, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the artisans and the peasantry. It is also essential to describe the large group of Liberals in exile (1823-33) who would play the important role of an "intelligentsia in power" in the 1830's.

were most noble titles, the average "noble" was a peasant farmer or an artisan whose family conserved a family shield of historical social importance, but of no necessary economic significance. Nonetheless, most large landowners did have noble titles. Due to the necessity of making this distinction, we prefer to use the word landed oligarchy, rather than nobility: the landed oligarchy, or class of large landowners probably numbered some 50,000 individuals.

THE ARISTOCRACY OR LANDED OLIGARCHY

Up until 1812 the class of great landowners formally constituted the seigniorial nobility. The nobility was spread all over Spain, but in those areas where landed property tended to be most concentrated, there also the aristocrats exercised the greatest power. "In Catalonia, Valencia, Galicia, Andalusia, New Castile and Extremadura the seigniorial properties occupied the majority of the land of these regions"⁹. During the whole of the 18th century the nobility had increased in prosperity. As the historian Gonzalo Anes states: "Since they received their rents in agricultural produce, and because they received feudal dues, the seigniorial nobility was much favored by the century-long price increases and by the rise in land rents"¹⁰. The nobles attempted to recuperate old forgotten feudal dues and increasingly pressured the peasantry to pay more rent. This 18th century "seigniorial reaction" ended with the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808. During the war the Liberal *Cortes* of Cádiz passed laws abolishing feudal practices. This legislation was the legal confirmation of the peasants' revolt against the obligations imposed by the landlords.

In 1830, nonetheless, the great landowners remained the dominant class in Spanish society. They had lost many of their feudal privileges, but they retained ownership of most of their land. They had also lost their monopoly over the positions in the Army hierarchy, but they continued to play an important role in all military affairs. Throughout the period 1814-1833 the aristocracy held many important positions in the government of Ferdinand VII. The King chose many of his Ministers and counsellors from amongst the *Grandeos*, the wealthiest of the nobles.

The character and power of the class of large landowners varied from region to region. Classically the region of the greatest concentration of landed property is Andalusia, and here was based a powerful sector of the Spanish aristocracy. The predominant type of estate in the provinces of Córdoba, Sevilla, Jaén, Málaga, and Cádiz was the "latifundio". These "latifundios" were worked chiefly by "jornaleros", the landless rural proletariat. These great estates produced olives and olive oil, wine, fruits and some wheat. These products were cash crops to be sold either to other regions of Spain (in exchange for agricultural and manufactured products), or destined for foreign export. The landed oligarchy of Cádiz and Sevilla had long been specialized in the wine/sherry trade with England. The wealthy sherry producers of Jerez controlled the export of the produce and were thus both landowners and sherry merchants. The Andalusian aristocracy had also traditionally exported to the Spanish colonies in the Americas, Sevilla had been the main channel for the American trade in the 16th and 17th centuries, and later in the 18th century Cádiz mo-

⁹ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, "La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868: Algunos problemas", in *Ensayos sobre la Economía española a mediados del siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1970), p. 237.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

nopolised this commerce until 1778. The Andalusian aristocracy was therefore a particularly wealthy group of families with international commercial connections. Furthermore they exercised a great degree of power within the Spanish army and government: they maintained a tradition of passing their estates on to their first sons, and training their second or third sons in the military academies and at the law faculties. Throughout the 19th century, there continued to be a disproportionate number of army generals and government ministers of aristocratic Andalusian origins¹¹.

The nobility of northern Spain, Galicia, Asturias, Santander and the Basque provinces contrasted with that of Andalusia. In a region such as Asturias the hereditary nobles were mostly mediumsized landowners; they constituted an extensive class of local notables whose influence was chiefly based on their control of town or district politics¹². There were some nobles who invested in mining and minor industry, but they were the exception. Such an exception was the Marquis of Sargadelos, an Asturian who founded the arms factory of Sargadelos in 1791¹³. Few landowners in the north dealt in international trade except, in a limited way, some of the Basque oligarchy of Bilbao and San Sebastián.

As in the rest of Spain, the nobility of Catalonia had prospered with the economic growth of the 18th century. They continued to constitute the wealthiest class of the region: among them were such men as the Marquis of Alfarrás, Barberá, Castellbell, and the Count of Fonollar and Munster¹⁴. The largest estates in the area were, however, in the hands of Castilian Grandees who intermarried with local Catalan families. The Catalan landed oligarchy was not as powerful as the Castilian or Andalusian, and furthermore they were already rivalled by the growing industrial bourgeoisie of Barcelona. A considerable number of Catalan aristocrats, discontented with the changes instituted since the Napoleonic War, later became Carlists. Such aristocrats as the Marquis of Monistrol and the Count of Fonollar supported the ultra-reactionary Carlist movement of the late 1820's and the 1830's, largely as a way of revindicating aristocratic values and practices. The same process occurred throughout the peninsula, although it should be observed that the majority of the Spanish landowners did not become Carlists.

The Castilian landed oligarchy was numerically the largest group within the Spanish landowning class. Their estates produced mainly wheat and wine, although there was still considerable sheep grazing. Traditionally, Castile (including Extremadura) had produced large quantities of wool for export to England, France and Holland. As a result of the wars of the early 19th century, wool production decreased. The once great Mesta, the organization of owners of the large merino flocks, finally was dissolved

¹¹ See Chapter 10, footnote 12.

¹² J. E. CASARIEGO, *El Marqués de Sargadelos o los comienzos del Industrialismo Capitalista en España* (Oviedo, 1950), pp. 32-33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁴ JAIME VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1969), pp. 170-71.

in 1836. From 1820 onwards Castile became the center of the expanding wheat production. Lack of irrigation and of capital investments in agriculture, however, did not allow very rapid growth. The prices of Spanish wheat remained among the highest in Europe. The Castilian landed oligarchy thus came to represent the protectionist wheat interests, one of the most powerful forces in 19th century politics.

A great number of the wealthiest aristocrats, the *Grandees*, traditionally resided at Madrid, participating in Court life, politics, and in the few important economic institutions of the capital. They generally left the administration of their extensive rural estates to salaried superintendents; these rural administrators tended to rob their patrons and exploit the peasants harshly and did not make significant improvements in the estates¹⁵. (Absentee landlords tend to make for inefficient agriculture.) The *Grandees* also surrounded themselves with great numbers of servants and hangers on, absorbing a considerable part of their income. In spite of the great expenses of their households, the wealthiest *Grandees* remained in 1830 the richest individuals in Spain. The best-known, such as the Duque de Alba or the Duque del Infantado, lived in sumptuous private palaces in Madrid, while others lived in more modest residences in the elegant quarter of the city.

Throughout the reign of Ferdinand VII, (1814-1833), the *Grandees* figured prominently at the Court as Ministers, Counsellors of State, Gentlemen of the Royal Bedchamber and other posts. Perhaps the key institution controlled by the *Grandees* was the *Consejo de Estado*, the Council of State¹⁶. At the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, the influence of the Council was politically crucial in its support of the Queen-Regent, María Cristina, and the transition to parliamentary government. At that time key members of the Council were the Duque de las Amarillas, the Duque de Medinaceli, and the Duque de Santa Cruz.

The *Grandees* also played a part in the economic administration of the State and in private economic institutions. In 1829 a leading member of the *Supremo Consejo de Hacienda* (the Ministry of Finances) was the Marqués de Almenara; the president and chief director of the *Real Compañía de Amortización* (Office of the Public Debt) was the Marqués de Casa Lozano, also Counsellor of State¹⁷. In independent economic institutions like the *Banco de San Fernando* (the only bank in Spain at the time) there were also well-known aristocrats: in 1829 on the board of

¹⁵ According to well-informed observer in 1835: "The authority of the 'administrador' on the estates of a nobleman, is of the most despotic kind; he treats the peasants as if they were slaves, and acts in all respects as if he were himself the lord of the manor. He keeps his calash and horses; his sons get commissions in the army, and places in the public offices, through his master's interest, and as a reward for their father's integrity and good management; and his daughters are sure to have a good portion on their marriage." *Madrid in 1835*, by a Resident Officer (London, 1836), p. 52.

¹⁶ EDUARDO R. EGGERS y ENRIQUE FEUNE DE COLOMBI, *Francisco de Cea Bermúdez y su época, 1779-1850* (Madrid, 1958), p. 121.

¹⁷ *Guía Mercantil de España, año de 1829* (Madrid, 1829), Vol. I, p. 521.

directors of the Bank were the Marqués de Casa Irujo and the Conde de Guaqui¹⁸. In the same year among the directors of the *Real Compañía de los Cinco Gremios Mayores* (formerly one of the most powerful commercial companies) was the Conde de Ofalía; likewise one of the directors of the *Compañía de Empresas Varias* (just founded in 1827 and one of the first joint stock companies) was the Marqués de Casa Irujo. Finally, the oldest and most traditional Spanish economic corporation, the Mesta, the association of sheep owners, was directed by Grandees. The presiding directors in 1829 were such nobles as the Duque del Infantado, the Marqués de Someruelos, the Marqués de Cerralbo, the Conde de Alcudia and the Marqués de Perales¹⁹.

The Spanish aristocracy of 1830 continued to exercise considerable political and economic power. They were closely bound to the absolute monarchy of Ferdinand VII and to key financial and commercial institutions of the capital. As a class they owned over half of the arable land of Spain. The landed oligarchy was the dominant class in Spanish society. Yet it was a divided class. A sector of the traditional aristocracy was displeased with the gradual loss of feudal dues and privileges. They feared the rise of Liberalism, (as demonstrated in the brief liberal governments of 1810-1814 and 1820-23). They opposed the attacks against the power and authority of the Spanish Catholic Church. This discontented sector included aristocrats in all regions of Spain, and they became Carlist supporters, Carlism being essentially a religious-political crusade to reestablish feudalism, and most particularly the power of the Church. The majority of the landed oligarchy, however, did not become Carlists. They were good Catholics, but their fundamental interests lay in political and economic stability, not in civil war. They opposed Carlism because they feared the incendiary terrorism of the reactionary forces, the mobilization of the armed peasants, and the threat to the State and the King. By 1830, therefore, there was an internal class conflict within the dominant landowning class.

THE CLERGY

In 18th and early 19th century Spain the clergy was a class of enormous social, economic and political importance. The clergy owned a great number of rural and urban properties, it controlled the universities and most of primary and secondary education; it exercised a singularly powerful ideological and spiritual influence over all sectors of Spanish society. "As a social institution the Church was superior in influence to the nobility"²⁰. In 1800 the total number of the clergy was about 180,000, including the members of the Church hierarchy, the priests, monks and nuns. (See Chart I.) This represented approximately 2% of the total population, or

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Other sections of Volume I.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ R. CARR, *Spain 1808-1839*, p. 45.

about 1 in 50 or 60 persons, (probably a higher proportion than in any other European country). Like the nobility, the clergy was a non-productive sector of society who lived off rents and feudal tribute²¹.

The Church was divided into two branches, the secular clergy and the regular clergy. The *secular clergy* consisted of the parish priests and of the ecclesiastics attached to the churches and cathedrals, as well as members of the Church hierarchy. The *regular clergy* was made up of the members of the religious orders, the monks and nuns. By tradition the regular clergy had more extensive landed properties than the secular. Most rural convents of monks or nuns were large agricultural establishments. The religious rented their extensive properties to the local peasantry, or hired day laborers to cultivate the land and tend the flocks. Numerous religious orders had huge herds of sheep, whose wool was sold at the great wool markets of northern Castile. There were also numerous convents in the cities. The urban establishments were famous as centers of charity; many offered a daily soup to the urban poor and indigent. They also administered hospitals for the sick, aged and infirm. A great part of the social welfare of the Spanish population was in the hands of the Church rather than the State.

The extent of the power and influence of the regular clergy can best be judged by the number of convents and the number of monks and nuns that occupied them. At the beginning of the 19th century, there were almost 3,000 monasteries and convents in all of Spain. The largest religious order, that of St. Francis, alone possessed 1,175 convents²². Other orders such as the Capuchins, the Agustinians, and the bare-footed Carmelites each had a hundred or more establishments, while others had a lesser number. According to the Census of 1797, there were 61,000 monks and 31,000 nuns in Spain. This number decreased considerably during the War of 1808-1814, and many monasteries were destroyed, but the religious clergy retained great power. In 1832 there were still 69 convents in Madrid alone: 37 of monks and 32 of nuns²³.

The other branch of the Church, the secular clergy, was a top-heavy bureaucratic apparatus with less landed property than the religious orders, but with almost the same amount of wealth, mainly derived from tithes. The tithes taxes were collected and administered by the Church hierarchy, the bishops and their assistants. In this way they exercised pecuniary control over all subordinate sectors of the secular clergy. In 1797 the

²¹ The clergy was a privileged class in many ways. Pascual Madoz calculated that at the beginning of the 19th century the average consumption of meat by the clergy was 184 pounds per man per year, or 8 and one half times more than the average Spaniard. MOREAU DE JONNES, *Estadística de España*, translation and notes by Pascual Madoz (Barcelona, 1835), p. 150. For more information on the Spanish clergy in the 18th century see references in the historical works of A. Domínguez Ortiz, Jean Sarrailh and Pierre Vilar.

²² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1844, Vol. 47, Accounts and Papers 16, p. 87. Includes a brief summary of properties of the Church at the beginning of the 19th century.

²³ RAMÓN MESONERO ROMANOS, *Manual de Madrid en 1831* (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Madrid, 1967), p. 20.

secular clergy consisted of 16,841 parish priests, 17,411 beneficed priests, 18,699 patrimonial priests, 18,600 in minor orders, and 2,393 canons. The secular clergy was clearly more concentrated in urban than rural areas. The enormous personnel of the cathedrals is symptomatic of the bureaucratic structure of the Church as a whole. In 1821, for instance, the Cathedral of Toledo had 14 "dignidades", 40 "canónigos", 50 "racioneros", and 33 "capellanes de coro". In the same year there were more than 150 ecclesiastics attached to the Royal Court at Madrid, including 40 "individuos superiores", (confessors, counsellors, administrator), 62 "predicadores al Rey", 25 "predicadores honorarios", and 25 "oficiales de la Párrquia Ministerial del Real Palacio"²⁵. This huge ecclesiastical bureaucracy obviously could serve little productive purpose, but its very size gave the Church an enormous source of patronage.

The stability of the Spanish Catholic Church seemed unquestionable until 1808. The War of 1808-1814 shook the Church to its very foundations. Both the regular and secular clergy took up arms against the Napoleonic troops. As Wellington wrote, "The real power in Spain is the clergy. They kept the people right against France"²⁶. Cloistered friars became soldier monks and the parish priests of rural communities inflamed the peasantry against the "atheist" French soldiers. The Church had good reasons to lead the struggle. The Napoleonic generals made it policy to sack and destroy the Spanish monasteries and churches. Virtually every monastery in Madrid, for instance, was damaged or destroyed during the French occupation; (the convents of the nuns were not attacked so systematically)²⁷. During the War the regular orders lost the larger part of their great herds, as well as much of their capital invested in agriculture. In many regions, furthermore, the peasantry refused to pay the tithe taxes any longer. The result was a rapid impoverishment of the clergy.

The reestablishment of the absolute monarchy in 1814 marked the beginning of an ecclesiastical campaign to restore the power of the Church. The King, Ferdinand VII collaborated in this task by helping to repair and rebuild the monasteries of Madrid and other cities²⁸. The Inquisition was reestablished and a fierce repressive campaign against the Liberals initiated. Throughout his reign (1814-1833), many of Ferdinando VII's closest counsellors were priests. During the brief interlude of constitutional government (1820-23), however, the disentailment and sale of monastic properties commenced and the Inquisition was abolished. These measures created great consternation among the regular clergy, and many participated in the armed insurrection of 1822-23 against the Liberal government. They were soon aided by 100,000 French troops who marched into Spain under the leadership of the Duke of Angouleme to eliminate the Liberals and the return the absolute throne to Ferdinand VII.

²⁴ RAYMOND CARR, *Spain 1808-1939*, p. 47. Cites statistics from the Census of 1797.

²⁵ *Estado eclesiástico de España del año 1821*.

²⁶ RAYMOND CARR, *Spain 1808-1939*, p. 45.

²⁷ R. MESONERO ROMANOS, *Manual de Madrid en 1831*, pp. 57-67.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

But the clergy was not satisfied. Don Jerónimo Castellón y Salas, former Inquisitor General and Bishop of Tarazona, returned from exile to Spain and demanded the reestablishment of the Inquisition. He declared: "I should state as Bishop and Counsellor of State that Catholicism and the independence of Spain are dependent upon (the restoration of) the Inquisition"²⁹. According to the historian Luis Alonso Tejada, this attitude was shared by the rest of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Tejada writes: "It can be said that in the historical circumstances of the restoration of absolutism in 1823, the Spanish Church... considered the Inquisition not as the remedy against evil doctrine and books, but, above all, as the chosen instrument to conserve the monolithic religious and political unity of all Spaniards under the legitimate and absolute throne..."³⁰.

Thus after 1823 religion and politics became increasingly indistinguishable. The exiled Liberals attributed the evils of Spanish society to the excesses of the Church. The clergy turned to right wing terrorism in order to eliminate the Liberals. The result was a rapid political polarization. The degree of politization among the Spanish clergy was remarkable. Documentary evidence indicates that the ecclesiastics, instigated and participated in a great number of clandestine right wing terrorist organizations between 1823 and 1833³¹. Organization like that of the "Exterminating Angel" or of "The Conception", composed of ultraroyalists and ecclesiastics were instrumental in the reactionary rebellion of 1827 in Catalonia³². This alliance between fanatic royalists and ecclesiastics would soon lead to the birth of Carlism. By 1833 the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the regular clergy were either Carlists or had Carlist sympathies. The Spanish Church was determined to defend the traditional order: the absolute monarchy, feudal privileges, and religious intolerance.

THE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BOURGEOISIE

The Spanish commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of 1830 was not comparable to those of France or England. Spanish industry was in its infancy and commerce was not as prosperous as it had been in the late 18th century. The War of 1808-1814 and the loss of the American colonies had dealt a major blow to Spanish merchants and industrialists; they lost considerable capital and a major market at a particularly crucial moment in the process of economic development. Only after 1820 did the Spanish economy begin once again to expand, foreign trade to increase, and the Catalan textile industry to revive³³. During the last six years of the reign

²⁹ LUIS ALONSO TEJADA, *Ocaso de la Inquisición en los últimos años del reinado de Fernando VII* (Madrid, 1969), p. 56.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-122, and many other pages.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

³³ There is a lack of historical studies on Spanish economic conditions in the first forty years of the 19th century. Among the few historians who have done work in this field are Jaime Vicéns Vives and J. Fontana Lázaro, but many more studies are needed.

of Ferdinand VII, (1814-1833), the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie experienced a period of modest prosperity.

Spanish commercial activity in 1830 was concentrated in the coastal provinces and consisted primarily of import/export commerce and the coasting trade. The most dynamic centers were the Mediterranean and southern ports of Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Málaga, Sanlúcar and Cádiz. An important part of this trade was in the hands of British merchants, who dealt heavily in contraband textiles, (cheap manufactured linen and cotton goods). There was also considerable trade with merchants and shippers of other nationalities, notably French, Sardinian, German, Danish, North American and Russian³⁴. The local Spanish merchants controlled only a part of the export of agricultural and mineral commodities: wine, brandy, wool, fruits, cork, wheat, lead, copper and mercury.

There was far less trade in the interior of the peninsula, (Castile, Extremadura, Aragon), with the exception of certain commercially active cities like Madrid, Zaragoza, and Valladolid. In 1830 there were a total of approximately 26,000 merchants in Spain: 7,000 "comerciantes por mayor" (wholesalers with fairly large establishments), and 19,000 "comerciantes por menor" (lesser traders and shopowners)³⁵. (These numbers do not include street or itinerant vendors, artisans who sold their own products, etc.) The low number of individuals engaged in commercial activities suggests the lack of commercialization and backward state of the Spanish economy. Most of the trade in agricultural products, furthermore, was monopolised in each town and district by a few landlords and merchants, by the Church and by the State. Since the exchange of agricultural goods was controlled by this class of "oligopolists", (as the historian Gonzalo Anes calls them), the accumulation of independent commercial capital was markedly slow³⁶. The Spanish merchant class of 1830 was concentrated in the littoral ports and primarily dependent upon the export/import trade rather than upon an extensive interregional commerce.

The institutional character of the commercial groups was antiquated. Up until 1830, most of the wholesalers, ("comerciantes por mayor"), were members of the *Consulados*, a type of traditional chamber of commerce, which served both as a mercantile court and as a monopolist guild of the chief merchants of a given city. The *Guía Mercantil de 1829*, (Mercantile Guide of 1829), provides detailed information on those commercial organs, their membership, organization and activities³⁷. A medium-sized *Consu-*

³⁴ *Balanza del comercio de España con nuestras Américas y las potencias extranjeras en 1827*, Junta de Aranceles (Madrid, 1831).

³⁵ See statistics in MOREAU DE JONNES, *Estadística de España* (Barcelona, 1835). Also see speech by Pascual Madoz in the Chamber of Deputies, of May 28, 1838, *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1838, p. 2552.

³⁶ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, *Las crisis agrarias en la España moderna* (Madrid, 1970).

³⁷ The *Guía Mercantil de España, Año de 1829*, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1829), is one of the richest sources for the commercial history of Spain in the 1820's. All information on the "Consulados" that is contained in this chapter derives from this source. The *Guía* also has some information on industry. A detailed analysis

lado was that of Alicante, a port which specialized in the export of Castilian agricultural products. There were registered at this *Consulado* in 1829=21 landowners, 29 merchants, 24 "mercaderes" (smaller merchants), 3 industrialists, 5 shipowners, 13 private merchant houses or companies, 13 foreign commercial houses, and 12 brokers. The *Consulado* was administered by a governing body called the "Junta de Gobierno", composed of 10 individuals, including members from each economic sector. The *Consulado* was clearly representative of the merchant class of the Spanish cities, as well as of many landowners directly involved in trade.

Among the other Mediterranean or southern cities were the *Consulados* of Barcelona, Mallorca, Valencia, Málaga, Granada, Seville, Sanlúcar and Cádiz. An important one was that of Barcelona: it included 148 merchants, 53 Royal brokers, and 15 and 31 merchants, respectively, from the nearby cities of Tarragona and Reus. The largest *Consulado* in the south was that of Cádiz, which included 259 "comerciantes por mayor", 59 landowners from Cádiz, 69 "mercaderes", 29 private merchant houses, and 61 brokers. Also listed were 41 landowners and 39 merchants from Jerez. Cádiz, which had been the richest Spanish port in the 18th century, had been hard hit by the loss of the trade with the Spanish American colonies, but it still carried on an extensive export/import trade. The export of the sheries of Jerez to the English markets was a major factor in the prosperity of the province. Among the local merchant-landowners who controlled the Sherry trade were numerous families of Irish and English origin, long established in Cádiz. The leading sherry exporters in the 1830's were the establishments of William Oldham, Pedro Domecq, Beigbeder and Co., Gordon and Co., Manuel María de Mora, Patrick Garvey, etc.³⁸ In many other regions of Spain, foreign merchants also played a major role, but in very few did they become important agriculturalists as they did in Cádiz.

On the northern sea-coast there were four major *Consulados*, those of Coruña, Santander, Bilbao and San Sebastián. Coruña was the largest of the four, with 33 landowners, 67 merchants, 20 "mercaderes", 8 shipowners and 6 industrialists. There were also two important commercial centers in the interior of northern Castile, namely Burgos and Valladolid. The information provided by the *Guía Mercantil de 1829* on the *Consulado* of Valladolid gives a detailed picture of its commerce. There were 6 merchants specialized in the sale of silk cloth, 10 merchants who sold Catalan textiles, 2 wholesalers of pharmaceutical products, 3 of packaged of imported foods, 3 of hardware, 12 of fine linens and flannels, 4 of baize cloth, 2 of iron goods, and 2 of German products, (owned by the local German merchant houses of Bayer, Muller and Co. and Wenceslao Yarve and Co.). The sale of textiles was clearly the most important commercial activity;

of the commercial and industrial data would provide a major contribution to early 19th century economic history. The only copy that I know of and which I consulted is in the Ticknor Collection of the Boston Public Library.

³⁸ See article "Statistics of Cádiz", in the *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, vol. I, 1839, p. 351.

it should be remarked that the merchants and wholesalers listed above were the provisioners not only of the city of Valladolid, but probably also of the entire surrounding region. The small number of merchants bespeaks the weakness of that class. In any comparable rural city of 25,000 inhabitants of German, France, or England in 1830, there would have been a much more numerous and prosperous commercial class than that found in the Castilian cities.

The merchants listed in the Spanish *Consulados* of 1829 were the wealthiest sector of the commercial class. The 500 merchants registered at the *Consulado* of Madrid were most likely the wealthiest men of Castile after the *Grandees*. They handled significant amounts of capital, controlled the provisioning of the capital and of the Army, and often lent the government money. Their possibilities for commercial expansion were limited, nonetheless, by the lack of commercialization of Spanish agriculture, by bad roads, and by an antiquated tax and duty system. Each province continued to have its own customs duties and each major city exorbitant taxes on the most basic articles of daily consumption³⁹.

Within the limits of the Spanish economy there were only two major sources for the accumulation of commercial capital. One was in the export/import trade; the other was in government contracts for the provisioning of Madrid and of the Army. One of the wealthiest men in Spain in 1830 was Gaspar Remisa; he had made his fortune as the principal Army provisioner in the 1820's. He was originally a Catalan merchant who had become rich during the War of 1808-1814 by supplying the city of Barcelona with food products⁴⁰. After 1823 he became the official provisioner to the Spanish Army and in 1829 he was a member of the ruling council of the Ministry of Finances; he was also personally in charge of the Office of the Royal Treasury⁴¹. There were other merchants who made their fortune by victualling the city of Madrid with wheat, oil, wine, meat and other necessary commodities. There is unfortunately little information on their activities on account of the lack of biographical and economic studies.

Numerous merchants who specialized in the export/import trade also were able to accumulate considerable quantities of capital. In the 18th century a great part of the import/export trade had been in the hands of commercial companies like the *Real Compañía de la Habana*, the *Compañía de Filipinas*, the *Real Compañía de Guipúzcoa*, and the *Real Compañía de los Cinco Gremios Mayores*. The War of 1808-1814 and the abrupt stop in the trans-Atlantic trade, however, led to their decline. Two of these companies still functioned actively in Madrid in 1830, but they never regained their former prosperity. Foreign merchants played an in-

³⁹ The chief tax on food consumption in the cities was the "derecho de puertas", legally binding in 73 cities and towns. For more information see "Memoria de Luis López Ballesteros sobre Hacienda", in *Documentos del reinado de Fernando VII*, vol. 6, pt. 3 (Pamplona, 1970), pp. 58-64.

⁴⁰ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, p. 190.

⁴¹ *Guía Mercantil de España, Año de 1829*, vol. I, p. 521.

creasingly important role after the War, particularly as shippers, although a good part of the Spanish trade remained in the hands of native merchants. A few of the latter were prosperous enough to even establish merchant houses outside of the peninsula in France. There was a considerable Spanish commercial community in the city of Bordeaux in southern France. An individual example of an enterprising merchant was Alejandro Aguado, who set up his commercial operations in Paris in 1814 in order to import the fruits of Andalusia⁴². His wealth and financial contacts allowed him to become the royal agent of Ferdinand VII for the Spanish foreign debt after 1823. By arranging the sale of the new bonds of foreign debt in the European financial markets, "valued at more than 2,000 million "reales" between 1823 and 1833), Aguado soon became one of the richest bankers in Paris⁴³. No Spanish merchant (who remained in the peninsula) was able to acquire a fortune even remotely comparable; this is an index of the difficulties the Spanish merchant class faced in accumulating large amounts of capital.

The Spanish commercial bourgeoisie of 1830 was not strong but weak, as compared to the late 18th century, or as compared to the equivalent classes of other European nations. The Spanish merchants no longer had either the large colonial markets or the sources of gold and silver bullion that they had enjoyed in the previous century. They had also lost the greater part of their mercantile fleet and were heavily dependent upon foreign shipping. The increase in contraband trade after 1808 brought the increasing competition of British and French merchants. Only the growth of the Spanish economy after 1820 allowed the native commercial sectors to hold their own.

Spanish industrialists were in a similar situation to that of the merchants. The only large and fairly advanced branch of manufacturing production in Spain was the textile industry of Catalonia. In the 18th century the textile production of Barcelona, Reus, Manresa and other nearby towns had grown rapidly and exported heavily to the colonies. The War of 1808-1814 resulted in the loss of capital and of those important markets. Furthermore, from 1808 British and French industrialists inundated Spain with contraband cloth, from cheap Manchester cottons to expensive Lyon silks. The extreme protectionist policies adopted by the Spanish government after 1825 helped defend Catalan industry and allowed it to grow, but smuggling continued to absorb a huge part of the Spanish markets.

Outside of Catalonia there was little concentrated industry. There was a considerable production of silk cloth in the city of Valencia, but manufacturing methods were antiquated and French competition strong. Another smaller industrial center was the town of Alcoy in Alicante. By 1836 there were 87 textile factories in Alcoy, employing more than 10,000 wor-

⁴² See article titled "Alejandro Aguado", in NICOMEDES PASTOR DÍAZ, *Galería de Españoles Célebres*, vol. I, entrega 2 (Madrid, 1844).

⁴³ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Coyuntura Económica y Reformismo Burgués* (Barcelona, 1968), p. 21.

kers, and 70 small paper mills⁴⁴. In Málaga and Seville several prosperous merchants used their capital to establish a number of large iron foundries with blast furnaces. The first such modern establishment was founded in Málaga in 1832 by Manuel Heredia, a wealthy merchant who copied English industrial methods. The Málaga iron foundries, however, remained the only large establishments of their kind in Spain for almost thirty years⁴⁵. There were many small and primitive foundries in Basque provinces, but they produced extremely small quantities of iron, by English or French standards. The largest manufacturing establishments in Spain were actually the State-owned tobacco factories of Cádiz, Seville, Madrid and other cities. In 1830 the Madrid factory, alone, employed more than 2,000 workers, mostly women⁴⁶. The factories had been founded in the 18th century; the sale of tobacco was a State monopoly and continued to be one of the major sources of government revenue throughout the 19th century.

The limited character of Spanish industrialization did not then allow for the development of an industrial bourgeoisie except in Catalonia. Here textile manufacturing was well established and was gradually modernized with the importation of the newest machinery. In the mid-1830's there were some 800 cotton textile factories in Barcelona, employing 25,000 workers. In the rest of Catalonia there were approximately 75,000 workers employed in cotton manufactures⁴⁷. There was also a significant production of silks in the cities of Reus and Manresa. It should be observed, however, that the size of these industrial establishments tended to be quite small. The majority of the textile factories in Catalonia had but from 10 to 30 workers. (In the rest of Spain the so-called industrial establishments were even smaller, having an average of 5 to 10 workers)⁴⁸. An exception was the huge metalurgical and machine factory established in 1832 by the textile capitalists Bonaplata and Vilaregut with considerable financial assistance from the government. At its height in 1835, it was said to employ the incredible number of 6,000 workers. The factory, however, was burned to the ground in that year by radical workers and artisans, ending the first important and truly modern industrial experiment in early 19th century Spain.

The growth of the Catalan textile industry in the 1820's allowed for the consolidation of a local industrial bourgeoisie. According to the historian Vicéns Vives, among the 337 industrialists listed in the Census of 1829, there were the names of virtually all the chief families of modern

⁴⁴ See information on industry in the *Guía del Ministerio de la Gobernación, 1836* (Madrid, 1836).

⁴⁵ JORDÍ NADAL, "Los comienzos de la industrialización española (1832-1868): La Industria Siderúrgica", in *Ensayos sobre la Economía española a mediados del siglo XIX*, p. 224.

⁴⁶ R. MESONEROS ROMANOS, *Guía de Madrid en 1831*, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁷ See *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación, 1836*.

⁴⁸ This information is derived from the sections on industry contained in both the *Guía Mercantil de España, Año de 1829*, and the *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación, 1836*.

Catalan industry. Among the leaders in 1830 were such men as Nicolás Tou, Valentín Esparó, Margín Coromines, Pablo Muntadas, José Bonaplata, Pablo Vilaregut and Juan Cortés⁴⁹. There was no comparable group of industrialists in the rest of Spain. The development of a *national* industrial bourgeoisie would only come decades later.

As in many European nations of the first half of the 19th century, two economic doctrines divided the Spanish industrial and commercial classes⁵⁰. The Catalan industrialists favored protection; the merchants of the Mediterranean ports and particularly of Cádiz, favored free trade. The Catalans were proteccionists because they feared the competition of the huge contraband trade in British and French textiles. The merchants of Cádiz were free traders because they were economically bound to British markets, and also because proteccionist policies tended to limit legal foreign commerce. During the last decade of the reign of Ferdinand VII, (that is between 1823-and 1833), the Spanish government carried out a contradictory commercial policy, which tended, generally, to favor the protectionist interests. In 1825 the government approved a tariff which was extremely restrictive; in 1829, on the other hand, they declared Cádiz a free port; this last decree was, however, revoked, in 1830. Neither the industrialists nor the merchants determined economic policy. They did influence it, but the weakness and regional character of both groups did not allow either to wield decisive power.

THE FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE AT MADRID

The economic policies of the government of Ferdinand VII were actually determined by a small financial/administrative elite centered in Madrid, and led by Luis López Ballesteros, the Finance Minister between 1823 and 1832. This key group of men controlled the few but important commercial and financial institutions of Madrid as well as the chief economic organs of the government. They were also closely linked to French capitalists, who subscribed most of the new foreign loans of those years. There are no modern studies of this small and important Madrid elite, yet it is essential to have a summary idea of who they were and how they acted in order to understand the political process in the last years of the absolute monarchy.

Ferdinand VII named Luis López Ballesteros Minister of Finances in December of 1823. Ballesteros was a capable administrator who carried out a series of fundamental reforms including the re-organization of the tax system, the modernization of the book-keeping methods of the economic administration, the creation of the Office of the Public Debt, the creation of the Bank of San Fernando and of the Madrid stock exchange⁵¹.

⁴⁹ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, p. 191.

⁵⁰ There is no adequate study of this topic in the literature on Spanish economic history, despite its importance.

⁵¹ NATALIO RIVAS, *Luis López Ballesteros, gran ministro de Fernando VII* (Madrid, 1945).

Between 1823 and 1832, Ballesteros obtained a series of important loans through the issue and sale of new bonds of the Spanish foreign debt in the financial markets of Paris and Amsterdam. These loans were the key to the solvency and credit of the government of Ferdinand VII, for without them the monarchy would have been absolutely bankrupt. The banker who arranged the sale of the bonds was Alejandro Aguado, established in Paris. Ballesteros had a close working relationship with Aguado throughout his Ministry; he depended upon Aguado to get the important European bankers to support the bond sales; Aguado, in turn, depended upon Ballesteros to provide him with ever bigger and more lucrative bond operations.

In order to obtain credit for each new foreign loan, Ballesteros was obliged to guarantee regular interest payments on the previous loans. To do so he had to make sure that the necessary amounts of money would be allocated from the government revenues to pay the interest due. He thus was forced to establish the first annual budgets of the Spanish administration⁵². But he also had to get the support of important commercial and financial interests for his policies. The historian Vicéns Vives suggests that the tariff of 1825, which prohibited the import of foreign wheat and textiles, provided the Finance Minister with the support of the leading representatives of two important groups: the Catalan textile manufacturers and the Castilian wheat producers. "The close relations of Gaspar Remisa, Javier de Burgos and the Duque de Sotomayor in the last years of the reign of Ferdinand VII tend to demonstrate this..."⁵³. Remisa represented Catalan interests at Madrid; Burgos was a high government functionary, and the Duque de Sotomayor was a leading Castilian wheat producer. In 1831 these three men, jointly with Alejandro Aguado, founded the company for the construction of the Canal of Castile. Another indication of the tacit alliance worked out between these industrial and agricultural interests is to be found in the publications of the Commission of the Factories of Catalonia, one of which stated: "The cotton textile producers have always maintained the principle of not injuring the agricultural provinces. This was the reason for having supported the prohibition of the import of foreign cereals, preferring the consumption of those of national origin, although they are somewhat more expensive"⁵⁴.

Among the key members of the financial/administrative elite of Madrid, we have already mentioned Ballesteros, Gaspar Remisa, Javier de Burgos, the Duque de Sotomayor, and in Paris, Alejandro Aguado. Other important men were: Grandees, such as the Marqués de Casa Irujo, the

⁵² There were no budgets of any kind until the year 1790, when an outline of government expenses was published, but this was suspended between 1791 and 1809. During the "Cortes of Cádiz", 1810-1814, attempts were made to formulate budgets, as well as during the period 1814-1820. More detailed budgets were first presented to the Liberal "Cortes" of 1820-23, but it was only after 1826 that annual budgets were published regularly. See "Memoria de Luis López Ballesteros sobre Hacienda" in *Documentos del reinado de Fernando VII*, 6, pt. 3 (Pamplona, 1970).

⁵³ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, p. 157.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

Conde de Ofalía, and the Marqués de Casa Lozano; wealthy merchants and financiers such as Julián Aquilino Pérez and Andrés Caballero; important functionaries and military officers like Victoriano Encina y Piedra (director of the Office of Public Debt), José María Puig Samper (member of the Council of Castile), and General Francisco Javier Aspiroz. Many of the members of this elite had important positions both in commercial/financial institutions and in the government. Several of the Grandees had, as we noted previously, substantial commercial interests; they also served in the capacity of Ministers or high functionaries at different times between 1823 and 1833. Some of the government functionaries likewise were independently wealthy and involved in commerce or agriculture. They were all men with a "bourgeois" outlook on life, although historically they functioned within the superstructure of a decaying absolute monarchy.

An index of the economic inter-connections of the elite can be found in their control of the few existing financial/commercial institutions of Madrid⁵⁵. It must be recalled that the Spanish capital of 1830 was but a provincial hamlet beside the expanding economic metropolis of London, Paris or Amsterdam. There was only one bank and no stock exchange in Madrid until 1831. The only significant economic institutions were the *Banco de San Fernando*, the *Compañía de Empresas Varias*, the *Compañía de los Cinco Gremios Mayores*, the *Compañía de Filipinas*, the *Compañía de la Habana*, and the *Mesta*.

The *Banco Español de San Fernando* was founded on July 9, 1829. It was authorised to print official paper money and served as the government bank. The Bank was set up under the supervision of Ballesteros, and was initially backed up financially by Alejandro Aguado, who made an advance payment of 40 million "reales"⁵⁶. The presiding director in 1829 was Andrés Caballero, one of the wealthiest of the Madrid merchants; other directors were Julián Aquilino Pérez and the Marqués de Casa Irujo, both of whom were in turn directors of the *Compañía de Empresas Varias*⁵⁷. This company, founded in 1828, was one of the first joint-stock companies of 19th century Spain; it began by establishing three factories at Madrid, one producing textiles, the others making varnish and alabaster; it also set up a carriage renting service. Other directors were Manuel Rufino González, leading member of the Ministry of Finances, and Francisco Javier de Burgos, who was president of the Royal Board for Economic Progress. Javier de Burgos also served as the intermediary between Ballesteros and Aguado. He was sent to Paris in 1823 to arrange the first important loan subscribed by the French capitalists. He was privately wealthy and had made investments in agriculture; in 1830 he set up the first sugar mills of Spain in Motril, Granada⁵⁸.

⁵⁵ The information on these inter-connections is derived chiefly from the *Guía Mercantil de España, año de 1829*.

⁵⁶ See article titles "Alejandro Aguado", in NICOMEDES PASTOR DÍAZ, *Galería de españoles célebres*.

⁵⁷ *Guía Mercantil de España, año de 1829*.

⁵⁸ PASCUAL MADDOZ, *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico e histórico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar*, vol. VIII (Madrid, 1848), p. 483.

Another important commercial institution was the *Real Compañía de Filipinas*. The president was none other than the Minister López Ballesteros. Other directors were General Francisco Javier Aspiroz and the Conde de Ofalía. The *Real Compañía de los Cinco Gremios* was directed by José María Puig Samper, a high government official, who also happened to be president of the *Mesta*⁵⁹. Samper thus had a position at the highest levels of an important merchant institution, of the royal administration, and of the oldest and most prestigious organization of the aristocratic sheepowners.

The Madrid elite was small but powerful. The overlap in the key financial and administrative positions suggests the kinds of inter-connections and close personal relations that existed between the different members⁶⁰. They were, ideologically, moderate Royalists who wished to modernise Spain gradually. It was in this elite that the French capitalists put their faith when they bought the Spanish bonds of 1823-33. (No Paris banker would have given the Spanish government a loan if the ultra-reactionaries (later Carlists) had controlled the Ministry of Finances.) It was this elite which stimulated the first modern financial institutions of the capital, the bank, the stock exchange, and joint-stock companies⁶¹. Because of their strategic positions these men had more concentrated political/financial power than any other economic group, be they Catalan industrialists, Catalan wheat producers, or Cádiz merchants. The elite supported Ballesteros throughout his Ministry (1823-1832), and in 1832-33 they supported his successors Cea Bermúdez and Javier de Burgos. In 1833 they played a crucial role in support of the Queen-Regent, María Cristina, and in opposition to the Carlists. They permitted the return of the Liberals and the institutionalization of the parliamentary system of government. Between 1834 and 1836, however, they rapidly lost most of their political power. They were, after all, but a small elite, without the support of large masses. The new governing elite after 1834, the Liberals, on the other hand, had the combined support of the commercial/professional bourgeoisie and of the artisans.

THE LIBERALS: SPANISH INTELLIGENTSIA IN EXILE

An important part of the Spanish bourgeoisie of 1823-33 was in exile⁶². The exiles were the Liberals, who had been forced to leave the peninsula after having been the protagonists of a three-year experiment in parlia-

⁵⁹ *Guía Mercantil de España, año de 1829*.

⁶⁰ The three directors of the Junta to supervise the Free Port of Cádiz in the year 1829, for instance, were Ballesteros, Casa Irujo, and Victoriano Encina y Piedra.

⁶¹ They also helped Bonaplata set up the first modern machine producing factory in Barcelona in 1831-33. See PASCUAL MADDOZ, *Diccionario Geográfico*, volumen III, p. 457.

⁶² For a history of the Spanish exiles in England between 1823-33 see the excellent study by VICENTE LLORÉNS, *Liberales y Románticos, Estudio de una emigración española en Inglaterra: 1823-1833* (Madrid, 1968).

mentary government in 1820-23. In 1820 the Spanish Army had led a rebellion against the absolute monarch Ferdinand VII and obliged him to accept constitutional government. For three years Ferdinand VII was a constitutional monarch and was forced to accept the dictates of a parliament made up of liberal deputies. In 1823, with the aid of 100,000 French troops, Ferdinand VII ended this parliamentary experiment and exiled the Liberals. Among the exiles were numerous military officers, government functionaries, intellectuals, doctors, merchants, and landowners. A majority of the Liberals went to England; a lesser number to France. They constituted a virtual "intelligentsia in exile". When Ferdinand VII died, an amnesty was proclaimed allowing them to return to the peninsula. By mid-1834 the Liberals had assumed most of the key positions within the government and Army hierarchy. The social analysis of this "intelligentsia" is therefore essential to understand the transition from absolute monarchy to parliamentary government in 1833-34.

There were actually two generations of Spanish Liberals. The first was that of the *Cortes* of 1810-1814, and the second younger generation was that of the constitutional government of 1820-23. A brief review of these two periods of parliamentary government is necessary to comprehend the origins of the Liberals. In early 1808 Napoleon obliged Ferdinand VII to leave Spain. Shortly thereafter French troops invaded the peninsula. The Spanish Army retreated towards the south, although it managed to win a few important battles. Resistance was widespread in the countryside and in the cities; in the rural areas the clergy and the peasantry led the struggle; in the cities, members of the middle classes and artisans fought against the invaders. By 1810, however, the only major city unsubdued by the French was the southern port of Cádiz. The Spanish government, under the direction of a three-man Regency, was established in Cádiz. There the Regency called for the reunion of the *Cortes*, the traditional Spanish parliament. More than 300 representatives from all Spain and Spanish America gathered together in Cádiz, and during more than three years led the struggle against the French, debated and legislated. They established the first liberal constitution of Spain, the Constitution of 1812; they formally abolished feudal practices, and they passed laws to reform the Church. This legislation was of great historical importance, but of limited practical effect. The government of José Bonaparte, established in Madrid, obviously did not recognize the patriots' reforms. Cádiz was an isolated outpost of Liberalism within a war-ravaged and occupied nation.

When the war ended in 1814 and Ferdinand VII returned to Spain, the Liberals found, much to their surprise, that they were attacked by the king whose monarchy they had helped save. All over Europe the end of the Napoleonic Wars led to the restoration of the power of the monarchy and of the Catholic Church. The Spanish King was determined to reestablish the absolute monarchy of his forefathers and the infamous symbol of the union of Crown and Church, the Inquisition. He abolished the *Cortes* and he persecuted the Liberals, many of whom left for France or England. For six years, (1814-1820), the first generation of Spanish

Liberals suffered exile, but in 1820 they returned to Spain, on the occasion of the reestablishment of parliamentary government.

A whole younger generation of military officers, intellectuals, merchants, etc., joined the ranks of the Liberal cause in the period of the parliamentary experiment of 1820-23. The Constitution of 1812 was again proclaimed, and the Inquisition again abolished. Many of the Ministers and high government functionaries of 1820-23 were men like Agustín Argüelles and Martínez de la Rosa, famous orators of the *Cortes* of 1810-1814. But younger men like Francisco Javier Istúriz and Juan Alvarez Mendizábal also had distinguished positions in the parliament. The three years of constitutional government were a period of experimentation for the Spanish Liberals. They held a virtual monopoly of political power, although technically the King Ferdinand VII had to approve all new laws and appoint all Ministers. The Liberals of 1820-23, however, only exercised real power in the major cities and particularly in Madrid; they had few followers in the rural areas. Numerous political factions proliferated in the capital, ranging from moderate royalism to several brands of republicanism, carbonarism, etc. The conflicts among these factions caused splits in the parliament and divisions among the Madrid Liberals. These divisions severely debilitated the constitutional experiment.

The major reason for the failure of the parliamentary government of 1820-23 was economic. The drastic reforms of the tax system did not produce an increase in State revenues; on the contrary, they caused an enormous deficit. In accord with contemporary liberal economic doctrine, the deputies passed legislation abolishing the State-run tobacco and salt monopolies and they eliminated the "derechos de puertas" and other taxes on consumption. The government, however, was not able to implement new taxes on landed property. The result was that in 1821 there was a large deficit, and in the following year a catastrophic drop in revenue. Foreign loans did not solve the fiscal problems. The Liberals had moved too quickly, without either sufficient control or understanding of the way the traditional administration functioned. The tobacco and salt monopolies, as well as the taxes on consumption, had always provided a great part if not the bulk of the government revenues⁶³. Their elimination gratified a few groups, especially the free traders of Cádiz, but led to government bankruptcy.

In 1822-23 right wing rebellions broke out all over Spain. The ill-paid Army could not contain them. Simultaneously at the Congress of Verona, the major European powers of France, Prussia, Austria and Russia decided to intervene in Spain and reestablish the absolute monarchy. When 100,000 French troops marched into the peninsula in 1823, the Spanish Army and the constitutional government collapsed. Thousands of Liberals went into exile, chiefly to England.

⁶³ In 1828, when the salt and tobacco monopolies had been reestablished, they produced almost 30% of the total government revenues. For a brief discussion of the problem see "Memoria de Luis López Ballesteros", in *Documentos del reinado de Fernando VII*, 6, pt. 3, pp. 68-80.

Between 1823 and 1833 there were almost 10,000 Spanish Liberals in exile. They consisted primarily of the deputies, functionaries and military officers who had served in the government of 1820-23. There were also numerous merchants, intellectuals, and landowners identified with the liberal cause. Many of these individuals found a refuge in London; the British government provided some with small pensions⁶⁴. Among the best known were Alvaro Flórez Estrada, José Canga Argüelles, José Joaquín de Mora, Agustín Argüelles, Evaristo San Miguel, and Antonio Alcalá Galiano. They wrote in British journals, frequented the homes of British politicians, taught Spanish in private schools, and set up small shops. Some individuals like Juan Alvarez Mendizábal established contacts with British financiers and set up their own commercial houses in London. Other Spanish Liberals lived in Paris. Martínez de la Rosa, the Conde de Toreno and Francisco Javier Istúriz became friends of the leading French Liberals, François Guizot, Benjamín Constant, and others. Finally, a few Spaniards emigrated to the Americas. The military officer Miguel Cabrera de Navares, for example, went to New York in 1823 where he taught Spanish at the university⁶⁵. On the occasion of the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, he returned to Spain, as did virtually all of the several thousand Spanish Liberals in exile.

A social analysis of the large group of exiles is necessary to understand their position within (and without) Spanish society. Fortunately there is adequate statistical and historical data to do so. The Liberals were essentially "bourgeois", members of the commercial and professional classes, military officers, public employees and some landed gentry. The statistics of the professions of the deputies of 1820-22 and 1822-23 give a good idea of the social stratification. (See Chart II.) Among the deputies from landholding families were Cano Manuel of Chinchilla, (Albacete), Gómez Becerra of Badajoz, Olózaga of Logroño, the Calatravas of Badajoz, Alejandro Mon, Pedro Pidal and the Conde de Toreno from Asturias. Among the representatives of Basque commerce and finance were such men as Joaquín María Ferrer and Martín de los Heros. From industrial Barcelona come Salvato and Doménech. From Valencia, the merchants Manuel and Vicente Bertrán de Lis, and from Cádiz, Istúriz, Mendizábal, Alcalá Galiano, etc.

Although the exiles were originally from many different towns and regions, there were two areas which produced a disproportionate number of Liberals: Cádiz and Asturias. The men of Cádiz were chiefly merchants; those of Asturias medium-sized landowners with university degrees. In a sense, these two groups define the social characteristics of many of the Spanish Liberals of the first half of the 19th century. The ideological origins of Liberalism in both Asturias and Cádiz were based on the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment in each respective region during the previous century. A clear connection can be established between the 18th century reform-minded predecessors and their 19th century Li-

⁶⁴ See V. LLORÉNS, *Liberales y Románticos...*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

CHART 2

The Deputies of 1820-22 and 1822-23 by Profession:

Class	Deputies	
	1820-22	1822-23
Landowners, merchants and men of independent wealth	45	61
State employees and military officers	69	60
Ecclesiastics	35	28
	149	149

(From F. Caballero, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*. 1836. Madrid, p. xxxiv.)

The Deputies of 1822-23

Títulos	3
Hacendados	60
Comerciantes	17
Militares	28
Empleados públicos	57
Párrocos	9
Dignidades eclesiásticas	18
Profesores de ciencias	17
Abogados	30
Magistrados	3
	232

These figures include the 149 deputies from the Spanish peninsula and 83 deputies from the Spanish American possessions.

(From *Ocios de los españoles emigrados*, vol. 3, p. 220-221. London 1825. Copy in Widener Library.)

beral successors⁶⁶. Economic reform was perhaps the chief concern in both regions. The result was that the Asturian and Cádiz Liberals formulated most of the economic ideas and reforms both in the *Cortes* of 1810-14, 1820-23, and the parliament of 1934-36. There were at least 10 Asturians who were Ministers between 1834 and 1844, and an almost equivalent number from Cádiz.

Already in the 18th century Asturias had produced a number of

⁶⁶ See ANTONIO ELORZA, *Economía e Ilustración* (Madrid, 1970).

distinguished economic thinkers, some of whom became Ministers of the King. The most famous were Gaspar de Jovellanos and Pedro de Campomanes. There were also other enlightened Asturians like Antonio Raimundo Ibáñez, Martín Flórez Estrada, and José Campillo y Cosío who invested their money in mining and manufacturing establishments, the first of their kind in the region⁶⁷. The sons of some of these became important Liberals; Alvaro Flórez Estrada, (son of Martín), for example, was a prominent Liberal and perhaps the most distinguished Spanish economist of the first half of the 19th century. He was a disciple of Jovellanos, as was another well-known economist, José Canga Argüelles. Both had studied at the Real Instituto Asturiano, founded by Jovellanos. The 18th century intellectual legacy was also evident in other Asturian Liberals such as Agustín Argüelles, the Conde de Toreno, Evaristo San Miguel, Alejandro Mon, Pedro Mata Vigil, Pedro José Pidal, José Posada Herrero, Rafael de Riego, etc.⁶⁸

A brief summary of the career of these men provides a picture of the prototype of the Asturian Liberal. The Asturian upper class consisted of a gentry which had relatively small landed properties. The principle of primogeniture was conserved to the end of the 18th century; consequently, the second and third sons of noble families usually took up a professional or military career. Traditionally they studied at the University of Oviedo. Almost all Asturian Liberals sprang from this background⁶⁹. Agustín Argüelles (1776-1843), for example, was the second son of an aristocrat of Ribadesella. He studied law at the University of Oviedo, and in 1800 was a government functionary at Madrid, specializing in foreign languages. He later became the best known orator of the *Cortes* of Cádiz, and the patriarch of Spanish Liberalism. Evaristo San Miguel (1785-1862) was the son of a landowning family and studied at the Real Instituto Asturiano and later at the University of Oviedo. In 1805 he entered the Army as a cadet. He became one of the most renowned generals and politicians of his epoch. Alejandro Mon was of a wealthy family. He studied philosophy and law at the University of Oviedo and was a member of the revolutionary Battalion of Students at the time of the revolution of 1820. He was exiled between 1823 and 1833; later in the 1840's, as Minister of Finances, he was destined to transform the Spanish economic administration. Pedro José Pidal, of an aristocratic family of few means, studied law at Oviedo and was also a member of the Battalion of Students of 1820. In 1822 he was a lawyer at Madrid, but a year later was forced into exile. In the 1830's and later years he would become a prominent figure in the Moderate party.

The Cádiz Liberals were men of a somewhat different stamp. They were mostly merchants involved in extensive international trade. The 18th

⁶⁷ J. E. CASARIEGO, *El Marqués de Sargadelos...*, pp. 31-40.

⁶⁸ See COSTANTINO SUÁREZ, *Diccionario biográfico de asturianos ilustres*, 8 volúmenes (Oviedo, 1946).

⁶⁹ Most of the biographical information in this paragraph is taken from SUÁREZ, *Diccionario...*

century had been the great period of the expansion of the commerce of Cádiz. This southern port monopolised most of the trade with the Spanish American colonies and carried on a lucrative wine trade with Great Britain. The many foreign merchants who lived in Cádiz brought the ideas of the enlightenment with them. The establishment of the *Cortes* at Cádiz in 1810 made the city the center of Spanish Liberalism during the Napoleonic war⁷⁰. Antonio Alcalá Galiano, Francisco Javier Istúriz, and Juan Alvarez Mendizábal were important Cádiz Liberals. The first sprung from a family with a long tradition in the Spanish Navy. The latter two came from prosperous merchant families, and they continued the family commercial concerns. All were in favor of free trade and were closely identified with British interests. The three participated actively in the government of 1820-23, but were later forced to emigrate. In the 1830's and 1840's they were among the chief political figures in Spain.

Typically, then, the Liberals of Cádiz and Asturias who were in exile between 1823 and 1833 were men of a high educational level and of a broad professional experience. Most of them spoke and read English and French. The Asturian Juan de la Dehesa translated the works of Edmund Burke into Spanish, while Antonio Alcalá Galiano wrote essays in English on Spanish literature for various British journals⁷¹. They were reform-minded men, who identified themselves with the European enlightenment, with the French revolution, and with the development of the industrial revolution. The Spanish Liberals acquired a capitalist ethic, regardless of whether they were landowners or merchants, military officers or lawyers. The exile of 1823-33 in France and England accentuated this tendency. They wished to reestablish the Constitution of 1812 and parliamentary government in Spain. They wanted to destroy the power of the Church and the feudal society it represented. They desired to encourage the development of the capitalist economy and to reform the State administration. The ten years of exile allowed the political and economic ideology of the Spanish Liberals to grow and to ripen. By the time of the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, they constituted a unified and highly capable political and intellectual elite. They were prepared to exercise power and they intended to do so. The Spanish intelligentsia was to become the political vanguard of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and of the anti-Carlist landed oligarchy after 1834.

THE ARTISANS AND URBAN WORKERS

The dominant form of manufacturing production in early 19th century Spain was artisanal. The artisans composed the largest sector of the urban work force. Most were members of guilds which monopolized the trade in each article in their respective town or city. The small vendors ("mer-

⁷⁰ See the excellent study by RAMÓN SOLÍS, *El Cádiz de las Cortes* (Madrid, 1958).

⁷¹ See V. LLORÉNS, *Liberales y Románticos...*

caederes por menor") which was a very extensive class, also had guilds; (on account of the extremely limited nature of their trade, most of these vendors would be considered a part of the artisanal or urban working group). Other urban workers were the servants, the water-carriers and post-boys, and the independent workers or "jornaleros" who were paid a day's wage for digging ditches and other similar tasks. Finally there was the factory proletariat, concentrated mostly in Barcelona, making up, however, only a small proportion of the total urban work force of the nation. As in most regions undergoing the slow process of expansion in textile manufacturing, a great number of the weavers and spinners in areas surrounding Barcelona worked at home and were essentially artisans tied down to a putting-out system of production. The concentration of all textile workers in the factories in the cities was progressing, but very far from complete in the Catalonia of 1830. In the rest of Spain the artisans constituted practically the absolute majority of the urban workers.

These groups played an important part in the political events after 1834, particularly in the numerous local and national rebellions of 1834-44. They were the Spanish "sans-culottes" of the period. Like the "sans-culottes" they followed the lead of the bourgeoisie because they did not have a class conscience nor were they organized politically as a class. Their ideology was a contradictory expression of both the progressive bourgeois forces and of the traditional grievances of the artisan groups. The factory workers and artisans joined in insurrections principally to protest against the high consumer's taxes to which all urban Spaniards were subject, and which, in times of crisis, raised food prices beyond the workers' capacities to pay.

Unfortunately there are practically no studies of 19th century artisans by historians of modern Spain. It is therefore essential to draw parallels from the historical studies of artisans in other European countries, in particular France. The noted historian of the Parisian "sans-culottes", Albert Soboul, has analyzed the mentality of the urban workers prior to the full development of industrial capitalism in the following way: "Divided between the dominant economy of artisans and the nascent large-scale industries, and lacking any class consciousness, how could the working world have opposed its conceptions to those of the bourgeoisie?... Economic evolution remained insufficient to give workers an awareness of the rank which they held in society as a group, and the place of labor as a function in society"⁷². The artisans who owned their own tools, and sometimes a shop, conceived of labor in terms of property. Their ideology was not fundamentally different from that of the more powerful bourgeoisie.

There were, in fact, few clear social differences between independent

⁷² A. SOBOUL, "Problems of Work in Year II", in *New Perspectives on the French Revolution*, edited by J. Kaplow (New York, 1965), 211-212. Also see ALBERT SOBOUL, *The Sans-Culottes, the Popular Movement and Revolutionary Government 1793-94* (Anchor, Books, New York, 1972).

artisans and small-scale entrepreneurs in both late 18th century France and early 19th century Spain. In the Spanish Census of 1797, and in documents of later years, the groups of "artesanos", "menestrales", and "fabricantes" are lumped together. The word "fabricante" could mean a small factory owner, or it could mean a wealthy artisan who had a large workshop. The confusion in this linguistic situation corresponded to the social reality. There was a real difference, however, between most artisans and the "fabricantes" or entrepreneurs. The "fabricante" did not do manual work himself. He had some liquid capital and a shop, and he hired workers. He sold his products directly to the consumer and was not bound by a guild nor necessarily bound to a middleman. The majority of the artisans, on the other hand, were dependent. "They worked at home under the control of the whole-sale merchants who supplied his raw materials and commercialized the manufactured product. The artisan owned his own stock of tools, he could even engage journeymen. Legally he was free and as the head of a business, he appeared as an employer. But economically he was only a salaried worker, dependent upon the wholesale merchant. The interests of the dependent artisan and journeyman were the same"⁷³. Many different words were used to describe the artisan or urban worker. In France the most popular word was "sans-culotte", referring to the type of dress of the urban worker. The Spanish equivalent expression of 1820 and later years was "descamisado", the shirtless one, because the average urban worker could not afford to buy the cotton or silk shirts that men of the middle classes wore. Other words used to designate artisans were "menestrales" or "artesanos", and to designate day laborers, "jornaleros", "operarios", or "miserables".

Within each artisanal guild there were three categories, apprentice, journeyman, and master artisan, "aprendiz", "oficial", and "maestro". These distinctions, as well as the actual institutions of the guilds continued in the early 19th century. Between 1814 and 1833 much legislation both for and against the guilds was decreed by the last absolute monarch, Ferdinand VII⁷⁴. Large merchants and industrialists attacked the larger and more powerful guilds. In the province of Barcelona, the Junta of Commerce carried on a campaign to limit artisanal production and exchange to circumscribed local areas⁷⁵. In 1823 there were 69 guilds in Barcelona. In 1835 there were still some 65, but after 1836 the dissolution of the guilds advanced rapidly. In 1842 the wealthiest Spanish guild association, the *Compañía de los Cinco Gremios Mayores*, was abolished. In 1845 the guild of small vendors ("mercaderes por menor") disappeared. The official records of most guilds tend to disappear all over the peninsula between 1830 and 1840⁷⁶.

The collapse of the guild system did not cause a decrease in the

⁷³ A. SOBOUL, "Problems of Work in Year II", p. 214.

⁷⁴ PEDRO M. RIBALTA, *Los gremios barceloneses del siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1969), p. 172.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 551-552.

number of artisans. Most artisans as well as the new capitalists were opposed to the old guild structures, which strictly defined the activities of the members, monopolized the local markets, and were often run by a small group of artisan-entrepreneurs in league with the wholesale merchants. The abolition of the guilds was a sociopolitical reform favored by most artisans and one that did not endanger their livelihood, chiefly because large-scale industrial production had not yet developed significantly and therefore did not offer serious competition.

Statistics from 1829 demonstrate the small size of most manufacturing enterprises and the large number of artisanal establishments. In that year there were approximately 8,300 workmen engaged in manufacturing in the city of Madrid. About 200 men were employed in small factories producing leather and silk products, pianos and beer. The average number of workers per "factory" was from 2 to 5. These were not necessarily artisanal establishments, but they were hardly more than small shops. Among the master artisans of Madrid there were 200 carpenters, 275 shoemakers, 170 tailors, 40 silversmiths, 34 chairmakers, etc. Each of these employed from 2 to 5 journeymen in his workshop⁷⁷.

Even in the more advanced industrial region of Spain, Catalonia, the size of the industrial establishments was not much larger than that of the artisans. In the bustling city of Reus the average factory employed 10 to 40 workers, and virtually every establishment was owned by a different individual⁷⁸. The textile capitalists of Reus were not artisans in any sense, but they were quite small entrepreneurs. Outside of the textile sector, most of the local manufacturing was in the hands of artisans. In 1829 there were in Reus 95 master artisans who were ropemakers, 141 sandalmakers, 150 master iron and locksmiths, 40 silversmiths, 60 building masons, 80 carpenters, 92 shoemakers, 84 tailors, and 500 bucket and barrel makers. In total there were more factory workers than artisans in Reus, but the artisanal mentality was still dominant among both groups.

There was clearly a greater proportional concentration of artisans and factory workers in Reus (a city of 30,000) than in Madrid (a city of 200,000). This fact is symptomatic of the contrast between the low level of manufacturing in the cities and provinces of the interior, as opposed to the relatively high level in the Spanish maritime provinces, particularly in the East and South. The towns and cities of Andalusia and of the Mediterranean coast, including Valencia and Catalonia were larger than the towns of the central plateau and of the north, excepting only Madrid. Likewise the number of artisans in the South and East was much greater. This is important because it was precisely in these regions where political radicalism was most prevalent throughout the period 1834-44 and much of the rest of the 19th century. The artisans formed the social basis of most of the local rebellions, "pronunciamientos", and "levantamientos". They formed the hotbed of advanced Liberalism and soon, of republicanism.

⁷⁷ See *Guía Mercantil de España, Año de 1829*, vol. II.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

In the decade following the collapse of the absolute monarchy, (1834-44), the Spanish artisans participated actively in the turbulent political process. They did not revolt because of salary demands, but over the question of food supplies, and in particular against the urban food taxes called "consumos" or "derechos de puertas". These demands were ones which could be reconciled with the progressive bourgeois political programs. The urban working groups accepted, followed and defended the leadership of the commercial bourgeoisie. The hour of the Spanish proletariat had not yet arrived, nor would it arrive until the end of the 19th century when it had become a truly significant force. In 1834 in Spain, as in 1789 in France, "among the urban popular classes, the most revolutionary element was not made up of a factory proletariat, but of small master artisans and their journeymen"⁷⁹.

THE PEASANTRY

The vast majority of the Spanish population in 1830 were peasants. A minority were independent farmers, a larger group rented land or were sharecroppers, and almost 50% were landless rural workers⁸⁰. The extremely diverse nature of the landholding patterns, as well as the profound regional and cultural differences, made the Spanish peasantry a heterogeneous and incoherent class. The Spanish peasantry was, in effect, a collection of distinct regional peasantries. The landless rural proletariat of Andalusia, for example, had little in common with the extensive class of "minifundistas" of Galicia. Many factors contributed to the regional differentiation: the different languages of each area, Galician, Basque, Catalan, and Castilian; the distinct customs and local traditions; the varied forms of land tenure and of cultivation. All foreign travellers in Spain in the early 19th century noted these traits and described the singular preservation of colorful but time-worn regional customs, dress and habits. The traditionalism of the Spanish peasantry contrasted with the broad social and cultural changes in the rural areas of France, England, and Germany, where the spread of capitalism (particularly the commercialization of agriculture) transformed agrarian practices and the life style of the peasants.

Neither the social structure nor the landholding patterns had changed significantly in the Spain of 1830. The greatest landed estates were to be found in Andalusia, ranging from 20,000 to an extraordinary 200,000 acres in a few cases. These "latifundia" were worked by a mass of landless laborers, many of whom lived in towns of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. They were the most oppressed and exploited of the Spanish peasantry. In central and southern Castile, in La Mancha and Extremadura there were also many great estates and a large mass of landless peasants. The principal agricultural occupation in Extremadura was sheep-raising; in La

⁷⁹ A. SOBOL, "Problems of Work in Year II", p. 214.

⁸⁰ See Chart I of Chapter I.

Mancha, wheat wine, and sheep were predominant. Among the great landowners of these regions were the feudal Military Orders, (Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara), which preferred hiring day laborers to leasing land. In central and northern Castile and in lower Aragon, on the other hand, a considerable portion of the soil belonged to small peasant farmers, or was owned collectively by whole villages. There was also a good number of medium-sized landlords and a large number of peasants who rented land⁸¹.

Throughout northern Spain and large parts of Catalonia the land was much more equally divided and there were far fewer of the immense estates to be found in the South. In Galicia the "minifundio" (1-5 hectare plots) was the principal form of property. The nominal owners of the land were the Church and the nobility, but they leased their land to the "foreros", who in turn subleased the tiny plots to peasant families. The enormous population growth in Galicia made for a chronic land hunger throughout the 19th century and continual emigration from the region. In neighboring Asturias a considerable number of old noble families owned estates, but much land was also owned by small farmers. The rural economy of the Basque provinces, Navarre and Upper Aragon was "based on small farms handed down in the same family from generation to generation or rented on long leases which were in practice hereditary". This family community system did not permit the extreme subdivision of land which was common in Galicia.

Apart from the great regional differences among the Spanish peasants there was one fact that stood out. The proportion of rural proletariat was higher than in practically any other European nation. This was not a recent development, but a historical social condition harking back almost to Roman times. According to the Census of 1797 there were a total of 805,000 landless peasants, (not including their families); in 1829 there were 785,000 of the same class, according to the *Guía Mercantil*. A great number of this rural proletariat was concentrated in Andalusia; there were 25,370 in Jaén, 32,982 in Córdoba, 82,186 in Granada and Málaga, and 118,741 in Seville and Cádiz. These men worked the great "latifundia" owned by aristocrats who lived in Seville or Madrid. The Andalusian rural laborer lived in conditions of chronic unemployment, (four to five months of each year without work), and often on the verge of starvation.

These terrible living conditions and the exploitation the peasants suffered made the social situation in the Spanish countryside potentially explosive. During the War of 1808-1814 there were evidently widespread peasant revolts against their masters and exploiters. Unfortunately, there are no modern studies of the peasantry in Spain, and in particular of the peasantry during the early 19th century, so we have little documentary

⁸¹ There are extremely few historical studies of Spanish peasants or indeed of Spanish agriculture. Among the best brief summaries of the regional differences and land tenure patterns is contained in Gerald Brennan's *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 87-130.

material to rely on. The historian Vicéns Vives refers to the fact that in Catalonia armed peasant bands called "somatenes" fought against the French invaders, but also attacked the local nobility, although he gives few details⁸². What is somewhat better known is that after the War of 1808-1814, the peasants all over Spain began to refuse to pay the tithe taxes⁸³. A particularly vivid eyewitness account of this phenomenon was recounted by the deputy Pascual Madoz in the Spanish parliament in 1837, in which he recalled that from 1824 onwards the peasantry of Aragón had refused to pay the feudal ecclesiastical tithes. He stated:

"On a certain day in the year 1827, which I will always recall for having been an eyewitness, the peasants appeared armed with clubs, picks, and other instruments, and publicly declared that they would not work anymore until the local government decided to desist from collecting the "diezmo" (tithe). And what happened then? That in spite of the orders of the despotic government that reigned at that time... they were forced to make a compromise with the rebellious peasants... and to accept three delegates from amongst them..."⁸⁴.

The social antagonism between peasant and landlord continued after the war. Many rural communities refused to accept the traditional jurisdiction the aristocrats⁸⁵. There were rebellions, but there was no great national social revolution. In Andalusia, for instance, much of the hatred of the peasant towards the landlord seems to have been channeled into forms of primitive rebellion, chiefly banditry. The bandit gangs became the popular heroes of the poor peasants. A foreign observer in this period observed:

"The entire south of the peninsula is now overrun by these guerilla bands. From Cartagena on the Mediterranean to Cape St. Vincent on the Atlantic, they exist in a perpetual state of nomadic or irruptional depredation... These levellers of social inequalities, and rough and ready equalizers, carried terror and dismay to every hearth in Andalusia. In numerous instances they were well-mounted, pillaged the richest dwellings and most comfortable farmhouses, kidnapped capitalists upon the high road, and held them in duress until they were paid an assigned ransom"⁸⁶.

These primitive rebels rapidly increased during and after the War of 1808-1814 and proliferated all over Spain. In some areas they dedicated themselves to the contraband trade, in others they were simply highwaymen. In the Basque provinces many of these guerilla bands joined the Carlist movement and fought in the civil war of 1833-39.

⁸² J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, p. 182.

⁸³ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, *Las crisis agrarias en la España moderna*, p. 435.

⁸⁴ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1838, pp. 2551-2552.

⁸⁵ See SALVADOR MOXÓ, *La disolución del régimen señorial en España*, p. 19. "El extraordinario número de pleitos de incorporación o sobre percepción de rentas señoriales entre 1800 y 1840..."

⁸⁶ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain in 1845*, vol. II, pp. 382-383.

Evidently our knowledge of the true social conditions of the Spanish peasantry in the early 19th century is extremely limited, and our knowledge of their political or ideological consciousness almost non-existent. The fact that the peasants of the Basque provinces, Navarre, and parts of Catalonia should have become Carlists has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, much less explained, by any modern historian or sociologist. Why other sectors of the peasantry did not become Carlists has also not been explained. Social and economic conditions, the different relations between peasant and landlord all undoubtedly played a large part. What we do know is that the War of 1808-1814 had deeply affected the lives of many peasants, in some cases completely disrupted it; that many peasants had taken up arms, many had begun to refuse to obey the traditional feudal practices, and some had become politicized, creating popular support in some regions for reactionary movements, for liberal movements in other areas. The Spanish peasantry had played a decisive role in the Napoleonic War, but in the 1830's the majority of the peasants did not play a large part in most of the political developments. They had taken the main stage of Spanish history at a most critical moment (1808-1814), only to allow themselves to be gradually pushed back into the wings of that changing theater.

II

The End of the Absolute Monarchy: The Financial and Political Crisis

The political developments of the last years of the reign of Ferdinand VII created a serious crisis of authority. The ultraroyalist forces challenged the power and stability of the government. They organized conspiracies, the revolt of 1827 in Catalonia, and finally the Carlist rebellion in 1833. The Spanish upper classes were deeply divided: the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the clergy favored Carlism, as did a minority of the aristocracy and of the army officers. The majority of the landlord class, (including most of the *Grandees*), the merchants, the industrialists, and most military officers became more and more opposed to the ultra-royalists. The arbiter of the political and social struggle was Ferdinand VII. He attempted to strike a balance by playing one force off against the other.

Between 1823 and 1832, however, the ultra-royalists (Carlists) had the upper hand in terms of political activity and propaganda. From 1823 the Church mobilized its very considerable organizational capacity and utilized its ideological prestige to carry out a campaign to reestablish the absolute authority of Catholicism and to extirpate all vestiges of Liberalism. Many of its more fanatic members proposed to reestablish the Inquisition, which would now be used to persecute Liberals instead of Jews or Protestants. In 1823 an "apostolic Junta" was formed in Madrid to promote this fanatic clerical plan to reconstitute the Inquisition and reinforce theocracy. One of its leaders was the Bishop of Osuna; its newspaper was called *El Restaurador*. Meetings were held in the Church of San Francisco; from there it was said that large numbers of missionary friars were sent out to the provinces to spread the ideas of the "Apostolic Junta"¹. Similar secret juntas soon sprung up throughout the peninsula. In time, the police of Madrid and other cities began to investigate their activities. In 1825, in a secret report to the King, the head of police Juan José Recacho wrote of the role of the clergy in Asturias among the Royalist Volunteers, (a right-wing para-military force). He said that the friars and priests dedicated themselves "to inculcate hatred and vengeance, instead of the peace and harmony of which they are (supposed to be) ministers". He added: "The reestablishment of the Inquisition is the weapon with which these spokesmen of disorder wish to obtain a power-

¹ LUIS A. TEJADA, *El ocaso de la Inquisición en los últimos años del reinado de Fernando VII*, p. 100.

ful ascendancy not only above the Liberal party, now impotent, but also above the people, the government, and even the Throne"².

The reactionaries aspired to force Ferdinand VII to adopt even more repressive measures than those he had already taken. They had also begun to plot a possible coup d'etat jointly with Don Carlos, the younger brother of Ferdinand VII. In 1827 a military rebellion broke out in Catalonia, led by the ultra-royalists. Its ultimate object apparently was either to oust the King, or to weaken his control of the government and Army. Ferdinand VII responded quickly to this threat and went himself to Catalonia to crush the rebellion, which was quickly accomplished. The unsuccessful revolt had the effect of intensifying the latent political divisions within the monarchy. The Army became increasingly opposed to Don Carlos and to the ultra-royalists. The reactionaries remained even more determined to seize power on the death of Ferdinand VII.

The majority of the propertied classes had remained politically passive up till now. There were few channels of expressing political opinions, for there were practically no newspapers, and any political meetings were denounced as being Liberal conspiracies. But the increasing financial difficulties of the monarchy, as well as the reactionary plots, began to force the merchants, industrialists, and landowners to search for a political change and for economic reforms that would stabilize the monarchy. The basis of much of the unrest among the propertied classes could be traced directly to the bankruptcy of the government administration. Furthermore, outside of Spain, there were powerful forces pushing for at least moderate economic reforms. English and French bankers, who held much of the Spanish foreign debt, desired an economically solvent regime that could continue to guarantee regular interest payments on its debts, and which would liberalize the international commerce of Spain. By 1830, therefore, important if little noticed pressures had built up both internally and externally in opposition to the ultra-royalists and their fanatic ecclesiastical supporters. British and French bankers, Spanish landowners, merchants and industrialists feared the consequences of a successful *reactionary* coup d'etat. After the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, these groups established an alliance which would support the re-introduction of Liberalism and parliamentary practices in Spain. For these groups the reform of the State was essential to resolve the financial crisis.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY

There were three main parts to the financial difficulties: the foreign debt, the internal debt, and the state administration. The first problem was how to continue to make the increasing interest payments to European bankers on the Spanish foreign debt, and thereby maintain the nation's international credit. The second was how to pay the interest on the huge

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

internal debt and restore local financial confidence. The third was how to rationalise the chaotic state administration and tax-collecting system. All three problems were of immediate significance to different powerful groups.

Since the Napoleonic War the Spanish State had accumulated a substantial foreign debt, both during the period of constitutional government of 1820-23 and the decade of absolutist rule of 1823-33. By 1833 the foreign debt outstanding totalled approximately 4 billion "reales", (200 million dollars/40 million pounds sterling)³. These debts consisted of Spanish bonds subscribed by the chief bankers of Paris, London and Amsterdam. The foreign banking houses demanded regular payments of interest on the bonds, and as a group constituted a major external pressure group clamoring for financial reform. Ferdinand VII had publicly refused to recognize the foreign debts contracted by the Liberal government of 1820-23. Most of the bonds issued by the constitutional government had been sold in the London stock market⁴. Consequently, the powerful British banking houses of Baring Brothers, Ricardo and Co., etc., refused any further financial assistance until payment of interest on the previous bond issues was guaranteed. Between 1823 and 1833, therefore, most new Spanish bonds were sold in Paris through the banker Alejandro Aguado and a syndicate of French bankers including the firms of Ferrière-Lafitte, Cottier, Blanc Colin, Fould, Hagerman, Odier and Wells⁵. These financiers were willing and able to subscribe issues of the foreign debt valued at more than 1,000 million "reales", over a ten year period, because the Spanish Finance Minister, Ballesteros, provided regular interest payments.

The international credit of Spain was nonetheless not solid. The selling price of the Spanish bonds on the market-place tended to be quite low, although they were usually sold rapidly. Many European bankers played the Spanish bonds on the stock market not because Spanish credit was good but because the bonds were subject to extreme fluctuations which often allowed for a financial killing⁶. The Spanish government was actually bankrupt. It depended upon the foreign advances of cash simply to stay afloat. Each new contract that Ballesteros arranged with Aguado was used to pay the government and army expenses, as well as to pay the interest on the foreign debt outstanding. Throughout the decade of 1823-1833 the Parisian financiers, including the Rothschilds, the most powerful banking house in Europe, urged the Spanish government to reorganize its finances⁷. In 1828 the *Journal du Commerce*, the *Constitutionnel*, the *Courier*, the *London Times* and the *Morning Chronicle* all severely criticized the Spanish government, declaring that it would be

³ RAFAEL ANES ALVAREZ, "Las inversiones extranjeras en España de 1855 a 1880", in *Ensayos sobre la economía española a mediados del siglo XIX*, p. 198.

⁴ BERTRAND GILLE, *Histoire de la Maison Rotschild*, vol. I (Paris, 1965), p. 113.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

unable to meet its obligations on the foreign debt that year⁸. In 1833 British bankers actively intervened in peninsular affairs by providing the financing for the army of Don Pedro, pretender to the Portuguese throne. Don Pedro soon took power and re-introduced Liberalism in Portugal. These same English bankers were closely tied to certain Spanish Liberals in exile, such as Juan Alvarez Mendizábal, who helped organize the Portuguese expedition⁹.

The *internal* debt of Spain was much larger than the *foreign* debt. It consisted chiefly of large loans made by Spanish merchant houses and wealthy individuals to the government in exchange for "vales reales", bonds of the public debt which paid 4% interest annually. In the late 18th century the "vales reales" were accepted as if they were metallic currency and circulated widely¹⁰. The internal debt had increased most rapidly during the reign of Carlos IV (1789-1808), in particular to pay for heavy expenses incurred in wars and naval expeditions such as that of the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. A large amount of commercial capital was thus transferred into State bonds which paid regular interest up until the Napoleonic invasion. After 1808 and during the whole of the reign of Ferdinand VII, virtually no interest payments were made¹¹. This caused the value of the "vales reales" to fall almost to nothing, reducing not only the amount of paper money in circulation but also creating a serious crisis of confidence in all dominant economic sectors. The most serious problem was clearly the inability of the State to comply with its financial obligations, but this deficiency was aggravated by the abrupt changes in official debt policy between 1808 and 1833, further depreciating the value of the public bonds. The internal debt was converted and re-converted into consolidated and non-consolidated bonds of different types on several occasions, namely, 1811, 1818, 1820, 1823 and 1831¹². Each time, the amount and form of the nominal interest payments changed, causing further havoc. The restoration of the absolute monarchy in 1823 led to a particularly serious crisis. Under the influence of his religious confessor, Sáez, who was also the prime minister in 1823, Ferdinand VII revoked the laws approved by the Liberal *Cortes* of 1820-23 which allowed the sale of Church properties. This revocation eliminated the major source of revenue of the Office of the Public Debt, which was in charge of these transactions, and alienated the proprietors who had recently bought up more than 1,000 million "reales" worth of monastic lands; (they were forced to return the properties to the Church without compensation)¹³. By similar

⁸ MODESTO FERNÁNDEZ Y GONZÁLEZ, *La Hacienda de nuestros abuelos* (Madrid, 1874), pp. 62-63.

⁹ See VÍCTOR DE SÁ, *A Crise do Liberalismo e as primeiras manifestações dos ideais socialistas em Portugal* (Lisboa, 1969), p. 116. This is one of the best studies of Portuguese Liberalism in the 1830's and 1840's, and provides information on the political relationships with Spain.

¹⁰ LUIS MARÍA PASTOR, *Historia de la Deuda española* (Madrid, 1858), p. 29.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 29-32.

¹³ BERTRAND GILLE, *Histoire de la Maison Rothschild*, vol. I, p. 118.

measures the government of 1823 destroyed the credit of the only Spanish Bank, the *Banco de San Carlos*¹⁴. It did not function effectively again until 1828 when Ballesteros was able to renovate it, changing the name to *Banco de San Fernando*. (See Chapter 1.) The net effect of the political reaction was to reduce the already weak confidence of Spanish investors in the economy. A financial agent sent by the banker Rothschild to Spain in 1823 commented that the "merchants and wealthy persons are sending their capital abroad and many are seeking a refuge outside of the Kingdom where they will not be subject to persecution"¹⁵. Many of these individuals were, of course, Liberals.

In 1833 the Spanish internal debt (including the accumulated unpaid interest) totalled approximately 16 million "reales" (160 million pounds sterling), according to British sources. The deficiencies in contemporary book-keeping and the chaotic conditions of the Spanish administration do not guarantee the accuracy of these figures, but the very fact that huge sums of capital were invested in *worthless* paper suggests that the financial situation of both State and society was quite dismal. Foreign financiers observed that there was no capital market in Spain¹⁶. All local sources of capital had been drained and the government could get large sums of money only from the foreign stock markets.

The merchants, industrialists, landowners and rentiers of Spain in 1833 had little available hard currency and they had considerable amounts of apparently valueless "vales reales". Only a profound economic reform, including that of the State finances could change the situation. There were at the time two political solutions to the economic quandary, that of the Liberals and that of the Carlists. The Liberal proposal for economic reform was the "Desamortización", the disentailment of Church properties¹⁷. The sale of Church lands by the State in exchange for "vales reales" would solve two major problems. On the one hand it would restore the credit of the government, and on the other it would transfer capital to the upper classes by transforming unproductive ecclesiastical lands and buildings into productive "bourgeois" property. The Carlists, on the contrary, proposed no structural reforms; the Church was to remain untouched and the State was to manage as before. Clearly the majority of the holders of "vales reales" were not particularly favorable to Carlism. There was also pressure for reform in the area of the State administration of taxes, duties, etc.

The local administration and the tax system in the reign of Ferdinand VII was essentially that which had prevailed in the 18th century. Government manuals of the 1820's defined the duties and functions of the royal functionaries, "corregidores", "alcaldes reales", in the traditional

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁷ Limited disentailment had already begun in the late 18th century, and more particularly in the last years of the reign of Carlos IV. These sales were re-initiated in 1820-23, and therefore were not a novel idea or practice. See the recent studies by the historian Richard Herr on this topic.

style. The country remained divided into the antiquated "kingdoms" of Valencia, Aragón and Castille: Catalonia was termed a principality, ("principado"), and Navarre still had a viceroy and independent "Cortes". Legislation in these different regions varied substantially. The tax system of Aragón, for instance, was different in many respects from that of Castille. Government revenues were supplied chiefly by customs taxes collected at the ports, by indirect taxes on consumption, and by the government salt and tobacco monopolies. There were few direct taxes on property. Furthermore the tax collection was expensive and inefficient: in 1825 the collection cost 15% of the total revenue¹⁸. In addition, there were many types of local customs taxes which impeded the commercialization and exchange of agricultural products. Local monopolists also added obstacles to commercialization: "There were towns in which even the sale of bread, potatoes, barley were monopolized, and also the sale of silk and thread in establishments which called themselves harberdashery shops... The state of abandonment of the local administration was most lamentable, particularly between the years 1823 and 1832"¹⁹.

The development of agriculture depended upon a modernization of the antiquated legislation and tax system. A contemporary geographer, Isidoro Antillón, pointed out several of the reasons for Spanish agricultural backwardness²⁰. One was the simple lack of exchange and commercialization, particularly in the non-maritime provinces. Another was the lack of good transport, roads, canals, and navigable rivers. Yet another was the lack of uniformity in weights and measures, which varied from region to region and even from district to district. Finally, the lack of mercantile liberty, including severe restrictions and taxes also made commerce difficult.

From 1820 onwards there were important groups that pressured the government for reforms in these areas. The Castillian wheat producers pushed for a liberalization of the internal market, at the same time as they demanded protection against imports of foreign wheat. The wheat producers increased their production and began to sell heavily to the maritime provinces, particularly Catalonia and Andalucía. But they needed protection against the imports of cheap wheat from southern Italy and the rich agricultural lands by the Black Sea. In the 18th century the maritime provinces had imported large quantities, but between 1815 and 1830 Spain sufficiently increased wheat production to meet the needs of national consumption and even to export some²¹. Considerable amounts of flour were exported to the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and starting in 1829-32 substantial quantities were exported to Great Britain, (more than a million bushels in a good year)²².

¹⁸ "Memoria de L. López Ballesteros sobre Hacienda", in *Documentos del reinado de Fernando VII*, 6, pt. 3, pp. 125-130.

¹⁹ RAMÓN DE SANTILLÁN, *Memorias (1815-1856)*, vol. I (Pamplona, 1960), páginas 141-42.

²⁰ ISIDORO ANTILLÓN, *Elementos de la Geografía de España y Portugal*, p. 158.

²¹ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, "La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868", pp. 261-63.

²² Exports to Great Britain were of some significance between 1829 and 1832.

The net effect of this agricultural expansion was to gradually weaken the traditional obstacles to internal commerce. Regional markets slowly became integrated, spurring the development of a national market in some basic products such as wheat, wine, and olive oil²³. The surplus of Aragonese wheat went to Catalonia, that of La Mancha and Toledo to Madrid and Andalucía, that of León to Santander for export²⁴. The wines of the northern Duero valley travelled both to Asturias and to Madrid, and the olive oil of Andalucía began to be sold all over the peninsula²⁵.

The process of economic integration was, nonetheless, extremely slow²⁶. Without sufficient capital investment in irrigation and intensive cultivation, Spanish agricultural production faltered behind that of other European countries. Widespread banditry in the countryside and the marauding expeditions of the "Voluntarios Realistas", (a rural para-military force numbering almost 100,000 and spread all over the peninsula), made trade and travel insecure. Furthermore the peasant rebellions led by the ultra-royalists in Catalonia in 1827 and by the Carlists in the Basque provinces in 1833 threatened the stability of rural society. Castillian wheat producers could only be opposed to this state of regional anarchy. They would not support the Carlist cause after the death of Ferdinand VII.

The economic forces that tended to favor a capitalist reform of the Spanish State and society were, nevertheless, not politically organized. The holders of the "vales reales", the Catalan industrialists, the Cádiz merchants and the Castillian wheat producers were so many unrelated interest groups. There were no formal political parties during the absolute monarchy of 1823-33. The small financial/administrative elite in Madrid led by Ballesteros attempted to make the tax system more efficient and stimulated a few economic projects, but they were not capable of carrying through fundamental social and economic reform. The powerful ultra-royalist forces and the Church attacked Liberal-capitalist ideas and programs. The anti-Liberal campaigns of the reactionaries dominated the politics of the period. The economic and political incoherence of a weak commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and of a divided landed nobility, made almost impossible any program of economic reform and modernization within the structure of the absolute monarchy. The political stalemate would end only with the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833.

During the civil war of 1833-39 they declined; there was a grain depression throughout Europe in these years. See *Parliamentary Papers* 1831-32, vol. XXXIV, pp. 307, 319-25, 1842, vol. XI, supplement 15 no. 1, p. 392, 428-29, 1843, vol. LIII, Accounts and Papers, p. 177.

²³ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, "La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868", pp. 262-63.

²⁴ See article on Spanish agriculture in *Parliamentary Papers* 1844, vol. 47, Accounts and Papers 16, pp. 75-85.

²⁵ ISIDORO ANTILLÓN, *Elementos de la Geografía de España y Portugal*, p. 159.

²⁶ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, *Las crisis agrarias en la España Moderna*, p. 437.

THE POLITICAL CRISIS: THE ROLE OF THE ARMY

In the last two years of the reign of Ferdinand VII there was a struggle to the death between the Carlists and the "moderate" elite, (essentially the financial/administrative elite of Madrid), over the question of the succession to the throne²⁷. The King was dying, slowly but surely. The Carlists wished to see him succeeded by his younger and even more reactionary brother, Carlos. The "moderates", favored the succession of María Cristina, the wife of the monarch, a young woman of more modern progressive views. In September, 1832, when the King suffered a particularly severe bout of his illness, it appeared that the Carlists had won. But the monarch recovered and soon thereafter a thorough purge of the Carlists was undertaken. It was the Army which decided this turn of events, and assured the defeat of reaction.

The Army generals became the arbiters of political life between 1823 and 1833 because the Spanish ruling classes were divided. The military were the only solid guarantee that Ferdinand VII had that the right wing terrorist campaign would not throw the country into a state of total chaos, swallowing up the monarchy in factional war. The government therefore allocated more than 50% of the national budget for the maintenance of the Army²⁸. It grew steadily in size and in number of officers. By 1833 the Army consisted of some 50,000 troops and 652 generals. But the Army was not the only military force in Spain; there was also an informal right/wing army called the Royalist Volunteers, which, it was said, numbered 100,000 men by 1830, (although much less a professional body than the regular Army). The history of the struggle between these two large military forces during the last decade of absolutist rule is the history of the conflict between "ultra-royalists" and "moderates"; it also forebodes the Carlist War of 1833-39.

The growth of the Royalist Volunteers as a powerful instrument of theocratic reaction increasingly forced the official Army to turn against the Church and against the followers of Don Carlos. In 1823 the Spanish Army had been largely destroyed as a result of the French invasion which expelled the Liberals and reestablished Ferdinand VII as absolute monarch. A great number of officers who had been Liberals went into exile. Some 20,000-30,000 French troops remained stationed in Spain. They constituted a virtual army of occupation, although they did not get overly involved in domestic politics. Ferdinand VII might have rested content with this foreign force as a bulwark for his regime, but he was

²⁷ The "moderates" were essentially the financial/administrative elite that had supported the reform programs of Ballesteros. The role of the "moderates" was pointed out by several 19th century historians. More recently the conservative historian F. Suárez Verdaguer (*Los sucesos de La Granja*), has attacked the "moderates" as an unrepresentative elite, but he has added little significant information to facilitate a social analysis of the group.

²⁸ See "Memoria de Luis López Ballesteros sobre Hacienda" in *Documentos del reinado de Fernando VII*, 6, pt. 3.

determined to restore the prestige of the monarchy. For this, a new Spanish Army was necessary, and recruiting began in April of 1824.

Ferdinand VII wanted to create a strong non-political army, "by which he meant a disciplined Right-wing Army"²⁹. A system of purification was introduced which obliged all officers seeking employment to prove their loyalty to the monarch. Radical Liberal officers were not allowed into the officer corps, but many untrained irregular Royalist troops were also excluded³⁰. The generals responsible for this military reform were professionals, who put their careers before politics. They were authoritarian Royalists whose loyalty was to the stability of the State and the strength of the Army. They wielded great power at Madrid, but even more as regional commanders, the captain generals who had an extreme degree of administrative and political autonomy. The most important military leader was Miguel Ibarrola, Marquess of Zambrano, (1776-1848), Minister of War between 1825 and 1832. Other important generals were the "Conde de España", head of the Royal Guards and Captain-General of Catalonia from 1827 to 1832; Manuel Llauder, Inspector General of Infantry (1825-1833) and later Captain-General of Aragon; Vicente Quesada, commander of the Royal Guards and Captain-General of Old Castille; Ramón Rodil, veteran of the American wars and later Inspector of the "Carabineros", a military force stationed on the coasts and frontiers with the purpose of preventing contraband trade.

The War Minister, Zambrano, had served the Liberals in 1820-22, but in 1823 had gone into exile, later returning with the Royalist invasion. Zambrano put into effect a program to reinvigorate and consolidate the Army. He guaranteed regular payments of soldiers wages and officers salaries by demanding that the government meet the Army expenses before all others. He transformed the corps of the Royal Guards into a training center for officers, and put strict disciplinarians in command³¹.

There remained many problems, lack of discipline among the regular troops, a lack of technical training, particularly in the artillery corps, but all in all the Spanish Army was a fairly professional force.

The Army was challenged, however, by the unprofessional Royalist Volunteers. These were a type of rural police "clad in celestial blue who occupied themselves in terrorizing the village Liberals and intellectuals they so much disliked". They were also used by the Church and local authorities to oblige the peasants to pay tithes and taxes³². The Royalist Volunteers were recruited "from the refuse of the population" since "there was in most instances a visible repugnance in the respectable part of the community to belong to such a corps"³³. There was, nonetheless, an Inspec-

²⁹ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain: 1800-1854* (Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 30.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-35.

³² See speech by Pascual Madoz in the Spanish parliament in which he briefly describes the actions of the Royalist Volunteers. *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1837-38*, pp. 2551-2552.

³³ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain: 1800-1854*, p. 46.

tor of the Royalist Volunteers, named by the King, and considerable sums were disbursed by the government for their maintenance. The Royalist Volunteers became the military instruments of the ultra-reactionary movement spawned by the Church and feudal-minded aristocrats.

The government became increasingly concerned with the terrorist activities of the clerical secret societies and with their influence among the Volunteers. In May of 1825, the Minister of Finances, Luis López Ballesteros, reported to the Royal Council that "there is a plan to envelope us in a revolution, and with that object there are secret correspondences between persons in the highest positions"³⁴. Thereafter, the head of the Royal Treasury, Gaspar Remisa became more and more reluctant to provide money or supplies to the Royalist Volunteers. The police intensified their vigilance of the "apostolic" secret societies, and soon found proof of a plan for a major rightwing uprising. In 1826 a *Manifiesto of the Federation of Pure Royalists* was published. In April, 1827, the first revolts of the Royalist Volunteers broke out in Catalonia. The police found that very important individuals were involved in a plan to get rid of the "moderate" Ministers of the government, and even to oblige Ferdinand VII to step down from the throne, allowing his younger brother Carlos to become King. The men involved were Friar Cirilo Alameda, (Counsellor of State), the Duque del Infantado, Francisco Calomarde, (Minister of Justice), José María Carvajal, (Inspector of the Royalist Volunteers), and the Bishop of Vich, Catalonia³⁵.

By August, 1827, the revolts in Catalonia had become a full-fledged regional uprising. Apostolic juntas sprung up in Manresa, Vich, Gerona and Figueras, led chiefly by ecclesiastics. The Royalist Volunteers provided military leadership and troops, and were supported by a large sector of the local peasantry. There were also numerous guerilla groups led by such men as José Bosoms, a peasant-farmer who had been a guerilla leader in 1812 and later a professional smuggler. He had participated in the Royalist reaction of 1823, but was bitter because he had not been granted an officer's salary afterwards. Other leaders were Narciso Abrés, a butcher from Cassa de la Selva, who had been a guerilla leader in 1823; Agustín Saperes, former sailor in the Navy, also a "guerrillero" of 1823³⁶. These men were representative of a whole class of men who were armed, had bitter social grudges, and had become identified with regional politics as a result of their military/guerilla activity in 1808-14 and 1821-23. They accepted the ecclesiastical propaganda spread by the newspaper of the rebellion, *El Catalan Realist (The Royalist Catalan)*, whose motto was "Long live Religion, Long live the Absolute King, Long live the Inquisition, Death to the Police, Death to Masonry, and all occult sects"³⁷. The newspaper also attacked the "Liberal" Army and the "Masons" who were counsellors of Ferdinand VII.

The danger of the Catalan insurrection for the government increased

³⁴ LUIS A. TEJADA, *Ocaso de la Inquisición...*, p. 119.

³⁵ JAIME TORRES ELÍAS, *La guerra de los agraviados* (Barcelona, 1967), p. 25.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

when it became evident that large numbers of local peasants had become active participants. They called themselves the "Malcontents", (the Discontented Ones). An anonymous witness noted that "in the rebellion of 1827, it was seen that the advocates of fanaticism consisted of the most miserable "proletarians", who at the same time as they declared for an absolute King, attacked the upper classes for their predominance and their privileges. "No more social differences, they cried, we are all equal; out with the usurpers of our rights"³⁸. Neither Ferdinand VII nor the Army could permit that the reactionaries should become the leaders of a widespread peasant rebellion. Military repression was necessary. Troops were sent to Catalonia to quell the revolt, and on the 22nd of September, 1827, Ferdinand VII left Madrid to lead the fight. On the 28th the King was in Tarragona; soon the reactionary movement had been crushed. 300 ringleaders were executed, the local Royalist Volunteers disarmed and disbanded.

The insurrection of 1827, of the War of the "Agraviados" (the Aggrieved Ones) as it is more popularly known, obliged the Army to become more political. The Generals began to turn against the Church and the more retrograde aristocrats; instead they became more favorable to the "moderates" and reform. The defeat of the "Malcontents" and of the Royalist Volunteers of Catalonia strengthened the position of the generals. The rebellion had apparently demonstrated that the Spanish Army was capable of maintaining order and arresting the advance of the right-wing forces.

The King, Ferdinand VII, remained seriously worried. He foresaw that his brother Carlos, with his devoted fanatical supporters would not desist in their drive for power. Furthermore, Carlos had a legitimate reason to aspire to the throne; his royal brother had no children to inherit it. Ferdinand VII solved this problem shortly. In 1829 he married a young Neapolitan princess, (his fourth wife), named María Cristina: she bore him two daughters in quick succession, Isabel (1830) and María Luisa (1832). Carlos, however, was not satisfied; he argued that only a male child could claim the throne, according to the Salic Law decreed by King Phillip V in 1713. Ferdinand countered that his father, Carlos IV, had revoked the Salic Law in 1789, and had drawn up the Pragmatic Sanction, which stated that any *direct* descendant of the King, *male or female*, had prior rights to the monarchy.

There was still plenty of room for worry. The Carlists were intent on seizing power. There were generals in the Army, as well as persons in high positions in the State, who were openly sympathetic to the cause of Don Carlos. Ferdinand VII attempted to guarantee the loyalty of his Army by a lavish distribution of favors. "At the Royal marriage, birth and oath of allegiance scores of neglected noblemen and officers were brought back into the King's service and showered with stars and promotions; landowners such as the Dukes of Híjar and Castroterreño, and the Marquess of San José whose influence over provincial municipalities and militia

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

regiments was one of the enduring factors of Spanish politics, were made generals, and generals who had won local and national celebrity in the War of Independence, such as Palafox, Morillo, Freyre, Castañón and Castaños were... given titles, commands and jobs”³⁹.

Unfortunately the illness of the King worsened rapidly. In September of 1832 it seemed that the monarch was at the point of death. In these trying circumstances, the Minister of Justice, Calomarde, a partisan of Don Carlos, convinced the Queen, María Cristina to urge her husband to revoke the Pragmatic Sanction. The Bishop of Leon, the Minister of State (Count of Alcudia) and Calomarde all pressured the King on his sickbed⁴⁰. Finally Ferdinand signed the document, which implicitly guaranteed that Carlos would succeed him. The next day, however, the King's health improved. On the 21st of September he was apparently out of danger. On the 22nd, María Cristina's forceful sister Luisa Carlota arrived at the Court. She immediately denounced Calomarde and obliged him to bring her the famous document. She tore it into shreds. Sensing defeat and fearing the wrath of his master, Ferdinand, Calomarde sneaked out of Madrid that night, taking the road for the French frontier and exile.

During this political crisis the military at Madrid had been clearly divided. The troops under General Llauder supported Cristina, but most of the Royal Guards pronounced openly for Don Carlos⁴¹. When Ferdinand recovered, he named his wife Regent, appointed a new Primer Minister, Cea Bermúdez, and initiated a purge of the Carlists. 200 Guards officers were suspended and all ultra-conservative generals were retired. Among them were the Captain Generals of Galicia, Granada, Avila, Cartagena, Guipúzcoa, and Catalonia. Furthermore, “regimental commanders were instructed to send in reports on the political reliability of their subordinates”⁴². The purge ensured that the Army would stand fast against the Carlists in the future.

The new Prime Minister, Cea Bermúdez, instituted what came to be known as a brief interlude of “enlightened despotism”. He wished to ensure the pacific succession of the daughter of Ferdinand VII. For this he believed necessary a program of limited reform, of conciliation of both “moderates” and the exiled Liberals. He reopened the Universities which had been closed since 1830, exonerated many political prisoners, and decreed and amnesty for the majority of Liberal exiles. Zea named a new Cabinet composed of “moderates” such as Del Pino, Encina y Piedra, and the Marquess of Casa y Irujo. He appointed General José de la Cruz Minister of War, who began a systematic program to dissolve the Royalist Volunteers across the whole of the peninsula.

The “enlightened despotism” of the new government also brought some significant economic/administrative reforms. Many monopolistic practices

³⁹ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain: 1800-1854*, p. 44.

⁴⁰ EDUARDO R. EGGERS and E. FUENE DE COLOMBI, *Francisco de Cea Bermúdez y su época, 1779-1850*, pp. 106-107.

⁴¹ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain: 1808-1854*, p. 45.

⁴² *Ibid.*

were eliminated. In March of 1833 a decree was published allowing wine producers to freely sell their wines. The sale of fish, wool, silk and all types of cloth, as well as the manufacture of glass, were all declared free of all former restrictions⁴³. The geographic/administrative structure of the State was re-organized. 49 provinces became the basic administrative units, replacing the antiquated kingdom of Valencia, viceroyalty of Navarra, principality of Cataluña, etc. A Ministry of Economic Development was created, and Javier de Burgos named to head it.

Zea Bermúdez refused, however, to liberalise political life. Strict censorship remained in force; no political parties were allowed. Consequently, the social basis of the new government remained weak, although certainly its chief enemy the Carlists had been temporarily defeated. When Ferdinand VII died on the 29th of September, 1833, the whole of the civil and military establishment supported the peaceful succession of Princess Isabel and her mother as Queen-Regent. But "the government remained deeply committed to the group of generals and courtiers who had made the succession safe"⁴⁴. A bitter fight soon broke out between the "bureaucrats" led by Zea and the generals to determine who was to wield power.

The generals were determined not to allow the civilian bureaucrats to give them orders, in particular not to limit the autonomy of the Captain-Generals. Under the old regime these military rulers of the provinces had exercised authority over all local administrative personnel. The "corregidores" were responsible to them; consequently, local politics were largely the domain of the generals. The reforms of 1832-33, and the plan of Javier de Burgos the Ministry of Economic Development should exercise its own provincial jurisdiction through subdelegates represented a serious threat⁴⁵. The Captain Generals were determined to resist, as were key military figures at Madrid.

The most important Captain-Generals were Llauder (Catalonia), Quesada (Old Castille), Jerónimo Valdés (Cartagena), and Rodil (Extremadura). In 1833 they came to be known popularly as the "Pashas" or "Satraps" because of their great regional power. At Madrid the military party was led by General Javier Castaños, "who since 1829 had been raised from disgrace to the Order of the Golden Fleece, the command of Madrid, the Presidency of the Council of Regency, and the Duchy of Bailén"⁴⁶. Castaños was supported by his nephews, the Marquess of Amarillas and the Baron de Carondelet, "who resumed their interrupted military careers under his patronage". He was also supported by Zarco del Valle, War Minister after November, 1833 and "through Amarillas he was connected with the military dynasty of Ezpeleta, and through Carondelet with the Puñorostros, courtier soldiers...". He was also a close friend of the Prince of Anglona, (brother of the Duke of Osuna, one of the most powerful Grandees) who was named Captain/General of Granada. One modern histo-

⁴³ See Juan Illa Velasco, *Recopilación de la legislación administrativa de España desde 1833 a 1849* (Salamanca, 1850).

⁴⁴ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain*, p. 47.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

rian calls this group of military men "the creme de la creme" of the 652 generals listed in 1833"⁴⁷.

These military "Pashas" had allied themselves with important "moderate" aristocrats like the Marquess of Casa Irujo, the Conde de Ofalía, and the Marquess of Miraflores. They also had friends within the Queen's camarilla, such as the Count of Parcent and García Carrasco, both of whom opposed to Zea⁴⁸. García Carrasco was a wealthy merchant from Cáceres, closely linked to influential Liberal circles. The Queen Regent's sister, Luisa Carlota and her husband Francisco de Paula also were enemies of the Prime Minister.

Zea Bermúdez attempted to strengthen his position by obtaining diplomatic recognition for the government of Isabel and María Cristina from foreign powers. France and England had recognized the Queen-Regent as soon as Ferdinand VII died, and were quickly followed by Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, and the United States. On the 4th of October, Zea Bermúdez published a manifesto in which he affirmed that the monarchy would be preserved and that "no dangerous innovations would be premitted". This document appeased several conservative European governments, but did not find favor at home. On the 5th of October, the Regency Council met for the first time and expressed disapproval of the actions of the Prime Minister. The Regency Council was a body of distinguished individuals named by Ferdinand VII in his will to supervise matters of state after his death. The principal members of the Council were none other than General Castaños, the Marquess of Amarillas, the Duke of Medinacelli, Nicolás María Garelli, the Count of Ofalía, José María Puig, and the Marquess of Santa Cruz. According to a French diplomat "the Regency Council is entirely under the direction of the Marquess of Amarillas, who often consults with the Count of Ofalía... The Marquess is a remarkable man, very well read, he speaks several languages... and he is firmly convinced that the good fortune of Spain rests upon the establishment of a representative monarchy, but one in which all the constitutional principles should be applied slowly and with caution"⁴⁹. The Regency Council thus represented the views of the military "Pashas" and of the "moderate" aristocrats. Essentially, the Council pressed for three objects: the dismissal of Zea Bermúdez, greater support for the generals who were now fighting against the Carlists in the North, and a moderate liberalization of politics.

The Prime Minister refused to consider the last point, perhaps thinking that any structural changes would lead to his own downfall. He trusted in the confidence the Queen-Regent had in him, and he was determined to continue to rule. The Queen-Regent's opinions soon began to change, however. The ambassadors of France and England urged María Cristina

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ E. R. EGGERS and E. FEUNE DE COLOMBI, *Francisco de Zea Bermúdez...*, p. 132.

⁴⁹ *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères* (Quai D'Orsay, Paris), "Memoires et Documents", *Espagne* 314 ("Situation politique de l'Espagne en Octobre de 1834"), p. 48.

to replace Zea with a more forceful leader who could speed the transition to representative government and effectively lead the war effort⁵⁰. General Quesada appealed to her to dismiss her ministers. "When he got the chief of police, General Latre and Castaños on his side, she had to make the concession of appointing their nominee Zarco del Valle to replace Zea's General de la Cruz, as Minister of War"⁵¹. On the 8th of January, 1834, Quesada published a declaration which made clear his disconformity with the continuance of Zea Bermúdez as Prime Minister, and asked for political reforms. Shortly thereafter Manuel Llauder, Captain-General of Catalonia, made a similar statement, demanding new ministers and a constitutional system. He was supported by the Catalans, by the guilds, by the merchants, and the manufacturing association of Barcelona, which included the wealthier industrialists⁵².

A stormy Cabinet meeting was held on the following day. The Minister of War, Zarco del Valle was then asked to consult the Regency Council on the means of dealing with Quesada and Llauder. The outcome of this consultation was not unexpected, considering Castaños' and Amarillas' views. The Regency Council decided to approach the Queen-Regent to demand the resignation of Zea Bermudez and Javier de Burgos. She dismissed Zea, but allowed Burgos to remain as Minister in the new government. María Cristina then appointed a former exile and distinguished Liberal, Martínez de la Rosa, to take over the direction of the Spanish government. Martínez de la Rosa was considered a "moderate" Liberal, a man of aristocratic tastes, esteemed in the highest political and literary circles at Paris. His nickname was "Rosita la Pastelera", "Rosy the pastry maker", because he had a talent for political compromise, even willing to compromise his own Liberal principles. He was logically considered to be the ideal person to guide the transition from absolute to representative government.

The ouster of Zea Bermúdez was the last act of the absolute monarchy. On the surface this palace coup d'état was the result of a conspiracy by the clique of "moderate" aristocrats and the "Pashas" of the Army to get rid of a troublesome and dogmatic government bureaucrat, who happened to be Prime Minister. More deeply the political crisis of 1833 was the consequence of the profound split within the Spanish ruling classes which produced a temporary political vacuum at the time of the death of Ferdinand VII. The social divisions had arisen out of the turbulent war years of 1808-14 and the political struggles that followed. They were accentuated by the intolerant and violent Carlist campaign, led by the Church, in the last years of the absolute monarchy. The more reactionary ecclesiastics and feudal-minded aristocrats questioned the legitimacy of the rule of the monarch, Ferdinand VII because they feared that the power of the Church and the influence of clericalism were on the wane. The massive destruction of monasteries during the Napoleonic War, the

⁵⁰ E. EGGERS and E. FEUNE DE COLOMBI, *Francisco de Zea Bermúdez...*, p. 132.

⁵¹ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain*, p. 49.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

refusal of the peasants to pay tithes, the expropriation of Church properties and the abolition of the Inquisition during the brief constitutional government of 1820-23 all pointed in the same direction. The Church did not intend to accommodate itself to this new situation; only a return to the "ancien regime" was acceptable, including the reestablishment of the Inquisition. The Carlist movement was the instrument of this uncompromising program. Secret societies, the rebellion of the Royalist Volunteers, conspiracies at the highest levels of government, all were legitimate weapons in this holy crusade.

The majority of the landed proprietors of Spain, the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, the Army, and the King himself were menaced by the ultra-reactionaries. In effect the actions of the Right pushed the bulk of the Spanish propertied classes towards Liberalism, an ideology which was in many ways antipathetic to them. But the Church and Don Carlos had refused to compromise, even over the politically absurd question of the reestablishment of the Inquisition. Thus a lack of flexibility had made impossible the reconciliation of two factions which were both essentially royalists, the "moderates" and the Carlists. Although the "moderates" were able to control the government by 1833 and assure the succession of Isabel and María Cristina, they had a weak social base. It was weak precisely because they were royalist aristocrats and generals, representatives of the class structure of the 18th century monarchy. In order to obtain the support of the middle classes, of the artesans, and of the richer and middling peasants they were obliged to turn to Liberalism. The establishment of a parliamentary government, which could claim the loyalty of these broader social sectors, could also guarantee the throne of Isabel against the military rebellion led by Don Carlos in the Basque provinces.

III

The Liberal Government of 1834-36: Moderates vs Radicals.

The years 1834-36 mark the transition from absolute monarchy to representative government in Spain. With the return of the several thousand political exiles came Liberalism and liberal institutions. Parliamentary government, freedom of the press, municipal elections were reestablished. A National Militia was set up in all the cities to protect them from Carlist attacks and to defend the new government. Control of the Army gradually passed from the "Pashas" into the hands of Liberal generals like Espoz y Mina and San Miguel. The formation of radical clubs, the parliamentary debates, the spread of pamphlet literature and newspapers, all contributed to the increasing consciousness of social and political change. The traditional aristocratic and military elites tried to limit these transformations, but failed. The former exiles now exercised control, the Liberal intelligentsia had taken power.

Historical circumstances accentuated the tendency towards political radicalism. By 1834 the Carlist rebellion in the North had become a full-scale war. The Carlists controlled most of the Basque provinces, Navarre, and had armed followers in parts of Catalonia, Galicia and La Mancha. Under the leadership of the tactical genius Zumalacárregui, they won many battles against the "Cristinos" (those supporting María Cristina). The Liberal government at Madrid was forced to battle for its life. Money, men and supplies had to be sent to the Army fighting in the North. This became a revolutionary war, a struggle against absolutism and theocracy, a conflict that had international repercussions.

The civil war between Carlists and Liberals became the most significant expression of the larger struggle between, the absolute monarchies of the Holy Alliance, Austria, Prussia and Russia, and the liberal parliamentary governments of the Quadruple Alliance of England, France, Spain and Portugal. The English and French bourgeoisies supported the Spanish Liberals because they feared the possible consequences of a Carlist victory, which would not only be a victory for Metternich and the European aristocracy, but also a blow against English and French commercial expansion in the Mediterranean. They shipped money and arms in great quantities to support the governments of Martínez de la Rosa and the Count of Toreno in 1834-35, and of Mendizábal in the following year. News of Liberal victories against the Carlists spurred upwards the price of Spanish bonds on the stock markets of London and Paris; contrary news had the opposite effect.

But this study is not a diplomatic or a military history of the epoch. We are primarily interested in the social and political changes that led to the consolidation of the bourgeois parliamentary State in Spain in this period. The years 1834-36 were the first and crucial stage in this process, the stage in which the liberal intelligentsia came to exercise power and began to reform society. Who were the Liberals, how did they come to control Spanish politics, and who supported them are some of the major questions to be asked, as well as who was opposed to liberal reform. Reforms were not carried out without opposition. The Carlists, old royalists, aristocrats and clergymen tried their best to slow the advance of radicalism. Even within the liberal party there were splits among conservatives and radicals. These divisions were most evident in the debates of the new Spanish parliament. The distinct parliamentary groups of 1834-1836 were the precursors of the future political parties, the Progressives and the Moderates. To understand these developments, attention must now be focused on Madrid and the new political system forged by the Liberals.

When the thousands of Liberal exiles returned to Spain in 1834 a great number went directly to Madrid. There they founded and published newspapers, formed clubs, and soon dominated the intellectual and political life of the capital. Madrid was a city of some 200,000 inhabitants, but to the Liberals it undoubtedly appeared provincial and backward compared to Paris and London, the cities where most had spent their long ten years' exile. Architecturally the capital remained much as it had been in the 18th century: most of the daily activity centered around the two main squares, the Puerta del Sol and the Plaza Mayor. Some new building was going on, several aristocrats were building private palaces on the new broad avenues. But Madrid, (like most Spanish cities), was still dominated by great numbers of monasteries and convents: there were in 1831 a total a 69, huge and half empty. The older sections of the city, which proliferated with petty commerce, were full of narrow streets and overcrowded tenements. There was only one bank, and only one truly large industrial establishment, the tobacco factory which employed over 2,000 workers, mostly women. As the administrative center of the monarchy, Madrid provided a livelihood for a large number of functionaries and attracted the greater number of the Grandees and a large proportion of Army generals and officers. The following contemporary description provides a vivid idea of the actual life of the city shortly before 1834.

In his splendid guide to Madrid, published in 1831, Mesonero Romanos inserted a short passage titled "A day in Madrid":

"At dawn the motion of this numerous town begins slowly. The gates are opened to let in scores of villagers who bring their wares from the surrounding countryside to deposit them in the abundant market places of the capital; ... gradually, people fill up the plazas and the markets, doing petty shopping; the churches are occupied by old men and women and the early risers who go to the first mass of the morning; the artisans stream happily to their respective working places; ... at nine o'clock, the tableau

changes: the carriages of the magnates, and of the public functionaries, followed by hordes of jobseekers... roll to the government ministries and offices... the lawyers open their doors to the multitude of litigants; the sound of coins ring in the shops of the merchants and hammers in those of the artisan; and the elegant clothing stores, well decorated, fresh and clean, welcome the diligent ladies who come there to satiate their caprices and their vanity... (At two-o'clock) the offices begin to empty... and everyone prepares to sit down at the luncheon table... (Afterwards) the population remains in repose; the siesta, which among the inferior classes is little or nothing, is prolonged more than an hour by the other classes; but at four-o'clock the city is reanimated... Most work is left aside, leaving room for pleasure; the shaded walks are peopled with individuals of all ranks; the bullfights, teas, short visits to the hill of Vista Alegre, and other diversions offer themselves to one and all... All remain happily in these activities until night approaches... The majority return to their homes to enjoy their repose, while others prolong their pleasures... in salons... or at gaming houses... until around two in the morning, when one can only hear the voices of the vigilant watchmen in the empty streets..."¹.

Despite the provinciality of the Spanish capital in the 1830's, it was there that the political life of the nation was centered. Indeed, the reestablishment of parliamentary government in 1834 and the return of the Spanish Liberals from exile soon made Madrid one of the most advanced and vigorous political centers in all of Europe.

Among the hundreds of Liberals who returned to Madrid during the winter and spring of 1834 were such men as Antonio Alcalá Galiano, Agustín Argüelles, José María Calatrava, Francisco Javier Istúriz, Juan Alvarez Mendizábal, and many more distinguished figures. The return of these illustrious politicians, intellectuals, and military officers to the peninsula brought profound changes. The government of Martínez de la Rosa granted increased political liberties and supported freedom of the press. Already in May of 1834 such newspapers as *La Abeja* and *El Eco del Comercio* appeared in the streets of Madrid, and a number of others in Barcelona, Seville and Cádiz. The government also published a decree on the 15th of February establishing the urban Militia to protect the cities from possible Carlist attacks. The Militia batallions rapidly became bastions of advanced liberalism. Finally, the Martínez de la Rosa Cabinet decided to reestablish parliamentary government. This was done through the publication of an official document titled the *Estatuto Real* (Royal Statute) on the 10th of April, 1834². This document served as the legal basis for the Spanish government for two years until August 13, 1836.

The *Estatuto Real* had been formulated by the Ministers, Martínez de la Rosa, Garelly, and Javier de Burgos, and clearly expressed their conception of the functions of the new representative institutions³. The

¹ RAMÓN MESONERO ROMANOS, *Manual de Madrid* (edición de 1831), vol. III (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Madrid, 1967), pp. 24-25.

² For the text of the *Estatuto Real* see E. TIerno GALVÁN, *Leyes Políticas Españolas Fundamentales (1808-1936)* (Tecnos, Madrid, 1968).

³ See FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto* (Madrid, 1837), pp. XII-XIII.

parliament was to be composed of two chambers called the *Estamento de Procuradores*, (Estate of Representatives), and the *Estamento de Próceres*, (Estate of Notables), (the antiquated language purposefully recalling the medieval *Cortes*). The dual chambers theoretically represented the two dominant classes of Spanish society, the aristocracy (Próceres) and the bourgeoisie (Procuradores). The "Próceres" were named directly by the King, while the "Procuradores" were to be elected by the 16,000 wealthiest men in Spain. Given the fact that these 16,000 gentlemen were most likely large landlords, it is difficult to assume that the *Estatuto* truly gave an opportunity to the urban bourgeoisie to directly participate in national politics. On the contrary, Martínez de la Rosa clearly intended that the new regime should be a democracy of the aristocracy; a government of, by and for the largest landowners, the chief generals, tolerant bishops, and a scattering of rich merchants and industrialists⁴.

Essentially the *Estamento de Próceres* was controlled by the royalist elite of 1833, composed of wealthy aristocrats and the "Pashas" of the Army. Among the leading "Próceres" in 1834 were generals like Javier Castaños, the Marquess of Amarillas, Ramón Rodil, Jerónimo Valdés, the Count of Ezpeleta and the Prince of Anglona; among the aristocrats were the Count of Ofalía, the Count of Parcent, the Count of Puñorostro, the Duke of Castorreño, the Duke of Alba, the Marquess of Miraflores and the Duke of Osuna. There were also eleven bishops and archbishops, (members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy not directly identified with the Carlists). Of the total 104 *Próceres* there were virtually no members of the commercial or industrial bourgeoisie. The upper chamber faithfully represented the aristocratic elite of the "ancien regime".

The *Estamento de Procuradores*, on the other hand, included individuals from a broader social background⁵. The law stipulated that all candidates to the position of *Procurador* had to have an annual income of at least 12,000 "reales", (in contrast with the 60,000 "reales" for *Próceres*). There were instances of individuals like the famous Liberal orator Agustín Argüelles who presented himself as candidate without complying with this regulation. Once elected, however, the government gave the penniless Argüelles an annual pension of 12,000 "reales" in order to allow him to keep his seat. In the elections of July, 1834 a great number of Liberals were elected *Procuradores*⁶. Of the total 188 members of the *Estamento de Procuradores* there were many who had participated in the *Cortes* of Cádiz of 1810-1814, and the *Cortes* of 1820-23. Others had held administra-

⁴ Fermín Caballero, in discussing the "Estamentos" of the *Estatuto Real*, wrote in 1836: "The union of the industrial and mercantile wealthy with the hereditary wealth (aristocracy), far from diminishing the power of the latter, served to perpetuate it...", *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, p. XV.

⁵ For a list of the "Próceres" see F. CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, appendix pp. 24-26. Also see *Estadística del personal y vicisitudes de las Cortes y de los Ministerios de España (1833-1858)* (Madrid, 1859).

⁶ Why so many Liberals were elected is not clear. Perhaps it was because they were more determined to enter politics and presented themselves as candidates, while most upper class Spaniards still did not know what to think of the new political system.

tive positions during those same periods. Thus almost one-half of the members of the lower chamber of the Spanish Parliament were former Liberals⁷. According to a contemporary source, the socio-economic breakdown of the *Procuradores* of 1834 was the following: 130 members were independently wealthy, either as landowners, merchants, industrialists, or lawyers; 53 were state employees or officers in the Army; 5 were ecclesiastics⁸.

The *Estatuto Real* did not clearly distinguish between the powers of the two chambers; it was assumed that they would function much as the English House of Lords and House of Commons. In practice, the *Estamento de Procuradores* (like the House of Commons) was the more important legislative body, and it met far more frequently. Proposals for laws were always submitted first to the lower chamber which debated the question, approving or rejecting the proposed laws. If approved they would then pass to the *Estamento de Próceres*, which generally ratified the new laws. The upper chamber rarely refused to approve a law; such an action would most likely lead to a major political crisis. Thus the real power of legislation lay with the *Estamento de Procuradores*⁹.

The decree calling for the reunion of the *Cortes* was published on May 20, 1834, allowing almost two months for the election of the *Procuradores*. The Spanish parliament opened its doors on the 24th of July. The representatives held their meetings in a building which had been a church; it was renovated to serve as a chamber of deputies and continued serving this function until 1841. The *Procuradores* generally met at around noon and sat through most of the afternoon, sometimes into the early evening, debating different points of legislation. The first legislative sessions were held in the midst of a turbulent situation. A cholera epidemic had hit Madrid, hundreds of persons had died, and many of the wealthy classes had fled the city. On the 17th of July a mob streamed down to one of the more populous districts of the city, known as "La Latina", entered several monasteries and slaughtered 75 monks¹⁰. Rumors had spread throughout the city that a monk had been seen pouring some powder into a water fountain; the populace apparently believed that this was the cause of the plague that had stricken the capital. The monks were also accused of being Carlist sympathisers and of storing arms in the monasteries. In addition to the monk murders, the recent news of

⁷ This affirmation is based on a comparison of the lists of "Procuradores" contained in the book *Estadística y vicisitudes de las Cortes (1833-58)*, with the deputies listed as being members of the *Cortes* of 1810-1814 and 1820-23 in the study of MÁXIMO GARCÍA VENERO, *Historia del parlamentarismo español* (Madrid, 1940), and in the *Repertorio estadístico de España de 1823* (Madrid, 1823), as well as other sources.

⁸ FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, p. XXXIV.

⁹ For points of clarification on the legal aspects of government under the *Estatuto Real* see Joaquín Villaroya's detailed *El sistema político del Estatuto Real* (Madrid, 1968).

¹⁰ Fermín Caballero provides a list of the names of the murdered friars and supplementary information in *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, pp. XLVII-XLVIII.

Carlist victories in the North did not provide propitious circumstances for the beginning of the parliamentary sessions.

Although there were not, as yet, anything resembling political parties, the parliamentary representatives soon divided into two main groups, the "ministerials" who supported the Ministry of Martínez de la Rosa, and the opposition. The opposition group particularly criticized the *Estatuto Real*, arguing that it was not a constitution and that it did not guarantee many basic rights and liberties. At the beginning of August, Joaquín María López (deputy for Alicante) presented a petition to the Chamber demanding the approval of a formal bill of rights. The petition was signed by numerous old Liberals and some younger ones. The bill had twelve articles, affirming individual rights, equality before the law, freedom of the press, and a request that the National Militia be reconstituted in the same form as in 1820¹¹. The Martínez de la Rosa Cabinet violently opposed the measure, but still did not have a majority in the lower chamber. The representatives discussed the question, voted and approved it by 71 to 38 votes. The Queen-Regent, María Cristina, however, refused to sign and proclaim the document.

Within a few weeks the remaining representatives arrived at the capital, and the Cabinet obtained a working majority. The opposition nevertheless kept on pressing the question of the bill of rights. Their chief leaders were Joaquín María López, Fermín Caballero, the Count of las Navas, and the great orator of 1812, Agustín Argüelles. Their initial political program was simple and straightforward. They supported the aforementioned bill, which would lead later to the proclamation of a constitution, and they pressed for the more democratic organization of the National Militia (which at this stage was called "urban militia")¹².

The conservative groups were the first to recognize and distinguish the political divisions within the lower chamber. As early as the 13th of August, 1834, *La Abeja*, a conservative newspaper, made the following commentary: "only one major question has been debated in the *Estamento de Procuradores*; yet already on account of it, there have appeared both in the *Estamento* and in the newspaper press of the capital, a party of the Ministry and another of the opposition. It should have been expected, for the very nature of representative government demands this..."¹³

These parliamentary groups were of course not yet political parties. They only indicated the general tendencies that were developing. *La Abeja* defined the factions as being the one, "moderate", and the other, "radical", recalling the political distinctions of the constitutional period of 1820-23. The "moderate" or government faction followed the lead of Martínez de la Rosa and of the new Minister of Economy, the Count

¹¹ For the text of the petition and the names of the deputies who signed it see FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, appendix, pp. 31-33.

¹² For a discussion of the debates of the first months of this legislature see DIEGO SEVILLA ANDRÉS, *Historia constitucional de España (1800-1967)* (Madrid, 1968).

¹³ Quoted in JOAQUÍN VILLAROYA, *El sistema político del Estatuto Real*, p. 329.

of Toreno. Their ideological program was defined as that of "el justo medio", equivalent to the policy of the "juste milieu" of the ruling party in France at that time¹⁴. The government also had the support of the upper Chamber, the *Estamento de Próceres*.

During this period, Martínez de la Rosa was chiefly concerned with obtaining support for a foreign loan of 400 million "reales", and in getting international recognition for the new government. He had sent the Marquis of Miraflores to London as ambassador, who, with the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Palmerston, was able to arrange the signing of the Quadruple Alliance. By this treaty, England and France were bound to aid the liberal governments of Spain and Portugal in their respective battles against the absolutists, Don Carlos and Don Miguel¹⁵. In Portugal the ultra-royalists had launched a rebellion against the liberal government. Don Miguel, led the absolutist forces. Don Carlos had joined this army when Ferdinand VII died, hoping that a right wing victory in Portugal would aid the reactionary cause in Spain. In the spring of 1834, a Spanish general, Ramón Rodil, intervened in Portugal decisively defeating the troops of Don Miguel. Don Carlos, however, managed to escape and reached England on a British ship. He remained there briefly, soon to secretly return to northern Spain in order to lead the Carlist rebellion. The war and the brilliant successes of the Carlist general Zumalacárregui began to rapidly undermine the prestige of the Martínez de la Rosa government.

The parliamentary opposition pressed the government particularly on two points: the Army and the Militia. Orators like Alcalá Galiano accused the government of laxness in prosecuting the war against the Carlists. General Rodil, who had been in charge of the Army of the North, was removed on the 7th of October, 1834, and replaced by the famous guerrilla leader of the War of Independence, General Espoz y Mina. But he did not have much more success than his predecessor. The more "radical" politicians in Madrid called for a larger urban militia. In February of 1834, it had totalled only 42,000 men in all of the peninsula. Later this number was increased, but it was only under the government of Mendizábal in 1835-36 that the militia became truly powerful; [in that period over 400,000 men were affiliated, although only one third of them were armed]¹⁶.

The chief newspaper organs of the opposition carried on a running battle against many of the policies of Martínez de la Rosa. The most

¹⁴ For a discussion of the conservatives ideology see LUIS DíEZ DEL CORRAL, *El Liberalismo Doctrinario* (Madrid, 1956).

¹⁵ For a discussion of the Quadruple Alliance and the international diplomacy of the period with respect to Spain in the 1830's see CHARLES WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841*, vol. I, pp. 422-494, and L. SAURA, *La política exterior de España durante la menor edad de Isabel II* (Madrid, 1930).

¹⁶ For statistical information on the Militia see *Guía Oficial de España de 1837*, *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación 1836*, and the appendixes of ANGEL PIRALA, *Historia de la Guerra Civil y los partidos liberal y carlista*, 6 vols., in particular vol. III, p. 484.

important of these were *El Mensajero de las Cortes*, edited by Evaristo San Miguel, Alcalá Galiano, and the Duke of Rivas, and *El Eco del Comercio*, edited by Angel Iznardi and Fermín Caballero. It was in the parliamentary debates, nonetheless, that the opposition showed its determination to press for more progressive measures. In his book, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, (1836), Fermín Caballero briefly described the leading members of the group :

"In remembering the spirit of unity and resolve that the opposition of 1834 maintained, it is necessary to recognize that there were present many figures of great worth. There excelled the torrent of eloquence of López, the tribunal fury of Alcalá Galiano, the prestige and person of Argüelles, the dauntlessness of Navas, the opportuness of Caballero, the fibre of Istúriz, the constancy of González, the candor of Trueba, and the strict voting of Pedraja, Pizarro, Ortiz de Velasco, Abargues, Rodríguez Vera, Cano Manuel, and several others"¹⁷.

Few historians have paid much attention to either of the parliamentary groups, the "ministerials", who supported Martínez de la Rosa, or the opposition. Yet it was from these grouping that the future political parties were to be born; respectively the Moderate and the Progressive parties. The only modern historian that has dealt with this question, J. Villaroya, makes a misleading resume of the situation. He says: "The simple review of the votes that took place in the 'Estamento' makes it immediately clear that, apart from two reduced and opposing groups, a great number of the representatives adopted a vacillating attitude, which frequently determined the outcome"¹⁸. The suggestion is that the political split was neither significant nor constant. Fortunately, there exist statistical tables of the votes of those years, published in the *Eco del Comercio* on February 12, 1836, and they disprove this assertion. This chart provides an index of how the representatives voted on several of the most important issues, and gives the numerical distribution of votes per deputy in the total 78 votes of the legislature of 1834: for the government, against, and abstentions. There were three groups :

In opposition to the ministry of Martínez de la Rosa	
there were	58 representatives
Among the "ministerial" members who favored the Ministry of Martínez de la Rosa there were	92 representatives
As "floating voters" there were	58 representatives

These figures clearly show the distribution of forces in the Spanish parliament in this period¹⁹. The political divisions were as yet only tendencies, but a study of the legislatures of succeeding years, shows that

¹⁷ FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, p. XXXI.

¹⁸ See JOAQUÍN VILLARROYA, *El sistema político...*, p. 332.

¹⁹ These figures can also be checked with the statistics in the appendix of F. CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, pp. 72-82, as well as with the published votes in the *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*.

the majority of the opposition of 1834 later became the chief members of the Progressive Party, and that the "ministerials" formed the bulk of the Moderate Party.

The legislative session of 1834 was not only extremely active, but also demonstrated a high level of political dedication and realism. This is surprising, considering that the Liberal government had taken power close on the heels of a chaotic and despotic period of absolutist rule, and in the midst of a vicious civil war. The credit goes chiefly to the large number of experienced and energetic liberal emigres, both conservative and radical, who returned to Spain in that year. A French visitor commented on the Spanish parliament in this period:

"I cannot express-he said- the admiration I have experienced at the dignity of the language, the balance of the words, the subtlety which the orators use, and the silent religious-like calm and attention of the Chamber. I have no remorse in affirming that the Spanish deliberating assembly is a veritable model in nobility and seriousness. Without doubt, the House of Commons of England does not attain the same level as that of the 'Estamento de Procuradores' of Spain"²⁰.

In July of 1835, the government of Martínez de la Rosa fell as a consequence of a series of provincial rebellions. First Málaga, and then many other cities of Andalucía declared their no-confidence in the ruling ministry, and established local governing juntas. In Barcelona many convents were burned, the largest and most modern factory was destroyed, and there were popular riots. The revolts were motivated by several causes, among which the most important were the increased political consciousness, the disasters of the Carlist War, and the continuing devastation caused by the cholera epidemic, particularly in the coastal Mediterranean towns. Literally thousands died in Valencia, as well as Alicante and Cartagena²¹. The urban militia was the chief protagonist of these risings, and they were supported by the "menu people", but it was the upper bourgeoisie that commanded the revolutionary juntas. These juntas were closely linked to the parliamentary opposition and its press in Madrid, which set the general guidelines for the political protest, namely the dismissal of the present Cabinet and the implementation of reforms.

On the 7th of July, the Queen-Regent named a new government, headed by the Count of Toreno. His ministry was brief. He did not have the confidence of opposing political leaders, mainly because he continued with the same policy of the "juste milieu". His chief failure was his inability to disband the provincial juntas. In September, María Cristina turned to

²⁰ "La Crónica apareció en *Le Moniteur* y fue reproducido en *La Revista Española* del 25 de diciembre de 1835", JOAQUÍN VILLARROYA, *El Sistema Político...*, p. 334.

²¹ Even in the city of Zamora, which is far from the Mediterranean, the cholera killed 2,235 persons in the months of July and August, 1835. See MANUEL RUIZ LAGOS, *Liberales en Avila: La crisis del Antiguo Régimen (1790-1840)* (Avila, 1967), p. 34.

a different man to head the state, Juan Alvarez de Mendizábal²². An able financier, with particularly good connections in the British Cabinet and in the European money markets, Mendizábal was a representative of the commercial bourgeoisie of southeastern Spain. He had friends in the opposition party, and was rumored to have great plans for the winning of the civil war and for administrative reform. The appointment of Mendizábal as Prime Minister did much to placate the provincial radicals. Most of the revolutionary juntas that had originally rebelled against the Ministry of Toreno soon disbanded.

The rise of Mendizábal was a victory for radicalism and the parliamentary opposition. During the nine months he served as Prime Minister (Sept., 1835-May, 1836), Mendizábal began a wide range of political and economic reforms, including the "*Desamortización*", (the disentanglement of the Church lands). By conservatives he was considered a dictator of the Left; by his own partisans and by many radicals he was deemed the chief pillar of the new Liberal State. What were the core of Mendizábal's ideas on politics and finances? The first was a practical approach to the problem of establishing Liberalism with foreign financial aid, but without foreign military intervention. The second was the necessity to strengthen the State and the bourgeoisie at the expense of the feudalistic Church. The third was the reform of the sick man, which was the Spanish state. His political philosophy was not sophisticated. He was a fervent Liberal, and his conception of himself was probably something on the line of an efficient doctor who used finances and practical reforms to cure and strengthen his patient, namely Spain. The most notable aspect of Mendizábal was that he had developed the basic ideas of his program of reform before his return to Spain. His close attachment to British politics and finances, as well as his contribution to the Portuguese Liberal cause formed the context of his preparation. His experience and contacts made him one of the more internationally respected of Spanish statesmen, but his lack of grasp of domestic political developments led him to numerous failures.

In the fall of 1835, Mendizábal acted quickly and energetically, winning respect and admiration among many. He decreed a mandatory enlistment of one hundred thousand men to strengthen the Army of the North, which was fighting against the Carlists. He also changed the name of the urban militia to that of National Guard, and increased its numbers. He was able to obtain a series of large foreign loans, and in general showed himself to be much more effective than his predecessors. In December of 1835, the second legislative session of the Spanish parliament opened with the *Estatuto Real* still in force. The representatives of 1835 were the same as those of the preceding year, but now the old "ministerials" formed the opposition, and the old progressive opposition supported the new government, calling themselves "mendizabalistas". The most

²² For biographical information on Mendizábal see Tejeiro's multi-volume *Historia administrativa de Mendizábal* (Madrid, 1856). Also see useful details in V. LLORÉNS, *Liberales y Románticos*, pp. 142-52.

important question to be discussed was the ratification of a new electoral law that would be less restrictive than that of 1834. The Mendizábal government had to play a delicate game of balance, conceding points to the conservative opposition since they had a majority, and not demonstrating excessive sympathies for the progressive wing of the Chamber.

In January of 1836, the parliamentary body began to discuss the electoral law presented by a special committee set up for this purpose²³. The conservative opposition favored direct elections by districts, with a limited number of voters. The "mendizabalistas" preferred indirect elections by provinces, with a larger number of electors, particularly in the category of "capacidades", that is the professional class of doctors, lawyers professors, etc. The conservatives believed that they would be able to dominate in elections by *districts* because these gave greater strength to the rural areas, which supplied conservative-voting landowners. The radicals, on the other hand, felt that their greatest support lay in the cities, and that elections by *provinces* would provide a proportionally greater weight adjudicated to the capitals. The parliamentary committee had discussed the different propositions, and ended up by submitting a compromise, including a proposal for mixed elections, combining direct and indirect electoral procedures. On the 14th of January the "Estamento" voted on the new law and rejected it. The results of the vote are indicative of the different tendencies:

Is the proposal for "mixed elections"	approved	97 no - 42 yes
Is article 6 on "capacidades"	approved	79 no - 63 yes
Is article 17 on elections by provinces	approved	71 no - 66 yes ²⁴

The conservatives had, then, won in all of the major votes, rejecting the more liberal electoral law that had been proposed. The Mendizábal Cabinet had not openly supported one or another system, but the results of the debates and votes meant a return to the status quo, and this in itself was a blow to the reform-minded government. Mendizábal had as yet been unable to fill all the Cabinet positions, occupying three of the posts himself since September. He asked for a vote of confidence, and the representatives granted it by an overwhelming majority. The conservative leaders like Martínez de la Rosa and Toreno were opposed, and, as Fernández de los Ríos tells us, the debate that preceded the vote of confidence, "revealed the seeds of an opposition which would later come to be the clear and resolute division of the liberal party"²⁵.

²³ For a detailed analysis of the debates on the electoral law see JOAQUÍN VILLARROYA, *El Sistema Político...*, pp. 427-474.

²⁴ See *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de diciembre 1835-marzo 1836, voting results published in the sessions of January 14, 17, 24. Also see FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, appendix, pp. 77-82.

²⁵ A. FERNÁNDEZ DE LOS RÍOS, *Estudio histórico de las luchas políticas de la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1879), p. 227.

With the vote of confidence in his pocket, Mendizábal decided to dissolve the legislature. The American ambassador, who was present at the reading of the decree of dissolution in the Chamber, reported "there was immense cheering in the gallery with cries of 'fuera los turcos' (out with the rogues)... The business has been very awkwardly managed"²⁶. The rogues were presumably the conservative deputies, for neither Toreno nor Martínez de la Rosa dared to appear on that day on account of the large and turbulent crowd around the building. The episode, nonetheless, demonstrated that Mendizábal had popular support, and left him with his hands free to proceed with important domestic reforms.

The most important reform initiated by Mendizábal was clearly the *Desamortización*, the disentailment of Church properties²⁷. This reform later came to be considered as the most important of all government measures taken to consolidate the bourgeois Liberal State. The decree ordering the sale of all monastic properties was published on March 8, 1836. A short preface signed by the Minister of Finance, A. Gómez Becerra, preceded the actual law and explained the motives for its ratification. The Minister noted that "the welfare of an immense number of families is based upon the amelioration of the Creditors of the State, and principally on the increase of the public wealth; that the amount of the debt requires great and effective means which it is necessary to obtain without injury to the people and without diminishing the supplies necessary for the support of the Civil War..."²⁸. The law itself declared all monasteries and religious orders of men suppressed. Article 20 of the decree stated that all of the nationalised property was to be applied to the Royal chest of the sinking debt, for the extinction of the public debt. Stipulations also guaranteed that former monks would receive pensions from the State.

The disentailment of 1836 did not affect the secular Church, the parish priests and the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The law was directed rather against the monastic orders, who not only had the largest landed properties, but also were, (in great numbers), partisans of Don Carlos. The sale of the Church lands gave the Liberal government the support of a large portion of the Spanish "rentier" classes. These classes were able to exchange their virtually worthless State bonds for valuable urban and rural real estate. Initially, of course, the sales were slow, but in coming years the disentailment produced a great capital market in land, thereby stimulating increased agricultural production in lands which had been formerly undercultivated.

²⁶ *National Archives* (Washington, D.C.), Department of State, Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Spain, Microcopy-31, roll 32, letter from Van Ness, January 27, 1836.

²⁷ For a discussion of the political aspects of the "Desamortización" see F. TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, *El marco político de la Desamortización en España* (Barcelona, 1971).

²⁸ For the text see *Gaceta de Madrid*, March 10, 1836.

As a measure to eliminate the last remnants of feudalism, particularly Church feudalism, the *Desamortización* was a success; as a means of stimulating the economy it was also successful; but as a true agrarian reform it was not. The *Desamortización* did not lead to the creation of a new independent peasantry because the only individuals with the capital to buy up the nationalised lands were the wealthy classes. This tendency, however, was not yet altogether evident in 1836; it would become increasingly apparent in coming years²⁹.

In other areas of government finances Mendizábal took important steps. He substantially increased the budgets of the Ministry of War to pay for the war against the Carlists, and the budgets of the Ministries of the Interior and of Finances to promote economic development, transport and communications. In order to cover these additional expenses Mendizábal was obliged to increase taxes and to seek foreign loans. The Prime Minister also had recourse to the somewhat unorthodox and expensive method of obtaining funds from local Madrid bankers who made short-term loans to the government. The loans paid extremely high interest but were necessary to cover the monthly and even weekly expenses. On the whole, Mendizábal provided greater and more regular funds for the Army fighting in the North than had his predecessors, Martínez de la Rosa and Toreno. The Army increased in size and its supply system improved.

The Mendizábal government did not only carry out significant financial reforms, it also brought important political changes. It was from the Ministry of the Interior that Mendizábal carried out his plans to change the political and administrative structure of the country³⁰.

The large size of the Ministry made it ideal as a source of patronage, and allowed Mendizábal to remove old royalist functionaries and to fill the government with Liberals and radicals both at Madrid and in the provinces.

The Ministry of the Interior had an extremely broad jurisdiction including everything related to the internal administration of the kingdom, transport, public education, prisons and economic development. Under Mendizábal the local units of administration acquired considerable power, in particular the political governors ("*jefes políticos*") of the provinces, the provincial deputations ("*diputaciones provinciales*") which dealt with economic and educational reforms, and the town governments ("*ayuntamientos*"). Local bureaus for the promotion of public education, medical care, and assistance to the poor were set up in all the cities. An extensive public works program was begun, as we can see from the *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación de 1836*: bridges, roads, jails, public buildings and monuments were constructed in practically all of the larger towns and

²⁹ For a listing of some of the recent studies on the "*Desamortización*", see GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, *La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868*, pp. 247-248. Also see the recent publications by Francisco Simón Segura.

³⁰ See RAMÓN SANTILLÁN, *Memorias (1815-1856)*, vol. I, p. 157.

cities. The reform of the jails and the abolition of torture were instituted³¹.

The increase in political liberties under Mendizábal promoted a change in the political consciousness of the population. More than half a million citizens participated in the municipal elections of December, 1835³². This bespeaks a considerable degree of democracy at local levels of government. The National Militia, which was under the control of the municipalities, increased greatly in size; the officers of the Militia were democratically elected by the members. Both town governments and the Militia played an important part in the radicalization of Spanish politics in this period. They directly threatened the authority of the traditional aristocracy in the provinces.

In the spring of 1836 the Spanish chief of state was also involved in rather delicate international maneuvering. He had established good relations with the British ambassador in Madrid, George Villiers, who supported his attempts to get foreign funds. There was considerable competition in the European financial world in the selling and buying of Spanish stock (of the public debt). Good news from Spain, victories of the Liberal troops against the Carlist would send prices up; speculation was a constant factor that had to be accounted for³³. Mendizábal was working at this time on a large foreign loan, the details of which he was to send to his agent in London, Pedro Zulueta.

The Spanish Prime Minister cultivated the influence of Villiers, who could help in the negotiations, or might even get the British government to support a loan. Villiers had already aided the Spaniards, by helping to organize the British Legion, a corps of some ten thousand volunteers who were fighting in the Basque country against the Carlists. Furthermore Great Britain was supplying virtually all the arms to the Spanish Army; about three hundred thousand carbines were supplied in the three years of 1834-36. But Villiers also wanted something in return. He attempted to get a commercial treaty signed secretly. In return for a loan, British cotton goods were to be admitted free of duty, thus competing with Catalan textiles. Villiers had begun the negotiations in September, but by January of 1836, word had leaked out about them³⁴.

The French government was obviously distressed at the secret British maneuvering. On the 10th of January, Villiers confessed to Rayneval, the French ambassador, that the commercial treaty would not be signed, because of the opposition of the Queen-Regent and the conservative ele-

³¹ There is an enormous amount of information in the *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación de 1836*. We have not seen any references to this excellent primary source in any histories, and recommend it for information on the administration, government personnel, and industry in the different provinces. The only two copies we know to exist are: (1) in the *Biblioteca del Senado* in Madrid, unclassified; (2) in the *Hemeroteca Municipal* de Madrid.

³² *Ibid.* (Has statistics for most of the provinces on number of municipal voters.)

³³ CHARLES WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston...*, vol. I, p. 425.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 437-38.

ments³⁵. Mendizábal, nonetheless, pressed the French for a commitment to armed intervention in the civil war on the side of María Cristina. The French Prime Minister, Broglie, refused to consider the question. Rayneval, then turned to scheming, and began to side with the "moderate" political groups. Villiers kept supporting Mendizábal.

The Spanish Prime Minister called for elections in early March, of 1836. There were several groups vying with each other for power, but fundamentally they were split in two groups, the "moderate" supporters of the *Estatuto Real*, and the more radical elements, that approved of Mendizábal's ecclesiastical reforms and demanded the proclamation of a constitution. The "moderate" group, which centered around Martínez de la Rosa and Toreno, also had ties with the faction of the so-called "enlightened absolutists", led by the Count of Ofalía, the Marquis of Amarillas, General Castaños, and much of the aristocracy. The French ambassador described the moderate party as counting upon the Queen-Regent, the Royal Guard, and the Army, now under the direction of General Cordova, "This party, which is composed of the Grandees, the principal proprietors and capitalists, the military chiefs, in a word, all those who have something to lose, counsel the Queen Cristina to risk a coup d'état rather than permit the annulment of the *Estatuto Real* and its replacement with a constitution"³⁶.

The elections were held in February of 1836. The *Eco del Comercio* described the two main protagonists: "There are two parties that chiefly battle, as we see it: the stationary or fusionist, and that of progress or 'exaltado'"³⁷. The second and more radical group won the elections handsomely. Among the 149 representatives elected, approximately 120 supported the government of Mendizábal, and the remainder opposed it³⁸. In spite of the victory of the radical party, there were severe obstacles to the realization of a program of constitutional reform. The main discussions during the legislative session of the spring of 1836 centred around the approval of a wider electoral franchise, as well as the possibility of reforming the *Estatuto Real*. But the civil war in the north was not going well, in spite of the fact that the greatest Carlist general Zumalacárregui, had died during the siege of Bilbao 4 months before, in December of 1835. There were also numerous secret societies that had caused alarm in January and now in March. In Barcelona, several conspirators were arrested³⁹. Furthermore Mendizábal had as yet to work out an agreement with the new Procuradores.

From the beginning of March, Mendizábal attempted on numerous occasions to get one of the most important parliamentary leaders, Javier

³⁵ *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères*, Correspondance Politique de l'Espagne, volume 771, Janvier-Juain 1836, letter dated January 10, 1836.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, letter of March 5, 1836.

³⁷ JOAQUÍN VILLARROYA, *El Sistema Político...*, p. 442, quoting the *Eco del Comercio*, February 20, 1836.

³⁸ FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes...*, appendix, pp. 13-18; this provides a detailed analysis of the deputies political affiliation by votes.

³⁹ ANGEL PIRALA, *Historia de la Guerra Civil...*, vol. III, p. 281.

Istúriz, to enter the Cabinet. But Istúriz had his own particular ambitions. Already in January, the Queen had received him secretly, suggesting that he might be the man to replace Mendizábal as head of the government. In these ambitions he was encouraged by the French ambassador, who promised, or appeared to promise, French intervention in Spain against the Carlists, if a different administration were put in power⁴⁰. The British ambassador, Villiers, then tried to get Istúriz to join the government, but he reported that the Spanish politician referred to Mendizábal's system of rule as "despotism". Villiers countered that Mendizábal was "the only man in this country who in the money markets abroad enjoyed the consideration absolutely necessary for meeting the present financial crisis of Spain"⁴¹. Istúriz, nevertheless, was intransigent.

The result of this fruitless wheeling and dealing was that Mendizábal decided to wage a campaign against Istúriz in the parliament. It had been expected that Istúriz would be elected president of the Chamber, but the vote went against him, and the old Liberal of 1812, Antonio González, was elected instead. It then appeared that the parliamentary majority was split Mendizábal could only count on about 30 deputies personally loyal to him. On the 11th of April there was a verbal duel in the parliamentary chamber between García-Carrasco and Istúriz; the latter demanded satisfaction; fortunately mutual friends interposed themselves. Then on the 15th of April, a violent debate arose between Istúriz and Mendizábal, who had come to defend the Cabinet's policies. The first demanded reparations, and Mendizábal agreed to a duel.

At eleven o'clock the following morning the two men dueled in the courtyard behind the chapel of San Isidro, a quarter of a league from Madrid. Two pistol shots were exchanged without injury to either party. These dramatic events served to obscure more important negotiations that were going on meanwhile between Mendizábal and one of the most radical of the parliamentary leaders, Fermín Caballero. Istúriz believed that he controlled the majority of the deputies, but he had not done much organizational work. Caballero, meanwhile, had bound together a group of abouth Sixty to seventy representatives, who met frequently at his house⁴². The French ambassador knew about this. He wrote on the 16th of April: "He (Mendizábal) is, in effect, negotiating with the deputy Caballero, the man up to now most radical among the radicals, and who has meetings of a kind of club of "Procuradores", at his home⁴³.

Mendizábal had already reached a general agreement with the progressive leaders at the end of January. The main points had been the

⁴⁰ *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères*, Correspondance Politique de l'Espagne, volume 771, Janvier-Juin 1836, letter of January 23, February 7, and March 12.

⁴¹ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 72, Spain, vol. 458. March-April 1836. Letter from Villiers to Palmerston dated March 22, 1836.

⁴² There is a good description of these political meetings held outside the parliament in JUAN RICO Y AMAT, *Historia política y parlamentaria*, vol. 3 (Madrid, 1860-61), p. 16.

⁴³ *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères*, Correspondance Politique de l'Espagne, volume 771. Janvier-Juin 1836, letter dated April 16, 1836.

following: the re-organization of the Cabinet, reforms and limiting of expenses in the governmental finances, the exile of all those Bishops and priests known to be Carlist sympathisers, and the replacement of many of the government functionaries in the bureaus of the Ministries by more liberal men. The more general agreement reached in April between the head of the government and the radical deputies included a plan to suppress the Regency Council, the dismissal of the conservative General Cordova, who was in charge of the Army, and the acceleration of work in the Spanish Parliament to permit a reform of the *Estatuto Real* and the proclamation of a constitution⁴⁴.

Plans were also made to be prepared in case of serious resistance on the part of the "moderate" or conservative sectors. Revolts were to be instigated and local juntas set up and run by local functionaries, members of the militia, and leaders of the radical party. These juntas were intended to maintain law and order, and to repress any reactionary plots. Presumably, these measures would be taken if the Army offered opposition to the reforms. With this agreement Mendizábal was able to count on majority support in the legislative body. He was also strengthened to press more directly for foreign aid to end the Carlist War. On the 17th of April, he met Rayneval and Villiers, and asked explicitly for French intervention, as well as for an assurance that the border on the Pyrenees would be formally closed, so that the Carlists could not get supplies. Reyneval wrote approvingly of this idea to the new French Prime Minister, Thiers, and suggested that if the French did intervene they could set up a conservative government and an appropriate constitution⁴⁵. Thiers answered twelve days later that all of the proposals were impossible, and that his government did not wish to create a situation which might lead to the overthrow of Mendizábal⁴⁶.

Opposition to the governmental tactics was increasing. On the 6th of May, the *Estamento de Próceres*, (the upper and aristocratic Chamber), approved a petition demanding the suspension of the "*Desamortización*", the sale of Church lands. The radical deputies in the lower Chamber reacted swiftly asking that the number of pro-Mendizábal "Próceres" or senators be increased, so as to give the government a majority⁴⁷. They also asked for the dismissal of Generals Quesada and San Román. The radical demands coincided with the campaign pressed from the most progressive of the newspapers of the capital, *El Eco del Comercio* (edited by Fermín Caballero). In the last days of April and the first of May, the *Eco*, published a series of articles which were, in effect, the manifesto of the progressive party. The chief points were that the national sovereignty lay with the people, and that the people had a right to draw up a constitution for itself. The *Eco* further stated that the *Estatuto Real* was but

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, letter dated April 17, 1836, from Ambassador Rayneval to Prime Minister Thiers.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, copy of letter from Thiers to Rayneval, dated April 30, 1836.

⁴⁷ Thus the Spanish legislators imitated the well-known tactics of the English House of Commons to pressure the House of Lords, when in conflict.

a document conferred by the monarchy on its subjects and that it should be abolished; that a new parliament should be elected, with constituent rights (rights to draw up and ratify a constitution).

Mendizábal, accompanied by General Rodil and the Count of Almodóvar, went on several occasions to ask the Queen-Regent to replace Quesada and San Román. The Queen-Regent, María Cristina, was adamant. She refused all petitions, and stood by her Generals. The 13th of May, the Cabinet of Mendizábal resigned. Two days later, María Cristina named Javier Istúriz and Antonio Alcalá Galiano to head the new government, which presumably would be conservative. This about-face by Istúriz and Galiano, who had been among the "radical" deputies during the first legislature of 1834, shocked their fellow colleagues in the parliament. The debates were stormy and the new Ministers were received in the Chamber with hoots and insults. The political crisis reached its apogee on the 22nd of May when a no-confidence vote against the Istúriz government was proposed and approved by 78 in favor, 29 against, and 13 abstentions.

This vote was perhaps the most significant of the whole spring session. It neatly divided the members by ideological affiliation. The 78 representatives who opposed the new government, were later to form the nucleus of the Progressive Party, which effectively took shape in that summer of 1836. The 29 who supported Istúriz later entered the ranks of the Moderate Party, which was already in partial existence. The 13 abstentions, constituted a small group of mostly elderly men, some of them Liberals of the Cortes of 1812, who wished to retain the unity of the Liberal party, and were somewhat anxious at the bitterness of the division. There is no question that the date of May 22, 1836, is significant in the annals of the party history of Spain. From that date on, and particularly from the elections of the following July, the two groups, Moderates and Progressives, were to become national political tendencies and eventually national political parties.

IV

The Bourgeois Revolution: June-September 1836

The fall of Mendizábal marked a critical stage in the political and social evolution of the period. The coup d'état of May 1836 was an attempt by the old royalist elite and the more conservative Liberals like Martínez de la Rosa to limit the advance of political radicalism. These conservative groups did not want a return to absolutism; but they preached prudence in the process of reform. These Madrid elites were supported by a considerable number of the Spanish landowner classes, who shared their conservative inclinations. These sectors, however, were neither well-organized nor prepared for the political revolutions that were to break out in every major city and region in the summer of 1836.

The events of June-September 1836 demonstrate two fundamental facts about the new Spanish politics. The first was that the majority of the propertied classes had definitively abandoned the absolutist ideology of the old regime and now actively adopted Liberalism. The second was that the commercial bourgeoisie (supported by the artisan sectors) desired a more radical political revolution than the landlords had expected. The merchants and professionals of Southern and Eastern Spain were not satisfied with the *Estatuto Real*. They wanted a real Constitution, a much more ample franchise, and more thorough economic reforms. These demands were expressed in the nation-wide rebellions of August, 1836, which led to the proclamation of the democratic Constitution of 1812. Subsequently a Constituent Congress was convoked to draft and ratify a new Constitution, definitively establishing the legal basis of the parliamentary State.

The radical demands were consistent with the political evolution since 1834. The completion of the bourgeois revolution required the dismantling of the absolutist legal apparatus and its replacement with a Constitution and a modern civil code. This was the program of the Progressives. The Moderates, represented by the new government of Istúriz, had contrary views. They favored authoritarian rule, a limited franchise, and the continuation of the *Estatuto Real*. The differences between Moderate and Progressives should nonetheless not obscure the fact that a general consensus had been established among the Spanish propertied classes: that consensus consisted of a mutual acceptance of representative government and opposition to Carlism. That this general agreement existed would be shown by the elections of July, 1836.

THE ELECTIONS OF JULY 1836:

When the Istúriz Cabinet took power in May of 1836, it was faced by a revolt in the Parliament. It was obliged either to resign or to dissolve the legislature. Istúriz chose the latter course. The vote of no-confidence, approved on the 22nd of May, was followed by the closing of the Chamber. The Cabinet called for new elections in July, hoping that a large number of Moderates would be returned, eliminating the majority of "mendizabalista" radicals. From the start the Istúriz government began to replace many of the officials in local administrative posts so as to assure a conservative triumph in the elections.

Some of the more conservative groups in Madrid, however, still distrusted Istúriz. They preferred a military dictatorship under Fernández de Cordova, the General in Command of the Army of the North.

On the 4th of June, 1836, General Cordova arrived in Madrid. The English ambassador reported: "At a meeting of Proceres and other persons who claim to be leaders of the Moderate Party, and who were desirous of securing the support of General Cordova, he frankly declared that their principles would find no sympathy in the Army, since the inactive timid policy of their party offered no guarantee of order... and was utterly unfit for combatting the elements of revolution which were now set loose..."¹ Cordova urged them to support Istúriz. The Moderate Party was aware that many of the army commanders sympathised with the Progressives, in particular, General Espoz y Mina, in control of Cataluña, General Serrano, at Zaragoza, and General San Miguel, in charge of the Army of the Centre. General Cordova was the leading Moderate in the army, but his defeats in the war had damaged his prestige². The Moderate Party necessarily had to support the new Cabinet and hoped to win the elections.

The Istúriz government published an electoral decree which was much more liberal than that of 1834. A total of 65,000 persons would be permitted to vote: 50,000 of them on the basis of the taxes that they paid, and about 15,000 in the category of "capacidades", which included doctors, lawyers, professors, military officers, and officers of the National Militia. This regulation was satisfactory to the opposing political parties, as it provided a majority of landowners, upon whom the Moderates believed they could count upon, but also gave considerable strength to the upper strata of the commercial and professional middle classes, whom the Progressives thought to be their own power base.

On the 13th of July, 1836, the British consul at Coruña reported the following news to the ambassador at Madrid: "The elections for the Members of the Cortes for the district of Coruña, commenced here this

¹ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 72, vol. 459, May-June 1836. Disptach Villiers to Palmerston, no. 141, dated June 14, 1836.

² For information on the career of General Cordova see F. FERNÁNDEZ DE CORDOVA, *Mis Memorias íntimas*. 3 vols. (Madrid, 1886), written by his brother.

morning, and will be over ere the departure of the next post... the Candidates are numerous and the manoeuvres of the opposing parties are far beyond what was before experienced... the new Civil Governor, and the acting Captain General—both candidates—expect to be elected, one for Pontevedra, the other for Coruña”³. Similar developments occurred throughout the peninsula. The number of participants and the intensity of political propaganda was high. The *Eco del Comercio* reported on the elections in Granada, and a summary list of candidates gives an idea of their social origins and position:

“In this capital (Granada), and electoral districts of the province there is great agitation over the elections and the eligible deputies; each person assumes that those individuals, whom they favor, will be elected. There are various lists of candidates in circulation, but that with most credit because of the reputations of the individuals, on account of their personal qualities, is the following:

1. D. Restituto Gutiérrez de Cevallos: commander of the National Guard of Baza, member of the provincial deputation, and ex-procurador of the last session of the legislature.
2. D. Antonio Torres Pardo: dean of the association of lawyers, and individual of the provincial deputation.
3. D. José Pareja: distinguished doctor, property owner, and chief mayor of the city government.
4. D. Pedro Chacón: colonel, property-owner, and civil governor of Murcia.
5. D. Francisco de Paula Castro y Orozco: lawyer of the association, property owner, and procurador-elect of the last legislative session.
6. D. Joaquín Marín: property-owner, provincial deputy, and resident of the town of Zubia.
7. D. Cebastián de la Huerta: property-owner of Baza”⁴.

Clearly the majority of the candidates were members of the Spanish propertied classes, many with important posts in the municipal, provincial, or national governments. A considerable number of former deputies Procuradores presented themselves again as candidates. Generally speaking, the Moderate candidates seemed to have the upper hand, although virtually all the leaders of the Progressive Party were assured victory. The returns came in slowly. In Madrid, according to the *Eco del Comercio*, (15 and 16th of July), the Progressives had won; among them don Agustín Argüelles, Manuel Cantero, Salustiano Olózaga, Juan Alvarez Mendizábal, and Miguel Calderón de la Barca. The newspaper commented on the order and calm which had presided the electoral operations, and noted that it was in the commercial district of Madrid that the Progressives got the most votes.

In Cordoba, on the other hand, the Moderates won handily. The con-

³ *Public Record Office*, F.O. Spain, Consular Correspondence, vol. 160, “Consular correspondence with Madrid”, July-December 1836, letter marked P-51-1-3, dated July 13, 1836.

⁴ *Eco del Comercio*, July 4, 1836.

servative newspaper, *El Español*, edited by Andrés Borrego, observed that the opposing party, which was called variously, "exaltado" "mendizabalista", was weak in this province. The article explained the program of the Moderate deputies, which consisted in cleaning up the government finances, the establishment of law and order, so "that the laws may always be stronger than the men", and the procurement of French intervention to help finish the civil war. It concluded: "This is, in compendium, what the 'Moderate Party' of the capital (Córdoba) and of the province desires, which has shown itself to be so strong in the elections"⁵. The quote is a significant indication of the evolution of the electoral party organization, which was, as yet, limited to the propaganda of the press, the distribution of lists of candidates, and the meetings of important electors, but this was the crucible of the future political parties.

Of particular interest in this context was the electoral program presented on June 22 by the newspaper *El Español*, presumably conceived by Andrés Borrego, already an important ideologue of the Moderate Party. The newspaper suggested that electoral associations be formed in all the major cities by the voters of similar political affiliation. There were at least eight proposals: that the associations should make an effort to get all eligible voters registered and get them to vote on the correct day; that they should call meetings together of the affiliated voters and present lists of candidates; finally, that they should do all in their power to maintain order in the elections and cooperate with the authorities. According to the one modern historian who has studied these elections, few associations were actually formed in 1836, although there were reports of such in the press of Seville and Córdoba⁶.

By the end of July the results were practically all in. The Moderates had won in the majority of the provinces, but the Progressives triumphed in Madrid, Cuenca, Málaga, Barcelona, Toledo, Ciudad Real, Cádiz, Alicante and Zaragoza. F. Caballero calculated that of a total 136 known elected deputies, 80 were "izturistas", supporting the Cabinet, and 56 were in the opposition⁷. Accusations were later made that the government had manipulated the elections. In a speech delivered in December, 1836, in the Spanish Congress, Vicente Sancho declared the Istúriz government guilty of electoral fraud and dishonesty. He accused the Minister of the Interior of having removed many functionaries from their posts. Of 49 civil governors, 37 were changed in order to insure better results in the elections, and many other measures were taken⁸.

⁵ *El Español*, July 15, 1836.

⁶ *El Español*, June 22, 1836. Also quoted in JOAQUÍN VILLARROYA, *El Sistema Político...*, p. 512.

⁷ FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes...*, appendix, p. 23.

⁸ In a speech delivered on December 28, 1836, Vicente Sancho gave a detailed report on the pressures exerted by the Istúriz Cabinet to oblige the voters to return Moderate candidates. This is the first known instance of extensive government electoral corruption in 19th century Spain. Similar pressures were exerted by the Moderate Cabinet of 1840, but all in all, the elections between 1834 and 1846 were remarkably free of such practices. This changed after 1848. In all

The elections of July, 1836, were of extraordinary importance, not only because they were the first "direct" elections to be held in Spain in the nineteenth century, but also because they revealed a surprisingly high degree of participation. Fortunately there exist accurate statistics on the returns, which we can use for our analysis. One is the statistical chart published by the government in June, 1836, accompanying a project for a new electoral law. A second chart, which agrees with the figures in the first one, is that published by F. Caballero in his book *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, (1836); it is more detailed and of greater utility.

Of a total of 65,000 eligible voters, over 45,000 went to the polls; that is almost 70%. Participation was generally high in all the provinces, although in Seville and Castellón only about 50% of the electors voted. The area with the least number of eligible voters, was that of Northern Castille, because there were few high tax payers. The right to vote was contingent, as we may recall, on a quota of taxes which the individual paid. If an individual paid more than about 300 "reales" per year, he was eligible to vote. But the quotas varied from province to province. That may explain why there were more voters per capita in Galicia and Asturias than in any other regions, for the quotas were lowest there.

The statistics also suggest some general sociological features of interest. One is that the dominance of Madrid and Barcelona was not nearly as great as it would be in the latter half of the century. The wealth of the respective cities can be calculated by comparing the number of voters (that is heavy tax payers), in the capitals. Barcelona, Madrid, Sevilla, and Valencia had the largest number of wealthy men, paying an average of 500 "reales" in taxes a year. They were followed by the capitals of Málaga, Baleares, and Granada. Apart from Madrid, it is clear that the wealthy urban classes tended to be concentrated in the cities on the Mediterranean coast or in Andalucía. The information on the number of "capacidades", or members of the professional classes, also shows some interesting trends. The cities with the largest number of lawyers in Spain were in order, Barcelona, Sevilla, Madrid, Valencia, and Alicante. Barcelona and Valencia had the greatest number of doctors, followed by Sevilla and Madrid. Valencia was the city with the greatest number of professors (Phd. 5), followed by Madrid and Sevilla. The military officers tended to be concentrated in Madrid and Barcelona. There were 523 military officers voting in Madrid, in contrast with only 33 eligible to vote in the province of Guadalajara. Finally, it should be noted that the greatest number of eligible officers of the National Militia tended to be concentrated in the cities of the Mediterranean coast.

All of these figures are of interest for different reasons. The statistics on the National Militia are significant because the militia tended to be

European countries there was a great deal of government interference in elections during this period. See SHERMAN KENT, *Electoral Procedures under Louis Phillipe* (Yale University Press, 1937). For the text of Vicente Sancho's speech see *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1836-37, vol. II, pp. 810-811.

highly politicized and affiliated to the Progressives. The information about doctors and professors shows that, relatively speaking, the professional classes of Spain were more equitably distributed than they would later be, and that Madrid seemed to have, at that time, a proportionally lesser number of the more politically advanced sectors of the professional and commercial bourgeoisie. Both wealth and education were concentrated in the cities stretching down the coast from Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Málaga, Granada, Sevilla to Cádiz. It was in five of these cities that the largest number of insurrections took place in the following eight years. It was also in these cities that the Progressives had their greatest strength.

The most important single fact about these elections, was nonetheless, the extraordinary large number of candidates for office. In Barcelona, for instance, the huge number of 374 candidates, presented themselves for the 9 seats as deputy from that province. In Oviedo there were 245 candidates for 9 seats. In Málaga there were 143 for 7 seats, and in Madrid 489 for 7 seats. Approximately 10% of the eligible voters actually presented themselves as candidates for the post of representative to the national Congress. The majority of these candidates obviously got only a few votes. In many instances an ambitious elector simply voted for himself, receiving only one vote. This occurred both in rural and urban districts. Everyone wanted to be a deputy.

Detailed proof of the degree of participation and of the new attitudes can be found in a review of the provincial newspapers, particularly the *Boletines Oficiales de Provincia*. The *Boletín* of the northwestern province of Coruña published the electoral results on July 30, 1836. There were a total of 2,200 eligible voters, and there turned out to be 300 candidates for the 9 deputies that the province was to send to Madrid. About 20 candidates received over 200 votes. Among the leading vote-getters were the admiral Casimiro Vigodet with 623 votes and Pío Pita Pizarro with 516. Most candidates, however, got very few votes. The count of Salazar, for instance, got only one vote, as the Marquis of Castellodosrius, the Count of Vigo, the lawyer José Larriva, and a couple hundred more individuals. They had simply voted for themselves.

The real importance of this fact is that it indicates that the average Spanish landlord or merchant accepted the new political game of elections. Many, indeed, wished to be deputies, active participants in national policy-making at Madrid. Clearly the position of deputy to *Cortes* was one of considerable social prestige both locally and nationally. Through their massive participation in the elections both as voters and as candidates, the Spanish propertied classes demonstrated that they had accepted Liberalism as their ideology; they had accepted the electoral process and the new parliamentary State.

THE REVOLUTION OF JULY-AUGUST 1836:

Despite the high degree of participation of the propertied classes in the July elections, one must recall that there were broad sectors of the

urban population that remained disenfranchised. The rank and file of the National Militia, which was composed chiefly of artisans, did not have the right to vote. But they supported the Progressive Party candidates and were easily led to believe that they would not be adequately represented if their favorites were not elected. Furthermore there were numerous accusations against the Istúriz Cabinet of having used pressure and corruption in order to elect Moderate candidates. Considering the ill-feelings of the progressives vis.a.vis Istúriz, it was logical that some of the elections rapidly turned into rather explosive situations. A rebellion of the National Militia broke out on the 26th of July in Málaga, spreading like wildfire down the coast to Cádiz on the 28th, Granada and Córdoba on the 31st, and then onto other areas of the country, in Zaragoza and Seville on the 1st of August, Huelva on the 4th, Badajoz and the rest of Extremadura on the 8th, Valencia and Coruña on the 9th, Alicante, Murcia, Castellón and Cartagena on the 11th, and finally Madrid on the 13th.

What had begun as localised rebellions had become a national revolution. The Istúriz government fell, replaced by Progressives, and the Queen-Regent, María Cristina, was obliged to proclaim the Constitution of 1812. This was no coup d'état, but a massive uprising of the urban population led by the commercial bourgeoisie, and unopposed by the Army which had remained generally neutral. How had this happened? The key element in the numerous provincial rebellions was the National Militia. This was not a small body. By 1835-36 it had become a major force, including 475,000 men; 157,000 of whom were armed⁹. Since the Militia was organized mainly in the cities rather than the countryside, this meant that most of the urban male population of Spain were members of the Militia in 1836. The rank and file, who as we said were largely artisans, elected the officers, who turned out to be generally members of the commercial and professional bourgeoisie.

The existence of the National Militia meant that the most radical sector of the Spanish propertied classes had a most powerful instrument in their hands. They could use and channel the discontent of the urban population to further their own political interests, which were those expressed by the Progressive Party. Thus the National Militia multiplied the power of the commercial bourgeoisie, despite the fact that this class was much weaker numerically than the landlords or the clergy. The roots of the revolution of the summer of 1836 are therefore to be found in the discontent felt by the urban masses, which in turn was channeled by the Progressives in order to complete the bourgeois revolution.

There were plenty of reasons for widespread popular unrest. A contemporary writer of 1836 explained some aspects of this difficult situation. He stated: "On top of all our miseries, for the last two years the harvests have been extremely poor in most provinces. Burdened down with heavy taxes, the Spanish people have had to quadruple their pecuniary tributes...

⁹ See *Guía Oficial de España de 1837*, and *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación, 1836*.

just at a time when the men which the cultivator and the industrialist need, have been obliged to go into combat; and when a devastating war annihilates production and the means to increase it. The people have had to suffer a war which destroys them... The insecurity on the roads and in industry, the uncertainty of the future have driven the little existing capital into hiding, paralyzing commerce and making difficult all means of existence. This is the cause of the terrible misery which is to be found in many regions, the discontent of those who can neither collect their salaries nor make any money; this is the cause of the spread of robbery and theft and of the menacing attitude of the hungry many towards the rich few"¹⁰.

The rebellions that sprung out of these circumstances in the summer of 1836 tended to be violent but brief. The first uprising occurred in Málaga. On the 16th of July, the British consul at Málaga had written to Madrid, reporting that the Progressives had won the elections in the capital. Six days later he wrote again saying that the situation had changed entirely: "It is quite inconceivable the clash which has arisen out of the elections here- since I reported to you the state of the case and gave the names of those elected-upon the scrutiny at Málaga. The votes have arrived from the different Towns in the Province and quite changed the aspect of things. The majority was thrown into a different channel and the discussions have run high for some days..."¹¹. A contemporary historian described the course of events: "On the night of the 25th of July, there was a call to arms and the National Militia began to meet; after having done so tumultuously, obliging the army drummer to sound the alarm, General Saint Just, (the military governor), arrived to reestablish order, but on proceeding to attempt to make himself obeyed he was shot down and killed"¹². The British consul described the consequences of this event: "The Civil Governor went to the barracks containing the Troops of the line, and desired them to follow him- They refused to do so, and he remained there till about two in the morning, when an officer of the 'nacionales' (Militia) entered the barrack and demanded to know what part the Troops intended to take- they answered 'that of the people'. They were then ordered to march out- The Conde of Donadío, their commander, then seeing his danger, dressed himself as a soldier- when they marched out someone pointed him out, disguised as he was, and he was assassinated"¹³.

On the following day a Junta was formed to rule the city as well as to maintain order. The president was Juan Antonio Escalante, a noted local figure, and one of the heads of the National Militia. All the other members of the Junta were commanders of the same Militia. On the afternoon of the 26th, the Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed in Málaga, and soon after an address was sent to the Queen-Regent, stating the reasons

¹⁰ FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes...*, pp. LXXXVII-LXXXVIII.

¹¹ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 185, Spain, Consular Correspondence, vol. 160, "Consular Correspondence with Madrid", July-December 1836, letter from Consul Mark to Villiers, marked P-50-1-44, and dated July 22, 1836.

for the revolt, which centered chiefly on the demand for the proclamation of the Constitution. The Junta published a decree ordering all men between the ages of 14 and 40 to present themselves under pain of death, to take up arms¹⁴. All those persons who absented themselves from the city more than eight days would have their property confiscated. On the 2nd of August, Escalante addressed the population of the city and proceeded to lead a large column of "nacionales" out into the province to pursue the Carlist Gómez expedition, which was nearby. The column of Málaga "nacionales" did not return for more than a month.

It may be observed that the popular support for the rebellion came from the Militia, who were chiefly of the lower middle and artisanal classes, but that the men who took over the control of the city were chiefly of the middle and upper classes. Escalante was reputed, in fact, to be a personal friend of Istúriz and of the Count of las Navas, and he argued that he had assumed a position of command in order to quell the disturbances¹⁵. The expedition against the Carlists, was however, directed both at getting these highly excited troops out of the city, and to insure that the rest of the countryside would support the rebellion of the provincial capital.

On the 28th of July, the city of Cádiz also revolted; among those who supported the local National Militia was the artillery brigade, which apparently disliked the military governor. The Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed and a Junta set up. The same series of events occurred in Granada. In Zaragoza, there was no violence, chiefly because General San Miguel was in command. He was, nonetheless, obliged to form a junta and proclaim the constitution. The junta was composed of the following people:

- "D. Felipe Almec: merchant and captain of the National Guard.
- D. Juan Trigo: wealthy apothecary and captain of the National Guard.
- D. Antonio Martín: ex-procurador, deputy, property owner and captain.
- D. Javier Quinto: secretary of the provincial civil government, and known in Madrid for his writings.
- D. Manuel Lasala: secretary of the provincial deputation.
- Sr. Iñigo: lawyer.
- Sr. Casalvon: lieutenant coronel.
- Sr. Marraco: merchant.

(Except for the seventh, who is a military man, all the rest are members of the National Guard)"¹⁶.

¹² ANGEL PIRALA, *Historia de la Guerra Civil...*, vol. III, pp. 298-99.

¹³ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 185, Spain-Consular Correspondence, vol. 160, "Consular Correspondence with Madrid", July-December 1836, letter from Consul Mark to Villiers marked P-51-1-25, and dated July 26, 1836.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Letter from Consul Mark dated July 28, 1836, marked P-51-5-27.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Eco del Comercio*, August 8, 1836.

Clearly it was the commercial bourgeoisie that had taken power here as in most of the other insurrections. The leaders of the National Militia pertained to this class, and they were democratically selected, for the officers of this body were elected by the troop. The local juntas also carried out reforms to please the populace as may be observed from the following report of Aug., 2, by the British Consul at Sevilla: "Accounts having reached this City on Saturday night with full particulars of the events of Cádiz and Málaga-the Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed here with great pomp on Sunday with the attendance of all the Authorities and Corporations with the exception of the Audiencia, few of whose members could be persuaded to be present- Perfect order has been preserved "and I cannot find that there was any loss of life- The payment of the 'Derecho de Puertas' has been suspended to please the rabble but this measure must embarrass the local authorities as it is the principal item of revenue..."¹⁷.

Some measures approved by the Juntas were intended to increase trade. On the 14th of August, the *Eco del Comercio* reported on the state of the provinces of Andalucía: In Málaga, the introduction and sale of tobacco was declared free of restrictions, as well as that of foreign cotton goods during a period of thirty days. In Ronda the "derechos de puertas" were abolished. In Sevilla, the prices of tobacco and salt were lowered. In Córdoba several monasteries were suppressed and the nuns and monks thrown out. Similar events occurred throughout the peninsula. In the port cities, the much hated limitations on foreign imports were lifted, and in many cities the "derechos de puertas" were temporarily suspended. The latter were taxes on any food provisions brought within the city, which tended to raise the prices. Together with the "consumos", (direct food taxes), these were the exactions most hated by the urban working classes.

In the national capital, events took longer to reach a crisis situation. Already on the 19th and 20th of July there had been demonstrations following the elections. The Captain General of Madrid, Quesada, repressed these riots. Then on the 3rd of August the National Militia attempted to revolt. Their leaders, according to Pirala, were Cayetano Cordero and Julián Martínez, well-known Progressives. The government was frightened by the revolt, although once again General Quesada was able to disperse the demonstrators, who were shouting "Viva la Constitución" (of 1812). The government was frightened and decided to dissolve the National Militia, but the order had little effect¹⁸. Every day addresses from the places where the Constitution had been proclaimed were reaching the city, directed to the Queen-Regent and setting forth the grievances of the people.

The news of the rebellions of Málaga, Cádiz, etc. produced repeated commotions. On the 9th of August, the British ambassador reported that

¹⁷ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 185, col. 160, "Consular Correspondence with Madrid", July-December 1836, Letter from the British Consul at Seville to Villiers, marked P-52-1-8, and dated August 2, 1836.

¹⁸ *Gaceta de Madrid*, August 6, 1836.

Madrid was in a state of siege and that the "nacionales" had refused to give up their arms. "The Cafés and other places of public rest are closed at an early hour in the evening with the object of preventing quarrels..."¹⁹ In conversations with the French ambassador the Queen-Regent had shown herself unwilling to accept the Constitution of 1812. She asked for French intervention, both for military assistance in the war and to quell the popular disturbances. Rayneval wrote to Paris, but Thiers, the Prime Minister, answered that it was presently impossible to intervene, although he was doing what he could. The French King, Louis-Phillipe, was opposed to meddling in Spain²⁰.

María Cristina, by this time, had set off to her country palace at La Granja, where she believed herself more secure than in the turbulent capital. But she was misinformed. On the 13th of August, the British ambassador writing from La Granja gave the following description of events:

"About eight-o'clock yesterday evening a regiment of Provincial Guards about 400 strong mutinied in their barracks which are outside the walls of the town- the gates were shut against them upon their approaching with cries of 'Viva la Constitución'.

During an hour admittance was refused to them by the officers commanding the piquet, when the Regiment of Royal Guards, amounting to about 700 men, sallied forth from their barracks uttering cries of 'Viva la Constitución', 'Viva la libertad', 'Mueran los tiranos'. They proceeded to the gates which they threw open to their comrades, when they all together marched with their music playing a Constitutional air to the Palace, where the cries were renewed accompanied with other cries of 'death to the Camarilla'.

Loud complaints were likewise uttered of the arrears of pay; the provincials not having received any for three months. This state of things continued for nearly two hours no answer having been given from the Palace, but a promise was made to the men by their officers upon the authority of the Queen that they should within 48 hours receive the pay due to them. This at first seemed to satisfy many of them who would have returned to their quarters but for the persuasions of the non-commissioned officers, and the effects of the wine which by some means or other was furnished to them at that moment.

Shortly afterwards great impatience began to be manifested and the Queen-Regent then sent to say She would receive a sergeant and two soldiers from each company.

It appears that these men declared that if her Majesty did not at once adopt the constitution that every person in the Palace should be massacred; and at three-o'clock this morning Her Majesty signed a declaration to the effect that She adopted the Constitution for the time being and until the meeting of the *Cortes*"²¹.

¹⁹ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 72, Spain vol. 460, July-August 1836, Villiers to Palmerston, no. 193, August 9, 1836.

²⁰ *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères*, Correspondance Politique, l'Espagne vol. 772, letter from Rayneval to Thiers, August 5 and August 9, 1836, and copies of letter from Thiers to Rayneval August 12, 1836.

²¹ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 72, Spain, vol. 460, Villiers to Palmerston, August 13, 1836, dispatch no. 194.

The British ambassador added a significant commentary:

"It would be incredible in any other country than Spain that the guards immediately about the person of the Sovereign should have been left three months in arrears of pay, and that the discontent which such a state of things produced should be unknown to the Commanding officers. It was only yesterday that the Count de San Román, the Commandant General of the Provincials, said that upon any critical event occurring he could rely with the utmost confidence upon their fidelity"²².

The North American Minister, who was present at La Granja, also analysed the situation. He said: "Here we have the whole secret of Revolution as it runs throughout the country. The misery prevailing and increasing in all classes, save the upper, drives them into extremes- they either become "exaltado" and insist upon a radical reform, social, as well as political, or turn Carlist for plunder-... The fault then rests with those who want skill enough to conduct the war and energy enough to strangle the abuses..."²³. He added that much blame was to be placed on Istúriz, who out of ambition had been enticed by the Moderate leaders, the aristocrats, and the Camarilla to take power from Mendizábal, and then carry out a vicious campaign against the Progressives. Istúriz was forced to flee the capital for France. Others also fled.

"The Queen's favorite Muñoz and her chief confidant old Alagon (who you recollect) was likewise her husband's, (Ferdinand VII), made their escape in the beginning of the row at La Granja- She, it is said, will follow them as soon as she can- at any rate the conversion of all her property into cash, which she has been effecting for some time past, gives with many other circumstances an air of plausibility to the report"²⁴.

The Queen-Regent, however, did not flee. She named a new Cabinet, headed by José María Calatrava, one of the most respected of the Progressives. In summary, we may observe that the national insurrection was an extremely complicated affair, and that it varied from region to region. The revolution did, however, follow a general pattern characteristic of the major liberal rebellions of nineteenth century Spain²⁵:

1. *Triumph of the provincial rebellions.*
 2. *Establishment of local Juntas.*
 3. *Triumph of the revolution in Madrid.*
 4. *Installment of a Central Junta.*
- (In this instance, the Calatrava Government.)

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *National Archives* (Washington, D.C.), Department of State, "Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Spain, Microcopy 31, roll 32, letter from A. Middleton dated August 16, 1836.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ I owe the formulation of this sequence/chart of events in the typical 19th century Spanish liberal revolution to Professor Miguel Martínez Cuadrado.

THE CALATRAVA MINISTRY: AUGUST-OCTOBER, 1836

As a result of the insurrection of July-August 1836, the Progressives took power. On the 14th of August, the Queen-Regent named the new Cabinet. Its members were distinguished Progressives, including Mendizábal as Minister of Economy, General Rodil as Minister of War and the famous orator Joaquín María López as Minister of the Interior. The Minister of State and head of the government was José María Calatrava, one of the older Liberals, a former member of the Cortes of 1812, a minister in the Constitutional years of 1820-1823 and probably the most respected jurist among the more advanced liberal circles. He had drawn up the first modern penal code of nineteenth century Spain, the "Código Criminal" (1822)²⁶. He had been imprisoned by the government of Ferdinand VII from 1814 to 1820 and later spent ten years of exile (1823-1833) in London; and according to one historian Calatrava was forced to make his living there, for a while, as an improvised shoemaker²⁷. On his return to Spain in 1834 he had once again become a member of the Supreme Court and soon affiliated himself with the Liberal opposition to the government of Martínez de la Rosa. He was much influenced by the Benthamites but he was also a firm "Constitutionalist". These two trends also characterized the 1836 Calatrava Cabinet and much of the politics of the 1836-1837 Constitutional Congress.

The new government took charge in difficult circumstances, but it did have considerable popular support. The local Juntas quickly dissolved themselves, accepting the authority of Calatrava and his colleagues. Its two chief problems were the Carlist War and how to consolidate the strength of the Progressive Party. With respect to the war and foreign policy, the Cabinet took a firm stance. The Carlists had launched several offensive campaigns, including numerous guerrilla attacks and had made strong advances in the Basque country. The General-in-Chief of the Liberal Army, Córdova, had lost his prestige. He was replaced by General Espartero and the General Staff of the army was reorganized, transforming it into an effective body (The institutional weaknesses of the Spanish Army from 1834 onwards had been one of the major reasons for the success of the Carlists). The government decreed a forced loan of two hundred million "reales" to be collected from all taxpayers. Meanwhile, sufficient funds were raised from the Madrid merchants to enable General Rodil to set out with an expedition for Aragón. Calatrava was determined to carry out a war policy independent of foreign influences. The North American ambassador reported that in a conversation with the Spanish head of State, Calatrava had spoken without reserve against the conduct of the French King and his duplicity in playing a double game between the powers of the Holy Alliance and those of the Quadruple Alliance.

²⁶ *Diccionario de Historia de España*, edited by Germán Bleiberg, vol. I (Madrid, 1968), pp. 634-635.

²⁷ VICENTE LLORÉNS, *Liberales y Románticos...*, p. 60.

The American Minister added that ever since 1835, the French King "not only duped his Ministers at home, but even his Ambassador at this Court, Rayneval unquestionably believed at two different periods that the intervention would be granted by his master, that is during Toreno's Ministry, and again when Istúriz entered into office and accordingly gave strong encouragement to the Queen Regent. Both Toreno and Istúriz shaped their course in the expectation of an intervention and the fall of each was accelerated by having placed their dependance upon it"²⁸. This general analysis of the situation has been confirmed by C. Webster's study of the diplomacy of the period. The Progressive government was determined that Spaniards should win the civil war on their own, and that foreign entanglements should be limited as much as possible.

In domestic politics the Cabinet also took quick and clear-cut measures, in spite of the opposition of the Moderate groups. Between August and October of 1836, a series of important laws were established, many of them already promulgated in the period 1820-23. Among others, the government reestablished the Municipal Law of 1823, that of the National Militia, of freedom of the press, and of the suppression of entailed estates. "It established an Intendency in each province, which was to be in charge of all questions related to finances; it abolished the Royal Council of Spain of the Indies; ... it instituted Juntas of armament and defence in the provinces; and ordered the creation of an Inspectorship of the National Militia, as well as an increase in the size of this body"²⁹. The policy of the "desamortización" was continued, permitting more funds from the sale of monasteries and convents to enter the Treasury, and the "temporalidades" of the Bishops, (additional income of different kinds), were eliminated. The salaries of the state functionaries were deduced by from 3 to 25%.

One may note three general tendencies in these reforms: the constitutionalism of 1820-23, the "mendizabalista" policies, and the rationalization of the administration. The Progressives affirmed the radicalism of 1820-23 because they identified themselves with it, and because the Constitution of 1812 was once again the law of the land. The Cabinet continued the disentailing program of Mendizábal because it was thought to be the major source of future income for the prosecution of the war, and it reformed the administration in order to eliminate corruption and to modernize such institutions as the Army and the Ministry of Finances. The installment of the Juntas of armament and defence and the expansion of the National Militia consolidated the power of the Progressives in the urban centres. The municipal law, decreed on the 3rd of September, 1836, asserted a type of federal democracy that was much criticized by the Moderates, Javier de Burgos affirmed categorically that through it: "The provinces consequently became so many small states, semi-independent of

²⁸ *National Archives* (Washington, D.C.), Department of State, "Dispatches from U.S. Ministers in Spain", Microcopy 31, roll 32, letter from A. Middleton, dated September 7, 1836.

²⁹ *Diccionario de Historia de España*, ed. G. Bleiberg, vol. I, p. 635.

the central power..." In summary, [in its first two months], the Calatrava government was able to realize a democratic, reformist and utilitarian program, which proposed to strengthen the Progressives and to renovate the national administration.

One of the major effects of the new government's policies was, as Burgos suggested, to increase the political autonomy of municipal and provincial government, (although there was at the same time an attempt to centralize the administrative apparatus). This tendency became, during the next eight years, one of the chief sources of support for the Progressive Party. There is no modern study of local government in the Spain of this period, but it is essential to an understanding of the backdrop to the central tableau of Spanish politics. Before dealing, therefore, with the national elections for the Constituent Congress of 1836-37, it is worthwhile suggesting some of the characteristics of the local polity at this time.

The newly reinstated municipal law of 1823 determined the nature of the provincial and municipal power structure. This law had several different provisions³⁰. It stated that the municipal governments were to be in charge of the local police, sanitation, cemeteries, statistics, civil register, food provisions, jails, roads and public works, public instruction, and care of the poor. The responsibilities as well as the powers of the local town halls were obviously extensive. The town mayors thus attained an important position, having real power vis.a.vis the officials of the central state administration. Municipal elections were to be democratic, in accord with the articles of the Constitution of 1812. All "vecinos", or tax-paying heads of families had a right to vote; a large number of "jornaleros", daily wage-earners, were excluded because they did not pay property taxes. The voters had the right to elect representatives who then chose the members of the municipal government³¹.

The provincial government, as opposed to that of the towns and cities, was in the hands of government functionaries. A provincial deputation was in charge of "development", that is to say, supervision of the economic, educational and beneficent institutions of the province. But this body had few attributes and little strength. Power was in the hands of the "jefe político", or civil governor, who was named directly by the central government, usually by the Minister of the Interior. The "jefe político" controlled the provincial administration and all its functionaries, from the postal system to the employees in charge of tax-collecting. The "jefe político" also was often in close contact with the local military commanders and with the Captain General of the region. Yet under the law of 1823, he was not able to coerce the mayors or city governments, and thus did not have much effective control over disaffected towns³².

This new municipal law, decreed, as we said, in September of 1836, came to replace that of 1835, which had allowed less local autonomy. The

³⁰ See ANGEL POSADA, *Evolución legislativa del Régimen Local en España (1812-1909)* (Madrid, 1910), pp. 76-106.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 92, for electoral regulations.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 116-118.

statistics from the *Guide of the Ministry of the Interior of 1836* indicated that more than half a million people were eligible to vote in the elections of December of 1835. With the new law of September 1836, this number increased, although it is virtually impossible to find any reliable published figures for a national estimate.

On many occasions, the results of local elections can indicate the type of voter who participated in municipal politics. Furthermore, the social class of the elected officials gives an idea of some of the predominant political groups. The elections of the municipal government of Madrid on the 8th of September, 1836, are a case in point. Since Madrid was a large city, several mayors were elected; they functioned rather as borough chiefs [on the 9th of September]. The *Eco del Comercio* published a list of the elected municipal officers:

“*Alcaldes:*

- D. Juan Lasaña; brigadier and the last civil governor of Madrid in 1823.
- D. Diego Argumosa: doctor and professor of medicine.
- D. José Torre y Ondarreta: property-owner.
- D. Joaquín Rodríguez Leal: of the commerce of the city.
- D. Enrique Ladrón de Guevara: landowner.
- D. Alejandro López: property owner and of the commerce of this city.”

The *Eco* also published a list of the names and professions of the city aldermen, (“procuradores síndicos y regidores”,. This list included three layers, six merchants, five professionals, (doctors, engineers, etc.), one landowner, three urban property owners, (two of whom were former military officers), two owners of small industries, one apothecary, one painter, one producer of playing cards, one peasant-farmer, two booksellers, and one carpenter who also owned some real estate. These were all propertied men, but there were among them some individuals who could scarcely be characterized as other than lower middle class. The gradual increase in political influence of the lower middle class and artisans was, in good measure, a consequence of the “bourgeois” revolution of the summer of 1836. In the August insurrections the dominant political group was the professional and commercial bourgeoisie, but both the increasing importance of the National Militia and the increased liberties in the municipal elections permitted the lower middle and artisanal classes to play an important political role. This was not only an important political advance over the years 1834-35, but it was a decisive first step in the process of democratization of Spanish society.

V

The Constituent Congress of 1836-37: The Consolidation of the Liberal State

The end of the revolution of August, 1836 and the rise of the Progressive Calatrava Cabinet to power marked the end of the crucial stage in the transition from the absolute monarchy to the liberal parliamentary State. The elections of July, 1836 had demonstrated that the majority of the Spanish propertied classes now accepted elections and the parliamentary system of government. The revolution of August, 1836 showed that the more advanced sectors of those propertied classes, the professional and commercial bourgeoisie, were determined to establish constitutional government and to promote democratic reforms. But in order to establish a constitution acceptable to all dominant sectors, the Calatrava Cabinet was obliged to call for elections to a Constituent Congress. This Congress would draft and ratify a new Constitution and a series of economic reforms which would be acceptable to both Moderates and Progressives, acceptable both to the conservative landed oligarchy and the more progressive commercial/industrial bourgeoisie. The political compromise worked out in the Congress of 1836-37 laid down the legal basis for the new Liberal State.

In late August of 1836, Calatrava called for the meeting of the national Constituent Congress. The government decree purposefully used the word "constituent", meaning "to have the power to create a government or frame or amend a constitution". The aim was to bring together all the elected representatives of the different provinces in order to set down the legal framework of the new political and economic system. Elections were held throughout the nation in September-October, 1836 and the Congress began meeting from October 24 onwards. It sat for over a year and approved a good portion of the most important legislation of 19th century Spain.

The Constituent Congress of 1836-37 accomplished important work in both the political and economic spheres. It effectively institutionalized the parliamentary system: from 1837 to 1923 there were legislative sessions of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate every year. It abolished tithes, eliminated the feudal practice of entail, and legalised the *Desamortización*, begun by Mendizábal, nationalising the properties of the Church, although not of the aristocracy. In foreign affairs, the Spanish parliament was also active, ratifying the first official recognition of the independence of the Spanish American nations, and defining the colonial policy toward Cuba and Puerto Rico, which was to remain essentially unchanged until 1898.

The legislation approved in 1836-37 should not be regarded as a purely legal matter, but as the expression of the political interests of the propertied classes of Spain. These interests were defined by the programs of the incipient political parties, Progressives and Moderates. Although the Calatrava Cabinet and the great majority of the deputies elected to the Congress of 1836-37 were Progressives, they reached a compromise with the Moderates outside the parliament. The result was that the most important piece of legislation, the Constitution of 1837, was "by all lights the product of a compromise between the two fractions of the Liberal party", as Andrés Borrego explained¹. The new Constitution reflected moreover the legal agreement between the two major social sectors represented by the two parties: the landlords and the commercial/industrial bourgeoisie. The commercial-industrial bourgeoisie got what they most wanted in 1836: a modern constitution and the sale of the Church properties. The landlords avoided what they most feared: the expropriation of their estates. They got, instead, legal "bourgeois" titles to their properties, as well as an upper chamber, the Senate, to protect their interests. Basically this arrangement between the two major social sectors of the propertied classes formed the legal foundation of 19th century politics in Spain.

THE ELECTIONS FOR THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS

The decree calling for elections to the Constituent Congress was published on the 23rd of August, 1836. The elections could be said to be the last stage of what we have referred to as the "bourgeois revolution" of August-October, 1836. The initial stage had been that of the provincial rebellions followed by the rise to power of the Progressives. The second stage was the period of radical reform initiated by the Calatrava Cabinet, including democratic municipal elections. The third and final step was the nomination of representatives from the whole country to meet in Madrid and begin work on legislative reforms, most importantly the modification of the Constitution of 1812 in order to consolidate the juridical basis of the new order.

In accord with the Constitution of 1812 the new legislature was to be formed of only one body, the constituent Congress, excluding any upper chamber. A total of 242 deputies were elected to this national assembly, representing the 49 provinces. Cuba and Puerto Rico also sent representatives, but they were not admitted. The method chosen for the elections was that described by the Constitution of 1812, which was indirect universal suffrage. By this plan, three million Spaniards would have the right

¹ ANDRÉS BORREGO, *De la organización de los partidos en España* (Madrid, 1855), pp. 67-68. There are also many other references to the "transaction" or compromise worked out in the Congress of 1836-37 in other 19th century histories. See A. FERNÁNDEZ DE LOS RÍOS, *Estudio histórico de las luchas políticas...*, p. 249. See J. RICO Y AMAT, *Historia política y parlamentaria*, vol. III, p. 77. See J. VILLA URRUTIA, *La Reina Gobernadora* (Madrid, 1925), first pages.

to elect 200,000 parish electors, who in turn chose 16,000 district electors who nominated a limited group of provincial delegates. These delegates then respectively elected the deputies that were to represent each province in the Congress². This system was overly complicated. Although it did permit the majority of the citizenry to participate, the results were easy to manipulate. This was the last general indirect election held in Spain. At the end of 1837, a new electoral law was passed that sanctioned direct limited suffrage.

The great question that was debated in these elections was the reform of the Constitution. It was generally recognized that the *Estatuto Real* could no longer be the legal basis of the State. In August, 1836, the Queen-Regent had proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, but many thought that it should be modified. The Moderate Party deemed it too liberal. Many members of the Progressive Party thought it antiquated and favored a new text more in the style of the French Constitution of 1830 or that of Belgium of 1831. So great was the prestige of the old Constitution, nevertheless, that no one spoke at this time of drawing up a totally new document, but rather of reforming the old one. The newspapers discussed these questions; *El Castellano*, for instance, directed this article to the voters:

"Never were the august functions of the deputies to the Congress so delicate and important as they will be in this next assembly to modify the political Constitution of the monarchy, object of such great hopes for some, and of grave fears for others. From the deliberations there shall arise the fundamental code of Spain for its future happiness or misfortune.

The pure and noble patriotism of the deputies will not suffice; profound intelligence will be required to deal with the questions of legislation and public rights, the principles of the administration and the economy in order to establish the public order and reestablish the finances and credit, which are in such chaos..."³.

The Progressives controlled the government, state administration, and they had the sympathies of most of the Army. Andrés Borrego explained that in the autumn of 1836, "the provincial deputations, the municipal governments, which in accord with the law of 1823 allowed them the drawing up of the voting lists and all of the electoral operations... were, in their majority, in the hands of the Progressive Party, as was the most numerous National Militia, which was armed and whose influence was all-pervasive"⁴. It was not wise to publicly identify oneself with the Moderate Party if one wished to be a candidate. The consequences, logically enough, were that the majority of the elected deputies were nominally affiliated to the Progressive Party, although many of them later shifted their position.

² See articles 34 to 103 of the Constitution of 1812 which deal with the electoral process. Texts in *Leyes políticas españolas fundamentales (1808-1936)*, ed. Tierno Galván (Madrid, 1968).

³ *El Castellano*, September 29, 1836.

⁴ ANDRÉS BORREGO, *De la organización de los partidos...*, p. 76.

There remain very few documentary sources on these elections, possibly because of the indirect method utilized. The newspapers of the period provide little information. One article published in the *Eco del Comercio*, however, may suffice to give a general idea. On the 27th of September it announced the district elections, and soon after gave a resume:

"Yesterday the district elections were celebrated in this capital (Madrid). The greatest order and good conduct has been observed by the electors, in whom the inhabitants of Madrid had placed their confidence. The meeting took place in the handsome salon of the columns in the city hall at nine in the morning, and after declaring itself an electoral junta, the voters went with their president to the Church of Saint Mary, where the mass of the Holy Ghost was held, as is specified by the Constitution, during which the parish priest gave a speech. After concluding the religious ceremony, the electors returned to the city hall and began voting without interruption until five-thirty in the afternoon. The following citizens were elected:

D. Tomás Fernández Vallejo	166	votes
D. Cipriano Llorente	167	"
D. José de la Fuente Herrero	165	"
D. Antonio Martel y Abadía	162	"
D. Francisco Bermejo	98	"
D. Evaristo Saiseca y Sarabia	146	"
D. Antonio Llaguro	151	"
D. Francisco Mena	131	"
D. José Garay	158	"
D. Manuel Azpeicueta	112	"
D. Lorenzo Gómez Pardo	99	"

After the results were tabulated, the electors directed themselves once again to the same church where the morning mass had been celebrated. After all were seated on the velvet cushioned benches, and after a national guard... took his seat at the organ, the Te Deum was sung and followed by pretty patriotic songs, concluding this solemn reunion with the Riego hymn, which was played until all went out into the street where 'vivas' for the Constitution and the Queen were shouted."

THE DEPUTIES OF 1836-37

The majority of the 242 deputies elected were of the Progressive Party. They were all men of the propertied classes, landowners, merchants, military officers, public employees and professionals (doctors, professors, etc.). The deputies, themselves, were acutely conscious that they represented the "middle classes" rather than the aristocracy, the Church or the working classes. There were, in fact, only 3 or 4 titled aristocrats in the Congress, 14 ecclesiastics and no artisans. An accurate description and analysis of the deputies is essential to understand the principal characteristics of the social class these men represented, which broadly speaking was the Spanish bourgeoisie of the first half of the nineteenth century.

We have gathered information on 150 out of the total 242 deputies⁵. The social breakdown is the following:

<i>Profession</i>	<i>No. of Deputies</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Landowners	35	23.3
Merchants	16	10.7
Military Officers	22	14.6
Public Employees	26	17.3
Lawyers	27	18.0
Professors, Doctors	10	6.8
Ecclesiastics	14	9.3
TOTAL	150	100

Using the same data another sort of breakdown is also possible:

Landowners	23%
Public Employees (including military)	32%
Commercial and Professional Class	35%

Since we lack information on approximately 90 deputies, any social analysis we may attempt could be partially mistaken. It is more than likely, however, that the majority of the 90 "unknowns" were provincial landowners. It is extremely unlikely that more than a very few would be military officers or public employees⁶. So a tentative first assumption would be that the percentage of "landowners" should be increased somewhat. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that a considerable number of the "public employees" (among whom we included judges) also were landed proprietors, as were many lawyers and some military officers. There is little doubt that the majority of the deputies of 1836 came originally from provincial landowning families.

Sons of landowners or merchants were often educated to other professions. Thus many individuals had more than one position and more

⁵ The information on the social position of the deputies is derived from various sources. (a) the newspapers of 1836: *El Eco del Comercio*, *El Castellano*, *La Gaceta de Madrid*, *El Español*, which often specified the profession of the newly elected deputies. (b) dictionaries and official guides: *Enciclopedia Espasa Calpe*, *Enciclopedia Hispano Americana* de Muntaner y Simón (Barcelona, 1887), *Diccionario de Historia de España*, ed. G. Bleiberg, *Repertorio Estadístico de 1823*, *Guía Oficial de España de 1835, 1836, 1837*, *Guía del Ministerio de Gobernación 1836*, *Guía de Litigantes de Madrid de 1830 a 1834*. (c) books: VICENTE LLORÉNS, *Liberales y Románticos...*; NICOMEDES PASTOR DÍAZ, *Españoles célebres...*; FERMÍN CABALLERO, *Fisonomía de los Procuradores* (Madrid, 1836), and many others.

⁶ Since we have surveyed most of the official guides of the period which include most of the public employees, and since both public employees and military officers were usually pointed out in the newspaper press when elected, it seems more than likely that few were missed in our survey of the deputies.

than one source of income. Francisco Castro y Orozco, deputy for Granada, was, for example, a landowner, a lawyer and member of the bar association of Granada, and the political governor of the Alhambra in the year 1836. Lieutenant General Diego Ballesteros was simultaneously the head of a bureau of the Ministry of State and a landed proprietor of the town of Solona. Aniceto de Alvaro, editor of the newspaper *El Castellano*, was a merchant, but had also served as a functionary in the Ministry of Finances. These multiple social and economic factors make the classification of individual deputies quite difficult.

A few general observations should nonetheless suffice to point out the social facts most directly relevant to the politics of the period. First, that the traditional titled aristocracy and the Church did not carry weight in the Congress. Second, that the commercial/professional bourgeoisie had more political power than was proportionate to their socio-economic strength as a sector of the Spanish propertied classes. Third, that the deputies of 1836-37 were in the majority extremely well-educated men. They were an intelligentsia, the intellectual elite of the Army officers, the State functionaries, the merchants and the landowners.

This last observation is directly related to the fact that many of the deputies were old Liberals and former exiles (who tended to be the best-educated and knowledgeable members of Spanish society). There were three generations of Liberals represented in this Congress. The oldest group was composed of men who had served in the *Cortes* of Cádiz of 1812, such as Agustín Argüelles, José Ramón Berra, Antonio González, Evaristo San Miguel and Miguel Antonio Zumalacárregui. A second group of Liberals consisted of individuals who had made their political reputations in the *Cortes* of 1820-23, such as Vicente Sancho, Manuel María Acevedo, Manuel Bertrán de Lis and about 20 more. Finally, there was a younger group of men (aged 30 to 40 years) who had become well-known political figures only after 1833, such as Fermín Caballero, Pascual Madoz and Salustiano Olózaga. Many of the latter would become the leaders of the Progressive Party for the next thirty years.

THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS: THE PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS

On Monday October 24, 1836 the Constituent Congress began its sessions with a speech read by the Queen-Regent, María Cristina. On following days the Ministers of the Interior, Finances and of the Navy, López, Mendizábal, and Gil de la Cuadra, respectively, read reports on their departments. As a first measure, the Congress decided to draft a formal statement confirming the authority of the Queen-Regent.

The debates on the constitutional reform of the State began in December. They continued for several months, along with other issues⁷. With

⁷ Among the non-constitutional issues discussed was a proposal by the Cabinet to establish a state of siege in Madrid in order to eliminate the radical secret societies. The Left wing of the Congress fought this measure, but it was

the passing of time, a general voting pattern became more and more evident among the deputies. There were essentially three blocs of deputies who had different political views, the Left, Centre and Right. On most of the constitutional issues the Centre and Right voted together, isolating the Left; but on most economic questions the Centre allied with the Left. On the basis of a careful statistical study of some 10 key votes, and a more superficial review of the remaining significant votes, the relative strength and membership of each bloc can be established. On the Left there were approximately 30 consistent radicals; in the Centre there were about 90 individuals; and on the Right stood some 70 deputies. There were of course considerable fluctuations in the blocs depending on different issues. On most days a maximum of 140-150 deputies were present in the Congress, so typical votes in which Centre/Right were allied against Left were the following: 124-35, 111-40, 93-39, 126-11.

The *Left bloc* of the Congressional deputies advocated the continuation of the democratic Constitution of 1812 and demanded fundamental economic reforms such as the abolition of the tithes and the expropriation of the lands of the aristocracy. The radicals were led by Fermín Caballero, Pascual Madoz and Mateo Miguel Ayllón. Caballero was the editor of the influential newspaper *El Eco del Comercio*, perhaps the most important organ of Progressive opinion throughout the entire decade of 1834-44. Pascual Madoz was a Catalan deputy, advocate of the textile interests and the protection of industry. Ayllón was a judge and member of the Supreme Court. The political program of the *Centre bloc* was essentially the consolidation of the representative monarchy. They did not wish to alienate the Moderates: their motto was national reconciliation. They were led by Agustín Argüelles, the dean of Spanish Liberalism, Vicente Sancho, perhaps the shrewdest and most influential of the Progressive parliamentarians, and Salustiano Olózaga, a young but forceful debater. Their ideology can be characterized as similar to that of the doctrinaire French ideologues like Constant, Guizot and Thiers. The *Right bloc* was opposed to a broad land reform and favored the institutionalization of an aristocratic Senate to protect propertied interests. Their leaders were such deputies as Gómez Becerra and Antonio González, both judges with landed properties.

Generally speaking, the typical deputy of the *Left bloc* was a member of the professional/commercial bourgeoisie. The typical member of the *Centre bloc* was an important government employee or military officer. Within the *Right bloc* there were chiefly landowners and government functionaries. The political divisions within the Congress not only reflected social differences, but also regional variations. An analysis of the

approved. According to a report from December, 1836, there were secret societies (of a proto-republican character), although all extremely small groups with little popular support. Among them were "Los Vengadores de Alibaud", "Derechos del Hombre", "Carbonarios", "Isabelinos", "Joven Italia" and "Joven España". See ANTONIO ELORZA, "Los primeros federales", in *Triunfo*, no. 545, March 10, 1973, pp. 29-35.

congressional votes by regions demonstrates that the conservative deputies tended to come mainly from the northern provinces of Old Castile (the Basque provinces, Asturias, Logroño, Soria, Palencia, León, Zamora), and the southern "latifundista" provinces of Extremadura, and of Ciudad Real and Córdoba. More liberal deputies tended to come from the Mediterranean provinces (Catalonia, Valencia, Alicante, Málaga, and Cádiz), as well as two eastern provinces of New Castile, Cuenca and Albacete. The basic split between the more radical provinces of the East and Mediterranean and the more conservative North and West would remain a constant factor throughout 19th and early 20th century Spanish politics.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The most pressing work before the Congress was the constitutional reform. The Constitution of 1812 had been in force since the triumph of the revolution of August. Many of the Progressive leaders, however, felt it essential to reform that Constitution, which they considered somewhat antiquated. Furthermore the Moderate Party was not disposed to accept the document of 1812 as the legal foundation of the Spanish State because they considered it too democratic. The result was that the majority of the deputies of the Congress of 1836-37 decided to draft and ratify a new text, which was to be the Constitution of 1837. The two underlying principles of the reform were the "modernization" of the State, and the "reconciliation" of the political parties, Moderates and Progressives. As Andrés Borrego explained: "The Progressive leaders of 1836-37 abandoned the dogmas of the Cádiz school (of 1812), adopting instead the lessons and example of the French constitutional opposition at the end of the reign of Charles X (1825-1830)..."⁸. The French parliamentarians had played a major role in the events leading up to the revolution of 1830, and they had ratified the new Constitution published in the same year, which served as the legal basis of the reign of the "bourgeois King", Louis-Philippe (1830-1848).

The Spanish Constitution of 1837 was, in fact, similar in many respects to the French Constitution of 1830 or the Belgian one of 1831. The deputies of the Constituent Congress eliminated the more democratic articles of the Constitution of 1812, strengthened the power of the monarchy, divided the legislature into two separate bodies, the Chamber of Deputies (called the Congress of the Spanish deputies) and Senate, and established a system of restricted direct elections. The deputies who ratified the Constitution of 1837 wished to place Spain on the same level as the constitutional monarchies of France and England, basing the government on the support of the urban bourgeoisie and the landowners.

The Congressional committee that drafted the basic proposals for the constitutional reform was made up of nine members elected by the Con-

⁸ ANDRÉS BORREGO, *De la organización de los partidos...*, p. 169.

gress at large. These nine were Agustín Argüelles, Joaquín María Ferrer, Antonio González, Vicente Sancho, Pío Laborda, Pablo Torrén y Miranda, Pedro Gutiérrez Acuña, Manuel María Acevedo and Salustiano Olózaga. The 9 individuals basically represented the *Centre bloc* of the Congress. The political importance of this group of men merits a brief portrait of each. We have already spoken of Agustín Argüelles, one of the leading politicians of both previous constitutional governments, (1810-1814 and 1820-23). He had spent ten years in exile in England, but on his return to Madrid in 1834 was elected *Procurador*. Joaquín María Ferrer had been a deputy in 1822 and had lived as an exile in France from 1823-33. He was a wealthy Basque merchant who had investments in the coal mines of Asturias. Antonio González, an old respected Liberal, had been deputy for Extremadura in 1822, and had gone into exile after 1823 in South America. He was a judge. Vicente Sancho, deputy for Valencia, was formerly a military officer who had served in the *Cortes* of 1820-23. He had been Minister under Mendizábal in 1835-36; and he was one of the most influential and energetic Progressive leaders. Pío Laborda, a judge, a professor and a proprietor, was deputy for Zaragoza. Pedro Gutiérrez Acuña was a representative from Jaén and had been a leader of the local revolutionary junta there in August. Manuel María Acevedo, deputy for Pontevedra, was a lawyer and landowner. He had been political governor of Asturias in 1820-22; later he was an exile in London where he helped edit the newspaper *El Español Constitucional*. Pablo Torrén y Miranda, a deputy for Barcelona, was an important industrialist, representative of the Catalan textile interests. Finally, Salustiano Olózaga, one of the youngest deputies in the Congress, at only 31 years of age, who would become a major leader of the Progressives. He had been appointed civil governor of Madrid by Mendizábal.

This group of deputies represented much of the best tradition of Spanish Liberalism from 1812 onwards. Most of them had spent long years in exile in France or England, establishing important political contacts there and learning much about the respective political and economic systems. They were all leaders of the Progressive party from different regions; in fact most of the regions of Spain: the Basque provinces, Asturias, Galicia, Catalonia, Andalucía, Valencia, Extremadura and Aragón, (but not central or southern Castille). The committee was dominated by the personality and erudition of Vicente Sancho, but all the members played an important part in the elaboration of the legislative proposals.

The committee presented four fundamental articles as the basis for the drafting of a new Constitution. The first stipulated that all of the "regulations" included in the Constitution of 1812 should be eliminated. The second stated that the Parliament would be composed of two bodies, an elective, (Chamber of Deputies), and a Senate whose members would be appointed by the monarch. The third article increased the power of the King, and the fourth specified that elections should be direct (rather than indirect).

The first article was approved by the Congress almost without discussion. The second article, however, which proposed the creation of an

aristocratic Senate provoked a vigorous debate. Francisco Luján, a general and distinguished intellectual, presented the conservative argument. He stated: "If the Assembly rules alone, despotism is likely; if the Government rules alone, despotism again. Consequently, the civilized nations have avoided this risk by constructing a dam; and this has been the conservative chamber; there are therefore three forces, which in accord with the most exact principles make possible the equilibrium"¹⁰. The radical deputies took a different position. Gorozarri, deputy for Cádiz, argued: "Gentlemen, if there is one country in which a system of conservative power is prejudicial, that country is Spain; if there is a nation where two chambers are prejudicial, it is Spain..."¹¹. He advocated rather the strengthening of a single National Assembly as in 1791 during the French Revolution. The majority of the Congress did not agree. They supported Vicente Sancho who used the argument of the division of powers as expounded by Montesquieu: that is, an equally strong King, Assembly and Senate¹². The second article was approved by a vote of 126 for, 11 against.

The discussion of the third article began on December 19. The article gave the King the right to an absolute veto. This contrasted with the Constitution of 1812, which only allowed a suspensive veto, that could be over-ruled by a majority vote of the deputies. The key to the debates lay in the different definitions of "national sovereignty". The Congress argued over the real meaning of words and concepts like "the nation", "the national will", "public opinion", and "the people".

The most important debate was that between Salustiano Olózaga and Pascual Madoz, the first in favor of the absolute veto, the second against. Olózaga argued that public opinion was favorable to the power of the King, and stated that there was not a single town which had participated in the revolution of August "which has not demanded that the Constitution of 1812 be modified, and in what sense? In a monarchical sense"¹³. Madoz, speaking for the radical deputies, answered that this was pure nonsense. "It is feared", he added, "that there may be an abuse of power, but I ask, who is more likely to abuse of their power, the king or the people?"¹⁴. For Madoz the increased power of the monarch would threaten national sovereignty. He defined national sovereignty as the expression of the national will, (Rousseau's concept), representing the different groups of the country. He argued that an absolute veto would permit only one way out for the people if they disagreed, namely insurrection. The suspensive veto was far more flexible. Madoz declared: "No sir; the conflict is between the Monarch and the people, and I see no way of avoiding it except through the suspensive veto..."¹⁵. He added that despite the

¹⁰ *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, vol. II, p. 651.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 652.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 652-654.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 697.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 700.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 701.

fact foreign governments would most likely accuse the Spanish deputies of being "anarchists and demagogues" if they did not approve the absolute veto, the Congress should not bow to those external pressures. The implication was clear that the French and or British ambassadors were pressing for a conservative solution.

Notwithstanding the powerful arguments offered by Madoz, the majority approved the absolute veto. The vote was 98 for, 57 against. Since this was such a significant issue, and one that stirred up so much opposition, it is worth analysing the vote carefully. Most of the Centre, led by Argüelles, Sancho and Olózaga voted with the Right, but the radicals, led by Madoz, Doménech, and Caballero, were able to gather more than a third of the votes. The deputies from the northern provinces and from the southern "latifundista" provinces of Seville, Badajoz, Ciudad Real and Toledo supported the absolute veto. The majority of the deputies from Catalonia, Valencia, Alicante, Málaga and Cádiz were opposed. Among the deputies who were landowners and State employees, 75% voted for more power for the king, 25% against; among the professional and commercial bourgeoisie, only 40% voted for, and 60% against; among the military officers 55% for, 45% against.

On December 26, the discussion of the last article of the basic program for constitutional reform began. This article stated: "The deputies to *Cortes* shall be elected by the direct method, and can be re-elected indefinitely." This question, which was one of application rather than actual elaboration of constitutional principles, nonetheless provoked a considerable ideological polemic. The respective merits of universal suffrage, restricted suffrage, and the doctrinaire Liberalism of the French ideologues were debated. The Congress again split into two camps, but each with various shades of opinion.

The deputy for Leon, Luis Sosa, a retired colonel, approved of the direct election, but did not want it restricted. He said: "I do not desire that we should adopt the ideas of the 'doctrinaires', (French doctrinaire ideologues like Constant or Guizot), which are extremely limited, for they want electoral rights to be enjoyed only by a small circle, a single class of citizens; I do not wish it should be only one, but all classes that should have the right to vote..."¹⁶ These democratic principles were challenged by Argüelles, Ayllón and Sancho who defended doctrinaire Liberalism. Argüelles attacked both universal suffrage and the indirect method of voting specified by the Constitution of 1812. He asked:

"Do all the residents of a given parish have the necessary moral qualities to make proper use of this right (to vote)...? How many priests are not authentic tyrants over the minds and opinions of their parishioners? I pass from priest to other persons; where there is a rich landlord, he is the first to try to use his influence; if not, it is the doctor, surgeon, pharmacist or notary who do the most intriguing; in other words there are infinite causes which are opposed to the freedom of elections"¹⁷.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 779.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 780-81.

Argüelles apparently supported the doctrinaire concept of the vote only for the "aristocracy of the intelligence". This group was defined as the propertied classes and the "capacités" or university trained persons. This was the classic electoral system used in the France of Louis-Phillipe (1830-1848). Ayllón agreed with Argüelles, but urged that the number of voters be increased from the 60,000 allowed to vote in the elections of July, 1836, to 150,000.

The decisive arguments in favor of restricted suffrage were presented by Vicente Sancho¹⁸. In a brilliant speech in favor of the restricted vote, Sancho declared: "If we have thrown the aristocracy out of the government, and we have sought the support of the middle class, it is asked why it is that the ignorant class is not allowed the right to vote." Sancho argued that despite the lack of economic development in Spain, the bourgeoisie was the best-educated sector and only one capable of governing. He asked. "If the middle class does not maintain this political system, who sustains it? The brutish and ignorant class? The Congress should meditate well upon this idea, for otherwise our enemies both within and abroad shall say we have no middle class"¹⁹. Sancho said that the argument used by the Carlists was that the Spanish aristocracy had lost its power, that the middle classes did not exist, and that the only class left was the "brutish and ignorant" mass; therefore only despotic absolutism could rule the nation.

Sancho explained that all the Liberals were convinced that the Madrid government was essentially a product of the middle classes. The propertied classes, rather than the peasantry or the artisans, should elect the deputies to Congress. For him the July elections were proof of the success of the direct vote by districts, in spite of the considerable electoral fraud perpetrated by the Istúriz forces. The deputies tended to agree with Sancho's presentation of the case. They voted 87 in favor of restricted direct suffrage, 63 against. The voting pattern was essentially the same as in the previous vote on the absolute veto.

Thus by the 28th of December, 1836, the discussion of the basic program for the constitutional reform had terminated. The committee was now delegated to draft the proposed text of the Constitution of 1837, which would later be submitted to the deputies for final approval. Simultaneously, and just as the year was closing, the Congress received important news from the battle-front in the North. On Christmas eve, General Espartero had broken the siege of Bilbao and routed the Carlist Army. This was perhaps the most decisive battle of the long civil war of 1833-39. The financial and political credit of the Madrid government rose rapidly in the major West European capitals. For the first time historical cir-

¹⁸ As the historian Pons y Unbert pointed out, Sancho was the single politician most responsible for the actual establishment of the system of direct elections by districts in Spain, largely as a result of his hard work in the legislatures of 1835-37. See ADOLFO PONS Y UMBERT, *Organización y funcionamiento de las Cortes* (Madrid, 1906).

¹⁹ *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, vol. II, p. 810.

cumstances seemed to augur well for Spanish Liberalism and the new parliamentary State.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1837

The committee charged with drafting the new constitution worked for three months. On March 9, 1837 they presented the text to the Congress; it was a clear, concise document, containing 31 articles. The radical deputies launched a wholesale attack upon the new constitution. In an impassioned speech, Fermín Caballero described the historical events leading up to the proclamation of the Constitution of 1812. He stated that the August revolution had not begun at La Granja, but had rather culminated there. When the Queen-Regent proclaimed the Constitution, she was only recognizing a "fait accompli"; practically all the major cities of the peninsula had already proclaimed it. The provinces had asked that the old Constitution should be modified, "but there was not a single province which asked that a new Constitution be formed, not a single province"²⁰. Caballero added:

"The strangest thing is that when we look to those nations which are said to be advanced in political theories, and which have more practical experience in the question of fundamental laws and ideas of representative government; when we take these countries as models to be imitated—we always have the misfortune of adopting all that which favors the Royal Power or the executive... while all that favors the people, the popular power, is rejected, allegedly because the circumstances are not yet appropriate for their application in Spain... For a single occasion that the people abuse of their power, the kings and counsellors abuse a thousand times over, and if someone doubts this, gentlemen, let him but look into the book of history, which should always be our guide to political questions"²¹.

The Congress, nonetheless, had already accepted the authoritarian principles to be embodied in the new Constitution. The radicals remained a minority voice. The deputies discussed and voted each article, one by one, during the months of March, April and May. But only the debates of two articles, 11 and 19, were of substantial interest. On April 5, the Congress began to discuss article 11, which stated: "The Nation is obliged to maintain the cult and ministers of the Catholic Religion which Spaniards profess." It had been drafted by Manuel Acevedo, member of the committee. Caballero attacked the wording and intent of the article, demanding that the following phrase be added: "and no person shall be persecuted because of his religious opinions"²². Joaquín María López, deputy for Alicante, concurred, referring to the need to extirpate the tradition of the Inquisition by establishing religious tolerance. The more conservative deputies rejected this point of view. Vicente Sancho made an amazing de-

²⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 2200-2201.

²¹ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 2204.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 2500.

fence of religious intolerance. He stated that nobody would be persecuted for their religious opinions, "only the actual expression of their opinions should be persecuted"²³. Salustiano Olózaga added that to allow religious tolerance would be "extremely dangerous for the future of Spain". The majority of the deputies agreed with him, by a vote of 125 for, 34 against.

Another issue which was hotly debated was the proposal of article 19 stating: "The position of Senator is life-long and without salary." Olózaga, member of the committee, nonetheless was the first to oppose it on this question. He delivered an extremely long speech which convinced the majority to reject this conservative definition of the Senate. Essentially, the issue was whether the upper chamber should be a narrowly aristocratic or a representative body. Conservative-minded deputies preferred a Senate similar to the English House of Lords, which confirmed the authority of the aristocracy. The more liberal deputies argued for a representative upper chamber such as that in the United States or France. This latter group won the vote by 91 vote against the article, 83 for. Subsequently the word "lifelong" was eliminated from the text.

The new Constitution was finally proclaimed by the Queen-Regent in a Royal Session of the Congress on June 17, 1837. The Constitution of 1837 definitively effected the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. It confirmed the freedom of the press and a system of direct elections. It divided the legislative power into two bodies, Congress and Senate. This system of parliamentary government was to last for almost a hundred years, of course, with several modifications. All the later Constitutions were essentially revised editions of that of 1837, either in a conservative or a liberal sense. The Constitution of 1845, for example, was more conservative, but with practically the exact same wording; the Senate was made more aristocratic, and the National Militia was eliminated. The Constitution of 1869, on the other hand, was a liberal version, providing for universal suffrage and religious tolerance²⁴.

THE ELECTORAL LAW OF 1837

A few days before the proclamation of the new Constitution, the Congress approved a separate electoral law to accompany it. This law gave the right to vote to a much larger number of citizens than in preceding years: 250,000 Spaniards were now allowed to elect the deputies and senators to parliament²⁵. The electoral Law of 1837 was a cross between the French electoral Law of 1831 and the English Reform Law of 1832. Essentially, only the propertied classes were granted suffrage. This basic principle was explained in the prologue to the law which stated: "in all

²³ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 2511.

²⁴ For a discussion of similarities and differences of the 19th century constitutions see LUIS SÁNCHEZ AGESTA, *Historia del Constitucionalismo español* (Madrid, 1964).

²⁵ For text of the Electoral Law of 1837 see *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, vol. VI, appendix to session of May 31, 1837, pp. 3787-3795.

the nations of Europe which have preceded us in the ways of representative government, private property has been considered the only proper indication of electoral capacity". As in France, all those individuals who paid a large direct tax (and therefore were large property-owners) had the right to vote. As in England, those citizens who paid a large sum in rents of house or land also could vote. In proportion to the total population, more Spaniards could vote than Frenchmen, but less than Englishmen. In 1837, 1 in 150 French citizens were electors, 1 in 48 Spaniards, and 1 in 28 Englishmen. Spain was not behind the times²⁶.

There were several pecuniary qualifications which permitted Spaniards to vote. All property owners paying more than 200 "reales" in taxes per year voted: of these there were approximately 77,000. All those persons who demonstrated that they earned more than 1,500 "reales" on urban or rural properties had the same right. Farmers paying a rent of 3,000 "reales" or more per year, "rentiers", receiving substantial income from State bonds, and the upper hierarchy of the State administration were all electors. Those merchants and industrialists who did not pay the commercial tax ("subsidio de comercio") could vote if they paid a high rent on the houses they inhabited. Finally, most university trained persons, qualified as the "capacidades", well-off lawyers, doctors, surgeons, pharmacists and professors were also electors²⁷.

The electoral qualifications guaranteed that the "pays legal" of 1837, (the political nation), would be dominated by the rural magnates and their dependents, but allowed a considerable sector of the commercial, industrial and professional classes to have a say in national politics. The qualifications for "electors" were determined by the provincial deputations, which were generally controlled by the party in power. The role of the State administration in determining elections was less important than in France during the period 1837-1850. (It would become more so after 1850.) Spanish elections in these years were determined chiefly, by the actions of the political parties, Progressives and Moderates. As in England, the open struggle between fairly evenly balanced parties (Tories and Whigs) often allowed for sharp electoral reverses and changes of parliamentary majorities as well as of Cabinets.

The Electoral Law of 1837 covered only national elections for deputies and senators. It did not refer to the municipal elections. Town governments in Spain were elected between 1837 and 1844 according to the democratic law of 1823, reestablished by the Calatrava Ministry in August of the preceding year. The result was that the propertied classes decided national politics, but had to allow men of little property, chiefly artisans, to participate in local politics. From 1837 onwards, the Moderate Party made the abolition of the democratic municipal law the major plank of

²⁶ For information on French electoral processes see SHERMAN KENT, *Electoral Procedures under Louis Philippe*, especially chapter 2. On the English electoral process see E. HALÉVY, *A History of the English People*, vol. 2, *The Triumph of Reform 1832-1841*.

²⁷ See text of Electoral Law as referred to in footnote 25.

its political platform. The Progressives, however, vigorously defended local democracy and this pushed them to the left after 1840.

ECONOMIC REFORMS: THE PACT BETWEEN ARISTOCRACY AND BOURGEOISIE

The deputies of 1836-37 intended not only to transform the political structure of the nation, but also to change fundamental aspects of economic life. The Congress approved three major pieces of economic legislation: (1) the partial abolition of the seigneurial regime; (2) the abolition of the tithes; (3) the nationalization of the properties of the monastic orders of the Church. Jointly these measures constituted an antifeudal program of reform, essential to the consolidation of the "bourgeois" Liberal State. But actually these reforms did not result in a loss of power for the traditional nobility, nor did they change the distribution of the landed property, except for the lands of the regular Church. By these legislative measures the Church lost economic power, but the Aristocracy did not; indeed the latter became fully integrated into the new order and played a significant political role throughout the 19th century.

The Partial Abolition of the Seigneurial Regime

The first major economic issue taken up by the Congress was the abolition of the seigneurial regime. Already in the previous periods of constitutional government of 1810-14 and 1820-23, the *Cortes* had decreed the abolition of the seigneurial form of property as well as all traditional feudal rights and privileges. The decision of the Congress of 1836-37 to reinstitute these decrees resulted in a major political and social crisis. The traditional nobility was willing to give up the practice of entail ("mayorazgo") and feudal privileges, including special tributes and the monopoly of certain lands for private use, such as hunting. But they were determined to retain actual ownership of their great estates.

On November 27, 1837, a congressional committee had presented a proposal to reestablish the decrees of 1811 and 1823. These decrees stated that those properties where the nobility only exercised "jurisdictional authority" (rights of judicial administration), but for which the noble, did not actually have deeds to the land, would be expropriated. Those nobles who could present authentic deeds of property would be allowed to keep their estates. A prolonged debate took place, lasting 28 days and in which 50 or more deputies took part.

The conservative deputies like Fernández Baeza, a distinguished judge from León, argued in favor of including the majority of the traditional landlords as "bourgeois" property owners, even when they could not present deeds of property. The problem, he believed, was to clearly define between feudal aristocrats who had no rights to the land, and "bourgeois" aristocrats, who through deeds or some other means could demonstrate

their right to their estates. Fernández Baeza stated: "What I note is lacking in the decree (of 1823) is a clear definition of owner and aristocrat, and specifically of the difference between owner and aristocrat... It appears that the lack of such a definition is the cause of the fact that the law appears to attack private property"²⁸. The conservatives wanted the Congress to transform the majority of the seigneurial nobility into "bourgeois" landowners, by providing them with new legal deeds of property. The more liberal deputies, led by Agustín Argüelles, were opposed. The law of 1823 specified that all landlords who wished to conserve their estates should present their deeds. If they did not have them, too bad; they would be expropriated. Argüelles asked:

"Is it possible to say that the seigneurial nobility belongs to the middle classes, or even to the inferior classes?... No, gentlemen, these people are not like the vulgar populace; and in their homes, isn't it true that they have several servants and other persons in charge of keeping their books and documents? Can they plausibly argue that they have lost them (the deeds to their estates)?"²⁹

The majority of the Congress concurred. The decrees of 1811 and 1823 were reestablished by a vote of 92 for, 64 against.

Two months later, however, the conservatives had gained strength and organized a campaign to modify the decrees. A petition signed by 83 deputies was submitted to the Congress, asking for an additional law, clarifying the difference between landlords with titles and those without. The extreme conservatives argued that all aristocrats should be considered legal property owners; no land should be expropriated. The very fact that the nobles had been masters of the peasantry and of the land was adequate proof of their ownership; they needed no titles, no deeds. An exponent of this view was Gómez Becerra, an old but distinguished politician and judge. He stated:

"In those territories where the nobles had all the prerogatives, all forms of domination; in those estates, for example, where a noble, on taking possession of some piece of land, had the right to hang a man (presumably the former peasant-owner); in such an estate where there existed a state of absolute tyranny, there were nonetheless private properties (belonging to the noble). And private property, gentlemen, is the most fundamental principle... Gentlemen, if there is any reason to take away land from a great landlord, then there is equal reason to take it away from a middle-sized or small proprietor..."³⁰

Gómez Becerra was blatant about his support for aristocratic rights. Another conservative, Miguel Burriel, deputy for Teruel, was somewhat more subtle. He began by stating, (as did practically all the deputies), that private property was sacred. He pointed out that many nobles had improved their estates by investing capital in them, even if they had no deeds; they would be most unhappy with the law as it now stood. Furthermore

²⁸ *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, vol. II, 993-995.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 1006.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 2216, March 18, 1837.

many landlords did not administrate their own properties. This was often handled by the "censualistas", who were allotted a part of the estate for which they paid a lump sum every year. The "censualistas", in turn, rented small plots out to peasants. Burriel asked what would happen to this large class of men, (who were a kind of indirect proprietor), if the aristocratic lands were expropriated³¹.

The Congress finally capitulated and asked a committee to draft a special clarificatory law. The conservatives approved highly of article 1 of this proposed law, which stated that only those "actual possessors" of property who had exercised jurisdiction would lose their estates³². This article virtually exempted the whole of the aristocracy. There were few "actual possessors" who had exercised "legal" jurisdiction because ever since 1811 these feudal rights had been formally abolished. Ferdinand VII had not revoked the legislation of 1811 which remained "officially" in force, if not always in practice. Since the aristocrats had not exercised "jurisdiction" since 1811, they were not guilty of being feudal lords. By this specious argument the nobility would retain their lands, regardless of whether or not they had deeds to them.

The deputies of the Left fought against the conservative avalanche, Joaquín Abarques, deputy for Alicante, insisted on the nature of the contemporary class conflict. He said: "We do not only clash with the Carlist principle, we clash with the aristocratic principle, which has attempted to defeat us, and to destroy our new Constitution, daughter of our (national) glories." Abarques suggested that his own province of Alicante was the only province where no peasants had become Carlists because "they believe they will obtain the improvements indicated by the decrees of the years 1811 and 1823 which oblige the landlords to present their deeds of property... Let us be frank, gentlemen, one of the principal causes which decides a man to follow a given (political) party is his individual (material) interest; that it to say that he should not pay more than is just, and that nobody should exploit his work unjustly..."³³. Abarques was appealing to the Progressive Party to obtain and keep the support of the peasantry.

But a great number of the deputies of 1836-37 were themselves landlords, with no interest in furthering the welfare of their tenants or day-laborers. Furthermore, the majority of the Progressives were intent upon establishing a reconciliation with the Moderate Party, in which the traditional aristocracy carried weight. The result was that the clarificatory law was approved by a vote of 111 for, 40 against. Several of the most important Progressive leaders, such as Argüelles, Sancho, and Olózaga, abstained from voting. Their indecisiveness allowed the majority of the Centre bloc to ally with the Right and defeat the radicals. Consequently, as Gonzalo Anes says: after 1837 "the nobility conserved their great properties and their privileged situation, and the peasantry did not obtain an impro-

³¹ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 2195, March 17, 1837.

³² *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 2332, March 28, 1837.

³³ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 2262.

vement of his position, which could have been possible only with (the expropriation of) the traditional seigneurial properties". The relatively inconspicuous clarificatory law was actually one of the key pieces of legislation in 19th century Spain.

THE ECONOMIC REFORM OF THE CHURCH

Although the Constituent Congress did not significantly diminish the economic power of the traditional nobility, it did strip the Spanish Church of much of its wealth. The legislation of 1837 abolished the ecclesiastical tithes and formally legalised the process of disentanglement begun under Mendizábal. Both the urban bourgeoisie and the landowning classes supported the weakening of the clergy. They benefitted from these reforms because they were able to buy up much valuable rural and urban real estate, (formerly monastic properties), and because the elimination of the tithes allowed for a greater degree of productivity and commercialization of agriculture.

The Congress received numerous petitions from villages in favor of the abolition of the tithes. The Centre bloc of the parliament allied with the Left to approve the extinction of these onerous taxes, which provided a great deal of revenue for the ecclesiastical hierarchy, but weighed heavily on the peasantry. Most Spanish peasants were barely able to break even at the end of the year; many were deeply in debt; the tithes not only limited the rural markets, they caused great social discontent. The radical deputies considered their abolition necessary to get the support of the peasants for the parliamentary State, and against Carlism. The peasants had to be given material incentives. The radicals were disappointed with the lack of new economic reforms approved so far by the Congress. Fermín Caballero declared that the elimination of the tithes "will be a true benefit, perhaps the only positive material reward that the (peasant) villages receive from this legislature"³⁴. The law was passed by a large majority on June 24, 1837.

The disentanglement of the Church was supported by the main political groups and by all social sectors. The government was also anxious for its approval because the sale of Church lands could provide large sums for the war being carried on against the Carlists. The main issue was how the nationalised monastic properties would be sold and distributed. A few months before, a petition had been submitted by the radical deputy from Cuenca, Diego Montoya, urging the Congress to distribute the Church lands to the rural proletariat. Montoya, who was himself a landowner, also proposed the formation of agricultural collectives for the soldiers who returned home from fighting in the North³⁵. A congressional committee, appointed to review this and other petitions, rejected these revolutionary

³⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. VI, 4202.

³⁵ *Ibid.* See appendix to the session of December, 30, 1836, vol. II, 840.

ideas, stating that the State could not eliminate its large public debt by distributing land free to penniless agricultural laborers or soldiers. The government needed money in exchange for the Church land. Montoya's amendment was rejected.

For two weeks the deputies discussed the disentailment law and voted favorably on it on July 29, 1837. The manner in which the law was formulated guaranteed that those who could benefit from the sales of the Church properties would be principally the wealthy landowners, merchants, and financiers. There were two ways of making payments for the land auctioned off by the State; one was to pay with State bonds and the other was to pay in cash. Those persons who paid with State bonds ("vales reales") were obliged to put down a small amount in cash, but then they had eight years to pay the total price. This favored many wealthy Spaniards who held large amounts of formerly worthless bonds, which they were now able to exchange for valuable real estate. Those persons who had cash obtained even more favorable conditions, allowing for sixteen years to pay up the total. The only problem was that most peasant farmers had very little spare cash and certainly no bonds. Either way they were unable to buy up much property. The already wealthy landowners and merchants, on the other hand, were able and eager to buy up and monopolise the old monastic properties. As the historian Gonzalo Anes states: "The transfer of properties favored the wealthy merchants, favored those industrialists interested in investing their savings in land for reasons of security or prestige, and favored politicians and aristocrats. These last (the aristocrats) were able, to a considerable degree, to compensate the loss of their former feudal tributes and privileges by buying up the former Church properties."

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF 1837

The Constituent Congress of 1836-37 was the first legislature since the death of Ferdinand VII to take up the problem of Spanish America. The majority of the Spanish American countries had obtained their independence between 1810 and 1824, but Ferdinand VII had never officially recognized this fact. The Liberals of 1836 decided to formalise the "de facto" situation. On the 6th of December, 1836 the Congress ratified the first and definitive official recognition of the independence. Normal diplomatic relations were soon established with the nations of Central and South America.

The issue of those countries which remained colonier, (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines), still was unresolved. The Congressional committee on overseas affairs presented the deputies with a proposal stating that the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico should be ruled by "exceptional laws" in the future. They would also lose their privilege of electing deputies to the Spanish parliament, and their chief authority would be the Captain-General, appointed by the government at Madrid. Cuba and Puerto Rico had sent elected deputies to the *Cortes* of 1810-14, 1820-23, and also

more recently in 1834-36. In October of 1836 the Constitution of 1812 had been proclaimed in San Juan (Puerto Rico) and in Santiago de Cuba, in the eastern part of the island, but not in Havana. Deputies had been elected by these two cities and sent to the Constituent Congress, but they were not allowed to take their seats³⁶.

The radicals of the Congress argued in the spring of 1837 that the Cuban deputies should be allowed to take their rightful seats, thus affirming the principle of Cuba's right to political representation. But this was a principle which many powerful interests opposed, for to allow Cuba to have political liberties might lead to unforeseen consequences. Conservative deputies argued that there would be a greater likelihood of slave rebellions, (more than 50% of the Cuban population were slaves by 1840), or for demands for autonomy³⁷. But the real basis of the opposition to political representation for the Cubans was economic. Cuba was a very valuable prize. Already it was producing large amounts of sugar and tobacco. Much of the tobacco consumed by the State tobacco factories of Spain was Cuban, and almost 15% of the total Spanish government revenues came from the tobacco monopoly. Furthermore the slave trade, conducted mostly by Cádiz merchants, was an extremely profitable business. The Queen-Regent, María Cristina, was involved in this trade; it was said that she received a large amount of money for every "sack of coal" (slave) landed on the island³⁸. Furthermore, both Cuba and Puerto Rico provided large tributes during the 1830's in order to help finance the war against the Carlists. To give the Cubans more political liberties could jeopardize all these profitable venture. It would be best to leave the island under the strict control of a Captain General like Miguel Tacón, who had good relationships with the owners of the great slave plantations³⁹.

The radical deputy Joaquín Verdugo, however, insisted that to limit Cuban political rights was hypocritical. He declared: "Gentlemen, it would be a political anachronism if we peninsular Spaniards, having just obtained our own political liberty, would now attempt to deprive our compatriots (the Cubans and Puerto Ricans) of the same"⁴⁰. But the Progressive leader Vicente Sancho rejected this idea. He said that all the other European countries had colonies, and none of them gave their colonies special political rights. To do so would be dangerous. Cuba would become another Haiti if the Constitution were established there. To pronounce the word "liberty" would be to encourage the slave to rebel and slaughter their white masters. Sancho asked: "And how can the weakly Europeans,

³⁶ One of the most vocal of the Cuban deputies elect was José Antonio Saco, who wrote many pamphlets on the subject of the need for giving Cuba political representation. See JOSÉ ANTONIO SACO, *Colección de papeles científicos, históricos y políticos*, 3 vols. (París, 1859), and *Obras*, 2 vols. (New York, 1853).

³⁷ See RAMIRO GUERRA Y SÁNCHEZ, *Manual de Historia de Cuba*, 2nd edition (Havana, 1964).

³⁸ See references in the excellent study by Juan Pérez de la Riva, who edited *Correspondencia reservada del Capitán General don Miguel Tacón* (Havana, 1963).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, vol. IV, 2270.

unnerved by the heat, resist the sons of the sun (black slaves) accustomed to defying both heat and suffering”⁴¹. The masters must be protected from the slaves, and the colony must be protected from political liberties and representation.

The majority of the Congress agreed with Sancho that no political representation should be granted to the colonies, as these might undermine the profitable slave production, of both Cuba and Puerto Rico. The result was that the committee proposal was accepted by the Congress. Cuba and Puerto Rico were ruled by “special laws” under the authority of Captain Generals for the rest of the century.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS

The Congress continued to meet regularly during the summer and fall of 1837. It approved a general educational law, and a reform of the clergy, providing for its financial support with State funds. It also discussed and voted on the budget, but was interrupted in the midst of this by a government crisis. On August 15 a batallion of troops, stationed outside Madrid at Aravaca, had revolted. The powerful general in charge of the Army of the North, Espartero did not issue a condemnation of this insubordination. The Calatrava Cabinet promptly resigned. The Queen-Regent appointed new Ministers, under the leadership of the old diplomat, Eusebio Bardaxi. In November, the Cabinet decided to terminate the legislative session of the Constituent Congress and to call for new elections.

The Constituent Congress had accomplished a great deal. It had ratified the Constitution of 1837, made the new Electoral Law, and established a wide-ranging series of reforms, economic, administrative, educational and religious. Actually the legislature of 1836-37 created more new legislation than any other legislature of 19th century Spain, with the exceptions of the *Cortes* of 1810-1812 and perhaps of that of 1869.

The President of the Congress, Joaquín María López, delivered the final speech. He stated:

“The Congress, gentlemen, according to the indication of the Cabinet, has reached its termination, and the moment of our separation is at hand. It is not for the President to make the defence (of the work of the Congress). The judgement of its work and conduct is left to the impartial contemporary writers and to the future... The Extraordinary Constituent Congress of the Spanish nation closes its sessions this day, November 4, 1837”⁴².

It was 3:15 in the afternoon. The Congress was closed “amidst the great acclamation of the large crowd present, which cheered the Constituent Congress, the Constitution, Queen Isabel II, (still but a child of 7 years), and the Queen-Regent”.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, vol. IV, 2506.

⁴² *Ibid.*, vol. IX, 7088.

VI

The Social Basis of Carlism

The Congress of 1836-37 institutionalized the liberal parliamentary State and most Spaniards accepted this new political system. A minority, however, did not, and indeed fought for two more years to defeat liberalism. These were the Carlists, the last defenders of the absolute monarchy. They refused to be convinced of the virtues of reform. They would be defeated only by force of arms. The civil war raging in the northern provinces was the bloody backdrop to the solemn parliamentary discussions of the deputies of 1836-37, and the war, on occasion, came virtually to the gates of Madrid. Scarcely three months after the proclamation of the Constitution of 1837, Don Carlos outflanked the liberal Army in the North and marched with 13,000 troops almost to the gates of the capital. Despite the fact that the city had little military protection, Don Carlos did not attack. He simply camped in the fields about fifteen miles away and then finally decided to retreat. Why he did not attack and attempt to obtain a decisive victory for Carlism is still not clear. He may have realized that his chances of holding power, even on capturing Madrid, were slim. At any rate, the retreat of Don Carlos back to the Basque provinces marked the end of the Carlist military-political initiative and bespoke the eventual liberal victory in 1839.

For two more years, 1837-39, the Carlists continued to fight, but their struggle remained limited chiefly to the Basque provinces and Navarre, where they had widespread peasant support. Although these military events were of enormous importance for Spanish politics in this period, we do not intend, nor can we deal with most aspects of the war. We shall not discuss the military or diplomatic details of the Carlist War of 1833-39, which have been adequately covered in numerous published works¹. Our interest will focus rather on the social basis of Carlism, a subject almost totally neglected, but a subject of direct relevance to an understanding of the complexity of the social forces unleashed by the fall of the absolute monarchy and the rise of the parliamentary State. This neglect is extremely surprising, considering that Carlism represents perhaps the outstanding example of a long-lasting peasant-based theocratic and absolutist mo-

¹ For a bibliography of the Carlist war see J. DEL BURGO, *Bibliografía de las Guerras Carlistas y de las luchas políticas del siglo XIX*, 3 vols. (Pamplona, 1953-55). The single best and most complete history is ANGEL PIRALA, *Historia de la Guerra Civil*, 6 vols. The most complete modern and exclusively military study is FEDERICO GARCÍA RIVERA, *Primeras Guerras Carlistas, Zumalacárregui* (Barcelona, 1945).

vement in Western Europe during and after the Industrial Revolution². Both in 1833-39 and later Carlism was the reactionary response to the spread of liberalism. That Carlism remained strong for so long is an indication that despite the fact that after 1836 the dominant ideology in Spain appeared to be liberalism, important ideological facets of absolutism had not and would not be destroyed. Although the central subjects of this study of the decade 1834-44 are the forces that supported reform, rather than those opposed to reform, no history of the period can avoid the subject of Carlism. To do so would be to ascribe a social and cultural homogeneity to the Spanish society of the 1830's which would be deeply misleading. Due to our lack of resources, however, we can only offer an extremely brief description of the social basis of Carlism.

The first problem in the analysis of Carlism is to distinguish between the military/political leadership of the movement and the peasant masses that supported it. The political leaders were Don Carlos and his ecclesiastical supporters. The military chiefs were mostly former officers of the Army of Ferdinand VII or of the Royalist Volunteers of 1823-33. As a group these men had little socially in common with the peasant soldiers they led. The Carlist Army was composed of and supported by the peasantry of the northern provinces of Spain, particularly the Basque provinces and Navarre, as well as parts of some other regions. They accepted the ideology of Don Carlos, which advocated the return to absolute monarchy and Catholic theocracy, but they actually fought for more immediate reasons. Essentially then, Carlism was an alliance between two different social sectors: (a) reactionary officers, ecclesiastics and aristocrats; (b) the regional peasantries of the Basque provinces, Navarre, and parts of Catalonia.

Carlism had actually begun as a cause without a leader. In 1821-23, the reactionary forces opposed to the Liberal *Cortes* launched a series of rebellions in the northern provinces, financed by French and Spanish legitimists across the border. But Don Carlos was not a prominent leader of this movement. He only gradually became the hope and symbol of Spanish reaction during the decade of 1823-33, as his brother the King Ferdinand VII became increasingly opposed to the ultra-right. It was after the monarch's death in 1833 that Don Carlos became clearly the leader of Carlism. He had proved his reactionary mettle in 1833 by joining former King Don Miguel in his struggle to reestablish absolutism in Portugal. When Don Miguel was defeated by the Liberals, Don Carlos fled to England where he remained several months, establishing international contacts to help his cause. He then returned secretly to the Iberian peninsula to lead the already vigorous Carlist rebellion in the Basque provinces.

The Carlist insurrection was supported by the Absolute Monarchies of Prussia, Russia and Austria. In 1833, at the Convention of Munche-

² For an interesting study of a similar reactionary movement during the French revolution see CHARLES TILLY, *The Vendée: A Sociological Analysis of the Counter-Revolution of 1793* (New York, 1967).

gratz, these three powers agreed to jointly oppose efforts by France or England to protect Liberal movements and governments. This was a clear statement of support for Don Carlos in Spain and Don Miguel in Portugal. The Carlist movement was seen by the European nobility as the last great defence of Aristocracy in Western Europe after the French revolution. French legitimist aristocrats were open supporters and many served as volunteer officers in the Carlist Army; they arranged contraband shipments of arms through the Pyrenees, and helped set up international financial contacts. Some English aristocrats in the House of Lords also favored Don Carlos, but they were limited by Palmerston's pro-Liberal policies and by the Whig majorities in both Houses, which approved of these policies. Portuguese, Italian, and German aristocrats also favored Carlism, and many volunteered to fight in Spain for the reactionary cause³.

The most important element provided by the foreign powers to the Court and Army of Don Carlos was money. Moritz von Haber, the son of a Karlsruhe court banker, was reported to have raised one and a half million francs for the Carlists in 1834⁴. Other attempts by second-rate banking houses to float Carlist loans, however, were uniformly unsuccessful. Most financial aid came directly from the treasuries of the absolute monarchs. The King of Piedmont provided 2 million francs to Don Carlos in early 1833. The Kings of Holland, Austria, Prussia, and Russia made large contributions. According to a British agent, the Absolute powers gave Don Carlos 800,000 pounds sterling between July and December of 1835. From April to September, 1837 the northern powers are reported to have subsidized Carlos to an extent of 120,000 pounds sterling⁵. In 1838 the Russian Czar, Nicholas, provided great amounts of cash in order to prevent Carlist defeat. A modern historian states that between June and November of 1838, Taitshcheve, a Russian agent, had made 14 payments to the Carlist agent in Vienna, (the Count of Alcudia), totalling 960,000 florins⁶. It would not be an exaggeration to say that all of these large sums made possible the Carlist military effort of 1833-39, and that this expression of international reactionary solidarity goes a long way toward explaining the capacity of Don Carlos to lead such a prolonged resistance in northern Spain.

THE COURT OF DON CARLOS

The Court of Don Carlos was not established in any one fixed place. The necessities of war, the ever-present danger of an offensive by the Liberal Army obliged Don Carlos to continuously shift location. Essentially

³ For information on aristocratic volunteers in the Carlist Army see EDWARD BELL STEPHENS, *The Basque Provinces*, vol. I (London, 1837), pp. 153-55.

⁴ For information on the international financing of the Army of Don Carlos between 1833 and 1839 see PHILIP E. MOSELY, "Intervention and Non-Intervention in Spain: 1838-39", *Journal of Modern History*, vol. XIII, 1941, pp. 195-210.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

there were three different groups that mad up the Carlist Court: the *military*, *civil*, and *ecclesiastical* "camarillas". Up to December of 1835, the military chief of the Carlist forces had been Tomás Zumalacárregui, but he was not personally close to the King, who actually determined military strategy in consultation with several aides-de-camp; in 1837 these men were Generals Uranga, Vibanco, García, Balmaseda, and Serradilla. The commander of the Royal Guards was Colonel Aguirre. These aides-de-camp were not capable leaders compared to the officers actually in command of the troops. After the retreat from Madrid in September of 1837, for example, the military camarilla dismissed one of the Carlist generals, Casa Eguía, because he had predicted the failure of the expedition, and they removed the command of the Army from the able hands of General Moreno⁷.

The civil "camarilla" was essentially composed of the secretaries of State. The Secretary of State for Finances was Pedro Díaz de Labandero, who had previously served as "intendente" of Catalonia under Ferdinand VII. The Secretary of the War Department was Manuel María de Medina, who had fought in the War of 1808-1814, had risen to the position of Marshall of the Army (Mariscal de campo) under Ferdinand VII, and was a rich proprietor in Andalucía. The secretary of the Justice Department was the Bishop of León. The secretary of State for foriegn affairs was Wenceslao María de Sierra, who had previously served at the Foriegn Office at Madrid before 1833⁸. In 1836 Don Carlos named a previously unknown individual, named Tejeiro, prime minister. For the next two years Tejeiro monopolised power in the Carlist Court.

The ecclesiastical "camarilla" was led by the Bishop of León. Other members were the Bishop's secretary, Ramón Pécondon, the Royal confessor, Larraga, and a priest named Echevarría and his secretary⁹. They were all representatives of the most fanatical sectors of the Spanish Church. They attempted to coordinate the activities and propaganda of the right-wing clergy in northern Spain, but like the civil and military camarilla were ineffective, partly because of their exaggerated fanaticism, partly because of stupidity. The effective administration of the Carlist movement and Army was to be found outside of the Court proper.

There were several important local groups which provided political and financial leadership for the Carlist cause. Among these were the 4 provincial Juntas that provided money for troops, as well as rations and clothing. The leaders were the Marquis of Valdespina, president of the Junta of Biscay, General Berastegui, president of the Junta of Alava and Commander of the Carlist army of the reserve, Sr. Aguiterez, head of the Junta of Guipúzcoa and intendent general of police, and Sr. Modet, leader of the Junta of Navarre and governor of the Supreme Tribunal

⁷ See *L'Appel a l'Opinion Publique sur la Situation d'Espagne* (Anonymous) (Paris, 1839), Appendix, pp. 84-87.

⁸ The biographical information on these "secretaries of state" is drawn from E. BELL STEPHENS, *The Basque Provinces*, vol. 156.

⁹ *Appel a l'Opinion Publique sur la Situation de l'Espagne*, p. 87.

of Navarre¹⁰. Together they formed the Council of the Interior, which effectively administered those areas under Carlist control.

THE CARLIST MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The Carlists effectively combined all the resources of modern guerilla warfare. The Carlist military was composed of two different sectors: the professional army and the guerilla bands. The professional forces were highly disciplined, well-officered and well-paid. They were broken up into mobile units which could unite for rapid coordinated actions, and on several occasions for sieges of cities, like Bilbao, or for extended marches into Castille. The guerilla bands were mostly composed of and led by local peasants; they were essentially bandit gangs that had the capacity of engaging in skirmishes, harassing operations, and lightening raids into enemy territory. Both the Army and the guerillas were based in these regions where there was a sympathetic peasant population that provided men and provisions for them. Don Carlos had agents and administrators in these areas, who collected customs duties and other local taxes.

The Carlist Army had a high proportion of officers to men. This high proportion may have been partly responsible for the effectiveness of their military organization. Most of the top leaders were disillusioned former generals of the Army of Ferdinand VII. Among the best-known were Zumalacárregui, Moreno, Santos Ladrón, Maroto and the Conde de España. These officers had been dismissed from their positions by Prime Minister Cea Bermúdez in 1832¹¹; they had consequently become champions of Don Carlos. Another source of officers and men were the former members of the Royalist Volunteers of 1823-33. They made up most of the lower ranks of the officer corps and of the cavalry. In October of 1833, for example, it was reported that 10,000 Royalist Volunteers from northern Castille had joined the Carlist rebellion. There were also a considerable number of foreign aristocrats and officers who volunteered for service with Don Carlos. In 1836 among the foreigners fighting were the following: the Portuguese Lieutenant-General Count Madeira, the Count of Boos Valdeck from Saxony, the Count of Coetlagan (a page of Charles X of France), Colonel Count de Montara (Chamberlain to the Duke of Lucca, Italy), Lord Ranelagh, Captain Rochefoucault, Captain Hennigsen¹², etc. The Carlist War was an ideal opportunity for the European military aristocrats to prove their valor, to help the reactionary cause, and to gain fame.

According to statistics for the year 1836, the Carlist Army had a total of 30,000 infantry troops and about 1,000 cavalry in the Basque provinces and Navarre. There were almost 2,000 officers, or about 1 per/15 soldiers¹³.

¹⁰ E. BELL STEPHENS, *The Basque Provinces*, vol. I, p. 117.

¹¹ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain: 1800-1854*, p. 45.

¹² E. BELL STEPHENS, *The Basque Provinces*, vol. I, 153.

¹³ For statistics see A. PIRALA, *Historia de la Guerra Civil*, vol. III, p. 441, document no. 5.

The Liberal Army, on the other hand, had over 180,000 troops, but not more than 70,000 were actually stationed in the northern provinces¹⁴. Given the nature of the terrain, the mobility of the Carlist forces, and the support of the peasantry for Don Carlos, the Liberal soldiers were at a decided disadvantage, despite their greater numbers. The Carlist guerilla bands were able to carry out many raids almost unopposed. In the summer of 1836 a band led by the "guerillero" Gómez marched through Castille to Alicante and Murcia, ravaging towns and villages. Gómez then marched into Andalucía, seized and sacked Córdoba, leaving with huge amounts of booty. By this time his force numbered almost 7,000 men. The Madrid government ordered 25,000 troops under the command of General Narváez to the pursuit, but Gómez's band managed to avoid them, safely returning to the Basque provinces in less than a month.

The different commanders of the Liberal Army in the North tried out different strategies to defeat the Carlists. In 1835, the strategy of General in Command Valdés was to concentrate all his forces in certain fortresses, and leave the less strategically importante villages to the enemy. The Basque peasantry interpreted this as a sign of the strength of the Carlists. Valdés was replaced by General Cordova, who appealed for foreign intervention; he wanted the help of French troops to help quell the rebellion. Cordova wished to set up a blockade in order to circumscribe the war to the northern provinces and gradually strangle the Carlists.

Cordova took possession of the valley of the Boruna from Vitoria to Pamplona; a French division covered the area from Pamplona to Irún, and British war ships on the coast of Biscay blocaked the seaports¹⁵. But the Liberal Army won few victories, and the French troops soon returned home, allowing the contraband arms trade through the Pyrenees to flourish again. In late May, 1836, Cordova travelled to Madrid, leaving his command to junior officers. Two months later he resigned. He was replaced by General Espartero, who remained commander of Army of the North until the end of the war. Espartero's strategy was to inflict major defeats on the Carlists in pitched battles and to try to disillusion his opponents by the sheer size of his army. He accumulated great numbers of troops, in the North, and provided them with good supply lines and regular pay. Eventually this strategy paid off. The Carlist officers and troops lost their hopes of winning the war, and the Basque peasantry became discontent with the unending death, destruction and hunger. By early 1839 the civil war drew to a close.

THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CARLISM

The leaders of Carlism were members of the Spanish upper classes, but their followers (including most of the soldiers of the Army) were

¹⁴ For more military statistics see FERMÍN CABALLERO, *El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto*, p. XLIII.

¹⁵ MAJOR FRANCIS DUNCAN, *The English in Spain: 1834-1840* (London, 1877), pp. 61-71.

peasants. Aristocrats and peasants fought under the same banners and for the same cause. The cause was, however, twofold. On the one hand, the Carlists fought for a return to absolute monarchy, (with Don Carlos as King), and on the other they proclaimed the defence of the liberties and privileges of the Basque provinces and of Navarre. It was this second aspect which was particularly attractive to the local peasantry. A brief social analysis of the northern provinces can provide an insight into the reasons for the strength of the Carlist appeal there.

According to a report written in 1837 by the British Consul at Bilbao: "in Biscay... the sympathies of the inhabitants are unequally divided between Don Carlos and Isabel II. The Carlist Party comprehends the universality of the Biscayan Peasantry and the majority of the lower orders of the Towns. The Queen's Party consists of the most numerous of the wealthiest and most enlightened of the landed proprietors of the Province, of all the great Capitalists and respectable Merchants and Tradesmen, and of a considerable number of Shopkeepers and Mechanics of the Towns"¹⁶. This description is somewhat misleading. Many aristocratic landowners were Carlists, most prominently the Marquis of Valdespina, the largest landowner of the province of Vizcaya; his palace at Ermúa served as a gun forge during the war¹⁷. Furthermore, the British consul failed to mention the important role of both upper and lower clergy, who were unanimously of the Carlist opinion. Apart from these omissions, the description is correct. Essentially the struggle was between rural Carlism and urban Liberalism.

Why did the peasantry of the Basque provinces and Navarre support Don Carlos? They had no previous particular devotion to the pretender. But that devotion was gradually hammered into the minds of the peasants by the parish priests, who explained that Don Carlos had come to defend the Catholic religion and regional liberties from the onslaught of Liberalism. The Basque and Navarese peasants were profoundly religious. Furthermore, unlike in other parts of Spain, the Church in these provinces had few large landed possessions. It was in many ways a democratic Church, in which the local parish priest tended to be a native son of the community. The priests and friars, themselves took up arms and supported the Carlists in every way possible. They served as examples for their parishioners. The fact that Don Carlos offered good pay to his soldiers was an additional incentive for the peasant sons to volunteer.

Above and beyond the fact that Carlism was the expression of a profoundly Catholic peasantry who were indoctrinated and manipulated by the clergy, Carlism was also a movement to defend regional liberties. The clergy and the military leaders utilised the "regionalist" ideology with great success. They told the peasantry that a Liberal victory would mean the end of their privileges of "fueros". There were basically four principal

¹⁶ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 185, Spain-Consular Correspondence, vol. 167, "Consular correspondence with Madrid", July-December 1837, letter marked P/79-1-9, from Consula Clark to Villiers, dated October 13, 1837, Bilbao.

¹⁷ E. BELL STEPHENS, *The Basque Provinces*, vol. I, p. 120.

“fueros” in the Basque provinces, which were jealously defended. The first was that the Basque provinces paid no contributions or taxes to the Crown. The second was that there was free trade in the region; articles forbidden or subject to heavy duties (in the rest of Spain), such as cotton and woolen goods, silks etc. were permitted to enter, subject only to small local duties, and in unlimited quantities. The third was that each of the provinces was governed by its own patrimonial laws, and the appointment of the judges and civil authorities lay with the people. A fourth and important privilege was the exemption of the Basques from conscription into the regular Army¹⁸.

The Basque language and culture combined with these “fueros”, which guaranteed self-government, created and accentuated “autonomist” or regionalist sentiment. But this sentiment was non initially opposed to the government of Isabel II and her mother the Queen-Regent, nor was it favorable to Don Carlos. In fact only because of the concentrated efforts of the reactionary leaders and the clergy did the Basque peasants come to identify their liberties with Carlism. As one historian commented: “The rebellion which was commenced in the interests of fanaticism, was thus purposely complicated and adroitly constituted into a sacred war in defence of the ‘Fueros’”. A clear indication of this is found in the fact that in 1833, previous to the rebellion, and while Ferdinand was still alive, Biscay acknowledged solemnly in Guernica through its representatives “the rights of Isabel II to the throne and the lordship of Biscay”¹⁹. The Carlists, however, convinced the peasantry that the Liberals would force them to pay new taxes, would take away their autonomous provincial governments, conscript their sons into the Army, and abolish the Church. These arguments thus fell on fertile ground, for the Basque peasants were a traditional-minded people. This was the result of their social and economic situation as well as of the “Fueros”. There was a fairly egalitarian distribution of land among the Basque peasants, and large amounts of forest and pasture were held communally. The typical Basque farm was owned by the peasant family and inherited by the eldest son, thus avoiding subdivision of the property. Younger sons typically became sailors or joined the clergy. The family thus remained identified with a single farm, often for centuries.

The social structure of Navarre was similar to that of the four Basque provinces. The more feudal character of Navarre made it an even stronger Carlist stronghold. By tradition this province was had a good deal of autonomy. It was ruled by a viceroy and by the local Navarese *Cortes*. The Navarese *Cortes* were medieval in form. They were composed of representatives of the three estates: the aristocracy, the clergy, and the municipalities (called “universidades”). There were a total of 185 members: 12 from the ecclesiastical branch, 135 from the nobility, and 38 from

¹⁸ FRANCIS DUNCAN, *The English in Spain: 1834-1840*, p. 164.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

²⁰ PASCUAL MADDOZ, *Diccionario Geográfico, Estadístico e Histórico de España y sus Posesiones de Ultramar*, vol. XII (Madrid, 1848), article on “Navarra”.

the municipalities²¹. Each branch had its leader: the bishop of Pamplona for the clergy, the deputy from Pamplona for the municipalities, and the "condestable" for the nobles. The sessions of the *Cortes* were secret. They were supposed to meet regularly, and as recently as 1817-18 and 1828-29 they had met in Pamplona to decide certain important questions²². Up to the outbreak of the Carlist war in 1833, therefore, Navarre conserved its special quasi-feudal form of government.

The Navarese peasants were attached to the local *Cortes*, and accepted the leadership of the nobles and clergy. But they were even more attached to their land and their own local customs. They believed the Liberals would change these. The sense of community was very strong. In the first place, the majority of land in Navarre was held communally. The communal land was mostly pasture and forest, used for grazing, hunting and fishing. In the second place, the peasants tended to own their own plots of land, particularly in the mountainous part of the province. (In the plains, or "ribera", there were larger estates; this was where the nobility and landlords were concentrated). A contemporary description of the town of Estella indicates some aspects of the local social structure:

"The inhabitants are very industrious... property is evenly divided, and the majority of the residents are proprietors... The traditional conservation of (the family) property is accentuated by the mutual communication of the associated ("mancomunadas") villages, and because the respective inhabitants intermarry with each other. They are devoted to the conservation of their original or native (farm) houses, which remain in the family, the father bestowing the farm upon the son of his choice... From the secure possession of their patrimony springs the industriousness of the elders, while the hope of inheriting the property, or of sharing in the profits, brings the cooperation of the sons..."²²

The Navarese peasantry looked unfavorably upon any possible change in the basic social, economic or political structure of their region. They were attached to their property (private or communal), to their *Cortes*, to their regional privileges and to their religion. They joined the Carlist cause with enthusiasm and would not have accepted peace in 1839 if the Liberal Army had not guaranteed that their traditional form of life would continue undisturbed.

In other parts of Spain there were also peasants who supported Carlism, particularly in Catalonia. The social and political conditions here were quite distinct from those of the North, but they offer some parallels for an explanation of peasant support for Carlism. The centre of the reactionary movement in Catalonia was the "Maestrazgo", a large area of low population density, made up of both mountain and plain, chiefly in the province of Castellón. Here, a natural-born guerilla leader named Ra-

²¹ See MARÍA PUIG HUICI GOÑI, *Las Cortes de Navarra durante la Edad Moderna* (Madrid, 1963), and RODRIGO RODRÍGUEZ GAMAZA, *Navarra, de Reino a Provincia, 1828-1841* (Pamplona, 1968).

²² PASCUAL MADOZ, *Diccionario Geográfico...*, vol. VII, p. 597, article on "Estella".

món Cabrera gathered together a large force of men to join in the Carlist rebellion. Beginning with a few bandit gangs, he slowly built up a small army. Cabrera was dedicated chiefly to sacking and plundering Liberal towns and villages. He gained considerable popularity among much of the peasantry of the Catalan provinces, although he was never able to consolidate a movement comparable to that in the Basque provinces. He continued to fight, nevertheless, after the major Carlist generals had surrendered in 1839, and was driven out of Spain only in 1840.

Why did the "Maestrazgo" produce this vigorous branch of the Carlist rebellion? The reasons are not clear, but an observation of the local social structure may provide indicators. In the first place, the "Maestrazgo" was the traditional domain of the Military Order of Montesa, including the districts of Albocacer, San Mateo and Vinaroz, with a total of some 50,000 inhabitants. This population was spread sparsely over a most inhospitable area. A description of 1845 offers a picture of the "Maestrazgo":

In that whole area there are many farm houses (called "masadas") which with their accompanying lands are rented by the farmers in perpetual inheritance: in this manner the farms carry the names of the families that have always rented the land, rather than that of the actual owner (members of the Military Order of Montesa). The majority of the territory is made up of arid hills, generally useless for cultivation, and for the same reason utilised for pasture, with a large number of cows; the rest of the region, principally to the East, is made up of valleys and plains which are fertile but almost without irrigation, which undoubtedly explains the sparse population of the "Maestrazgo de Montesa"²³.

The majority of the men who fought with Ramón Cabrera were the peasant sons of these isolated farms and the nearby villages. The peasantry of the "Maestrazgo" held their perpetual rights to work the land in great esteem, for these constituted virtual ownership of the properties²⁴. When the clergy and the members of the Military Order told them that the Liberals would change the existing situation, the peasants volunteered to fight for Don Carlos.

In the "Maestrazgo", as in Navarre and the Basque provinces, there were special circumstances which made the peasantry reluctant to accept social and political changes. Unlike most of the rest of Spain, the peasantry in these areas had secure possession of their land. They had no quarrel with the Church as an economic force, for in these regions the clergy had few landed possessions. (In the rest of Spain the Church was traditionally a great and rigorous landlord.) The peasants of the Carlist regions were furthermore bound by the most antiquated socio-political structures still to be found in 19th century Spain. But these local power structures were not particularly exploitative, and they allowed for a good deal of municipal liberties. Led by the retrograde local ruling class, the Navarese, Basque and (some) Catalan peasants joined the Carlist movement, making the reactionary rebellion a full-blown peasant war.

²³ *Ibid.*, vol. XI, pp. 130-33, article on the "Maestrazgo".

²⁴ *Ibid.*

The liberal Army was never able to exercise military control over those areas where the peasantry was strongly Carlist. Only as the Basque peasantry became increasingly disaffected from Carlism and from the ravages of war did the Liberals make significant advances. It was the military officers of Don Carlos who finally decided the outcome of the war. In 1839 a key group of Carlist officers, led by General in command Maroto, forced Don Carlos to dismiss most of his top-level counsellors. Maroto then began negotiations with General Espartero and reached an agreement to end the war. This was formalised [in September of 1839] in the famous Treaty of Vergara. By this treaty, Espartero acknowledged the traditional "fueros" and privileges of the rebellious provinces, agreed not to prosecute the Carlist soldiers, and acceded to the request that the Carlist officers should be given posts in the Spanish Army. That Espartero was forced to accept these conditions bespeaks the vigor that the Carlist movement still had. Reaction had been defeated, but the regionalist spirit was still very much alive.

VII

The Growth of Political Parties: 1837-1840

The years 1837 to 1840 marked a period of growth for the political parties, Progressives and Moderates. With growing strength came increasing antagonism, leading to bitter electoral and parliamentary fights. As the parliamentary groups/parties came to represent the different social and economic interests of the nation, the political conflicts reflected the struggles among these forces. Initially, however, the major battles were fought not over economic but political questions, most prominently the issue of who was to control local/municipal government. The Moderate Party advocated a policy of centralization, as in France, in which the King through the State functionaries would appoint all local mayors. The Progressives rejected this proposal, standing fast to the principle of democratic municipal elections. The struggle was violent because the issues touched upon every citizen. For the artesans and petty merchants of the towns, popular local government gave a chance to break the monopoly of power traditionally held by the wealthier groups. For the large landowners, local democracy was a severe menace, which in practice could be translated into higher taxes on their great properties and a loss of control, over the judicial and administrative apparatus. For the Progressive Party the popular municipalities were a tremendous source of political power. The town governments controlled the organization of the National Militia, and had extensive right with respect to tax-collecting and the Army draft¹. For the Moderates these popular powers were a threat to law and order, a menace to Aristocracy and the Church; they could not be tolerated.

Since August, 1836, all municipal elections were democratic. This meant, generally speaking, that local governments tended to be Progressive. The Moderates had been largely excluded from political power during the Constituent Congress of 1836-37. But the Progressives had made many concessions, (the Constitution of 1837 was forcefully monarchical), and in the Cortes of 1838 the Moderates obtained a majority of the seats. This conservative majority attempted to pass a new "municipal law" which would eliminate the local democratic process. When they finally succeeded

¹ "Every pueblo or village containing one hundred householders, elects by household suffrage its own Ayuntamiento, consisting of four alcaldes, besides regidores and syndics, who have the collection of all the taxes, the management of most matters of civil and criminal jurisdiction, of the quintas or levies of soldiers of the line, and of the enrollment of National Militia - as well as volunteers": F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain in 1845*, vol. II (London, 1845), p. 251.

in 1840, the Progressives responded by launching a major revolution, led by General Espartero, that climaxed with the flight of the Queen-Regent to France, and brought the exclusion of the Moderates from participation in the Congress for about two years.

This intense antagonism between the political parties was a consequence of two developments. One was the increasing strength of the Moderate Party, which threatened their opponents. The second was the gradual radicalization of the urban masses, which accentuated the tension between social classes, between rich and poor. These developments were clearly visible in the elections held the month before the closing of the Constituent Congress of 1836-37.

THE ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER, 1837

[In the fall of 1837.] The Moderate Party launched a major campaign to gain control of both the Congress (the chamber of deputies) and the Senate. One of their chief leaders was Andrés Borrego, the editor of the newspaper *El Correo Nacional*. Borrego published a pamphlet titled "Manual for the Electors of the monarchical/constitutional opinion", ("monarchical-constitutional" being synonymous for "Moderate"), and set up a small central committee to help coordinate the elections². Through his newspaper Borrego also spread his ideas, which consisted quite simply of forming local committees of Moderate notables who would organize the campaign. This was done in many cities, although as yet the electoral meetings were rather informal. In most provinces slates of candidates were presented and published in the local press, or in some cases distributed in the form of printed cards to the electors.

The Progressive Party did not utilise the same methods. In fact it did very little electioneering, and even discouraged the formation of local electoral committees, claiming that this was a foreign method and therefore unworthy. (Borrego had adopted the idea of the local committees from France and England, where there was much more experience in electoral practices.) Local Progressive newspapers reprinted the editorials published by the *Eco del Comercio*, the major Progressive organ. In late September, for instance, the *Defensor del Pueblo* of Cádiz reprinted an editorial which stated:

"In order to obtain such a patriotic end (the election of Progressive candidates) we do not recommend the formation of committees in the foreign manner, upon which our opponents place such importance... There should be no difficulty in the election. Agreements should be reached on the slate of candidates by the numerous electors of the party of progress... and the triumph will be easily obtained"³.

² See ANDRÉS BORREGO, *El Libro de las Elecciones, reseña histórica de las verificadas durante los tres periodos del Régimen constitucional (1810-1814, 1820-23, 1834-1873)* (Madrid, 1874), pp. 48-49.

³ *El Defensor del Pueblo* (Cádiz), September 25, 1837, which copied the article from the Madrid newspaper *El Eco del Comercio*.

The over-confidence of the Progressives had a predictable result. The Moderates won the elections, obtaining at least 150 seats, whereas the Progressives got hardly more than 60.

Approximately 150,000 voters or about 60% of the 250,000 eligible electors went to the polls in November of 1837⁴. This was four times as many voters as had participated in the last *direct* elections, held in July of the preceding year. Now, virtually the whole of the Spanish propertied classes had the right to vote; large and mediumsized landowners, merchants and industrialists, rentiers and high government officials, doctors, professors and lawyers. The Electoral Law of 1837 actually favored the Moderates, because the larger number of electors meant, above all, a larger proportion of rural landowners and well-to-do "arrendatarios" (farmers who rented land). These agriculturalists tended to be of conservative opinions, fiercely protective of their property and prerogatives. But even in the cities among the commercial bourgeoisie, there was a tendency toward conservatism after the proclamation of the Constitution of 1837.

The reports of the British Consuls on the elections in their respective districts provide the most interesting and detailed information available on the entire process. A typical report was that from Consul Carter in *Cartagena*, the southeastern port. He wrote:

"About 2/3 of the Electors invested with the elective franchise have voted in the late Elections, and the Votes to the successful candidates were evidently given in a spirit for the maintenance of order in the State, for the reformed Constitution of 1837, and for the Conservation, generally, of the existing Laws and Institutions of the Country; and with the desire that the Members of the Senate should be exclusively and unlimitedly appointed by the Crown. The foregoing will show that the Majority of the Electors cannot be considered to incline towards ultra/Liberal opinions; on the contrary the Moderate Party has been altogether the favorite one at the Elections of this Province"⁵.

A long report from Consul Crispin at *Coruña*, the northwestern port, indicated that there were numerous Carlists, or men of extremely reactionary views who had participated in the election and been elected on the Moderate ticket. Crispin provided information on the exact number of votes each candidate had obtained and their political affiliation. Among the Senators were the following:

"*José Ozores del Rial*: Colonel of the Provincial Battalion of Compostela; he had been an officer of the Royalist Volunteers in Santiago during 1823-33; he will be an absolutist of Isabel II, that is absolutist but not of the Carlist, against whom he has fought with bravery.

D. Antonio Quiroga: He is a General, and should be considered a Moderate.

⁴ See FERMÍN CABALLERO, "Las Elecciones de 1837" (Madrid, 1837), a pamphlet.

⁵ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 185, vol. 167, "Consular Correspondance with Madrid", July-December, 1837, letter from Consul Mathew Carter to Villiers, dated October 11, 1837, Cartagena, and marked P-79-1-7.

Rafael Caamaño: Comendador and Landowner, he is a very respected gentleman, and although he has never had occasion to make his political principles known, he should be considered a Carlist.

Conde de San Juan: A Moderate, and without risking much it could be added retrograde- he is a man of little energy, and in general is not well-considered.

Julián Malvar: A Landowner, he was a Colonel of the Royalist Volunteers. A Carlist"⁶.

These five men were selected by the Queen-Regent to serve as Senators from a list of 15 eligible candidates, who had obtained more than 2,500 votes in the local elections. Since the Queen/Regent selected as least three out-and-out absolutists and the rest conservatives, it is clear that the ruler of the Spanish nation was not, herself, of very liberal ideas.

In the province of *Málaga* the Moderates did not initially have the same success as in much of the rest of the country. The majority of the deputies elected by the city of *Málaga* were Progressives. They tended to be functionaries, merchants, or professionals, rather than landed proprietors as most Moderates were. The elected deputies were the following, as described by the British Consul :

Cristóbal Pascual: Advocate ad Vélez Málaga. Member of the present Cortes and secretary of that body- a most decided 'exaltado' (Progressive).

José de San Millán: Director de Loterías in Madrid, and rather an 'exaltado'.

José Macrohan y Blake: Nephew of General Blake... native of Málaga, liberal in politics and an officer in the army. A Moderate.

Manuel Loaiza: Landed proprietor at Ronda, an 'exaltado'.

Miguel Muñoz: Chief clerk in the Administración de Correos at Madrid, 'exaltado'.

Juan Zalabardos: Merchant at Málaga of liberal sentiments, excellent character and moderate opinions.

Fernando Fernández de Villar: Clerk in a commercial house, formerly a disparate absolutist, now an 'exaltado', a demagogue of the most ultra class"⁷.

With respect to the general political situation in the province the British Consul wrote :

"All the liberal parties here seem to rally under the standard of the Constitution of 1837. The 'moderados' under the idea that it is more consistent with the state of the country, and the 'exaltados' (Progressives) desirous of what they can obtain, relying perhaps falsely, on the recklessness of the party in being able to secure what still remains to satiate their desires.

The *Estatuto Real* appears to be a dead letter throughout this province.

⁶ *Ibid.*, letter from Consul Crispin to Villiers, dated Nov. 25, 1837, Coruña, and marked P-81-1-29.

⁷ *Ibid.*, letter from Consul Mark to Villiers, dated October 28, 1837, Málaga, and marked P-80-1-11. The city of Málaga elected Progressives but su back.

The banner of *Aristocracy* or *Republicanism*—the two extremes—meet with few *pronounced* upholders.

That part of the population not invested with the electoral franchise, are even ignorant of the meaning of the boon they do not enjoy: in the country they are mostly laborers, and in the cities the poorer class of working artesans; they do not cry out for suffrage and would rather not be handled by those who would use their ignorance as an engine for party purposes..."⁸.

In the northern *Basque provinces* the main electoral struggle was not simply between Progressives and Moderates, but between defenders of the regional "fueros" (privileges) and those opposed. In the province of *Vizcaya* the "pro-fueristas" (who were mostly Moderates) won; in the province of *Guizpúzcoa*, the "anti-fueristas" (Progressives) had the upper hand. The British Consul at Bilbao (*Vizcaya*) pointed out that the elected deputies and senators were among the wealthiest men of the province. Among them were Pantaleón Aguirre "one of the wealthiest proprietors and merchants of Bilbao", Claudio de Zumalega, "a wealthy Mayorazgo", Vitoria de Lecea "a young man of considerable entailed income", and Allende Salazar "a land proprietor". These individuals were opposed to any change in the status of the Biscayan "fueros". The British Consul wrote:

"The universality of electors, with the exception of the Constitutional fraction (Progressives), appear to have been animated solely with the spirit of the maintaining or defending the foral government of Biscay, and of obtaining peace by foreign intervention, most of the electors being under the impression that foreign intervention has been hitherto refused on account of the ultra-liberal principles of this Government (Progressive) and the Cortes (the Constituent Congress of 1836-37)"⁹.

In the port city of San Sebastián, in contrast, the "antifuerista" forces won the elections. The elected deputies were representatives of the industrial/commercial bourgeoisie rather than landed proprietors. The British Vice-Consul wrote:

"As it may be perceived the elected have had a majority of votes which is not far from unanimity. This is owing to having only voted persons whose opinions are against the maintenance of the 'Fueros'... The industrial and mercantile classes consider prejudicial the continuation of these Privileges, as being incompatible with other measures which may favor the trade and industry of the Province"¹⁰.

In both of these provinces, as in the rest of Spain, the contending parties made substantial efforts to coordinate the electoral campaigns. The Moderates of Bilbao formed the most coherent organization, fearful that

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, letter from Consul Clark to Villiers, dated October 13, 1837, Bilbao, and marked P-79-1-9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, letter from Vice-Consul Brunet to Villiers, dated October 17, 1837, San Sebastián, and marked P-79-1-9, enclosure no. 2.

the Progressives, who controlled the local city government, might win the elections.

"To counter act these fears (that the Progressives might win) and to encourage the timid, a *Committee* was appointed of liberal moderate men of the first standing, and at several public meetings at the Theater, candidates for deputies and senators were proposed and accepted, and legal measures agreed upon to secure their election"¹¹.

Although the Progressive Party had control over the government at Madrid and of many of the local municipal governments, the superior organization of the Moderates throughout the nation resulted in the election of a conservative majority in both Congress and Senate of the new legislature of 1838. Evidently the Progressives did not utilize all the powerful instruments at their disposal, (the State administration), in order to obtain favorable results. But besides the lack of forceful campaigning, the Progressives were at a disadvantage for other reasons. The first was that there was a widespread belief that the civil war could only be won with the military and financial help of France. The Moderate Party was on particularly good terms with the French government. It was known that former Prime Minister Istúriz, (a leader of the Moderates), had worked out good relations with Louis-Phillipe. Furthermore, the Moderate leaders Martínez de la Rosa and the Count of Toreno were close to the French rulers. Both Toreno and Martínez de la Rosa had spent ten years of exile in Paris and still owned houses there; (Toreno had connections with the French branch of the powerful banking house of the Rothschilds)¹². On the other hand, the Progressives were identified with the British government. From the days of Mendizábal, Anglo/Progressive relations had been warm, the British providing most of the weapons for the Spanish Army in its struggle against the Carlists¹³. The extent of British aid was, however, not widely known, and in 1837 the majority of the Spanish propertied classes considered that it was necessary to seek French military assistance in order to defeat the Carlists. This general sentiment was exploited by the Moderates to their own great advantage.

Another reason for the conservative victory in the fall of 1837 was the fear of the wealthy classes that the urban masses were becoming too radical. Not only the clergy and landowners, but also merchants and industrialists, were threatened by the popular radicalization. A vivid example of the intense social tension was manifest during the elections of the most industrial city of Spain, Barcelona.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, letter from Consul Clark to Villiers, dated October 13, 1837, Bilbao, and marked P-70-1-9.

¹² See BERTRAND GILLE, *Histoire de la Maison Rothschild*, vol. I, p. 251.

¹³ By 1836 200,000 arms had been sent from Britain to Spain gratis. By end of 1837, 300,000. The value was calculated at some 487,000 pounds sterling, or 48 million "reales", a considerable sum, which was not repaid. See *Parliamentary Papers*, 1839, vol. 50, p. 191, "Papers relating to the War in Spain, 1834-38".

"The Elections commenced on the 8th (October) and as it was generally supposed that they would terminate in favor of the Moderate Party, every species of intimidation was resorted to by the populace to prevent the freedom of election by frightening such votes from the Electoral Colleges as were not in favor of the ultras or democratical Party (Progressives), of which the candidate *Doménech* is at the head.

On the first day of the election a gentleman of respectability, M. Vehils, was inhumanely murdered by the populace on his return into the streets from tendering his vote, and such was the effect produced by this barbarous outrage that few were to be found sufficiently courageous to brave the Mob and enter the Colleges, two of which were closed, the other 3 remaining open. On the following day Brigadier Puig issued the "bando"... prohibiting the forming of groups and the carrying of arms or other weapons; Guards were placed at the doors of the Colleges... but the number of voter was still small and the most threatening rumors were afloat; lists of persons to be assassinated and houses to be pillaged were in active circulation, and the 12th (October) was the day said to be fixed for carrying out these atrocious projects into execution.

It has never fallen to my lot to witness such a panic as was produced; the authorities were feeble and without force, the National Militia were known to be disaffected, and almost *all* the respectable inhabitants fled precipitately from their homes, seeking refuge either in the Country or on board of Vessels in the Port...

The day fixed for the disturbance breaking out, the 12th, having passed over without any open rupture or acts of violence, it was supposed that Sunday the 15th would be that on which hostilities would commence, as the working classes would then be unemployed in the Fabricks and on that day the results of the elections could be known. The emigrations still continued and many were in the act of leaving the City when, on Friday the 13th, the Baron de Meer (Captain General of Catalonia) suddenly and unexpectedly entered it at the head of about 4,000 infantry and 300 Cavalry. It is impossible for me to describe the feelings of the better classes of the community on beholding this timely arrival of a force sufficient in itself to secure the tranquility of the City. Confidence was restored and most of the wealthy inhabitants who had retired to the adjacent villages returned to their residences"¹⁴.

A few days later, the British Consul wrote again, reporting that he had obtained information on the revolutionary plans, which had included the kidnapping of the French Consul and of himself, in order to neutralise the French and British ships in the Barcelona harbor. The Consul described the plan in the following manner :

"In the event of (the insurrection's) success, the Gates (of the city) were to have been opened to evil disposed persons from the neighboring villages and a general pillage of the city to ensue, whilst without respect to party or person, houses were to be burned and assassinations to take

¹⁴ *Public Record Office*, F.O. 185, vol. 167, "Consular Correspondence with Madrid", July-December, 1837, letter from Consul Amesely to Villiers, dated October, 14, 1837, Barcelona, and marked P-79-1-29.

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place, a self-constituted Government to be formed, all allegiance to the Queen to be thrown off, and Barcelona to be declared Independent!

Tarragona and Reus were to follow the example. Insane and atrocious as these projects may appear to be, they were, Sir, nevertheless, to be carried into execution, had not the Baron de Meer most fortunately been apprized of the situation of the Town"¹⁵.

Despite the possible exaggerations of these reports, it is perfectly clear that the degree of class conflict in Barcelona was intense. The radicalism of the urban workers forced the bourgeois industrialists to support the repressive government led by the Captain-General Baron de Meer in Catalonia and by the Moderates at Madrid. This social situation had parallels in many other cities in Spain, although in a much less accentuated form. The fear of popular radicalism contributed to the gradual swing to the Right in 1837-1840, and to the Moderate control over the legislative and executive branches of government.

THE MODERATE CORTES OF 1838-39

The deputies and senators elected in October, 1837 sat through two successive legislative sessions, one fairly long and the other short. The first lasted from November, 1837 to July, 1838. The second commenced in November, 1838 but was suspended early in February of 1839. Throughout both sessions the Moderate Party controlled both legislative branches, (Congress and Senate), as well as the executive branch of government. The prominent Moderate leaders in the Senate were mostly aristocrats like the Conde de Parcent, the Marqués de Falces, the Conde de Ezpeleta, and the Conde de Vigo¹⁶. Parcent and Ezpeleta, (an old Royalist General), had close ties to the Queen-Regent, María Cristina; they had been her warm supporters in the succession crisis of 1832-33, at the time of Ferdinand VII's illness and death. The Moderate chiefs of the Congress tended to be middle-aged Liberal politicians, many of whom had been exiles in 1823-33. Some of them had been radicals, like Antonio Alcalá Galiano, but had become increasingly conservative as time passed.

In 1837-1838 the provinces of Cádiz, Granada, Málaga, Oviedo and Sevilla sent a disproportionate number of important Moderate Party chiefs to the Congress. Among the deputies from Cádiz were Francisco Javier Istúriz, Antonio Alcalá Galiano, Juan Donoso Cortés, the Duke of Osuna, and Francisco Domecq. Istúriz and Galiano had been heads of the Spanish government during the summer of 1836, but had been forced into exile after the August revolution. They returned from exile in France only after the closing of the Constituent Congress of 1836-37. Donoso Cortés, a great landed proprietor of Badajoz, was a friend of the García Carras-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, letter from Consul Amesely to Villiers, dated October 19, 1837, Barcelona, and marked P-79-1-38.

¹⁶ For a complete list of all Ministers, Senators and Deputies see *Estadística y vicisitudes de las Cortes de 1833 a 1858*.

co's, wealthy capitalists who were intimates of the Queen-Regent. Donoso Cortés wrote in the Moderate press of those years: *La Abeja*, *El Correo Nacional*, *El Piloto*; he was editor of *El Porvenir* from 1837 to 1840. The Duke of Osuna, Mariano Téllez de Girón, had simultaneously inherited the titles of Duque del Infantado, Duque de Béjar and Duque de Ureña. The combined patrimonies that accompanied his aristocratic titles probably made him the single largest landowner and the wealthiest man in Spain. Francisco Domecq was a member of the famous sherry-exporting family¹⁷.

From Granada came deputies Francisco Paula Castro, Martínez de la Rosa, and the Duque de Gor. Paula Castro was a young lawyer and landowner who had played a prominently conservative role in the Constituent Congress of 1836-37. Martínez de la Rosa, Prime Minister in 1834-35, was the dean of the Moderate Party. The Duque de Gor was vice-president of the Congress in 1838 and a hardworking politician.

From Málaga, normally a Progressive stronghold, came a compact block of Moderate deputies led by Andrés Borrego, the editor of *El Correo Nacional*. Among these was Antonio Ríos y Rosas, a local landowner who dedicated himself full-time to politics, also writing in the conservative newspaper *La Abeja* (1834-36), and in Borrego's paper. Accompanying him was another friend of Borrego's, deputy Serafín Estébanez Calderón, a Málaga lawyer who had been political chief of the provinces of Logroño and Sevilla in 1835-36, but who was best known as a brilliant journalist. Another deputy was Carlos Martínez de Irujo, Marqués de Casa Irujo, (one of the most prestigious aristocratic titles), an individual of considerable political experience and of a great fortune¹⁸.

From Oviedo came Alejandro Mon, the Conde de Toreno, Francisco Paula Fernández de Córdoba, Pedro José Pidal, and Alvaro Flórez Estrada. Mon was a young lawyer from Oviedo with a good understanding of money matters; he would soon be named Minister of the Economy. The Conde de Toreno, former Prime Minister, was a shrewd politician, but considered somewhat unprincipled, (he had enriched himself enormously as Minister of State)¹⁹; Toreno was probably the single most powerful leader of the Moderate Party. Fernández de Córdoba was a relative of Luis Fernández de Córdoba, the conservative General, who was elected deputy by another province in the same year. Pedro José Pidal, a capable lawyer and judge, was later to become, (together with Alejandro Mon and Saturnino Calderón Collantes), political boss of the whole of northwestern Spain, (Asturias and Galicia). Finally, Alvaro Flórez Estrada, a man of

¹⁷ For sources of information see footnote 5 of chapter V.

¹⁸ The Marqués de Casa Irujo was the largest landowner in the province of Palencia, as well as having huge estates in the province of Córdoba and Cádiz.

¹⁹ Toreno had received a bribe of 1 and one half million francs (7 million "reales", a fortune by Spanish standards), from the Rothschilds in 1835 in exchange for giving them the monopoly contract of the Almaden mercury mines. Toreno was Minister of Finances at the time. See BERTRAND GILLE, *Histoire de la Maison Rothschild*, vol. I, p. 251.

contradictory political ideas, was the most distinguished Spanish economist of his time; his name lent prestige to the Moderate Party.

The province of Sevilla elected at least four important Moderate leaders, Joaquín Francisco Pacheco, Ramón María Narváez, Juan Bravo Murillo, and Francisco Olavarrieta. Pacheco, a distinguished jurist, was the foremost and most liberal *constitutionalist* of the Moderates. Ramón María Narváez, Andalusian General and great landowner, had also been elected deputy by three other provinces. He was becoming the rising military star of the Moderates, replacing Luis Fernández de Córdoba. Juan Bravo Murillo, a future Prime Minister, was at this time best known as a prominent editorialist for several conservative newspapers. Francisco Olavarrieta was one of the Moderates' chief contacts with the French ambassador, Le Tour Maubourg²⁰.

Jointly these individuals constituted the leadership core of the conservative groups. They were on good terms with the Queen-Regent, with the majority of the aristocracy, and with the government of the French bourgeois king, Louis-Phillipe. Despite their common points of view, however, they did not yet constitute a particularly coherent political party, as much as an alliance of several powerful interest groups. In this respect they paralleled the Progressives, who were also a coalition of various social groupings and economic interests. In succeeding years, these parliamentary parties became somewhat more coherent, but the lack of well-developed party organizations remained a constant factor throughout 19th century Spanish politics²¹.

The incapacity of the Moderates to act as a truly coherent party, with a single political platform, was evident both in the opening sessions of the *Cortes* of 1837-38 and in the initial attempts to form a Moderate Cabinet. When the legislative session opened, the conservative deputies tried to run roughshod over the Progressives by electing the authorities of the Congress, before the deputies formally swore loyalty to the new Constitution of 1837. (It seemed as if they wished to act as if there were no Constitution.) The Progressives reacted quickly. Two deputies went to talk with the president of the Chamber, the Marqués de Someruelos, and demanded that the Congress immediately swear loyalty to the Constitution; if not, the Progressives threatened to leave Madrid and set up a rival national Congress at Zaragoza²². The Moderates were forced to retreat from their aggressive stance, the opposing parties reached a compromise.

A key figure in these discussions was deputy Olózaga, who (although

²⁰ During the Constituent Congress of 1836-37, the French ambassador reported that he had become intimately involved with the Moderate opposition. He reported that Olavarrieta contacted him frequently. See *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique de l'Espagne*, vol. 772, Juillet-December, 1836.

²¹ There are extremely few studies of the 19th century political parties and their structure. Throughout the century, however, they remained essentially parliamentary groupings which had the support of a large class of rural notables.

²² See JOAQUÍN, FRANCISCO PACHECO, "Las Cortes de 1837", in *La Revista de Madrid*, 2e Serie, vol. I (1839), p. 530.

nominally a Progressive) had already participated in meetings of Moderate deputies. Olózaga had played a conservative role in the Constituent Congress of the preceding year. "This tendency of Mr. Olózaga had been observed with pleasure by many Moderates..."²³ He was offered the presidency of the Cabinet in order to form a bi-partisan government, but he refused. The conservative majority then asked the Marqués de Someruelos to form a government. He held a meeting with all the deputies of Old Castille, (who represented the conservative landholding classes of that region)²⁴. They were unable to come up with a satisfactory solution. Finally, Someruelos, the young Castro y Orozco, and Alejandro Mon asked the Conde de Ofalía to join them in a new Cabinet, and he accepted. But Ofalía, (an old diplomat), "had neither executive initiative nor any concrete program to present to the Congress"²⁵. The Moderates stumbled along for almost a year under the incompetent leadership of this Cabinet.

The Moderate majority then called for a vote of the Congress to support a demand for armed French intervention in the Basque provinces in order to defeat the Carlists. They rammed the vote through the legislature, but were unhappily surprised by the French reaction. In early February of 1838, the French Prime Minister Molé delivered a famous speech in which he stated that France would never ("jamais") intervene in Spain. The effect of this bad news for the conservatives was described by the Moderate deputy, J. Francisco Pacheco. He wrote: "The Moderate Party was in a state of virtual dissolution after the discussion of the constitutional questions and after the idea of (French) cooperation had been abandoned; it seemed, likely that it (the Moderate Party) would break up into two or three fractions during the legislature..."²⁶. But the older party leaders like Toreno managed to reforge a semblance of party unity.

One of the first measures which the Moderates collectively defended was the approval of the state of siege declared in the regions of Catalonia, Granada, and Andalucía. The government had appointed ultra-conservative generals to govern these areas, the Baron de Meer, Palarea and Clonard, respectively. In Catalonia the Baron de Meer had disarmed the National Militia after the elections, and with the support of the industrialists had set himself up as a sort of local dictator²⁷. The Progressives attacked these measures, but were defeated in the vote.

The Moderates then presented their most important legislative project, which was a plan to eliminate democratic elections at the municipal level. The proposed law limited the number of electors to the propertied residents, and specified that the actual selection of mayors would be done by the Minister of the Interior, acting through the political governors of

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 526-534.

²⁴ RAMÓN DE SANTILLÁN, *Memorias (1815-1846)*, vol. II, p. 190.

²⁵ J. FRANCISCO PACHECO, "Las Cortes de 1837", in *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. 2 (1839), p. 34.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁷ See J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, pp. 363-364. Also see E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain*, p. 79.

the provinces. The Progressives attacked the proposal, arguing that it would finish with the traditional liberties of the Spanish municipalities and with the local "fueros". Furthermore, as the radical deputy Caballero declared, "this project has the tendency to concentrate enormous power in a single hand, (the Government's), over and above that constitutionally justified, and to drown out the voices of these (municipal) corporations which have been at all times the principal support of the towns and of public liberties"²⁸. The Moderates were, nonetheless, determined to stamp out democratic elections, and defended their plans with extreme arguments. Deputy Villaverde praised the proposal because it was similar to Napoleon's law, which allowed the emperor to personally appoint the mayors and other members of the municipal councils²⁹. Calderón Collantes stated that the traditional customs and liberties no longer had a modern function. Article by article, the Moderates pushed the bill through Congress. The Progressives put up a stiff fight. Typical votes were 85 Moderates for, 55 Progressives against; 92 for, 43 against; 102 for, 66 against. Actually the whole law was never fully approved nor ratified. The Moderates were not able to muster sufficient strength to pass a complete municipal law until more than two years later during the legislature of 1840.

Another bill which aroused fierce debate was that of the tithes. Although the ecclesiastical tithes had been formally abolished by law in June of 1837, the Ofalía government proposed to collect half the value of the traditional tithe taxes from the peasants in order to pay the clergy and cover the budgetary deficit. Deputy Pidal from Asturias approved of this plan and went even further; he urged the formal reestablishment of the tithes³⁰. The more liberal deputies attacked him furiously. Deputy Luján described the evils of the tithes, which it had been estimated totalled 2,000 million "reales" per year before the Napoleonic War of 1808-14. This meant that most of the agricultural surplus of the peasantry was drained off into the eager hands of the already wealthy Spanish Church. Since 1808, however, many peasants had refused to pay the tithes. Their abolition was a "fait accompli", and nobody could change that³¹. A contemporary individual who was intimately involved in these debates, the Moderate deputy Pacheco, wrote an article in a magazine explaining the division in the Congress over this question. He noted that the deputies from the northern provinces, (Galicia, Asturias, the Basque provinces, Navarre and Catalonia), were not generally opposed to the tithes, where these taxes were not particularly oppressive. There was more opposition to the tithes in Castille, but the landowners and peasants were still accustomed to complying with the ecclesiastical tax. But...

The great and true opposition to the tithes was to be found in Extremadura, Andalucía, Murcia, Valencia and Aragón. The great weight of agriculture in these provinces, and the great participation of the Church in the

²⁸ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1837-38, vol. III, p. 1837.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1769.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, May 28, 1838, vol. IV, pp. 2538-2540.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2543.

fruits of the land, had from long ago created a very different opinion (about the tithes) than those held in the northern provinces... For a great many years the tithes were not regularly paid; and the revolutionary movement had made it altogether impossible to collect them any longer"³².

The Deputies were deeply divided. The Progressives were opposed to any continuation of the tithes, even when supervised by the government, and the Moderate majority was split. Finally the Minister of the Economy, Alejandro Mon, came to the Congress and declared that the collection of the tithes was a necessity because the government lacked sufficient funds to function properly. According to the Minister, there were 133 villages in the province of Madrid, alone, which had not paid their taxes. (There were also 8,000 individuals in the capital city who had not paid the taxes they should have.) In many villages the peasants had refused to pay and had attacked the tax-collectors. "In Aldea del Fresno they beat up the collectors, in another villages they cut off the ears of one of them, and in a third they assassinated the commissioned official"³³. Confronted with these vivid arguments and convinced of the imminent bankruptcy of the government, the Moderate majority passed the bill to collect the tithes by a vote of 92 for, 62 against.

Apart from the discussion and vote of the municipal and tithe questions, the legislative session of 1837-38 accomplished relatively little. It approved a new Army draft of 40,000 soldiers, and a new "extra-ordinary" tax of 600 million "reales" in order to finish the war. It approved the budget for 1838, which was the same as that of 1837. Since the expected expenses were much greater than the revenues that could be collected, the deputies also voted favorably on a plan to obtain a loan of 500 million "reales" from Alejandro Aguado, the well-known Spanish banker in Paris. The Congress closed on July 18, 1838, reopening several months later in November. For three months the same deputies returned once again to the discussion of issues such as the reform municipal government, but actually passed no new laws.

Meanwhile there had been a change in the Cabinet. The Queen-Regent named a new group of Moderates to take charge of the government in December of 1838, headed by Evaristo Pérez de Castro, a diplomat, who had once previously served as Prime Minister during the Liberal *Cortes* of 1820-1821. Accompanying him was Lorenzo Arrazola (former rector of the University of Valladolid) as Minister of the Interior as well as of Justice. General Francisco Narváez was named to head the two military Ministries; that of War and that of the Navy. Finally, Ramón San Millán was appointed Minister of Finance. Shortly thereafter, both Narváez and San Millán resigned, but Pérez de Castro and Arrazola remained as the heads of a staunchly Moderate executive. In May of 1838 they called for new elections to the Congress and Senate.

³² J. FRANCISCO PACHECO, "Las Cortes de 1837", in *La Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. II, p. 246.

³³ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1837-38, vol. IV, p. 2567.

THE CONGRESS OF 1839

The elections witnessed the growth of more sophisticated electoral campaign organizations within both major political parties. The Moderate magazine *La Revista de Madrid* wrote in July 1839:

"Never before has there been seen so much passion in the electoral struggle, nor so much progress in the political customs which our (constitutional) regime requires. The different slates of candidates were decided upon in partisan meetings to which the electors were invited and to which the greatest publicity has been given"³⁴.

The Progressives had learned a valuable lesson from their defeat in October of 1837. They now campaigned forcefully and won the elections by a large margin. The *Revista de Madrid* accused the War Minister, Latre, of having manipulated the vote; Latre, however, was not a Progressive, (he had been chief of police at the end of the reign of Ferdinand VII)³⁵. The Moderate press was insinuating, rather, that Espartero, General in Command of the Army of the North, had pressed for a Progressive victory.

When the Congress opened in September of 1839, the deputies received news from General Espartero of the signing of the Treaty of Vergara, which marked the end of the civil war in the Basque provinces. As an act of appeasement towards the defeated Carlists, the Madrid Cabinet moved immediately to confirm the "fueros" (local laws) of Navarre and the Basque provinces. But the Progressive deputies objected. Seven Progressive leaders presented an amendment to the proposal to reestablish the "fueros", which stipulated that a committee should be set up to present a new law which would later revise the "fueros"³⁶. The Castro-Arazola Cabinet rejected this measure, and thereby precipitated a major political battle. The Progressives lined up behind the seven leaders, (known as "los siete brillantes"): José Calatrava, S. Olózaga, V. Sancho, M. Cortina, J. María López, M. Roda, and Fermín Caballero.

After several weeks of debate, the Progressives agreed to a compromise. (They were under pressure to do so from General Alaix, the new Minister of War, and a warm friend of Espartero, now the most powerful Army General, after his triumph over the Carlists.) A secret meeting was held between Arazola, (Minister of the Interior), and the Progress-

³⁴ "Crónica del Mes de Junio", in *La Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. I (1839), p. 271.

³⁵ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain...*, p. 49.

³⁶ The Progressives were opposed to the continuation of the "fueros" for several reasons: (1) was that the whole war had been fought to establish national unity under the Constitution. The "fueros" were the expression of an antiquated regional system of legislation which had to be modernised; (2) the "fueros" allowed for free trade in the northern provinces, permitting a great contraband trade into the other nearby provinces, which was prejudicial to the Catalan textile interests.

ive deputies Olózaga, Sancho and Madoz, in which an agreement was reached³⁷. On October 7, Vicente Sancho rose to speak in the Congress, declaring himself in favor of a conciliatory policy, which would allow the government's proposal to stand as proposed, adding only a phrase to the effect that the national Constitution would not be infringed. To the consternation of the Progressives, Arrazola replied essentially that the government would not accept even this slight modification. Deputy Olózaga then jumped to his feet and denounced the Minister of the Interior for his duplicity, as did Madoz and the Conde de las Navas. A political crisis would have been the necessary consequence of this confrontation, had not Alaix, the Minister of War, dramatically intervened. He delivered a speech in defence of the administration, but calling for reconciliation. On finishing he strode across the hall of the Congress and embraced Olózaga, declaring "this is the Treaty of Vergara"³⁸. The public galleries, which were packed, broke out in cheers. Arrazola, however, was not satisfied, and several days later castigated Alaix for having proceeded in the manner he did. The Senate, nonetheless, approved the bill already passed by the Congress. It was expected that the principal Moderate leaders of the Cabinet would hesign. They did nothing of the kind. Instead Alaix was obliged to resign on the 31st of October, and the Congress was temporarily suspended.

Previous to this executive decree, the deputies had sensed that the Progressive-dominated legislature would soon be closed. They had therefore proceeded to approve a radical law, which granted material compensation for the soldiers who had fought in the Army against the Carlists. The bill was a clear political maneuver, designed to obtain military support for the Progressive Party. The proposed law stipulated that the compensation for each soldier would amount to 1,440 "reales", consisting of a rural property of equivalent value. The land to be distributed would be from the barren, uncultivated land belonging either to landowners or to the communal properties of the towns³⁹. The illustrious deputy Agustín Argüelles defended the bill, stating:

"I am convinced of the necessity of approving this bill in order to consolidate this revolution. And I call it a revolution, because it is one, and I shall repeat it a thousand times if need be. The revolution is not our doing, no. We have received it as a legacy... It is essential that this immense mass of properties be transferred to productive hands, and that it not remain fruitless..."⁴⁰.

Numerous Progressive deputies, nevertheless, criticized the proposal. Pascual Madoz affirmed that 1,440 "reales" worth of land was extremely little,

³⁷ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero, Historia de su vida militar y política*, vol. III (Madrid, 1845), p. 99.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-120.

³⁹ For the text of the proposed law see *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1839*, appendix to no. 30, p. 525.

⁴⁰ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1839*, p. 737.

and furthermore that the distribution of land without capital was useless. Only a complex land reform program, which was adjusted to the particular conditions of each region, would be beneficial. The Conde de las Navas answered that he believed any land reform would be better than nothing. He stated that he was one of the then large landowners of the town of Lucena (Córdoba), but that he favored the distribution of the land⁴¹. The deputies approved the first two articles of the law, but did not approve the third, which specified which lands would be distributed. The law thus remained ineffective and was never actually implemented.

On the 16th of November, 1839, Castro and Arrazola reorganized the Cabinet, bringing in several conservatives to head the Ministries of the Interior, Economy, and War. Two days later they formally dissolved the legislature and called for new elections. The intention of the Moderate Party was to obtain a majority in the new Congress in order to pass legislation limiting the powers of the National Militia and of the town governments. The conservatives mobilised all the forces at their disposal. A central electoral committee was set up to coordinate the campaign and published a manifesto, which served as the party platform⁴². In Burgos the clergy worked openly for the Moderate Party. Numerous powerful aristocrats such as the Duke of Alba or that of Altamira (who owned huge estates in various regions) distributed orders to their dependents to campaign for the Moderates⁴³. The old absolutists and Carlists all over Spain publicly joined the Moderates in order to stem the tide of revolution⁴⁴. The Moderate controlled government also helped. On the 5th of December, 1839 the Cabinet published a decree ordering the Justices of the Peace to draw up the electoral lists, instead of the municipalities as specified in the Constitution. In Coruña the Captain General openly worked for the Moderates, and all over Spain there were reports of administrative pressure brought to bear on the voters to elect conservative candidates.

In spite of the legal and illegal efforts of the Cabinet to obtain a victory for the conservatives, the Moderates were not satisfied. The *Revista de Madrid* published an editorial urging the government to take and even more active part in the electoral process. The editorialist stated:

“The Government has taken some part in the election, although not all that it should have; in the great electoral struggle, which is none other than the battle of all the social and political interests, the great and good influence of the Government should not remain inactive and indifferent when confronted by the attacks of the anarchic and disolute parties, (Progressives)...”⁴⁵.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 921.

⁴² For text of the manifesto see ANDRÉS BORREGO, *El Libro de las Elecciones*, pp. 65-72.

⁴³ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, pp. 200-212.

⁴⁴ RAMÓN SANTILLÁN, *Memorias (1815-1856)*, vol. 2, p. 235.

⁴⁵ “Crónica del mes de Diciembre 1839”, in *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. II, pp. 183-185.

The Moderates won the elections as a result of the legal and illegal methods utilised, but they suffered one major political defeat. The most powerful general, Baldomero Espartero, refused to support the Moderates, and indeed criticized them harshly. On the 15th of December he ordered his assistant, Brigadier Linaje, to make public a manifesto stating his displeasure with the electoral process. A few days later he published a personal letter backing up Linaje's manifesto⁴⁶. As the year 1840 progressed, the rupture between the Moderates and the war hero became more accentuated. But the conservatives proceeded without caution, and even tried to buy him off by giving him the joint command of the Armies of the North, of the Centre, and of Catalonia in order to finish off the last Carlist battalions in Catalonia. The effect of this measure was to transfer all effective military power into the hands of a single man. Espartero was now on the path that would ultimately lead to his elevation as Chief of State, and eventually Regent of Spain.

THE LEGISLATURE OF 1840

During the winter, spring and summer of 1840 the Moderate-dominated Congress and Senate attempted to carry out a truly conservative program of reforms. They debated and approved a series of bills, including a new municipal law, placing the political control of the towns in the hands of the Minister of the Interior, a bill to continue collecting the tithe taxes, and finally the national budget. The Senate also passed a law to limit the freedom of the press, another to restrict the number of individuals allowed to vote in national elections, and a bill to reestablish the Council of State, (a royalist institution, which had been eliminated after 1834). These last measures (approved by the Senate) were not, however, submitted to the vote of the Congress and therefore were not put into practice. The effect of the Moderate offensive was to alienate the Progressives, including the less radical members, to drive General Espartero to the Left, and to undermine the authority not only of the Government Ministers, but also of the Queen-Regent. By the end of the legislative session in July, the country was faced with a national political crisis.

The Congress of 1840 had begun inauspiciously. In the first sessions the Progressives accused the Government of having manipulated the elections and demanded a recount or annulment. The public galleries were packed and enthusiastically supported the more radical orators, while they hooted at the more conservative⁴⁷. On February 23, the conservative deputy Peña Aguayo, apparently on purpose, provoked the anger of the public. The National Militia was ordered to eject all spectators from

⁴⁶ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, pp. 160-65. For text of the manifesto also see A. PIRALA, *Historia de la Guerra Civil*, vol. 5, p. 539.

⁴⁷ For the events of February 22-29 see "Crónica de Febrero 1840", in *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. II, pp. 368-381; also see *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1840, pp. 24-111.

the Congress. On the following day, nevertheless, the public was again allowed to enter. When the radical deputy, Joaquín María López, rose to speak, the public gallery broke out in a great demonstration of applause. At the same time, a large crowd outside the building began a minor tumult. The president of the Congress closed the session and ordered the spectators out of the hall and into the streets. The deputies then met in secret session until the fall of darkness when troops dispersed the angry crowd outside. On the following morning the Government ordered the imposition of a state of siege on Madrid, and temporarily suspended the legislative sessions.

The Congress reopened four days later, but at the official swearing-in ceremony on March 21 the two leaders of the radical wing of the Progressive Party, Joaquín María López and Fermín Caballero presented their resignations, in protest against the state of siege. Caballero and López then assumed their positions as mayors of the Madrid municipal government, (to which they had been previously elected). From there they led the radical opposition to the Moderate government.

The Government was itself faced with serious economic difficulties, primarily due to the deficit of the budget. Expenses were much greater than revenues. Most State employees were in arrears of their pay, (some almost two years in arrears), and most Army officers and soldiers were on half-pay⁴⁸. The only way of obtaining funds was to arrange contracts with local financiers, who advanced money to the Government, but at extortionist interest rates. In order to cover some expenses, the Cabinet, supported by the legislature, authorised the Treasury to emit large quantities of paper money and bonds. Because of the lack of solvency of the State finances, as well as a total lack of gold/silver reserves, "this operation brought with it the strongest censure not only of the national press, but also of the foreign"⁴⁹. The price of the bonds of the National Debt dropped from 35% to 25% of their face value on the stock markets. According to the *Revista de Madrid* of May 1840, the measure had provoked the particular alarm of the holders of State bonds and all others involved in the public debt⁵⁰. The Moderate government was thus rapidly losing the support of key economic sectors, including the wealthy and powerful financiers. Furthermore without sufficient money, the administration was unable to guarantee the loyalty of the thousands of public employees and of the majority of the Army officers.

Throughout the spring there were rumors of a possible Cabinet crisis, and of the necessity of replacing at least some of the Ministers. The crisis was precipitated by General Espartero. The Chief of the Army was in the process of mopping up the last resisting Carlist forces in Catalonia. He was now anxious to consolidate his own political power. Espartero

⁴⁸ R. SANTILLÁN, *Memorias* (1815-1856), vol. II, p. 250. Santillán was Minister of Finances in 1840.

⁴⁹ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, p. 470.

⁵⁰ "Crónica del mes de Mayo 1840", *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol III, p. 184.

demanded that Brigadier Linaje, his chief aid and secretary, (who wrote most of his speeches and manifestos), be awarded the rank of Field Marshall. The Government refused. As a result, the Ministers Narváez, Collantes, Montes de Oca and San Millán resigned. These events demonstrated once again the weakness of the executive branch of the government vis.a.vis outside forces, be they an Army general like Espartero, the parliamentary oppositon, or foreign pressures. The executive power was shared by the Queen/Regent and by her Ministers. The Queen-Regent did not pay systematic attention to political developments, and more often than not reached her decisions in consultation with her camarilla, (largely composed of friends and relatives of her secret lover and husband Fernando Muñoz)⁵¹. The Ministers were generally leaders of the respective political parties, but the appalling turnover of Ministers greatly reduced their ability to implement consistent policies. Throughout the Carlist War of 1833-39, the weakness and incapacity of the executive at Madrid gradually permitted more and more power to pass into the hands of the Army leaders, and particularly its Commander in Chief.

The new Ministers who joined the Cabinet, as a consequence of the crisis provoked by Espartero, were General Clonard, Ramón Santillán, A. Armendariz, and Díaz Sotelo, all conservatives. They were well received by the Moderate Party, which, with a remarkable lack of political caution, proceeded to press forward with the debate on the law dealing with municipal government. The proposed municipal law was essentially the same as that previously debated in the Congress of 1837-38. The two major planks of the bill were: (1) a reduction of the number of voters, who would now be only the tax-paying citizens; (2) the appointment of the mayors by the political governors of the provinces, who would choose from the list of candidates elected by the electors, (this was article 45 of the bill)⁵². In itself and alone, the first plank was acceptable to the Progressive Party chiefs who had remained in the Congress of 1840. On the other hand, they could not swallow the second plank (article 45), which meant complete centralized control over the municipalities.

The Moderates tried to ram the bill down the throats of the Progressives by calling for a vote on the entire proposed law, without bothering to discuss it article by article. The Progressives responded by proposing one amendment after another to the whole bill. The discussion, which had begun in April, continued through May and into June. Some 123 amendements were presented by the Progressives, and one after the other

⁵¹ There is little detailed information on the Queen's camarilla. In 1837 the Nort American Minister wrote the following of the camarilla: "This is composed of the relations and friends of the favorite Muñoz—at the head of it being his uncle, González, an ecclesiastic, acting as governor of the little Queen (Isabel II)—then comes a cousin of Muñoz, a Mr. Calvet, and Domingo Ronchi... These were the real framers of the Istúriz Cabinet and had a hand in the selection of the present Ministers..." *National Archives* (Washington D.C.), Department of State, Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Spain, Microcopy 31, roll 32, July, 1834-June, 1843, letter from A. Middleton to Secretary of State, dated January 6, 1837, Madrid.

⁵² See text of the municipal law in *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1840, appendiz to no. 26, pp. 585-588.

were either voted down or tabled by the Moderate majority⁵³. The deputy Argüelles delivered a speech which summed up the arguments of the Progressive opposition. He stated:

"This law is but the prelude to the establishment of a fortress within which we will shortly see imprisoned the freedom of Spain... it is evident that after this law will come other (conservative) ones: the Council of State, an electoral law, a law to limit the freedom of the press. It is a complete system...

What is the intent in establishing this law on town government? To convert the municipal institution, which is the oldest in the Monarchy... into a mere agent of the central government"⁵⁴.

The Progressives were willing to concede some points and reach a compromise, as deputy Vicente Sancho demonstrated by attacking the principle of universal suffrage. He declared that "it is necessary to establish quotas of electors for each town and by no means permit universal suffrage...". His colleague Calatrava agreed, criticizing the existing municipal law, but he added that the Progressives could not accept article 45 of the new bill; they would not accept complete centralization as in France. The Moderates were adamant and refused to compromise. They wanted to eliminate the very roots of popular radicalism; they felt that only the curtailment of the democratic town elections would accomplish this goal.

As the debates dragged on, and as it became clearer and clearer that nothing would stop the passing of the bill, fights broke out among the Progressives. Heated arguments and personal insults were common in their party meetings held outside the Congress. Several more deputies resigned from their posts, following the example of López and Caballero⁵⁵. By early June there was only a small minority of Progressives left actively participating in the legislature. These were chiefly deputies who had previously been members of the Centre bloc of the Constituent Congress of 1836-37, parliamentary leaders like Sancho, Mendizábal and Cortina who believed in the virtues of political negotiations and compromise. When the decisive moment of the final vote arrived, nevertheless, the Moderates did not conciliate and they passed the whole municipal bill by 114 votes for, 17 against⁵⁶.

On receiving news of the ratification of this new law, a violent outcry of anger and fear burst out among the Progressive supporters across the nation and in many town councils. Before entering into a description of this popular reaction, however, we should pause to ask why it was that the Progressives so heartily defended the town governments. The reasons are not hard to find. First of all it should be observed that the Progressives tended to represent principally the commercial and professional

⁵³ See speech by Martínez de la Rosa who mentioned that 123 amendments had been presented, *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, p. 1174.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, speech by Argüelles, pp. 1599-1601.

⁵⁵ "Crónica del mes de Junio 1840", in *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. II, p. 183.

⁵⁶ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1840, June 5, 1840, pp. 2259-61.

bourgeoisie. There were also amongst them considerable numbers of public employees, military officers, and some specialised agricultural interests like the sherry producers of Jerez who were tied to English markets. The Moderates represented the majority of the large landowners (the Aristocracy), the clergy, many wealthy urban property owners, and, more recently, significant sectors of the Catalan textile industrialists. It may be recalled from Chapter 1 that the Spanish commercial bourgeoisie of 1830 was relatively weak both in numbers and in wealth, when compared with either the landed nobility or the clergy; the Progressives were far outnumbered by the Moderates among the propertied classes. But they had obtained a great source of political support through the creation of the National Militia in the towns. The large artisanal population, (as well as some small farmers), who joined the National Militia, provided the popular impetus to the political developments of those years. Yet who controlled the National Militia? The local town governments. Thus it was essential for the Progressives to support the municipalities which were by now much attached to their free elections. Since 1836, (with democratic elections in the Spanish towns), the vast majority of the municipal governments were in the hands of the Progressives or of Progressive sympathisers. Local democracy had become a key element in the political struggle. The approval of the Moderate bill to restrict and control local elections would be a mortal blow to the Progressive Party and its supporters. But before it could actually be implemented there was a major political revolution.

THE REVOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 1840

As soon as the Moderate municipal law had been approved by the Congress, the Queen-Regent began to receive hundreds of petitions from town councils all over Spain demanding that she not sign the bill⁵⁷. On June 2, 1840, the city government of Madrid published a manifesto, signed by Joaquín María Ferrer, Joaquín María López, Fermín Caballero and others, stating their firm opposition to the new law⁵⁸. The Progressive newspaper press of many cities launched a vigorous offensive against the Government. Among the most important of these organs were: *El Eco del Comercio* in Madrid, *El Constitucional* in Barcelona, *El Eco de Aragón* in Zaragoza, *La Tribuna* in Valencia, *El Eco del Mediodía* in Málaga, *El Nacional* in Cádiz, *El Diario del Comercio* in Sevilla, and *El Liberal Guipuzcuano* in San Sebastián⁵⁹. Furthermore for the first time, groups of out-and-out republicans began to publish news sheets. The republicans (who had some strength in Barcelona, Valencia, and Madrid), supported the Progressives, but made much more pointed attacks upon the institution of the monarchy. The first republican newspaper in Madrid was called *La Revolución*, and had begun publication on May 1, 1840 under the

⁵⁷ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, pp. 490-95.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 461-62.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

direction of Patricio Olavarría. It designated itself as the organ of democratic opinion and attacked the royal camarilla as well as the Ministers. It declared that the political goal of the democrats was the establishment of a Federal Republic in Spain⁶⁰. The Moderate government soon ordered this newspaper closed, but in June another republican publication appeared in the streets of Madrid called *El Hucarán*, (also edited by Olavarría), which gained considerable popularity.

At the end of June, the Queen/Regent María Cristina suddenly decided to leave the capital. She did so without consulting the Moderate Party, which was somewhat distraught with this decision. She left for Barcelona, ostensibly on a summer trip to benefit from the sea-baths in Catalonia, but actually she was going to see Espartero. María Cristina was clearly under pressure to find a solution to the political crisis motivated by the Progressives' refusal to accept the new Moderate laws. Her trip to see Espartero was a last desperate measure intended to convince the General to publicly support her own position and that of the Moderates. Her personal relations with Espartero had always been cordial: she wrote him frequently and sent gifts both to him and to his wife⁶¹. The Queen-Regent probably sincerely believed she could convince him. On arriving at the city of Lérida, María Cristina met Espartero and had a long talk with him. She offered him the Presidency of the Cabinet, although she asked to appoint the other Ministers herself. Espartero unexpectedly answered that it was necessary to convoke a new Congress and to veto the municipal law. A heated conversation followed, after which the Queen-Regent departed for Barcelona, agreeing to meeting with him there in the near future⁶².

On June 30, 1840, María Cristina entered Barcelona, being well received by the majority of the propertied classes. Two weeks later, on July 13, General Espartero arrived. His entrance into the Catalan capital was a triumphal march; more than 80,000 persons filled the streets to acclaim him. According to one Catalan historian this reception was "the first true *mass* demonstration in the history of the city, overshadowing by far that which had been prepared previously for the royal family"⁶³. Furious at her loss of prestige, María Cristina signed the Moderate municipal bill into law on the following day, July 14. This was a direct act of provocation against both the Progressives and Espartero. The Barcelona Progressives and democrats responded quickly:

"On the evening of July 18 a large crowd filled the principal square of San Jaime in front of the city hall, and cries were heard of 'down with the Cabinet', 'down with the municipal law', and 'long live the Duque de la Victoria' (Espartero), 'long live the Constitution'. After this barricades were set up tumultuously, which the armed forces did nothing to impede;

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 479-484. Also see ANTONIO ELORZA, "Los Primeros Federales", *Triunfo*, no. 545, March 10, 1973, pp. 29-35.

⁶¹ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, pp. 571-73.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 580-82.

⁶³ JAIME VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, p. 372.

meanwhile many of the crowd went to the Plaza of Santa Ana to cheer Espartero, who was installed there. The General came out into the balcony, spoke to the groups and asked that nobody make any attacks upon liberty or upon the Constitution of 1837"⁶⁴.

After consulting with the Barcelona municipal authorities, Espartero went that night to see the Queen/Regent. He demanded the resignation of the Cabinet and the annulment of the municipal law. He was now backed up by both the Army and the Militia of the city. María Cristina was forced to accept the first demand, but she did not concede the second. Three days later (July 21) the local Moderates organized a counter-demonstration to support the Queen-Regent, but it degenerated into a street fight. "Aristocrats and bourgeois fought with each other in the Plaza de Palau"⁶⁵. On the following day there was bloodshed throughout the city. The ultra-conservative lawyer Francisco Balmas was murdered, although not before killing several of his assailants. At another point of the city, the Militia lieutenant Manuel Bosch de Torres was assassinated and the offices of the newspaper *El Guardia Nacional* were destroyed. Espartero was obliged to step in to establish order. He declared a state of siege in the Catalan capital, backed up by the Army. The Queen-Regent remained three weeks and then left for Valencia, arriving there on August 23. She lodged at the palace of the Count of Cervellán.

Meanwhile at Madrid, the Moderate Cabinet had resigned on July 28, and a month of political chaos followed. No single group could control the situation. Finally, on September 1, 1840, the Madrid city government declared itself in favor of a revolution. A public meeting had been held at the city hall at 11 o'clock in the morning. The session actually began with a discussion of the problems of the water supply system of the city, but was soon interrupted by cries calling for the meeting to discuss the important political questions of the day. One citizen got up to speak, declaring himself in favor of a revolution and in defense of the Constitution. He declared:

"Let not the city council think that those who are here are mere shirtless individuals (proletarians), no; everyone here has at least a bed to sleep on, is a representative of an industry, of a profession; this is the class of people who pays taxes, who suffer and are forced to pay tribute to the despots..."⁶⁶.

Another cried:

"We are more than a thousand! The hall outside is full! The people think as we do! Take measures! Call to arms!"⁶⁷.

⁶⁴ VICENTE BOIX, *Historia de la Ciudad y Reino de Valencia*, vol. III (Valencia, 1847), p. 464.

⁶⁵ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, p. 373.

⁶⁶ Anonymous, *Reseña histórica del glorioso Alzamiento de 1840* (Madrid, 1840), p. 35.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Between 12:30 and 2:00 p.m. the National Militia assembled all over the city. There were a few skirmishes with the Royal Guards, but the Militia soon occupied the main government buildings and took control of the situation. Large numbers of citizens came to ask for arms and over a thousand rifles were distributed. Three main bodies of armed citizens were stationed around the city; at the square of Santo Domingo, at the Plaza Mayor, and in the square in front of the Church of St. Thomas. Most of the regular Army soldiers fraternised with the Militia. A contemporary observer commented: "Never has a revolution been effected with such complete order and discipline..."⁶⁸.

On the next day, (September 2, 1840), the provincial deputation and the city government, together, formed a provisional governing Junta. The president was the former 1st mayor, Joaquín María Ferrer. The first official orders of the Junta were: (1) that all men between 18 and 40 years of age, not already enlisted in the Army or Militia, should present themselves to take up arms; (2) that all the military officers should prepare themselves to defend the capital. On September 3, the stock market was re-opened and the bonds of the public debt rose rapidly in value⁶⁹. Soon loans were obtained from the chief capitalists and merchants in order to pay the daily wages and expenses of the National Militia and local Army troops. The financial elite backed the revolution, expecting that a new government would soon provide opportunities for lucrative loans and contracts.

By the 10th of September, news was received of the establishment of revolutionary juntas in the cities of Toledo, Burgos, Zaragoza, Salamanca, Avila, Cáceres, Segovia, Huesca, Granada, León, Ciudad Real, Cádiz, Lérida, Cartagena, Málaga, and Almería. The insurrection of September had become a national revolution. In Valencia the troops loyal to the Queen-Regent did not permit the formation of a junta. The Valencia Progressives and democrats left the city and met in the town of Alcira, proclaiming the formation of a Junta of the province of Valencia. They published a manifesto which demanded the abolition of several taxes, accused the local nobility of bribing the judges in order to obtain ownership titles for their great estates, and declared that the farmers and share-croppers of the province would never more pay the tithes taxes⁷⁰.

On the 12th of September, word was received in Madrid of a manifesto sent by Espartero to María-Cristina at Valencia expressing his support for the national revolutionary process. But news soon came that the Queen-Regent refused to recognize any of the juntas. Therewith the Madrid Junta began to dismiss great numbers of the Moderate public employers. Orders were given not to obey any royal decrees issued from Valencia, and all the Ministries were closed. On September 17, the Junta ordered the arrest of the former Moderate Ministers, Castro, Arrazola, Santillán, Clonard and others. All military officers in the capital were ordered to

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷⁰ VICENTE BOIX, *Historia... de Valencia*, pp. 469-470.

present themselves at the city hall to swear allegiance to the new authorities. The great majority of generals and officers did so; among them were old courtier-generals like Castaños, the duque de Castrorreño, and others like Generals Palafox, Balanzat, the Conde de San Román, the Conde de Torre Pando, Zarco del Valle, etc.⁷¹ Both Army and National Militia now officially backed the insurrection. The National Militia of the nearby towns assembled in Madrid. One contemporary report described the entrance into the capital of 600 farmer/peasants of the Militia of the town of Colmenar el Viejo⁷².

On September 27th Espartero arrived at Madrid from Barcelona. A contemporary observer described his arrival:

"This public entry was solemnized by the most enthusiastic reception—for three days the festivities continued on a scale of royal magnificence the streets illuminated—the houses draped, triumphal arches erected in the Prado and a lofty column with appropriate symbols in the Puerta del Sol—besides dramatic entertainments and bullfights to which the spectators were invited by ticket to meet him (Espartero)...

The Junta must be considered as acting henceforth in concert with, if not under the control of Espartero..."⁷³

The official culmination of the celebrations was a great banquet held in the Theater of the Orient, (Teatro de Oriente), to which were invited the members of the Junta, the provincial deputation, the city councilmen, representatives from the provincial juntas, the commanders of the National Militia, "patriots, artists, merchants and important proprietors, etc.". Espartero sat at a table with other Generals, namely Linaje, Lorenzo, López, the Duque de Zaragoza, Ferraz, and others.

"The galleries were full of spectators of both sexes who came to see such a grandiose banquet... The orchestra began to play... the Duke (Espartero) offered a toast 'for the Queen, (Isabel II), the Constitution, liberty and national independence..."⁷⁴

These events marked the consolidation of the September revolution, and signalled the assumption of power by the Progressive bourgeoisie. The Moderates had not only been roundly defeated, but many were also forced into exile⁷⁵. The Queen-Regent, furthermore was discredited. María Cristina had refused to recognize the Madrid Junta, but in early October she did name a new Cabinet composed of Progressives, headed by Joaquín María Ferrer, who was the president-extant of the Junta. On October 6th, Espartero and the new Ministers left Madrid for Valencia to present their political program to the Queen-Regent. They had pledged themselves to

⁷¹ Anonymous, *Reseña del glorioso Alzamiento de 1840*, pp. 116-117.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁷³ *National Archives* (Washington D.C.), Department of State, U.S. Legation, Madrid, Official Papers 1838-1856, inventory no. c8.1 no. 122, p. 598-615, letter from A. Middleton to Secretary of State Forsyth, dated Nov. 2, 1840.

⁷⁴ *Reseña del glorioso Alzamiento de 1840*, p. 222.

exact from her the following terms: the nomination of Co-Regents, the dissolution of the legislature of 1840 and the convocation of a new one, and the nullification of the municipal law. The Queen-Regent was not prepared to yield to what she thought such rigorous conditions. She declared that she would resign the Regency and she prepared to board a ship which was to take her to exile in France.

These quickly unfolding developments surprised public opinion, yet they were actually quite inevitable. The North American ambassador who was an eyewitness of the September revolution wrote an interesting report, which attempted to explain the defeat of the Moderates and the consequences of the obstinacy of the Queen-Regent. He wrote:

"It may well be asked how it was possible for the Queen and Cortes to deceive themselves so much with respect to the limits of popular endurance. This may be partly accounted for by the apathy in which the nation has been plunged for three years past in consequence of the disappointment it experienced at the course followed by the Exaltado ministry during their short reign in 36 and 37, which it must be confessed did little to awake the enthusiasm or patriotism of the people. But this apathy was only apparent...

For myself, I always thought... that the great majority of the young men of means and education forming the strength and flower of the National Militia were *progresistas*, and would eventually triumph over all attempts at crabbing as they call it here-retrograding. In addition to the mistakes committed by the Cortes on this head, there was another on the part of the Regent that proved still more fatal. This was her expecting to win over Espartero to the views of the Moderado Ministry, from whom it was thought, he had only been alienated by a personal pique long since forgotten, and who had indeed loaded him with honors and emolument. The Duke (Espartero), however, was convinced that they (Moderates) had lately attempted to undermine him by secret tampering with the soldiery, and fortified by his advisers, held firm against the charms of the Queen's manners which are highly seductive and have been often exerted with success on similar occasions. This reliance on her powers of persuasion was the secret motive... of her journey to Barcelona- but when she was compelled to abandon all hopes of Espartero's aid in her designs, what can have emboldened her to persist in them with such peril to herself and the Country? It is explained with every mark and probability by the agency of French encouragement. Certain it is that the downfall of the Moderados, draws after it that of the preponderance which the French Government had lately enjoyed here- as the rise of the Exaltados (Progressives) will, no doubt, for the present secure the ascendancy of English influence"⁷⁵.

On the 12th of October María Cristina published her formal abdication of the position of Queen-Regent. Five days later on October 17th, she boarded the steamship *Mercurio* which was to take her to France. Among

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 235-240.

⁷⁶ *National Archives* (Washington D.C.), Department of State, U.S. Legation at Madrid, Official Papers, 1838-1858, inventory no. c8.1, no. 122, pp. 598-615, letter from A. Middleton to Secretary of State Forsyth, dated Nov., 2, 1840.

those at the dock to bid her farewell were Espartero, Chacón the new Minister of War, Antonio Seoane, Captain-General of Valencia, the Count of Santa Coloma, the majordomo of her Majesty, the Marqués of Malpica, and the Marqués de Amarillas. María Cristina left behind her, her two daughters, the future Queen of Spain Isabel II (only eleven years old) and her little sister Luisa. She took with her a small camarilla and a very large fortune. She was not to suffer a penniless exile. As the North American ambassador later reported:

“Before her departure for Barcelona... she had stripped the (Madrid) palace of all such valuables as she could send away or convert into money. Every corner was ransacked; and pictures and objects of art and antiquity which have accumulated and were held in store there, were conveyed out of the country or sold; the little remnants of provisions and fuel left unused were turned into cash; parts of the royal wardrobe found their way to hands of dealers in cast-off clothees...

No surprise need, therefore be felt at the circumstance- said to be beyond doubt- that ex-Regent Cristina has retired from the Spanish Throne with a clear fortune of from six to eight millions of dollars (120 to 160 million “reales”)⁷⁷.

The toil and trouble of being a Queen-Regent had been undoubtedly compensated by the large salary María Cristina had received (of 40 million “reales” per year) between 1833 and 1840, most of which had been deposited in French banks. She left Spain in 1840 as perhaps the wealthiest woman in Europe.

⁷⁷ *National Archives* (Washington D.C.), Department of State, Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Spain, September 1840-August 1842, Microcopy 31, roll 33, letter from A. Vail, dated February 1, 1841.

VIII

The Politics of 1841-43: Social Contradictions and Political Divisions

By mid-October of 1840 the Progressives led by General Espartero had taken power. They were to rule Spain for approximately three years. During this brief period (1841-43) the Progressives virtually monopolised the control of both the executive and legislative branches of government. The Moderate opposition was, however, allowed to participate in all elections, to use the press with great freedom, to hold meetings and to form associations. Likewise the radicals and in particular the fast-growing republican party were given the opportunity to distribute propaganda, participate in all municipal elections, and even to elect a few republican deputies to Congress. The stability of the government of 1841-43 depended to a good degree upon the popularity of Espartero and upon the unity of the Progressive Party, but internal political divisions soon undermined both that popularity and that unity. By 1844, the Moderate Party and its own military hero, General Narváez, were able to engineer a return to power and the reestablishment of a conservative administration. This Moderate regime was to last for an almost uninterrupted 25 years, up to the revolution of 1868. The Regency of Espartero (1841-43) was therefore the last period before 1868 when truly broad sectors of the population were able to participate actively/legally in local and national politics¹. This Regency was also the last stage in the turbulent transition (1834-44) from the old absolutist/aristocratic regime to the consolidated bourgeois society of 19th century Spain.

The Progressive government of 1841-43 was based on several socio-political forces. The first was the Army, commanded by Espartero, the war-hero, originally a common soldier who had risen from the ranks to the preeminent position of authority both in the Army and in the State. Espartero was essentially a bourgeois populist, and therefore immensely popular among the middle and working classes. The second major political force was the Progressive Party itself, a coalition of social groups led by a parliamentary elite. The Progressive Party leadership was always center-

¹ The number of electors allowed to vote after 1844 decreased drastically, and did not recover the levels of 1840-43 until 1868. Furthermore a coordinated system of electoral fraud perpetrated by the government throughout the Moderate regime made the electoral process unrepresentative. Only in the brief period of 1854-56, when the Progressives were in power, was there more liberty, but the democratic elections at the municipal level characteristic of the period 1840-43 were not reestablished until 1868.

ed at Madrid, but maintained its control over provincial supporters through the wide distribution of excellent newspapers like the *Eco del Comercio*, to which local sympathisers subscribed². Finally the third major political force of 1841-43 was the somewhat amorphous and dispersed elements associated in the National Militia and the local municipal governments. These constituted the bulk of popular sympathizers of the Espartero government, including, as they did, the majority of the large and small merchants, professionals, and artisans of the Spanish cities and towns.

These different social and political forces joined together to make the revolution of September 1840 and to establish a Progressive government, but once in power they coexisted in an unstable and unequal equilibrium. The competing interests of power-hungry generals and avaricious financiers, the conflicts between Andalusian free-traders and the Catalan protectionist interests, the contradictions between the propertied sectors that controlled the Progressive Party and the artisan masses that followed them, all created social and political tensions that became accentuated with the passing of time. Through the first year and a half of his Regency, Espartero was able to keep the support of the majority of the Progressives, and therefore to provide adequate leadership. But by the end of 1842, the internal party splits, the class warfare in Barcelona, and the rapid growth of republicanism throughout the country threatened to shatter the coalition. The Progressive Party leaders became deeply divided and many even allied themselves with the Moderate opposition, which began to bombard the Congress and Espartero with an aggressive newspaper press. By the spring of 1843 the entire political system entered a final crisis.

Although Espartero wielded considerable power during his Regency, he was not in any sense a military dictator. On the contrary, during 1841-43 there were more national and local elections, (and with greater popular participation), than in any comparable period up to the revolution of 1868. Espartero exercised the executive powers of the government, as well as effective command of the Army, but legislative power was in the hands of the Congress and Senate. Furthermore, during his Regency the town governments gained even more autonomous strength than before. The failures of the Progressives to keep power after 1843 did not arise as much from the numerous political mistakes of Espartero as from the effects of increasing social conflict upon the political system. The threat of a greater popular upheaval turned the majority of the Spanish propertied

² *El Eco del Comercio* had both a daily Madrid edition and a daily provincial edition, with slightly different contents. There is no reliable information on the number of copies printed, but between 1834 and 1844 it was unquestionably the most widely read newspaper in the country. It was edited by Fermín Caballero and Angel Iznardi from 1834 to 1840. According to a well-informed British observer: "The *Eco* was the *Journal des Debats* and the *Times* of Madrid, with the difference that it was much more democratic; and this journal it was that crushed the Estatuto Real, prepared the way for the revolution of 1836, and contributed to expel Cristina from the kingdom", F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. II, p. 288.

classes definitively against the populist aspects of the Espartero experiment, and finally to a conservative reaction in 1844.

Divisions among the Progressives were actually manifest from the moment Espartero assumed control of the government. During the September insurrection many provincial Juntas had sent delegates to Madrid to form a national Central Junta, which would direct the revolutionary process. Those who most strongly advocated the formation of a Central Junta at Madrid were Joaquín María López and Fermín Caballero, the leaders of the radical wing of the Progressives³. They advocated the abolition of the Senate and the establishment of a truly radical regime. But only 22 provincial representatives had arrived at the capital by September 30, making it difficult for the Central Junta to claim that it was the voice of all the revolutionary Juntas of Spain, the voice of national sovereignty⁴. Furthermore there were political conflicts with the local provincial Junta of Madrid, led by Joaquín María Ferrer, which was issuing decrees as if it were a national government. When Espartero arrived at the capital at the end of September, he allied himself with Ferrer and the more conservative Progressive Party leaders. This marked the death blow for the Central Junta, which had recently elected its authorities. These authorities were the following: General Evaristo San Miguel was the nominal president, the Catalan financier Pedro Surrá y Rull was the vice-president, and the secretaries were Fermín Caballero and Miguel Ruiz de Arbol⁵. Some of the members of the Central Junta wanted to publish a manifesto criticizing the actions of Ferrer and Espartero, but the majority decided not to do so. As Evaristo San Miguel stated: "My heart is not tranquil on seeing General Espartero at the head of the Regency. But this is not the occasion either of demonstrating ill will, or of attempting any physical resistance"⁶.

Espartero, (who by no means intended to share executive power with the radicals), had won a first major victory. The assistance of the provincial Junta of Madrid had been invaluable. Consequently Espartero named its chief, Joaquín María Ferrer, Minister of State (for Foreign Affairs). A few days later on October 17, the Madrid Junta dissolved itself, officially transferring all effective power to the Ministers under Espartero, (who was himself President of the Council of Ministers). On dissolving, this Junta published a declaration of political principles, which expressed the maximum program of the nonradical Progressives. They stated that the revolution had been carried out because the Moderate had been undermining the Constitution of 1837. They declared that the basic principle of the government and of the political regeneration of Spain must be that of *national sovereignty*. Finally, they urged the implementation of various reforms: reform of the educational and financial system, an increase in

³ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, p. 728.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 786.

⁵ Anonymous, *Reseña histórica del glorioso Alzamiento de septiembre 1840*, p. 242.

⁶ JOSÉ SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, p. 794.

the sale of Church properties, a resolution to finish with the last remaining feudal dues and practices, and a plan to distribute parcels of land to the soldiers who had fought against the Carlists⁷. Essentially, this "nationalist" and "reformist" position constituted the political program of Espartero throughout his Regency.

The new Cabinet was composed of five other Ministers besides Espartero and Ferrer. These were Alvaro Gómez Becerra (an old distinguished Liberal jurist) as Minister of Justice, Agustín Fernández Gamboa as Minister of Finances, Pedro Chacón (a military officer) as Minister of War, Joaquín Frías as Minister of the Navy, and Manuel Cortina (a Sevillian lawyer/landowner and Progressive leader) as Minister of the Interior. This Cabinet began to publish a series of decrees of two main types. First there were the popular decrees, annulling the Moderate municipal law, increasing the size of the National Militia, and calling for democratic municipal elections in December of 1840. The National Militia, which had numbered over 450,000 in 1836, was increased in 1841 to over 750,000 men⁸. The militiamen elected their own officers. They were under the authority of an inspector-general, residing in the capital, who was named by the government, and by subinspectors in each province. But at the same time the Militia was also under the control of the municipal authorities, who provided salaries and drew up the lists of recruits. This huge institution of the National Militia remained loyal to Espartero throughout his regency in most provinces. They were the only major group that defended him to the end of his regime. The municipal governments, on the other hand, were quite independent of the central government, and from early in 1841 many town councils adopted a radical republican ideology not in consonance with Espartero's politics.

The Cabinet did not only take measures to obtain the support of the artesans and peasants of the town and country, but it also issued decrees that would attract the propertied classes, the merchants, industrialists, and landowners. One such decree dealt with economic re-organization, and specifically the establishment of a government Board to revise import duties. The Board was particularly important because it would determine whether the principles of free trade or those of protection would prevail in Spanish commerce. To this Board were named important Progressives, Moderates, academic economists, and capitalists⁹. The conservative and bipartisan character of the members indicated that Espartero's new Cabinet was willing to serve the interests of the more powerful capitalist forces of the nation. Among those representing Catalan industry on the

⁷ Anonymous, *Reseña histórica del glorioso Alzamiento de septiembre 1840*, pp. 300-301.

⁸ In 1841 the National Militia totalled the incredible number of 763, 164 men, 211,243 of whom were armed. See FRANCIS DUNCAN, *The English in Spain*, p. 337. Also see information in the *Guía Oficial de España* for the years 1836 to 1844, and the appendixes of A. Pirala's *Historia de la Guerra Civil*, 6 vols.

⁹ For the complete list of members of this Board see J. SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. III, p. 800.

Board were José Bonaplata (perhaps the foremost Barcelona industrialist), Pedro Surrá y Rull (a Catalan financier and politician), and Buenaventura Carlos Aribau (spokesmen at Madrid for the textile capitalists). Among the Moderate landowners was the Marqués de Valgornera (former Minister in 1838), and the Duque de Gor (vice-president of the Moderate Congress of 1838-39). Among the Progressives were Vicente Sancho, Manuel Cantero (a Madrid merchant and banker), and Martín de los Heros (a Basque financier, who jointly with J. Ferrer had interests in Asturian coal mines). Among the academic economists were two Moderates, José Canga Argüelles and Ramón de la Sagra, (who had also begun organizing a sugar refining company), and the Progressive professor Eusebio María del Valle.

The economic program of the Cabinet was not revolutionary but reformist. Essentially the policies initiated by Finance Minister Gamboa were intended to modernize the State administration and to encourage capitalist development. The plan was to centralise the financial resources of the State, to improve public credit by liquidating the public debt, and to promote projects for economist growth. There was no intent here to go beyond the reformist program initiated by Mendizábal in 1836. A well-informed contemporary observer analysed some of the policies of Gamboa. He wrote:

“Meanwhile the Finance Minister is exerting all the energies of his Department in preparing for and hastening a thorough financial reform by centralising and husbanding his ordinary resources and by restoring the public credit; In furtherance of these objects he has rendered available for actual treasury purposes the revenues of Cuba, which, before, was almost wholly absorbed and in great part wasted in the payment of the Queen-Regent’s civil list and of other privileged expenditures. He is establishing a system of accountability in all branches of the Department, which he thinks, will put a stop to much waste in the management of finances...

He is promoting the sale of the domains of the Crown and Clergy, by receiving in payment these new inscriptions as well as those of the general consolidated debt, hoping thereby to redeem a great portion of the public liabilities...

It is proposed, then, to revise the entire system of taxation and the tariff of customs, and to modify both so as to give a fresh spring to industry, encourage commerce in all its branches etc...

The plan is a plausible one; and in a better organized community with the strong arm of power to carry it into effect, some of the results it is anticipated to produce, might be realised”¹⁰.

The same observer added that in Spain, however, the prospects for these reforms were not bright.

“Here, where all the ties which bind society have been loosened by continual civil war and foreign contention, where universal demoralisation

¹⁰ *National Archives* (Washington D.C.), Department of State, “Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Spain”, Sept. 1840-August 1842, Microcopy 31, roll 33, letter from A. Vail, dated February 15, 1841, Madrid.

has smothered all sense of public responsibility in public agents, and reduced the laws almost powerless..."¹¹.

The Finance Minister's efforts did not produce the expected positive results. Gamboa resigned on March 8, 1841. The *Eco del Comercio* commented that he had attempted to centralise and accumulate resources, but could not do so rapidly enough before the expenses mounted. He was unable to cope with the vultures of the State funds who were the Madrid financiers.

It should be observed, nevertheless, that the overall economic picture was not altogether bleak. The sale of Church properties increased rapidly after 1840; (more than 1,200 million "reales" worth were sold between 1840 and 1844, as opposed to only 170 million "reales" worth between 1836 and 1840). The State securities rose in value, numerous commercial and industrial firms were established, the newspaper press brought much more complete financial and stock market information. With the civil war now over, there was an opportunity for the capitalist economy to establish itself more solidly and to slowly expand.

More immediately evident than the process of economic recovery in 1840-41, was the increasingly important role of the military in Madrid society and in the State. All contemporary accounts refer to the large number of swashbuckling officers in the cafés and public squares of the capital, in the halls of the Ministries, in the salons and clubs of middle class society. The end of the Carlist War had not only filled the Spanish cities with officers, but also brought a generalised cult of all things military. "By the end of the war, postilions, mayors, ushers, and clerks began to dress like officers, who became distinguishable only by their medal ribbons, sheepskin collars and martial language"¹². The greatest popular idol was of course Espartero, himself, who was awarded several honorary aristocratic titles, and who delighted in many other distinctions "which included Godoy's palace, ducal coronets, civil crowns, tigerskin saddle cloths, cinammon mule teams, and noble aides embellished with imperial eagles..."¹³. Espartero's face and features were embellished on cigarette wrappers, barrack walls and broadsheets.

Espartero and his aides commanded an Army which had grown from a total of some 40,000 troops in 1833 to almost 200,000 in 1840, and they now moved into many important State positions. The distribution of spoils after the September revolution turned them into an aristocracy of office. The Esparterist clique of generals became popularly known as the "Ayacuchos", because many had participated in the Spanish American colonial wars in the 1820's, and, in particular, in the battle of Ayacucho (Perú) in 1824, (which the Spaniards had lost, signalling the final victory of American independence). Among this clique of powerful generals were Ramón Rodil, Jerónimo Valdés, García Camba, Francisco Linaje, and An-

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain*, p. 102.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

tonio Seoane. Ramón Rodil, had been the leader of the 575 officers who surrendered at Ayacucho; he returned to Spain in 1825 and loyally served Ferdinand VII. In 1834 he was named General in Command of the Army of the North, and in 1837 he was Minister of War. From this position he gave appointments to his friends Espartero, Alaix, Seoane, all of whom had served with him in Perú. A year after Espartero assumed the Regency of Spain, Rodil was named both Prime Minister and Minister of War (1842). Jerónimo Valdés had fought in America, had participated in the Carlist War and had been later elected a Senator. In November of 1840 Espartero rewarded him with the rich plum of the Captaincy-General of Cuba. García Camba, who had served in Peru, was a protegee of Rodil's. In 1841 Espartero named him Minister of the Navy and of Commerce. Antonio Seoane, another American veteran, had been Captain-General of Madrid during the Constituent Congress of 1836-1837. He had become a hero of the Progressives and was elected deputy, later becoming President of the Congress, affecting the coarse oratory style that won him the nickname Thunderclouds, ("Nubarrones"). Throughout 1837-39 he led a small group of military deputies who attacked the war management of the Moderate Ministers. "By attacking from the Left he and his friends had done much to recommend the Progressive cause to Espartero after 1837"¹⁴.

Espartero and his military colleagues did not constitute a political party; they were no more than a powerful Army clique. But they could count on a widespread popularity and they were intent upon obtaining and keeping a monopoly of certain key centers of power, namely the Ministries of War and of the Navy, and the Regency, itself. They would soon enter into conflict with the radical Progressives who wanted to cut down the size of the Army, and who also desired that Espartero should share the Regency with two civilians.

THE CONGRESS OF 1841: THE REGENCY VOTE

The Progressive deputies of the Congress of 1841, (March 19-August 21, 1841), were divided essentially into two major blocs: the radicals led by Fermín Caballero and Joaquín María López, and the more conservative bloc led by Vicente Sancho, Salustiano Olózaga, and Manuel Cortina. These parliamentary groups reflected the political divisions that had been first apparent in the Constituent Congress of 1836-37. The radicals of 1841, as before, desired more broad-reaching social and economic reforms; they also objected to General Espartero as the only Regent of Spain. The more conservative bloc supported a program to rationalise the state administration and promote economic growth, but they wanted no radical reforms. Furthermore they supported Espartero's bid to hold the Regency alone.

The Congressional debates of the spring of 1841 focused on the Regency question: Was Espartero to rule alone, or would the Congress

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

name two other Regents to govern with him? The majority of the deputies were initially in favor of the three-man Regency; they were popularly known as "trinitarios". Those deputies in favor of a one-man Regency were called "unitarios". The Congress opened on March 19, but the discussion of the Regency was postponed until April because Espartero wanted to pressure many "trinitarios" to switch their position to that of the "unitarios". Espartero's collaborators cajoled, argued and threatened the "trinitarios" to drop their opposition to the one-man Regency. In the Senate, (which included a good number of Moderates), the "ayacucho" general, Antonio Seoane, "declared that if the question were not resolved in favor of the 'unitarios', it would be decided by force, and in public session he stated that if a three-person Regency were named, it would not last more than two hours"¹⁵.

Clearly the Army generals were not about to allow Progressive civilians to check their ambitions. The more prudent (or cowardly?) Progressive leaders decided to collaborate with Espartero. During the months of March and April, Cortina, Sancho and Olózaga did all they could to convince their colleagues to accept the position of the "unitarios"¹⁶. But the radicals did not accept it, nor did many cautious Progressives like Mendizábal, Ayllón, Somoza and Alcalá Zamora. When the debates actually began, then, there were still considerably more "trinitarios" than "unitarios". The latter defended a one-man Regency because, as General San Miguel stated, the executive needed "unity of action". Three Regents would result in chaos. The "unitario" deputy Sánchez Silva urged that Espartero be named single Regent in order to crush the republicans, whom he stated were active both in Madrid and in his home town of Jerez in Andalucía¹⁷. Others spoke of the necessity of having a military officer run the country in order to prevent repeated Carlist uprisings, as well as to confront the hostile policies of the Vatican towards the government. Pope Gregory XVI had recently published a speech condemning the new Spanish administration¹⁸.

In the midst of the discussions, General Linaje published a manifesto in the Madrid press stating that Espartero would only accept the one-man Regency. Since Linaje was Espartero's personal secretary, this political bombshell further divided the politicians. Considerable numbers of deputies began to waver, some going over to the "unitario" position. The radicals launched an attack upon Espartero's pretensions. Fermín Caballero declared in the Congress that:

"There is no single man, no matter how great he be, gentlemen, who has the right, nor should he even presume it, to arrogate to himself all the glories of the Nation"¹⁹.

¹⁵ "Crónica de Abril, 1841", in *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. 4, p. 572.

¹⁶ FERMÍN CABALLERO, *Vida de Joaquín María López* (Madrid, 1857), p. 103.

¹⁷ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841, vol. 1, p. 641.

¹⁸ For text of the Papal speech see *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. 4, pp. 455-65.

¹⁹ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841, p. 770.

Caballero's friend and political ally, Joaquín María López, declared in a splendid speech:

"But we should also consider the destiny of the person to whom we all refer (Espartero). Once that he is named the single Regent, we may be sure that his ascendancy will wear thin rapidly and that his prestige will decline... little by little that rather magical enthusiasm which we now feel for him (Espartero) will collapse..."²⁰.

These were prophetic words, for within two years what López predicted would come to pass. The final vote was held on May 8, 1841. The Congress and Senate met together, making a total of 290 individuals. The vote was 153 in favor of the single Regent, 136 for a three-man Regency²¹. The bare majority of the deputies voted for the "trinitario" solution, but the senators swayed the balance against them by voting almost unanimously for the one-man Regency. The members then proceeded to elect Espartero Regent by 179 votes, although Agustín Argüelles got 103. After this, the president of the Congress, (namely Argüelles), declared: "The Cortes of the Spanish Nation have elected as single Regent, His Excellency, the Duke of Victory (Espartero). The Session is closed."

The radical Progressives had suffered a severe defeat. Not only was Espartero now in complete control, but in addition the more conservative Progressives were also in a stronger position and could impede many reforms. The *Revista de Madrid* had predicted the results of the Regency vote. It said:

"If the Regency is single, the revolutionary party will not only abdicate its power and influence... but it will also have to accept the ignominy and affront of having served as a stepping stone and support for the enthronement of a soldier, of the force of the sword, over and above that of the constitutional powers..."²².

Although this analysis exaggerates the omnipotent character of Espartero's power, it does suggest the attitude, the state of mind of many of the radical Progressives after the vote of May 8, 1841. They had failed, they had been betrayed, and they could do nothing. But, for the sake of party unity, they decided not to press their opposition to the Espartero Cabinet. Symptomatic of this conciliatory attitude was the conduct of Fermín Caballero. Manuel Cortina (pro-Espartero and a conservative Progressive) went to speak to Caballero to see if he would convince the radical bloc to collaborate, and urged him personally to retire from Congress and accept a government position. Caballero agreed, taking charge of a department charged with setting up the government statistics and geographical division. For more than a year he stayed out of most parliamentary

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 845-892; includes all the names of those who voted for and against.

²² *Revista de Madrid*, 2e serie, vol. 4, p. 479.

politics. Likewise the radical bloc, formerly led by Caballero and López, did their best to collaborate with the executive during almost two years.

THE CONGRESS OF 1841: GOVERNMENT FINANCES AND CORRUPTION

The Congress of 1841 spent much of the rest of the legislative session discussing matters of economic policy. They debated and voted on the budget, several important government contracts, and the sale of the Church lands. The common theme of these discussions was to what extent certain powerful capitalists and commercial groups were to obtain monetary benefits from the government. There were many individuals who had made their fortunes in dealings with the State during the Carlist War and continued to do so. Investments in loans to the Ministry of Finances, in contracts for the supply of the Army, and in the Church lands sold by the government were the most lucrative forms of business in Spain in the decade 1834-44. The new Liberal State not only protected but enormously stimulated the accumulation of capital in the hands of a small number of capitalists, mostly centred at Madrid.

Much money could be made from the shrewd and unscrupulous exploitation of the main weakness of the government, namely its perpetual deficit. The State administration could not collect in taxes as much as it spent. Under Ferdinand VII, when the budget had been much smaller, and almost exclusively dedicated to the maintenance of the Army, the deficit was covered by obtaining huge foreign loans from the French bankers, led by Alejandro Aguado. In 1835, however, the budget expenses rose from around 700 million, (average budget 1829-34), to 990 million "reales". Part of the deficit was covered by a loan of some 400 million "reales" advanced by the fabulously wealthy Rothschild bankers of Paris and London. By 1837 the State expenses rose phenomenally to 1,900 million "reales", including an increase of 524 for the War department, 27 for the Navy, 70 for the Ministry of the Interior, 80 for the Finance Ministry, and 106 for the Office of the Public Debt²³. This enormous increase in expenses could not be met by foreign loans; the bankers of London and Paris did not have much confidence in Spanish finances by this time.

The result was that the Finance Minister Mendizábal established a generalised system of arranging contracts with Spanish capitalists to cover the monthly government expenses²⁴. The individual capitalist would advance a sum of money to the Minister in exchange for Treasury bills and various types of government commercial paper. In February of 1837, for example, the Madrid banker José Safont advanced 1 million "reales" in cash to the Finance Ministry in exchange for Treasury bills and a percentage. In June of 1837, another capitalist, Francisco Pérez, who provided the Army with supplies, arranged a contract of 6 million "reales" with

²³ The information on the budgets is taken chiefly from the budget reports published in the *Diario de Sesiones* from 1834 onwards.

²⁴ See R. SANTILLÁN, *Memorias (1815-1856)*, p. 157.

the government. He handed over 2.7 million "reales" in cash and 3 million "reales" in Army promissory notes that he had received for supplies. In exchange he received 6 million "reales" in Treasury bills and other paper²⁵. ... In all of these operations the capitalists earned profits of 20 or 30% or more. The contracts were privately arranged between the favored capitalist or capitalists and the Finance Minister. A contemporary British observer, (who lived in Madrid during 1841-44), described the financial operations. He wrote :

"It is a delicate thing to say that the Minister often had his percentage, but it was almost always the practice for him to enter either directly or indirectly into every beneficial operation, having a share whether nominal or real of every loan advanced to the Government, and enormous interest of 20 or 30% upon sums of money lent to himself (Ministry of Finances)!"²⁶.

There were many months, however, when even these numerous private contracts were insufficient to pay all the government expenses. The result was that the public employees were always in arrears of pay by several months, and the Army officers and soldiers were generally on half-pay. In addition, the financial deficit made it all but impossible to pay the interest on the foreign debt, thus reducing the likelihood of obtaining financial aid from the powerful bankers of the stock markets of London, Paris, and Amsterdam.

The only effective solution for the chaotic state of Spanish finances was a complete reform and improvement of the taxation system. The tax system continued to be the same antiquated one of the 18th century. There were still at least 40 different taxes, mostly indirect. There were few direct taxes, (for instance on landed property), and they did not bring in much revenue. The government actually received the largest single amounts of revenue from the State tobacco and salt monopolies. (This was due in large part to the enormous consumption of tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, in the Spain of this period.) Furthermore, the actual collection of the taxes was, more often than not, in the hands of individual capitalists or merchants (to whom the revenue collections were farmed out) rather than in the hands of State employees. A contemporary observer wrote of this system :

"The lazy system of farming out the revenue still prevails in every part of the Peninsula. The ruinous practice extends down to the minutest items and the smallest heads of municipal taxation; which, instead of being collected by receivers appointed by the Ayuntamientos, are disposed of by auction and stripped by this slovenly means of a large percentage. It is still precisely as in 1594, when Cervantes was dispatched with a commission

²⁵ See report presented by the Finance Minister to Congress in September of 1837, which includes information on a large number of contracts the government arranged with various capitalists. *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, appendix 2 to no. 300, vol. VIII, pp. 5799-5808.

²⁶ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. II, 370-71.

from Phillip II to the kingdom of Granada, to look after the missing proceeds of the royal 'tercias' and 'alcabalas', or proportion of ecclesiastical tithes and percentage on sales"²⁸.

The Finance Minister of 1841, Pedro Surrá y Rul, did not, nonetheless, have the intention of reforming the tax system. His priorities were to reduce the Army expenses and to improve the credit of the government vis. a vis. the local Madrid financiers who supplied it with money. Surrá y Rull presented a considerably smaller budget to the Congress of 1841 than that which had been presented to the Congress of 1840. The total expenses for 1840 had been estimated at 1,700 million "reales". The total budget for 1841 was 1,100 millions. How did the Minister achieve such a notable drop in expenses? First, Surrá y Rull cut Army expenses by almost 300 million "reales", mainly because the Carlist War was now definitively over and half the soldiers were released. Secondly, he virtually eliminated the category of the interest payments on the Public Debt (foreign and national) from the budget, which normally totalled some 300 million "reales" per year. Unlike all previous Finance Ministers, Surrá y Rull did not make the pretence or even promise to pay the interest on the public debt. In this he was at least a realist, for the Spanish State was not in a position to pay off its debts for many years to come. The Congress approved the budget without heated discussion.

A somewhat more animated discussion arose with respect to a related financial matter, namely the payment of the floating debt. The floating debt was essentially the sum of unpaid debts that the state owed to individual capitalists who had supplied the Army or who had advanced sums of money to cover the monthly administrative expenses. The Finance Minister asked for Congressional authority to centralise the floating debt and to negotiate a 60 million "reales" loan to cover interest payments on these debts outstanding. The floating debt totalled 576 million "reales". The monthly interest on this sum totalled 20-22 million "reales", according to the Finance Minister²⁹. (This meant an extortionist 35% interest per year.) After paying the interest, the Minister proposed to sublet the salt monopoly, and to use the profits to pay off the whole of the debt. Naturally, many financiers were extremely interested in receiving the 60 million "reales", and pressured for the approval of the bill. Among such capitalists were Jaime Ceriola (who was perhaps the chief Army provisioner), Joaquín Arrieta (a leading Madrid merchant and head of the Junta of Commerce), Enrique O'Shea (a banker with offices in both Seville and Madrid), José Buschenthal (a merchant-banker who had originally made his fortune in Brazil), Daniel Weisweiler (agent at Madrid for the Rothschild bankers), and several others³⁰. Under this kind of powerful pressure the deputies of 1841 soon approved the bill.

But the importance of this bill was not so much that it provided

²⁸ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. II, p. 377.

²⁹ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841, p. 2532.

³⁰ For details on the floating debt see financial charts published in *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura 1841, vol. 1, pp. 197-98.

60 millions for a goodly number of Spanish capitalists, as that it allowed several of them to control the salt monopoly. Surrá y Rull sub-contracted the salt monopoly to the group of wealthy men led by the young financier José Salamanca. The other partners were the merchant-banker José Buschenthal and two Málaga industrialists, Heredia and Larios³¹. The salt monopoly produced more than 50 million "reales" per year for the government, and these capitalists calculated that with a more efficient and harsh private administration, the monopoly could be made to produce greater and greater profits, most of which would go into their own pockets. In fact, they managed to make a great deal of money, so much so that in a short while Salamanca and Buschenthal were probably among the five or six wealthiest men in Spain.

The Congress of 1841 was witness to another scandalous contract, (dealing with the administration of the coast guard and the customs houses), but in this case decided to do something about it. A Congressional committee presented a motion to censure and abolish the contract arranged with a civilian by the name of Miguel Ors for the management of the southern coast guard. (The coast guard was chiefly dedicated to the elimination of smuggling.) The deputy Proyet from the province of Alicante explained the circumstances of this contract. In 1838, a naval pilot by the name of Miguel Ors submitted an offer to the provinces of Valencia, Castellón, Alicante and Murcia for the management and administration of the local coast guard, which was accepted. In July of 1839 the contract was extended to include the whole of the southern Mediterranean coast up to Portugal³². This meant that, henceforth, Miguel Ors, a civilian, had complete control over a force of some 71 war ships and 3,000 armed men, (this constituted the southern coast guard of the time). The contract was approved by a group of unscrupulous deputies from various southern provinces. The formal agreement was that Ors would receive 30% of the value of all increases on customs duties and on any increase in the amount of tobacco legally entered into the country. Miguel Ors not only obtained very substantial earnings, he was also able to make large sums of money in other ways: for instance, by expropriating contraband ships, or by getting payoffs from wealthy smugglers whom he would allow to ply their illegal trade. Deputy Proyet deemed this conduct likely, given the fact that Ors originally came from a seaport almost exclusively dedicated to smuggling³³.

Other deputies also spoke angrily against this amazing contract. Joaquín María López declared that the Congress had a duty to rescind the contract in order to help eliminate "that portion of vampires that feed on the blood of the corpse which is our poor nation". Another deputy by the name of Guibert also argued for the termination of civilian control over the coast guard. He stressed the urgency of eliminating smuggling,

³¹ For biographical information on Salamanca see F. HERNÁNDEZ GIRBAL, *José Salamanca* (Madrid, 1963).

³² *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841, pp. 1507-1512.

³³ *Ibid.*

staffing, that the government should focus its attention not only on the small smugglers with a boat or two, but also on the big fish. He declared :

“There are (smugglers) of high category who live in Madrid and in the provincial capitals... Many of these great capitalists employ up to a million or two million 'reales' (in their contraband operations)...”³⁴.

The Congress proceeded to approve a vote of censure, although not unanimously. There were 68 votes in favor, and 51 against. Later a law was approved to put the coast guard permanently in the hands of the Navy.

One of the last bills discussed by the Congress was that of the sale of the Church properties³⁵. The previous year (1840), when the Moderates had been in power, the legislatures had approved a law temporarily suspending these sales. The bill of suspension had been opposed by the radical Progressives, but conservative members of the same party like Sancho, Cortina, González (named Minister of Foreign Affairs by Espartero in 1841), and Surrá, (also Minister in 1841), had voted for this reactionary law. Now, only a year later, they did a complete about-face and proposed not only that the sale of Church properties should continue, but also that they should be expanded. The Finance Minister Surrá proposed that in addition to the properties of the monastic orders, all properties of the cathedrals and the parish clergy, (excepting the Church buildings, religious garments, etc.), should be sold by the State.

The proposed law stipulated, however, that the sales would proceed in the same manner as before, thereby guaranteeing that only the speculators, wealthy merchants and industrialists, and aristocrats would buy up the majority of the properties. There was no provision in the law which provided for some form of aid or credit for the poor or landless peasants to acquire even small plots of land. Several deputies in the Congress defended the class of poor peasants and proposed several possible solutions. The deputy Sánchez de la Fuente suggested that one way of arriving at a more equitable distribution of the land would be to put the sale of the Church properties in the hands of the local municipal governments in order, as he said, “that they (the sales) should not continue to be controlled by the capitalists and those individuals who utilise all types of manipulations so as to assure that their personal interests win over those of the common people”. He added :

“I wish, gentlemen, that the sale of the Church properties not become the exclusive patrimony of a few hundred individuals, as has been the case up to now with the sale of the monastic properties”³⁶.

Another deputy, Muñoz Bueno, who expressed forthright republican views, suggested that the former Church lands should be given to the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1683.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1701, appendix to no. 81, which includes the text of the proposed law.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2617.

peasants in the form of lifelong leases, paying the government only a modest annual fee. Muñoz Bueno stated that the great land reform carried out during the French Revolution demonstrated that the equitable distribution of agricultural properties also stimulated other forms of economic activity, namely commerce and industry. But in Spain, he said, the land reform was being carried out solely in the interests of a moneyed elite. The acquisition of Church properties had become the most profitable business in the country. He asked:

“Does anyone know of another speculative business which offers such certain profits? Clearly not; as it is equally obvious that since it is so lucrative the great capitalists use their fortunes for this type of business (buying Church lands), making it all but impossible for the poor to obtain any farms”³⁷.

Muñoz Bueno argued that the Progressives still had powerful enemies, chiefly the clergy and the aristocracy. The best way of combatting these forces and of guaranteeing the continuity of the Constitution of 1837 was to obtain the support of the peasants. The creation of an extensive class of peasant proprietors would mean an increase of votes for the Progressives because the peasants would no longer be under the influence of the great landowners, as they were now in 1841. He added that if the Progressives leaders did not consolidate the revolution through the establishment of an authentic land reform, the reactionary forces, the clergy and the aristocracy would eventually take their revenge and the peasantry would remain apathetic, they would not defend the Progressives.

But most of the leading figures of the Progressive Party were not disposed to support an egalitarian land reform. Many of them, like Juan Alvarez Mendizábal, had bought large amounts of land at cheap prices. As Muñoz Bueno had said, this was too good a business to spoil by letting the peasants have a major share of it. The Congress approved the law without modifications. The sales increased but the number of new buyers did not. The rich were getting richer, and the poor stayed poor.

THE RIGHT WING CONSPIRACY OF OCTOBER 1841:

After the Congress closed in August, 1841, insistent rumors began to circulate of an imminent reactionary coup d'etat. The information provided by Espartero's informers at Paris and by the police of Madrid and the provinces suggested that a well-planned right wing conspiracy was under way, with the backing of both the French King Louis Phillipe and the Vatican³⁸. The headquarters of the opposition to Espartero was centered at Paris, surrounding the self-exiled former Queen-Regent, María Cristina. Her chief counsellors were Francisco de Cea Bermúdez and his brother

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2580-2581.

³⁸ See introduction to JUANA VEGA DE MINA, *Memorias de la Condesa de Espoz y Mina*, ed. by J. Pérez de Guzmán (Madrid, 1910), pp. LII-LIV.

the Count of Colombi, both of whom were known to be sympathisers of the Carlist cause and to have good relations with the French royal family and with the Vatican. They urged María Cristina to go to Rome to seek an absolution from the Pope. The papal blessing would provide critical support for her recent decision to seek the overthrow of Espartero. When María Cristina returned from Rome, the French royal family went to visit her and invited her to dine at the royal palace that evening. From that day onwards she dined regularly with King Louis Phillipe. She bought a sizeable palace in Paris for nearly 3 million "reales", and set up a kind of small "court in exile"³⁹. The friendship between the French monarch and María Cristina derived in large measure from their mutual antipathy towards Espartero. Louis Phillipe disliked the evident predominance of British influence and interests in the peninsula since 1840, and in addition, he wanted an ally on the Spanish Throne to help protect French expansion in the Mediterranean sea and to northern Africa, (namely the conquest of Algeria)⁴⁰. He was therefore happy to collaborate with and encourage the Spanish right wing plots. In April of 1841, the Count of Colombi introduced the King to those Spanish generals in exile in Paris who supported María Cristina.

From this moment the conspiracy against Espartero began to gather speed. The French monarch urged María Cristina to form an alliance of Moderates and Carlists. On August 1, 1841, General Ramón Narváez left Paris for Marseilles with the intention of reaching Barcelona and Valencia. He took with him large sums of money to distribute among the Catalan Carlists, who he expected would join the rebellion⁴¹. Meanwhile, Espartero's agent at Paris reported that the conspirators there had established contacts with a right wing junta in Madrid which planned to organize the rebellion of the Royal Guards. Simultaneously revolts were to break out in the Basque provinces, led by Moderate and Carlist officers. One of the right wing leaders at Paris, Zea Bermúdez was reported to meet regularly with the French Prime Minister Guizot, who agreed to pressure the Spanish Moderate and Carlist exiles in France to join the insurrection. Among the exiles, (who received small pensions from the French government), were 72 former Ministers and high functionaries, 4 archbishops and bishops, 573 priests and monks, 284 former public employees, 67 Army generals, 915 superior Army officers, and 4,172 subaltern officers⁴². Most of the lower-ranking officers were former Carlists who had crossed the Pyrenees into France in 1839 or 1840.

Inside Spain, itself, there were many members both of the Church and of the Army who were also willing to join the conspiracy. The clergy was incensed with the suppression and sale of more and more convents and with the expulsion of the Papal representative from Spain. Among the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. LVIII.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* It should also be observed that the French government was interested in controlling Spain because it was the chief foreign market for its cotton manufactures as well as other exports.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, LIX.

⁴² *Ibid.*, LVII.

Army officers there were various reasons for discontent. The North American ambassador at Madrid wrote in late August of 1841:

“But the most dangerous agent... alienated from the Government consists of the great number of military officers suddenly thrown out of active employment. The Queen’s bodyguard, five hundred strong, composed chiefly of young nobles all holding the rank of officer, has been entirely disbanded. Although they are kept in pay to enter the ranks of the army when vacancies may occur, they know too well- the difference between regimental duty and that of mounting guard at the palace chamber doors to be pleased with the change in their destiny... a great many other officers, though likewise kept on the payroll are detached and discontented. It is estimated that there are now in Madrid between 2 and 3 thousand of these men holding rank and wearing the uniform of officers in the army... Their devotion, even to their leader, the Regent, is now a matter of doubt...”⁴³.

The right-wing rebellion broke out in early October in Pamplona, Vitoria, and Madrid, although few regiments elsewhere followed their example. In Madrid, the Generals Diego de León and Concha, (brother-in-law of Espartero and formerly his friend), led a detachment of Royal Guards to seize the Royal Palace and the girl-Queen Isabel, but failed. On the following day, Espartero rallied the Army behind him and the insurrections were soon crushed. General Diego de León was captured, tried and executed.

BARCELONA RADICALISM

As soon as the news spread of the right wing rebellions, juntas or Commissions of Public Vigilance and Security were spontaneously formed in various provinces and cities to defend the Progressive government. Arms were widely distributed to the National Militia, which was put on the alert. Once the insurrection was defeated, however, Espartero ordered the juntas to disband. But the Barcelona junta refused to do so, and demanded with increasing insistence that the military fortress of Barcelona (known as “la ciudadela”) should be torn down. A petition had been submitted to the Congress of 1841 on this account many months before, which was never acted upon. Now the Catalans repeated their demand, and began to tear the fortress down stone by stone. When Espartero called upon the military authorities to put down the protestors, the Barcelona junta responded with the cry of “Demolition or Death!”⁴⁴.

A smoldering resentment against the Madrid government had been growing in Barcelona for about a year. It was centered chiefly in two

⁴³ *National Archives* (Wash. D.C.), Dept. of State, “dispatches from the U.S. Ministers to Spain”, September 1840-August 1842, Microcopy 31, roll 33, letter from R. Vail, dated August 23, 1841.

⁴⁴ See JAIME CARRERA PUJAL, *Historia política de Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, vol. III, and reports by the American ambassador in the fall of 1841, as referred in footnote 43.

groups: the republicans, led by Abdón Terradas, and the associations of textile weavers of Barcelona. Already in 1840, an Association of Textile Workers had been formed in the Catalan industrial capital. The pressures of the workers eventually obliged representatives of the factory-owners to set up bi-partisan negotiating committees to discuss salaries and working conditions. There were two closely related workers' associations, the Union of Weavers and the Mutual Association of Weavers of Barcelona⁴⁵. In early January of 1841, Espartero had ordered the dissolution of these associations, but the social situation was too tense in Catalonia to carry out the decree. Furthermore most of the National Militia was composed of weavers and spinners⁴⁶. Meanwhile, the republicans, led by Abdón Terradas, moved closer and closer to the textile workers⁴⁷. Terradas published impassioned pamphlets and broadsheets urging the union of the workers and republicans. These popular groups were the main force behind the demands for the demolition of the military fortress.

In mid, November, 1841, Espartero ordered General Van Halen to take possession of the city and the citadel. He did so without facing significant armed resistance. The Progressive newspaper of Barcelona, *El Constitucional*, urged the textile workers not to vote for the republican candidates in the upcoming municipal elections, and they agreed⁴⁸. The Madrid Cabinet, however, once again ordered the dissolution of the workers' associations, although the local municipal government tried to defend them. The net effect of these events was to intensify the already considerable Catalan resentment against the arbitrary measures of the Madrid government. Although Espartero had successfully crushed the right-wing conspiracy of October, 1841, he had not been able to quench the radicalism of Barcelona. The social tensions in Catalonia had become a permanent thorn in his side, and they would eventually be one of the causes of his downfall.

THE GROWTH OF REPUBLICANISM

There were municipal elections across all of Spain in December of 1841. The new republican movement presented candidates in most of the large cities and in many towns. The Moderate Party, on the other hand, continued its policy of electoral abstention, with a few exceptions. So the real battle was between the Progressives and the republicans. The struggle was bitter, there were many violent incidents, and the government annulled some of the elections. The Espartero administration wholeheartedly supported those candidates who defined themselves as belonging to the party of "legal progress", that is, Progressives of the old school. But some radical Progressives abandoned their party and joined the republicans. The

⁴⁵ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, pp. 236-238.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ ANTONIO ELORZA, "Los primeros federales", in *Triunfo*, no. 545, March 10, 1973, pp. 29-35.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

success of the latter led to a decrease in the popular support of the Espartero government and led to a serious internal crisis in the Progressive Party.

The republicans did not constitute a centralised political party. They were still only a movement of radicals supported principally by the artisans of many Spanish cities and towns, as well as by a good number of small peasant proprietors. They did have two newspapers in Madrid, *El Regenerador* (1840-41) written by José Ordax AVECILLA, and *El Huracán*, edited by Patricio Olavarría; in Zaragoza they had the newspaper *El Centinela de Aragón*, published by Víctor Pruneda⁴⁹. A type of republican central committee ("Junta Central") was set up in Madrid in 1841, composed of at least the following individuals: Juan Martínez Villergas, Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, José Espronceda, Patricio Olavarría, Ordax AVECILLA, the Field Marshall Pedro Méndez Vigo, and the sarcastic bibliophile Bartolomé José Gallardo⁵⁰. The political program of this "Junta Central" was the suppression of the throne, the reduction of the size of the budget and of the Army, a plan for the establishment of universal primary education, and the distribution of the nationalized Church lands among the agricultural proletariat. The two republican deputies of 1841, Manuel García Uzal and Pedro Méndez Vigo, had fought for this program in the Congress, although obviously without much success. It was not the Progressive parliamentarians or the propertied classes that would pay attention to the republicans, but rather the artisans and small peasant proprietors throughout much of Spain.

The republicans managed to win the municipal elections in several provincial capitals, such as Córdoba and Valencia. In Córdoba the four new mayors were by profession: 1 lawyer, 1 merchant, and 2 peasant proprietors (probably fairly large proprietors); the eight new aldermen were: 1 silversmith, 1 master tailor, 1 public employee, 1 notary, 1 retired captain, 1 land surveyor, and 2 peasant proprietors⁵¹. In Valencia the struggle between republicans and Progressives arose from an internal split in the Progressive Party. The newspaper *El Correo Nacional* published an article on December 20, 1841, explaining the local electoral battle:

"You will recall that the two groups into which the Progressive Party of the city is divided have the following names: 'la barraca', applied to those who are the most exaggerated (radicals), and 'el mortero' (the mortar), the name being due to the profession of two of its leaders who are pharmacists. The first had its electoral meetings in the 'casa misericordia' (charity centre), and the latter in the amphitheatre of the university... The latter meeting (of 'el mortero') was presided by the Count of Soto-Ameno and the deputy to Congress Mascarós. The nomination of candidates was discussed and party delegates were appointed to take charge of congregating the electors in each parish, urging them to vote for the designated candidates..."⁵².

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ NARCISO ALONSO CORTÉS, *Juan Martínez Villergas* (Valladolid, 1913), p. 27.

⁵¹ *El Correo Nacional*, December 19, 1841.

⁵² *El Correo Nacional*, December 20, 1841.

But the Progressive group led by Mascarós lost the municipal election. The republicans (and radical Progressives) celebrated their victory with a banquet in a large rented hall. After the victory toasts, one of the leaders, Vicente Boix, made an impassioned speech criticizing the Espartero government. This incident was considered seditious by the political governor of the province who subsequently ordered a systematic persecution of the republicans, of their publications, and associations⁵³. The republicans, nonetheless, retained control of the municipal government, which helped them to defend themselves.

In the city of Alicante, to the South of Valencia, the battle between the more conservative and the more radical Progressives was violent. The radical Progressives and republicans had controlled the local municipal government since Desember of 1840, but now the merchant community of the city decided to outvote and oust the radical mayors and aldermen. A member of the conservative Progressive group described the political situation in a letter published in *El Correo Nacional*:

"The instigators of the riots of last Sunday continue their activities... The 'barraca', which is the club of 'carbonarios' or republicans, is the promoter of all the evildoing, and since all the smugglers are affiliated to it, or so it is said... it can dispose of considerable forces.

Here, those of us who are called of the party of commerce ('del partido del comercio'), because we are more closely identified with the present situation (Espartero government), here we cannot take a single step, nor even go out into the streets unless we go armed with pistols and knives"⁵⁴.

The author of this letter added that the municipal electoral law had to be changed in order to guarantee the tranquility and security of the merchants and proprietors of Alicante. The existing democratic law encouraged anarchy and sedition. But the Madrid government had avoided dealing with a reform of the municipal law. The same writer added:

"In this city it is sufficient that some of the gangsters we have alluded to should ask for something, than no sooner it is done, no matter how just or unjust it may be"⁵⁵.

Both the merchant group of the party of "legal progress" and the republicans of Alicante struggled furiously to win control of the municipality. A report published in the *Eco del Comercio* described the details of the electoral battle:

"In the first days of this month (December 1841) the most influential and wealthy men of the city began to gather together in order to finish with the present municipal counsellors (which were republicans and radicals)... 89 persons signed a program asking for the opening of a public suscription to carry out public works in which the working classes could be employed...

On December 7, another contrary program was published, signed by

⁵³ VICENTE BOIX, *Historia de... Valencia*, vol. III, pp. 480-92.

⁵⁴ *El Correo Nacional*, December 20, 1841.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

79 individuals (republicans)... The bitterness between the two parties increased and yesterday at twelve noon, the hour of the elections, there was a large turn-out of both groups...

In one of the parishes the party of commerce (merchants) won the right to preside the electoral table, and as a result their opponents became furious... and they attacked the deputy Proyet with knives..."⁵⁶.

Deputy Proyet survived the stabbing incident. Subsequently the local Army garrison patrolled the streets of the city and arrested some of the republicans. A few days later the merchant party of "legal progress" won the municipal elections.

In Seville and Barcelona the elections were so bitter that the Government suspended or annulled them. In the province of Cáceres the republicans campaigned hard, but won in only two or three towns. In the city of Badajoz the party of "legal progress" won; likewise in Burgos, where a newspaper reported that "there is no republican party here". In Bilbao, on the other hand, an electoral manifesto was published and circulated urging the artesans to vote against the conservative Progressives and against the Moderate aristocrats⁵⁷. It stressed the fact the wealthy classes wished to rid themselves of the taxes imposed upon them by the local (radical) municipal government.

Throughout the nation the republicans demonstrated considerable strength. This radical political movement menaced both the popular basis and the unity of the Progressive Party because the control of the municipal governments was so important. The administrative powers of the city councils were great: they had in their hands the collection of all taxes, the management of most matters of civil and criminal jurisdiction, of the "quintas" or levies of soldiers for the Army, and of the enrollment of the National Militia. This last was perhaps the most important function of the town government, for the political color of the Militia influenced local, provincial, and national politics. Most of the inhabitants of every Spanish town were therefore extremely interested in the type of local government they might have. A given mayor might charge his relatives and friends less taxes, or might help their sons avoid the military draft. More than that, a radical town council could eliminate some of the hated consumers' taxes, ("consumos", "derechos de puertas"), or they could impose taxes on the wealthy. This had occurred in Barcelona in October of 1841, when the local Junta levied heavy taxes from the rich industrialists and proprietors, most of whom happened to be Moderates⁵⁸; (one of the wealthiest Catalans, Juan Guell, was urged to pay a tax of no less than one million "reales"). There were abundant reasons, therefore, for the artisans to support republican candidates who promised to reduce taxes on the working classes and increase those on the rich.

Those Progressives who were wealthy merchants or property owners,

⁵⁶ *Eco del Comercio*, December 19, 1841.

⁵⁷ *Eco del Comercio*, December 15, 1841.

⁵⁸ See speech by PEDRO MATA in *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841-1842, Feb. 1842, p. 755.

as well as the Moderates, clearly disliked and feared this popular radical movement. The February issue (1842) of the Moderate *Revista de Madrid* accused the Barcelona Junta and the republican municipal governments of tyranny over the rich, precisely for these reasons. In addition, the propertied classes felt increasingly threatened by the populist National Militia and by the universal suffrage in the town elections. A well-informed foreign observer summed up the feelings of the Spanish wealthy classes:

"The working of universal suffrage is not ill illustrated in these municipal elections. Every one who has a pot to boil has a vote. When the election is contested, it is force which usually decides. The most audacious and most disorderly, surround the approaches to the urn...; fellows armed with bludgeons and seven knives, reckless smugglers, sometimes more reckless bandits, give the law to the community in too many of these elections, frightening away the laborious and peaceful, and inspiring with horror the respectable citizens"⁵⁹.

The same writer sarcastically described the mayor of one Andalusian village he visited in 1843.

"I once had occasion to see the first Alcalde of a remote Andalusian village engaged in his official duties. The mayor and chief Magistrate of the municipality wore no shirt, an article which seriously formed no part of his ordinary costume; his feet were encased in heavy brogues, which the peasantry commonly wear in winter, of leather, ill-tanned and never cleaned—the mud not even scraped off... His hands were rougher and blacker even than his face, and I ascertained that he could not write. His Escribano, or notary, supplied this deficiency... Both seated at a tremulous table, smoked paper cigars without intermission, while the witnesses gave their evidence, and about a dozen bare-legged peasants, with guns, represented the National Militia"⁶⁰.

The popular character of many Spanish town councils in the years 1841-43 increasingly alienated the upper classes from the Espartero government. Many well-to-do Progressives left their party and joined the Moderate opposition. This process was accentuated by severe economic differences between sectors of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.

FREE TRADE VERSUS PROTECTION

The second legislative session under the Regency of Espartero began in the last weeks of December, 1841, and ended in July, 1842. The most important question discussed in the Congress of 1842 was the issue of

⁵⁹ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. II, pp. 264-265.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

⁶¹ The whole issue of free trade versus protection and the problem of contraband has not been paid practically any attention by historians of modern Spain. There are a number of books published around 1840 by such authors as Pío Pita Pizarro and Manuel Marliani which cast some light on the subject.

free trade versus protection in Spanish commerce⁶¹. Essentially this was a battle between Andalusians and Catalans. There were powerful Andalusian commercial interests (tied to British capital and markets) that pressured for complete freedom of trade in all articles and with all nations. On the other hand, there were equally powerful Catalan industrial interests which opposed free trade and supported the protection of national industry by the application of a high tariff policy. According to the Catalan deputies, if free trade were established the national textile industry would soon be ruined. According to the Andalusian representatives, if protection were continued Spanish agriculture and commerce would stagnate. The outcome of these parliamentary discussions and of the government's economic policies of 1841-43 did not, however, turn out to be particularly favorable to either group. There was, in a sense, a stalemate between two powerful and contradictory economic interests.

The discussion of the question of free trade versus protection had actually already begun in the Congress of 1841. It was at that time that the legislature discussed and approved the new tariff of 1841. This tariff had been elaborated by a Board to revise import duties, which, it may be recalled, was composed of important Progressives, Moderates, representatives of Catalan industry, academic economists, and others. The Board recommended that the tariff duties on most products imported from foreign nations be reduced, but it urged there should be a prohibition of the import of all cotton textiles, of forged iron, wheat, and wool. These measures would protect both the developing Catalan textile industry against cheap British and French products, and it would protect the expanding (but still expensive) wheat production of Castille against the cheap Russian and Italian cereals⁶². On the other hand, the tariff allowed most other kinds of manufactured and primary products into Spain with a rather small duty.

There had been a fierce debate in the Congress of 1841 to decide whether the new tariff should be approved or not. Although many deputies participated in the discussions, the two chief opponents were Deputy Gil Sanz defending the protection of Catalan industry, and Deputy Sánchez Silva advocating free trade and the promotion of Andalusian agricultural exports. Sánchez Silva had proposed a general amendment to the tariff, urging that a policy of free trade be established. Gil Sanz attacked this proposal, stating sarcastically that Sánchez' Silva's reasoning appeared to be "more that of an advocate of Great Britain than that of a Spanish legislator". Gil Sanz said that free trade was a policy encouraged by Great Britain in order to conquer foreign markets for its own expanding industry. To accept free trade would be to become an economic colony of Great Britain, and it would oblige Spain to remain predominantly an

⁶² See the comments of J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, pp. 157-59.

agricultural nation, which exchanged its primary products for foreign manufactured goods. He asked:

"Would we be insane to sell our raw silk only to buy the silk textiles of Lyon, to sell our wool only to buy English and French woolen goods, and thereby condemn to death the cotton factories of Catalonia, the silk factories of Valencia, Seville and Murcia, the leather establishments of Galicia and Salamanca?"⁶³

Gil Sanz declared that the Catalan textile industry had expanded by more than 50% in the last few years, in spite of the civil war. But the industry was still in its infancy; a developing industry needed great protection in order that it not be crushed by foreign competitors. He added that to speak of national independence appeared to be a bitter irony if Spaniards were obliged to go to foreign lands to obtain their manufactured products, their science, their fashions, their literature, and their art.

Sánchez Silva replied that Gil Sanz' reasoning was offensive and incorrect. Silva stated that the capital value of the Catalan industry was much smaller than was normally assumed, that Catalonia imported much raw cotton and coal, creating a negative balance of payments for the nation, and that, therefore, the Catalan textile industry was a drain on the nation rather than a positive contribution⁶⁴. On the other hand, Silva declared that the Jerez wine and sheery industry was much more valuable than the textile industry, both in capital-value and in amount of exports. (It should be noted that Sánchez Silva was, himself, a representative of the Jerez sherry interests, whose almost exclusive foreign market was Great Britain)⁶⁵. Other free-trade deputies supported Silva. Among them were Juan Alvarez Mendizábal, (a representative of Cádiz mercantile interests and closely tied to British financial circles), and Joaquín María López (representative of the Alicante merchants). But the majority of the Congress opposed complete free trade; consequently they approved the tariff proposed by the government-appointed Board.

The next year, in the Congress of 1842, the free traders again suggested that the tariff be revised. Sánchez Silva repeated the same arguments he had used before, declaring that Spain was destined to be a predominantly agricultural nation and that industry should not be protected⁶⁶. He was opposed by the two Catalan deputies, Joaquín Doménech and Pedro Mata, who argued that not only Catalan textiles, but also Castillian cereal interests would be damaged by free trade⁶⁷. Spanish wheat production had increased rapidly since 1820 because of an increase of the land cultivated and because of a strict policy that prohibited the import of cheap foreign grains. The Congress once again rejected the free traders' proposals.

⁶³ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841, June 12, 1841, p. 1296.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1300.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1310. Deputy Jaumar says that Sánchez Silva is a representative of the sherry interests.

⁶⁶ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841-42, no. 42, pp. 1039-1044, February 16, 1842.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* April 6, 1842, pp. 2250-2251.

In spite of the (selective) protection guaranteed by the tariff of 1841, the effects of this measure were not altogether favorable to Spanish industry. The contraband trade in foreign textiles and tobacco continued and increased. Furthermore the legal introduction of silk products (mainly from France) and of linens (mainly from Great Britain) soared so rapidly that many of the silk factories of Catalonia and Valencia were ruined, as well as many linen establishments in Galicia and other regions⁶⁸. But the government did not take any strict measures to stem the inflow of foreign goods, neither by establishing higher tariffs, nor by improving the coast guard and persecuting the smugglers. Espartero, himself, was known to be favorable to the freetraders, because of his close ties to British interests. The British ambassador in Madrid in 1841-43, Asthon, often dined with Espartero and pressed for the ratification of a special commercial treaty between Spain and Great Britain, that would increasingly favor the introduction of British manufactures⁶⁹. In this project he was aided by two chief Spanish spokesmen of free trade, Sánchez Silva and Manuel Marliani, Senator for the Balearic islands, (long important in British commerce in the Mediterranean). But Ambassador Asthon was not a shrewd negotiator and soon offended the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Antonio González. As a result the treaty was not signed.

The British government and commercial interests had long yearned to dominate Spanish politics and economics. Spain was a very important market for British textile products, and there were considerable British investments, particularly in southern Spain, in mining and commercial establishments. In 1837, the then British ambassador in Madrid, George Villiers, had written to the Secretary of the Foreign Office in London, Palmerston, that "he could 'Portugalise' Spain if he received sufficient support from home"⁷⁰. Ever since the Methuen Treaty of 1703, Portugal had been a virtual economic colony of Great Britain. This relationship had been accentuated by the Treaty of 1810. The Portuguese landed oligarchy exported their wines to England in exchange for English manufactured products. This relationship effectively impeded the development of local industry and of a truly independent political system in Portugal⁷¹. George Villiers proposed to do the same with Spain, principally through his alliance with Mendizábal, the Spanish free-traders, and several important generals. They would together monopolise Spanish political life, wreck the Catalan textile industry, and bring Spain firmly under the sphere of British influence, breaking most ties with France. This idea of Villiers

⁶⁸ "En Barcelona, de 60 fábricas sederas, sólo sobrevivieron 16 en 1843; en Reus funcionaban 600 telares, y llegaron a desaparecer todos...", JOSÉ LUIS COMELLAS, *Los Moderados en el Poder, 1844-54* (Madrid, 1970), p. 14, who derives his information from JOSÉ MARÍA FONTANA, *La lucha por la industrialización de España* (Madrid, 1953), a book which we were unfortunately not able to consult.

⁶⁹ J. SEGUNDO FLÓREZ, *Espartero...*, vol. IV, pp. 542-547.

⁷⁰ C. K. WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1831-1840*, vol. I, p. 424.

⁷¹ See the excellent study, S. SIDERI, *Trade and Power: Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations* (Rotterdam U. Press, 1970).

was impracticable, and he failed to extend British influence as far as he would have liked.

Villiers failed partially, but the English merchants, among whom were the Chambers of Commerce of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, and the powerful Liverpool Mediterranean and Levant Association⁷², wished to continue his aggressive policies. These mercantile groups exported large quantities of cotton textiles and linen goods to Spain, mostly by smuggling them into the peninsula. The main smuggling depot was Gibraltar, but much contraband also passed through the Portuguese border, as well as from Italian or Sardinian ports to the Spanish Mediterranean coast. Because of the great quantity of contraband, the statistics on British exports in this period are misleading. In 1842, the official statistics show that only 2,000 pounds sterling of cotton manufactures had been exported to Spain. But in the same year over 600,000 pounds sterling had been exported to Gibraltar, and over 560,000 to Portugal⁷³. All the Gibraltar exports were later smuggled into Spain, as well as at least 50% of the exports to Portugal. In addition, more cotton goods were introduced into Spain from Italian ports, and through the northern coast into Galicia and the Basque country. Thus, Spain received at least one million pounds sterling in British cotton manufactures in 1842, (100 million "reales"). In 1832 Spain was the fourth biggest foreign market for British cotton goods. By 1842 it ranked far behind the rapidly expanding markets of the colonial or neo-colonial British empire, India, Turkey, Brazil, but it still was important. Actually the *total* British exports to Spain increased from the early 1830's through the late 1840's. Apart from cotton goods, Great Britain exported woolen and linen goods, sugar and spices, tobacco (smuggled through Gibraltar) and some machinery to Spain. By 1846-48, Spain was the fourth-largest *European* trading partner of Great Britain, after Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. In these terms, British foreign policy was successful in increasing its influence over the Spanish economy.

Spain exported mainly primary products to Great Britain in exchange for manufactured goods. The chief Spanish exports were wine, wool, wheat, quicksilver, and fruits of all kinds. Spanish wine exports to England in 1830-50 were approximately worth an average of 370,000 pounds sterling (37 million "reales")⁷⁴. These wines were principally Jerez sheries and wines. Most of the fruit exported to England was from the Mediterranean coast, chiefly from Málaga. There were numerous English commercial houses established in all of the Mediterranean ports, and there were English mining companies established in southern Spain, particularly in the Sierra de Almagrera. The Mediterranean ports, Cádiz, Málaga, Cartagena, Alicante, Valencia, were also the main channels for the British contraband goods from Gibraltar. The smugglers were well organized and,

⁷² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1837, vol. 39, p. 429.

⁷³ For all statistics on trade between 1830 and 1844 see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1831-32, vol. XXXIV, p. 307, and 1844, vol. 47, Accounts and Papers 16, pp. 75-123.

⁷⁴ S. SIDERI, *Trade and Power...*, p. 293, which includes statistics of Portuguese and Spanish wine exports.

as often as not, introduced their illegal goods through the customs houses by paying bribes to the functionaries. A contemporary English observer described the conditions which allowed such a great deal of smuggling. He wrote:

“Spain is of all European countries the most helplessly exposed to contrabandist operations. With an ill-paid army, and with revenue officers directly exposed to temptation by inadequate salaries, she has 500 miles of Portuguese frontier and near 300 of Pyrenean; and with a fleet crumbled into ruins, and no longer of the slightest efficacy, she has 400 miles of Cantabrian and 700 of Mediterranean coast. Four thousand smugglers are constantly engaged in demolishing her absurd fiscal laws and some 1,600,000 pounds weight of cotton goods alone are every year illicitly imported”⁷⁵.

But Great Britain was not the only country that inundated Spain with contraband textiles. France also exported huge quantities of silk, woolen, and cotton products to Spain, most of them smuggled through the Pyrenees. In 1831 the contraband cotton goods of French origin were valued at 50 million “reales”, in 1833 at 57 millions, and in 1839 at 93 millions. Large quantities of expensive silks from Lyon and woolen goods were also smuggled in across the mountainous border. In 1842 the French government published the statistics of all textile exports to Spain (the vast majority of which were contraband) reaching a total of 33 million francs (or 120 million “reales”)⁷⁶.

Spain was the single largest foreign market for French cotton manufactures in the 1830's and 1840's: 30% of French cotton textile exports went there⁷⁷. The Spanish markets were, therefore, even more important to the French industrialists and merchants than to the British. The economic rivalry was intense and translated itself into a furious political rivalry, in which the British tended to support the Progressives, while the French aided the Moderates. During the Regency of Espartero, the British clearly had a political advantage, although the economic statistics indicate that the French were, nevertheless, able to profit enormously from the same situation. Spain continued (as it had in the 18th century and during the War of 1808-14 and the monarchy of Ferdinand VII) to be a rich prize, over which the two major European powers fought tooth and nail. This foreign economic competition retarded Spanish industrial development, and the political and military pressures of the greater powers limited Spanish political independence.

THE DIVISION OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY

On March 11, 1842, Robert Peel, the British Prime Minister, delivered a speech in the House of Commons in which he stated that great progress

⁷⁵ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. I, p. 276.

⁷⁶ For statistics see RAMÓN DE LA SAGRA, *Revista de Intereses Materiales y Morales* (Madrid, 1844), vol. 1, pp. 23-34. R. de la Sagra takes his information from the official French sources.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

had been made in the commercial negotiations between the British and Spanish governments. This was a direct reference to the proposed commercial treaty which Espartero and Minister González were discussing with Ambassador Asthon. Peel's speech was reproduced in much of the Spanish press, and caused a great outburst of indignation, particularly in Catalonia. The news also provoked a bitter battle in the Congress of 1842 between the supporters of Espartero and his opponents. The opposition was composed of two parliamentary factions, one led by Joaquín María López, and the other by Manuel Cortina. They joined together in an effort to topple the González Cabinet. The parliamentary battle that followed marked the decisive division of the Progressive party.

The parliamentary opposition accused González of selling the nation out to British interests, and they accused the Finance Minister, Surrá y Rull, of corruption. Manuel Cortina declared that Surrá had arranged a total of 65 secret money-contracts with Madrid financiers during his term in office⁷⁸. Sharp words were also directed against a huge (160 million "reales") contract between the government and the financier José Salamanca, supposedly signed by Espartero, himself. On May 28 several deputies presented a motion to censure González and the other Ministers. Joaquín María López blasted a bitter speech against the Cabinet. The supporters of Espartero and González answered that these accusations were intended only to divide the Progressive party and the popular cause. The vote on the motion to censure was extremely close: 85 deputies voted in favor, 78 against⁷⁹. Among those who voted for censure were Pedro Mata, Joaquín María López, Fermín Caballero, Salustiano Olózaga, and Manuel Cortina. Among those opposed were Agustín Argüelles, Evaristo San Miguel, Juan Alvarez Mendizábal, Alvaro Gómez Becerra, and Francisco Luján. The top leaders of the Progressive party were thus firmly divided; this would have widespread repercussions throughout the nation.

Espartero named Ramón Rodil to head the new Cabinet. Rodil was an old comrade in arms of Espartero and had been chief of the Army of the North in 1841-42. He met with several friendly political leaders, Argüelles, Calatrava, Ferrer, Gómez Becerra and Quintana to try to solve the government crisis. These individuals attempted to establish a dialogue with the leaders of the dissident Progressives, Joaquín María López and Manuel Cortina, but they failed. Rodil then selected Calatrava, Dionisio Capaz, and Miguel A. Zumalacárregui to assume the other Cabinet posts. Surprisingly, the parliamentary opposition did not attack the new Ministers; there was a cautious truce during the rest of the legislative session.

But outside the Congress there were dramatic battles, specially in the newspaper press. The Moderate press, led by the newspapers *El Heraldo* and *El Sol*, attacked Rodil, as did the republican organs, *El Peninsular* and *La Guindilla*. The principal pro-Espartero newspapers of Madrid, owned by the government, were *El Espectador* and *La Iberia*. Until September

⁷⁸ *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841-42, May 28, 1842, p. 3511.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3548-49, includes a list of deputies for and against.

of 1842 the traditional organ of the Progressive party, *El Eco del Comercio*, took an equivocal position vis. a vis. the Regent. But in the last days of August, 1842, a notice appeared informing the subscribers that the newspaper had been sold to new owners⁸⁰. The new proprietors launched a vigorous attack against Rodil and soon organized a formal coalition of newspapers opposed to the government. Who had bought the *Eco del Comercio* and why is still not altogether clear. The *Eco* had been from its start in 1834 the voice of the radical wing of the Progressives, led by Fermín Caballero and Joaquín María López. By selling the *Eco* in 1842 they effectively lost their main national political organ of expression. It appears that the new owners of the newspaper were a powerful group of interests linked to the Infante Francisco, brother-in-law to the former Queen-Regent, María Cristina. Their principal political program was that Isabel II, daughter of María Cristina, should be declared of age and promptly crowned Queen of Spain; immediately thereafter, she should marry a son of the Infante Francisco, thus satisfactorily resolving the Spanish political crisis. Don Francisco was himself a well-known mason and friend of many Progressives. The history of this new political group who supported Don Francisco is one of the most peculiar stories of 19th century Spanish history, and many of its details are still unknown.

At any rate, the *Eco del Comercio*, the Moderate press, the republican press, and several other newspapers and magazines officially formed a coalition against the Rodil Cabinet on November 1, 1842. The most important point of their manifesto stated that there should be no delay in the declaration of age and the coronation of Isabel II⁸¹. This was a direct threat to Espartero as Regent. During the fall of 1842 the polemics between the *Eco* and the pro-Espartero organs, *La Iberia* and *El Espectador*, reached an extreme degree of virulence.

THE REVOLUTION IN BARCELONA: NOVEMBER 1842

At the same time as the Progressive party was splintering into several factions, there were signs of increased popular unrest throughout the peninsula. The Moderate newspapers continuously called attention to these developments, seeing in them the prelude to a possible social revolution. In May of 1842, for instance, the *Revista de Madrid* reported with anguish that in Seville the (2,000) workers of the great tobacco factory had organized massive strikes. In Barcelona, republican songs were sung in the theaters, and cries of "death to the Regent and to the Ministry" were heard, upsetting the "respectable" citizens⁸². In June, in Madrid, the workers of all the printing presses and shops formed a union and went on strike, demanding higher salaries. The Moderate magazine urged the owners not

⁸⁰ *Eco del Comercio*, August 27, 1842.

⁸¹ *Eco del Comercio*, November 1, 1842.

⁸² *Revista de Madrid*, 3e serie, vol. III, pp. 58-60.

to concede the demands of the workers. In July, 1842, the *Revista de Madrid* wrote:

"The cities of the whole monarchy are dominated by the most low and vile classes...

The fields and roads are teeming with robbers and criminals... in spite of such a large Army and Militia...

The most subversive doctrines are spread everywhere without being persecuted..."⁸³.

There was indeed considerable popular agitation. During the year 1842 republican newspapers sprung up in various cities, of which we have already mentioned two in Madrid. There appeared in León, *El Leonés, guía de los pueblos*, in Cartagena *El Telégrafo*, in Málaga *La Emancipación*⁸⁴. There was also a great profusion of republican broadsheets, particularly in Catalonia. There, the revolutionary leader of Figueras, Abdón Terradas, wrote incendiary propaganda and popular revolutionary songs, urging the people to fight for the republic. His ideas and songs were spread in Barcelona by the newspaper *El Republicano*, edited by Juan Manuel Carsy, during the month of October, 1842⁸⁵. One of the most popular songs went more or less as follows:

"The bell rings
The cannon sounds
Flee yee tyrants
The People wish to be Masters
Amen, Amen
Republicans, Amen
To the victory, amen."

"The day has arrived
That the People desired
The court, the nobility
The proud and the rich
Fall with a single blow
Amen, Amen, etc."

The conduct of the military authorities of Catalonia aggravated the already insurrectionary spirit of the population. When General Zurbano began to draft peasants into the Army from the rural towns near Barcelona, there began to be outbreaks of sporadic violence. Rumors spread inside the city of Barcelona that Zurbano was coming to draft citizens at any moment, and that he shot those who refused⁸⁶. There were also rumors that the National Militia was to be disarmed. On November 13 there was a fight between some soldiers and civilians at one of the city gates. A large crowd gathered and soon the radical National Militia sounded the alarm, congregating en masse in the main square of Barcelona, the Plaza de San Jaime. The Captain General, Van Halen, ordered the arrest of several of the editors of *El Republicano* as revolutionary ring-

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁸⁴ ANTONIO ELORZA, "Los primeros federales", in *Triunfo*, no. 545, March 10, 1973.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* Also J. CARRERA PUJAL, *Historia política de Cataluña...*, vol. III.

⁸⁶ ANTONIO VAN HALEN, *Diario razonado de los acontecimientos que tuvieron lugar en Barcelona desde el 13 de noviembre al 22 de diciembre del año de 1842* (Madrid, 1843), p. 13.

leaders, and ordered Zurbano's troops to occupy the "Ramblas", the main avenue leading to the Plaza de San Jaime. But by that time many armed peasants had entered the city to support the rebellion. Furthermore the National Militia was well-equipped; according to Van Halen they had over 10,000 muskets, several cannon, and abundant munitions⁸⁷. They built barricades in all the key streets. On the 15th of November Van Halen ordered his troops to attack, but they were beaten back. The Militia fought on the barricades, and from the rooftops they poured a lethal fire on the Army troops, who suffered heavy losses; (one estimate says as many as 300 dead and wounded). Van Halen ordered a guarded retreat of his 2,100 infantry and 300 cavalry to the Fort of Ataranzas near the docks, and to the fortress of Montjuich overlooking the city.

Meanwhile a revolutionary Junta was formed by the rebels, led by the republican Juan Carsy. The Junta published a manifesto which maintained the following principles: union among all Catalans, the independence of Catalonia from the Madrid Cabinet until a just and virtuous new government were formed, and protection for Catalan industry⁸⁸. A series of unexpected events quickly followed this proclamation. The Junta attempted to get the support of a powerful group of proprietors and industrialists of Barcelona, among whom were Agustín Yáñez, José Xifré, Muntadas, Güell and others, but these refused to have anything to do with the republicans. Instead this latter group encouraged the conservative wealthy classes to topple the revolutionary Junta, which they did. They, then, began to negotiate with Van Halen, at the same time as they arrested Carsy and put him on a ship which took him into exile. Then, suddenly, the most radical sectors of the population revolted against the conservatives and set up a new revolutionary Junta, led by two artisans. The negotiations with Van Halen were called off; revolutionary groups paraded through the streets of Barcelona with black flags. Many wealthy citizens fled the city.

On the 20th of November, General Van Halen began a blockade of the city, which continued for eight days until the arrival of General Espartero from Madrid. Van Halen and Espartero met and discussed the situation. They demanded that the Junta disarm the Militia (which now had at least 14,000 weapons), or else they would commence to bombard the city. The Junta refused. On the morning of December 3, 1842, the cannons of the fortress of Montjuich began to pour their lethal fire down onto Barcelona. The cannon-fire continued for twelve solid hours; over 1,000 projectiles fell on the city; over 400 buildings were damaged or destroyed. At 10:30 p.m., that same evening, a representative group of citizens came to Van Halen to offer the surrender of the city. Van Halen marched into the city, disarmed the Militia, and jailed a large number of the rebels. He also imposed an extraordinary tax of 12 million "reales" upon the city as a punishment for the insurrection.

The Catalans submitted bitterly. The industrialists lamented the da-

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸⁸ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, pp. 377-381.

rages to their factories and homes. The workers suffered the worst of the military repression. The social classes would remain as polarised as ever, but their common opposition to the Espartero government only increased. The industrialists as a class now definitely supported the ambitions of the Moderate party to return to power. The majority of the workers and artisans no longer had confidence in the Progressive party; increasing numbers would become federal republicans. In the rest of Spain the newspaper press criticized Espartero for the bombardment of Barcelona. Progressive, Moderates, and republicans condemned the harsh methods used. This widespread condemnation of the Catalan rebellion was to serve as one of the major pretexts for the eventual overthrow of Espartero in the summer of 1843.

IX

The Downfall of Espartero

General Espartero returned from Barcelona to Madrid at the end of December. On his entrance into the capital on January 1, 1843, the Regent was not greeted by the customary enthusiastic crowds. This was a bad omen. Only the National Militia loyally welcomed him back. The coalition of the Madrid newspaper press greeted him with a unified protest against the proposed Anglo-Spanish commercial treaty, (which had been recently mentioned again in the English press). Stung by these attacks, Espartero reacted swiftly and closed the Congress, calling for new elections in March. The Regent had blundered. This act of closing the legislature encouraged many Progressives and Moderates to join in a combined opposition to the government. The electoral campaign was the ideal opportunity for the entire opposition to distribute propaganda and organize demonstrations against the authorities.

If Espartero had not closed the Congress he would have been faced by a severe political crisis, but at the least he would have been able to avoid the re-organization of the Moderate party. For it was during the two-month electoral campaign of January-March 1843 that the Moderates began to plan the overthrow of Espartero. On January 10 there was a meeting of the notables of the Moderate party to select the members of the committee which was to direct their electoral campaign. Among the leaders appointed were the Marqués de Casa Irujo, Francisco Istúriz, General F. Javier Aspiroz, Pedro Pidal, Alejandro Oliván, José García Carrasco, Antonio Ríos y Rosas and Luis Sartorius¹. These men intended to re-organize the Moderate party, to reestablish the local committees in all the provincial towns and cities, and to elect a bloc of Moderate deputies and senators to send to the Congress. The Moderate magazine *La Revista de Madrid* explained the position of the party. It declared:

"The Moderate party has decided to present itself and battle in the electoral arena, although not in order to seize power... but rather to be represented in the Congress... The monarchical-constitutional party will have its representatives in order that when the much desired day arrives (when Isabel II is named Queen)... the Crown will be able to select collaborators from amongst those parties which have contributed to its conservation"².

In a declaration published by the electoral committee in February, the Moderate leaders declared that they considered themselves conservatives,

¹ *Eco del Comercio*, January 10, 1843.

² *Revista de Madrid*, 3e serie, vol. IV, pp. 138-142.

but not reactionaries. They did not wish to reestablish feudalism or the power of the aristocracy. "The (feudal) relations have finished, the (feudal) privileges have been ended, and those who formerly possessed them have not protested. They retain only their honor and a clear conscience..."³. These pronouncements were intended to attract the less conservative voters to the party, by demonstrating that the great landowning interests accepted Liberalism and the parliamentary system. But at the same time the Moderates were indirectly affirming their ties to the traditional aristocracy.

The Progressives, on the other hand, were not united. There were two main groups, the pro-Espartero Progressives, and the Pure Progressives who were opposed to the government. Even within the "Pure Progressives" there were divisions among the groups led, respectively, by Joaquín María López and Manuel Cortina. These groups published different manifestos, electoral pronouncements, slates of candidates, etc.; there were so many declarations published in the press that it was not entirely clear who was who. In some provinces the Pure Progressives joined the Moderates in presenting a joint slate of candidates opposed to the administration. In other provinces they organized meetings with the pro-Espartero forces. The degree of political confusion is well-illustrated in a brief article which appeared in the *Eco del Comercio* describing the elections in the city of Toledo. There, the pro-Espartero and Pure Progressives met together to select a slate of candidates. The newspaper reported:

"Toledo, February 5:

The question of whether the democratic party (republicans) should be taken into consideration on forming the slate of candidates was discussed; it was decided against, and immediately they (the republicans) said farewell and voluntarily left the meeting... The opposition to the Cabinet was discussed... In effect the article was put to a vote and the pure Progressives approved (the opposition to the Cabinet) while the 'ayacuchos' (pro-Espartero) said no. As a consequence, the pure Progressives left the meeting and went to form a junta at the inn of 'Caballeros', while the 'ayacucho' party remained in the inn called 'de la Caridad'.

The Moderate party has sent delegates to the candidates of the pure Progressives offering them all their support and cooperation; the same has been done by the democratic party; the same will be done by the clergy and by all virtuous Spaniards who love their country, because the Catholic clergy does not want any alliances with the Protestants, and the Moderates, absolutists, and democrats want to be Spaniards and not 'anglo-ayacuchos' "⁴.

In Madrid there were three main slates of candidates, the Pure Progressive, the pro-Espartero, and the Moderate. The leading candidates of the Pure Progressives were Joaquín María López, Manuel Cantero (a rich merchant), and Juan Bautista Alonso (radical lawyer and former deputy)⁵. The candidates who led the pro-Espartero slate were Agustín Argüelles, Juan Al-

³ *Eco del Comercio*, February 27, 1843.

⁴ *Eco del Comercio*, February 6, 1843.

⁵ *Eco del Comercio*, February 23, 1843.

varez Mendizábal, and Antonio González (former Minister of State). The Moderates were led by Martínez de la Rosa, but did not include many of their best-known chiefs because the conservatives did not expect to win the elections in the capital, where the middle classes were still firmly Progressive. The Moderates had the best chance of winning in the northern provinces. In Oviedo their candidates included the Conde de Toreno, Alvaro Flórez Estrada, Alejandro Mon and Pedro Pidal. The motto of their campaign was "National Independence and protection for industry".

There were two other political parties or groups that participated in the elections of March, 1843. One was the republican party, which now called itself the democratic party. The democrats of Madrid published a manifesto in January which was much more conciliatory towards the conservatives and the monarchy than it had been previously⁶. It was signed by M. García Uzal, Wenceslao Ayguales de Izco, and Antonio Seijas, the editors of the newspapers *El Peninsular* and *La Guindilla*. Another group of republicans, however, led by Olavarría the editor of *El Huracán*, attacked the democrats for joining with the Pure Progressives and with the Moderates in the electoral campaign against Espartero. The *Huracán* asked:

"If Espartero has misunderstood his own position and his interests, cannot the same also be said of some republicans? In particular those republicans who in exchange for overthrowing him (Espartero) will submit themselves to the domination of the reactionaries..."⁷.

The *Huracán* asked who would replace the present Cabinet. The old "ayacuchos", González and Infante? The former spokesmen of the *Eco del Comercio*? Cortina and Doménech? Olózaga? No, none of these would be capable of organizing a stable popular government. The *Huracán* defended Espartero, in spite of his mistakes, because the Regent still had the support of much of the National Militia and of the Army; under his command these two forces would impede the Moderates from reestablishing conservative government.

Another and final political party or faction was the "francisquita" party, those who supported the Infante Francisco. They proposed that he be elected deputy and that his son should be married to Isabel II as soon as she be named Queen. Don Francisco was supported by the new *Eco del Comercio* in Madrid and by *El Imparcial* in Barcelona. He was a candidate for deputy to Congress in several provinces, and he was elected by Zaragoza, although his victory did not significantly increase his political power.

The Moderates won in some of the northern provinces, often in alliance with the Pure Progressives. The conservatives also won in Barcelona, where the propertied classes voted for law and order, for repression of the workers and the republicans. The Pure Progressives won in the

⁶ See text in *La Guindilla*, January 22, 1843.

⁷ Quoted in *La Guindilla*, March 19, 1843.

provinces of the Mediterranean coast, Alicante, Málaga, Cádiz, where the radicals traditionally had strength. The "ayacuchos" (pro-Espartero candidates) won in Madrid and various provinces of Castille and Andalucía. The government used legal and illegal methods to pressure the voters to return candidates favorable to the Espartero administration. As the opposition scornfully pointed out most of the "ayacucho" candidates were government employees, in one way or another. In Lugo, for instance, the "ayacucho" candidates were the following⁸:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Salary</i>
Rodil	General and Minister	120,000 "reales"
Seoane	General	60,000 "
Tejeiro	General	46,000 "
Hacha	Colonel	24,000 "
Cuervo	Judge	50,000 "
Becerra	Political Governor	24,000 "
Moscoso	Treasurer	16,000 "
Solanot	Minister	120,000 "
Pampillo	Judge	24,000 "

The same pattern was repeated in many other provinces. Furthermore, the government received the important support of José Salamanca, the Madrid financier who controlled the salt monopoly. He gave orders to its 3,000 employees all over Spain to campaign for the "ayacuchos". At least two instances of this pressure were reported by the *Eco*, in Córdoba and in Ciudad Real⁹.

The results of this confusing election were that in the Congress of the spring of 1843 there were four or five factions. The largest was that of the Pure Progressives, followed by the "ayacuchos". There were also Moderates, a few republicans and two or three "francisquitas". Espartero did not expect that his present Cabinet could control this explosive legislature. The Regent took an unexpected and shrewd step. He named the two radical deputies, Joaquín María López and Fermín Caballero to head the new Cabinet. He thus won the support of all the Pure Progressives and republicans, and threw the Moderates into a state of confusion. But Espartero failed to appreciate the significance to the step he had just taken. López and Caballero published a statement of principles. They declared themselves in favor of a general amnesty for all political exiles since 1840, (mostly Moderates), in favor of complete liberty of the press and of association, and in favor of increased sales of the Church lands. This manifesto was received enthusiastically by the Congress and by the population of Madrid. But on May 16, Caballero and López went to see the Regent to demand that he replace General Linaje and several other officers. Espartero refused to dismiss his close friend Linaje. The

⁸ *Eco del Comercio*, February 13, 1843.

⁹ *Eco del Comercio*, February 21, and March 3, 1843.

new Ministers retired disappointed from the interview; they were prepared to resign if the Regent did not change his opinion, for they considered that only by eliminating some of the leading military supporters of Espartero would they be in a position to act freely and with popular favor. Espartero remained inflexible and thus forced López, Caballero and General Serrano to resign on May 19, 1843. This one blow directed against the Ministers boomeranged. Espartero did not know it yet, but he had cut his own political throat.

THE COALITION AGAINST ESPARTERO: REVOLUTION OF JUNE-JULY 1843

On May 19th rumors began to circulate in the Congress that the López Cabinet had been forced to resign. When the session opened, the Progressive deputy Salustiano Olózaga made the news public and predicted the fatal consequences of such an act. The Congress resolved to send a message to Espartero, condemning his inflexibility. The deputies also approved a bill affirming their confidence in the (deposed) López Cabinet by a vote of 114 yes-votes against only 3 no's. On the following day [when the new Ministers headed by Alvaro Gómez Becerra entered the Chamber], there was an atmosphere of intense political agitation, Salustiano Olózaga attacked this new Cabinet and the Regent in a long and emotional speech, which ended with the cry of "May God save the country: God save the Queen!" This rhetorical flourish became the slogan of the coalition of Progressives and Moderates opposed to the Regent.

On May 26 the official organ of the government, the *Gaceta de Madrid*, published a decree ordering the dissolution of the Congress, and calling for new elections in August. Immediately the Progressives and Moderates formed a joint committee to prepare for the electoral conflict. But this very proper parliamentary step was irrelevant. By the beginning of June, many Spanish cities were already up in arms. A revolution was brewing that would eventually end with the flight and exile of Espartero. The press of Madrid had begun a furious campaign directed against the "camarilla" which surrounded Espartero. The newspapers denounced General Linaje (the Regent's personal secretary), Antonio González, Facundo Infante, General Seoane and the British Ambassador, Asthon; also included were the poet Quintana, Martín de los Heros, and General Francisco Luján¹⁰. The press was aware that what was at stake was more than just the survival of this "camarilla", but the continuation of Espartero in power. The *Eco del Comercio* spoke of the "volcanic crater which will cover us with burning lava" as a result of the popular outcry against the resignation of the López Cabinet, and accused the Espartero Regency of being an "absolute dictatorship"¹¹. The actual insurrection, however, did not begin in Madrid but in the provinces.

On May 29th the *Eco* reported that Málaga had rebelled. The National

¹⁰ *Eco del Comercio*, May 22, and June 7, 1843.

¹¹ *Eco del Comercio*, May 22, 1843.

Militia had gathered and elected a local revolutionary junta which had published a manifesto. The basic principles were the following: (1) the independence of Málaga from the government of Espartero until the López Cabinet was re-instituted, (2) that the National Militia be on the alert and remain armed, (3) that delegates be sent to the other provinces of Andalucía to spread the revolutionary message. Reports from Valencia indicated that it was the university students who had begun the revolts there. They were joined by Moderates, Progressives, and republicans. A local newspaper declared: "Our government has been sold to English gold!! This is said by the proprietors, by the artisans, by the military officers, and even by the peasantry. This is repeated by all classes and the rage and fury is clearly visible in the faces of all the "Valencianos"¹². One of the reasons for the discontent of both the artisans and industrialists of Valencia was that the once flourishing silk manufacturing industry had been ravaged [in recent years] by the import of foreign silks. Economic as well as political discontent, therefore, played a major part in many of the provincial rebellions.

The provincial rebellions were initiated generally by the more radical Progressives and the republicans, but the local Juntas tended to be dominated by wealthy "bourgeois" and by disaffected military officers. In the city of Reus in Catalonia, the radical General Prim took up the banner of rebellion, publishing a proclamation in defence of the Constitution and declaring that Isabel II should be crowned Queen immediately. The leaders of the Junta of Reus were radicals, although among the members were 3 local industrialists, two merchants, one doctor, and no artisans. In Málaga the North American consul reported:

"The present Junta are almost all highly respectable merchants who chancing to fill stations in the different municipal bodies, have in the course of events, been brought into this disagreeable situation (of having to serve as members of the Junta)..."¹³.

On June 19th the *Eco* reported the rebellions in Alicante and Teruel, but also noted that the majority of the representatives of the Juntas were high-level military officers. It became increasingly clear that important sectors of the Army were openly opposed to Espartero. There were bloody skirmishes in Reus and Valencia between opposing batallions.

The divisions within the military were not only the product of dissatisfaction with the low salaries, but also the result of political agitation carried on for over a year by a secret Moderate military organization called the Orden Militar Española. The Orden Militar had been organized by the exiled General Ramón Narváez and other conservative officers in Paris. They and allies in Madrid such as Brigadiers Lara and Mazarredo, and Colonel Roncali. Together they had spread anti-Espartero propaganda

¹² Quoted in *Eco del Comercio*, June 1, 1843.

¹³ *National Archives* (Wash. D.C.), Department of State, U.S. Legation at Madrid, "Consular and Miscellaneous Letters", inventory number C8.4, June 1842-July 1843, letter dated June 7, 1843, Málaga.

within the upper ranks of the Army and had affiliated considerable numbers of officers by the summer of 1843. Thus, when the exiled officers led by Generals Narváez and Concha sailed into the port of Valencia on June 27, 1843, the Spanish Army was deeply divided. Favorable to Espartero were Generals Seoane, Van Halen and Zurbano who commanded several thousand troops in Catalonia, and Generals Nogueras, Gómez de la Serna, Linaje, Infante and Osorio in Castille and Andalucía. Opposed were General Prim in Catalonia, Narváez, Concha, and Aspiroz in Valencia, and others throughout the rest of Spain. The latter were supported by the Moderates who expected the formerly exiled Generals to re-establish conservative government. The Moderate sympathies were clearly manifest even in such a Progressive stronghold as the city of Málaga. The North American consul at Málaga reported in a letter dated July 6, 1843:

"On the 3rd instant (July), General Manuel Concha landed here from the steamer Isabel II, with the object of... offering his services to his countrymen in opposition to the Regent. Those who are here designated as 'Moderados' expressed every possible satisfaction-while those who are styled 'Progresistas' did not express themselves with entire accordance, but rather manifested a jealous feeling which I am led to believe extends to Granada, for which place the General departed yesterday morning. In case these two parties should succeed in their object (of overthrowing Espartero), then there must be a contention as to whose influence shall have the ascendancy. They have been rancorous opponents heretofore"¹⁴.

Espartero did not marshal his forces effectively. He let the insurrections spread and "ordered his officers not to 'antagonize the people', an instruction which planted a seed of doubt in the mind of every public official whether he were already a member of the 'Orden Militar' or not"¹⁵. The Minister of Finances, Mendizábal, had attempted to conciliate the radicals issuing decrees postponing the collection of taxes, abolishing the hated consumers' taxes ("derechos de puertas"), and lowering the customs duties. But outside of the capital these measures had little or no effect. Espartero left Madrid in June to pacify the South, and spent several weeks inexplicably wasting his precious time in Albacete and Ciudad Real. Meanwhile the troops of Aspiroz and Narváez were marching on the capital from Valencia.

On July 10 Madrid received news of the advance of General Aspiroz. The National Militia of the capital, which numbered almost 15,000 men, remained loyal to the Regent, and organized the defence of the city. In contrast, the majority of the military officers demanded a leave of absence from a government which they were no longer prepared to defend. On the following days, Aspiroz seized several nearby sites, the Pozuelo de Aravaca, El Pardo, and Puerta de Hierro. The Militia occupied the strategic points of defense of the city, dug trenches, and set up barricades in the main streets. Different rumors spread through the city; some said

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, letter dated July 6, 1843, Málaga.

¹⁵ E. CHRISTIANSEN, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain...*, p. 113.

that Narváez was fast approaching; others that the pro-Espartero forces under Seoane and Zurbano were near. Soon, the troops of Narváez neared the besieged city. The water supplies were cut off and the inhabitants began to suffer from severe shortages. On the 17th of July, Narváez ordered the municipal government to open the gates of the city, or else, as he brutally declared, he would attack the capital "without remorse for the blood that shall have to flow, for the more vile and traitorous blood that is spilt, the better it will be for the future prosperity of the nation"¹⁶.

But on the 18th some of the besieging troops retreated. News arrived of the rapid advance of Generals Zurbano and Seoane. The decisive battle was fought on the 22nd. Although Narváez was outnumbered, he had a better strategic position. Furthermore Seoane's troops were tired from marching. The battle began at nine in the morning. Narváez ordered his cavalry to attack from all sides and envelop the enemy before Seoane had a chance to set up his artillery. In a few hours the pro-Espartero troops had given up the fight and were fraternising with the troops of Narváez. On the following day, the municipal government of Madrid published a declaration allowing the troops of Azpiroz and Narváez to enter the city, but with the following conditions: (1) the continuation of the Constitution of 1837, (2) the National Militia would not be disarmed, (3) respect for the public employees, regardless of their political affiliation. On the following days, the troops under Generals Narváez, Prim, and Serrano entered the capital, acclaimed by enthusiastic crowds. On July 25, the old López Cabinet, including the Ministers Caballero, Ayllón, and General Serrano went to pay their respects to the girl-Queen, Isabel II, and re-assumed the reins of government.

A few days later, on July 28, General Espartero, who had begun to besiege Seville in a last futile attempt to contain the rebellions in Andalusia, left hastily for Cádiz. There he boarded an English ship, the "Betis", which saluted him, appropriately enough, with a 21 gun salute. There and then concluded the Regency of Espartero, just as three years before, María Cristina had ended her Regency on board another ship in another port.

THE LÓPEZ CABINET: AUGUST-OCTOBER 1844

The fall of Espartero left a power vacuum at Madrid that the López Cabinet could not adequately fill. The Ministers López, Caballero, Serrano, and Ayllón attempted to reconcile the two major political parties, Progressives and Moderates, and to reestablish a semblance of rational administration, but the circumstances were not favorable to these ends. Actually, the Ministers did not exercise the complete power of government because the military power was largely in the hands of Narváez. Further-

¹⁶ For a detailed account of the siege of Madrid in July, 1843, see "Acontecimientos de Madrid" por un testigo ocular (Madrid, 1843), a pamphlet of 16 pages. Also see the account printed in JUANA VEGA DE MINA, *Memorias de la Condesa Espoz y Mina*, ed. by J. Pérez de Guzmán y Gallo (Madrid, 1910).

more, the López Cabinet was confronted with several radical rebellions in various provinces such as Barcelona and Zaragoza, where the local juntas did not accept the authority of the new Madrid government. The result of this confusing and contradictory situation was that there was no effective government during these months, and that the different political factions fought bitterly against each other to gain the upper hand¹⁷.

Early in August, several of the principal pro-Espartero leaders, such as Mendizábal, Seoane, and Zurbano, left Madrid for exile in France or Portugal. The Minister of War, Serrano, also ordered several Progressive military officers to leave the capital, although he did not force them into exile; among them were Generals San Miguel, Rodríguez Vera, Capaz, Isidro, and Colonel Luján¹⁸. Meanwhile, General Narváez began to disarm the National Militia of several cities and to appoint his friends and followers to key military positions. The provincial deputations were replaced as were many municipal governments, and the Senate was dismissed in its entirety because of the large number of pro-Espartero members it had. Narváez and the Moderates also moved quickly to surround the girl-Queen Isabel II with conservative advisors. The new "camarilla" was composed of Narváez, the Marquesas of Santa Cruz and de Valverde, the Duke of Osuna, and the Moderate ideologue Donoso Cortés. According to a contemporary observer the "camarilla" was characterised by the fact that "All are faithful adherents of Cristina (the former Queen-Regent), extreme 'Moderados' in their politics and strongly tinged with Absolutism..."¹⁹. These developments at the Court, within the Army, and in the State administration demonstrated that the conservatives were intent upon seizing power.

The Moderate party, however, did not wish to act too quickly, for it did not yet have sufficient strength. They Moderates were willing to let the López Cabinet rule at least until the 10th of October, the day Isabel II would be declared of age, and thenceforward Queen of Spain. They were also disposed to continue the political coalition with the more conservative Progressives and to present joint slates of candidates in the upcoming September-October elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. But they were piqued by the radicalism of two of the Ministers, namely Caballero, Minister of the Interior, and Allyón, Minister of Finances. The *Revista de Madrid* commented in August of 1843:

"That there is not a unity of purpose within the López Cabinet is a fact which nobody now denies... The Ministers Serrano and López, faithful to the principles of the coalition (with the Moderates), govern with impartiality, selecting capable functionaries regardless of their political opinions.

¹⁷ Two first hand accounts of the period were published by two Ministers, but they clear up few of the historical questions. See JOAQUÍN MARÍA LÓPEZ, *Exposición razonada* (Madrid, 1843), and FERMÍN CABALLERO, *Vida de Joaquín María López* (Madrid, 1857), pp. 127-47.

¹⁸ J. TANSKI, *L'Espagne en 1843-44, Lettres sur les moeurs politiques et sur la dernière revolution de ce pays* (Paris, 1844), p. 32.

¹⁹ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. I, p. 169.

The two gentlemen, Ayllón and Caballero, however, either because of a distrust of the new state of things, or because of their dislike of the conservatives, govern exclusively in the interest of their old friends..."²⁰.

The López Cabinet was therefore unable to carry out an effective program of reform. It approved a few important measures, such as the reorganization of the medical faculties, the internal reform of the Ministry of Finances, and a contract of 400 million "reales" with the financier José Salamanca to build a whole network of essential roads within the next two years²¹. But these measures were not destined to last because the political situation again turned exceedingly complicated.

Numerous provincial rebellions increased the tensions at Madrid. The Barcelona revolutionaries had formed a "Junta Central" and absolutely refused to accept the authority of the Madrid government. Generals Serrano and Narváez wanted to smash this revolt quickly, but López, Caballero and Ayllón were opposed to spilling any blood. At the same time there were radical rebellions among the National Militia of Zaragoza, and later in Segovia, Badajoz, Seville, Córdoba, Granada and Almería. The rebellion in Granada illustrated the nature of these localised insurrections. The city of Granada had been among the first to rebel against Espartero in June, and had fought against the troops of the "ayacucho" generals, Alvarez, Van Halen, and Infante. But once the fight was over in August, the coalition of Moderates and Progressives of the city began to fight over the control of key positions in the provincial and municipal government. In September the 1st and 2nd batallions of the National Militia of Granada, (composed chiefly of artisans and small merchants), (the rich "bourgeois" and nobility having been excluded from the Militia), threatened to establish a radical junta, rejecting the authority of the new military powers at Madrid led by Narváez²². The 1st and 2nd batallions demanded that the 3rd and 4th batalions, (composed mainly of small rural proprietors and "labradores"), be disarmed. But the 4th batalion, which was of Moderate sympathies, refused. Narváez ordered Army troops to Granada, and they soon crushed this minor rebellion.

On September 26, 1843, a bomb exploded in a powder magazine at Madrid. It was attributed to some Barcelona revolutionaries who had supposedly organized a conspiracy to begin a revolt in the capital. This incident served as the excuse for Narváez to finally concentrate all military and police power in his own hands. He replaced the political governor of Madrid with an intimate friend of his own, General Mazarredo. He also got Minister of War Serrano to issue a manifesto declaring all those who participated in the revolts of Barcelona and Zaragoza to be traitors, and ordered the Army to use maximum force to carry out repression. The military obeyed. It thus became increasingly clear that for the first time since 1834, the bulk of the Spanish Army was no longer

²⁰ *Revista de Madrid*, 2.^a época, tomo I, 1843, pp. 62-66.

²¹ See account by FERMÍN CABALLERO, *Vida de Joaquín María López*, pp. 127-47.

²² J. TANSKI, *L'Espagne en 1843-44...*, pp. 122-23.

willing to compromise with the radicals or revolutionaries. The motto of the Army had become law and order, no matter how costly this might be.

The change in the ideology of the Army from a predominantly liberal to a conservative stance was not merely the consequence of the downfall of Espartero. It was also the reflection of an increasingly conservative sentiment among the whole of the Spanish bourgeoisie. The propertied classes were fed up with radical experiments and repeated rebellions, with popular municipal elections and the continual threat of a powerful National Militia, largely composed of artisans, workers and peasants. As both Progressive and Moderate politicians did not tire of repeating in the fall of 1843, the revolution had ended. It was finally time to firmly consolidate the "bourgeois" State and society.

THE COURT AND THE CONGRESS: OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1843

There were national elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the autumn of 1843. The great question to be decided by the combined legislatures was the majority of age of the girl-Queen Isabel. She would be thirteen years of age on October 10, 1844, and henceforth, it was expected, would begin the formal reign of Isabel II. The young Queen would have to first swear loyalty to the Constitution of 1837 in order to gain the support of the legislators. Once assured of the continuation of the principle of constitutional monarchy, the deputies and senators would in their turn vow to remain loyal to the Queen and Court. The first stages of this solemn process were celebrated in a pompous but, relatively decorous form. Once crowned, however, the young Queen was swept up in whirlwind of factious intrigue that burst forth in a wave of scandals, accusations and counter-accusations.

As in the previous elections of spring of 1843, there were now several political parties or groups that battled against each other, but the most important parliamentary politicians tried to restrict the party differences. As a result, the Moderates joined with most of the Progressives in an electoral coalition in many provinces. This coalition was not faced by strong competition. The "esparteristas" and republicans presented candidates in several cities, while for the first time since 1840 the absolutists, (who were virtually Carlists), also ran for office. In Madrid the coalition presented a bi-partisan slate of candidates, composed of three Progressives- Manuel Cortina, González Bravo, and Manuel Cantero, and three Moderates- Martínez de la Rosa, Casa Irujo, and Sartorius²³. The coalition won easily in most provinces, although the pro-Espartero Progressives and republicans won in some southern cities such as Seville. The absolutists obtained their largest number of votes in northern Castille, where they almost won the elections in several places. Their campaign slogan was "Rey, Patria, Ley"²⁴. All contemporary observers noted that the elections

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 138. Also see *Revista de Madrid*, 2^a época, vol I, 1843, p. 168.

were clean and there were virtually no signs of government interference or corruption. This may have been due to the strict orders issued by the Minister of the Interior, Fermín Caballero, to the public employees in order to guarantee free elections.

The first legislative session began on October 15 in the new Theater of the Orient ("Teatro de Oriente"). The Congress and the Senate initially met together, although they later separated. A French observer described the social characteristics of the two chambers:

"The aristocracy is represented in the Congress (Chamber of Deputies) by three 'Grandes de España', the Duque de Abrantes, the Conde de Lalaing y Balazote, and the Conde de Parcent, as well as by 5 or 6 nobles who have Castillian titles... There are nine ex-Ministers in the Congress. The Army has 15 deputies, among them 7 generals, Serrano, Narváez, Concha, Azpiroz, Mazarredo... The urban middle class is represented by about 30 lawyers, 6 literary individuals, 5 bankers, 4 merchants, 1 industrialist, 1 notary public, and a pharmacist. Another group of above 100 deputies is composed almost equally of rural landowners and of public employees, active and retired"²⁵.

The social composition of the Congress was evidently similar to that of the previous Congresses in 1841-43. The political color was substantially different because there were many more Moderates than before. There were now about 80 Progressives and 60 Moderates, and a few republicans. In the Senate, however, there was an almost complete predominance of Moderates, and a great number of aristocrats, as well as several bishops and numerous military officers. The predominant role of the aristocracy in the Senate was a sign of the conservative tendencies increasingly evident in the upper circles of Spanish politics. Among the senators there were quite a number of members of the old royalist elite who had served in the *Estamento de Próceres* of 1834-36: the Duque de Frías, the Marqués de Falces, General Ezpeleta, General Castaños (also Duque de Bailén), the Conde de Santa Coloma (now majordomo of the Royal Palace), the Marqués de San Felices, and the Conde de Altamira. There were also more liberal aristocrats such as the Duque de Rivas (the famous poet) and the Marqués de Miraflores (well-known diplomat). Finally there were several of the wealthiest Madrid bankers, notably Gaspar de Remisa and Antonio Jordá de Santadieu²⁶.

The deputies and senators met in a solemn session on November 8, 1843, to vote and proclaim the majority of Queen Isabel II. There were 193 votes in favor, and 16 opposed, (mostly republicans). On leaving the hall, the Queen and the legislators were greeted by a large and enthusiastic crowd, which shouted "Long live the Queen". But there were also particularly loud cries of "Long live Narváez"²⁷. This was an ominous sign both for the López Cabinet and for the Progressives.

²⁵ J. TANSKI, *L'Espagne en 1843 et 1844...*, p. 149.

²⁶ See *Estadística y vicisitudes de las Cortes...*, 1833-1858.

²⁷ J. TANSKI, *L'Espagne en 1843 et 1844...*, pp. 196-200.

Up until November of 1843, the proclamation by the combined legislature of the majority of Queen Isabel II had been considered to be the principal goal of both political parties, Progressives and Moderates, and the symbol, of their reconciliation. Underlying the apparent harmony of opinion, nonetheless, there were currents of suspicion and hatred between the opposing politicians. During September and October, the Moderates had been forced to negotiate with the Progressive leaders and to tolerate the government of López and Caballero, because they did not yet have sufficient strength to seize power. But they were intent upon seizing control of the executive. The *Revista de Madrid* had said as much in its second editorial of October, 1843.

"We desire the power for our party; but since we are not blinded by desire, we believe that our hour has not yet arrived..."²⁸.

As soon as Isabel II officially ascended the throne, however, the Moderates moved quickly to oust the López Cabinet and to divide the Progressives. The conservatives began to negotiate with the two most vain and fickle of the Progressive leaders, Olózaga and González Bravo. At a closed meeting of the Moderate deputies at the house of García Carrasco, they decided to support the formation of a new Cabinet composed of the following persons: Olózaga- president, General Mazarredo- Minister of War, Pedro Pidal- Minister of Justice, González Bravo- Minister of the Interior, Alcón- Minister of the Navy, and Cantero- Minister of Finances. Mazarredo, Pidal, and Alcón were all old Moderates, while Olózaga and his good friend Cantero were still nominally Progressives. González Bravo was of dubious political opinions, but by this time he had been bought off by the Moderates. When the deputies met in the Congress, González Bravo cajoled and threatened the Progressives in order to elect Olózaga president of the Chamber of Deputies, the first step toward his nomination as Prime Minister. During this legislative session twenty-one radical Progressives and republicans rose and left the assembly, declaring their total disagreement. Subsequently Olózaga, Alcón, Mazarredo, Pidal, and González Bravo were elected as presidents and vice-presidents of the Chamber. They were thus prepared, to themselves replace the López Cabinet [at the indication of the Queen].

In the following days the Progressives had several meetings at the home of Pascual Madoz. There, the leader Manuel Cortina refused to support the ambitions of Olózaga and stated that he wished to curtail short the Moderate plots. The majority of the Progressives therefore broke off the parliamentary coalition with the Moderates, but a minority did not. This minority of 20 younger and less wellknown deputies joined with about 30 Moderates, who now followed the lead of González Bravo. There were now three groups in the Spanish parliament: (1) the Progressives led by Cortina (about 50-60); (2) the group led by González Bravo, called the "party of Young Spain", (about 50); (3) the pure Moderates (about 30).

²⁸ *Revista de Madrid*, 2.^a época, vol. I, 1843, p. 277.

Groups (2) and (3) tended to vote together, their common interest being the removal of the López Cabinet.

On the 14th of November several revolutionaries attempted to assassinate General Narváez in the streets of Madrid. They threw a bomb at his carriage, killing the driver and wounding an aide, but failing to injure the General. Immediately afterwards, Narváez ordered a program of repression, arresting suspects, and closing the newspaper *El Eco del Comercio*. The Minister of the Interior, the radical leader Fermín Caballero, interpreted these moves as the prologue to a Moderate coup d'état. He responded by issuing a decree to rearm the National Militia and to carry out the municipal elections. This was a direct and powerful challenge to the Moderates. They acted rapidly and convinced the Queen to replace the López Cabinet. On November 24th, Salustiano Olózaga was named Prime Minister, and he immediately rescinded Caballero's orders to the Militia and municipalities.

Olózaga apparently intended to reconcile the Progressives and Moderates, but he knew this to be virtually impossible. The Progressive deputies led by Cortina demanded that he form an all-Progressive Cabinet. The Moderates pressured him to accept their collaboration, at the same time as they tried to undermine him. The well-informed correspondent of the *London Times* described the intrigues at Madrid. He wrote:

"I am assured that Señor Olózaga and the Moderado Camarilla were mutually endeavoring to do each other in. They stipulated with him that they should support the 'situation' created by the revolution against Espartero, and form a coalition Ministry; and he stipulated with them that he should not be interfered with in his political education of the Queen, which he commenced so recently as 'ayo' or tutor. From the moment the bargain was struck, both parties hastened to make the most of it by running a race of treachery; and what was very amusing and piquant to the interested, they knew each other perfectly from the first, and had regular advice of each other's movements of petit treason. The game they both played by common consent was to ruin each other as rapidly and as completely as possible, and they have not been idle on either side. Olózaga formed a Progressive Ministry, instead of a coalition one, declared the acts of the López Ministry illegal, and prepared to dismiss the Camarilla, Captain General (Narváez) and Cortes 'tout a coup'. The Camarilla played 'the short game' to disgrace him at Court forever..."²⁹

The Moderate "camarilla" won the race against Olózaga. On November 29th, the Prime Minister went precipitately to see the young Queen at the Palace and got her to sign a decree dissolving the legislature. On the following day, Olózaga was unexpectedly informed that as a consequence of this decree the Queen had decided to dismiss him from his position as Prime Minister, and that he was now replaced by González Bravo. Olózaga was accused of having physically obliged the young Queen to sign the decree. In order to prove this accusation, the Moderate "ca-

²⁹ *London Times*, December 13, 1843, p. 5.

marilla" organized a public ceremony at the Palace at which Isabel II was to make a formal declaration and accusation against Olózaga, in the presence of the most important politicians, aristocrats, and generals, that is to say, the new Moderate power elite.

The meeting was held in the very room where it was said Olózaga had forced the hand of Isabel II. Present were Mauricio Onís, president of the Senate, the Duque de Rivas and the Conde de Ezpeleta, vice-presidents of the Senate, Pedro Pidal, president of the Congress, the Duque de Cartorreño, Dean of the Deputation of the Grandees of Spain, José Bonel y Olbe, Patriarch of the Indies, etc. etc.³⁰ Isabel II read a declaration which stated that Olózaga had visited her on the night of November 29, had bolted the door of the room, and then forced her to sign the decree. The Royal declaration was distributed to the press and served as the official justification for the coup d'état which ousted Olózaga. It was later observed that there were several inconsistencies in the Queen's declaration, as for instance, the fact that the palace room did not actually have a bolt; nevertheless, the accusation had served its purpose. Olózaga ranted and railed in the Congress, winning himself fame as a martyr for the Progressive cause, and as a victim of the intrigues of the Moderate "camarilla". But both he and the Progressives had finally lost their control of the government.

THE REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA OF BARCELONA: SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1843

During the last month of 1843, and at the same time as the Moderates were outmaneuvering the Moderates at Madrid, there was an amazing insurrection in Catalonia. As a result of the nation-wide revolt against Espartero in the summer of 1843, there had sprung up a revolutionary Junta in the city of Barcelona. Supported by the National Militia, the artisans and workers, the Junta had moved increasingly to the Left. By mid-September, the majority of the propertied classes of Barcelona had emigrated to the nearby towns of the province. The Junta took complete control of the city, virtually establishing a popular revolutionary dictatorship. The political crisis at Madrid did not allow the Army to intervene and attempt to crush this rebellion until the end of September. From this moment onwards there began a violent battle between the military forces and the Barcelona Militia (led by the Junta) which lasted until the end of November. This extremely violent conflict was the most dramatic example of open class warfare in Spain in the first half of the 19th century³¹.

³⁰ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. I, pp. 60-61.

³¹ There is unfortunately no modern account of the Barcelona insurrection, as far as I know, despite considerable documentation available for research. A methodological investigation of these events would constitute one of the first building blocks upon which can be reconstructed the history of the Spanish working classes in the 19th century.

The first sign of a possible insurrection in Catalonia had been manifested in the last days of August, after Espartero had fled the country, and the López Cabinet had been established as the provisional government of the nation. There were several radical groups in Barcelona that rejected the authority of the López Cabinet, demanding instead the formation of a revolutionary Central Junta at Madrid, composed of delegates from all the provinces, and prepared to carry out a democratic populist program. On August 13th and succeeding days, several groups paraded about Barcelona with a banner reading simply "Junta Central". They were supported by the National Militia, in particular by the "batallón de la blusa", an armed battalion of workers, who took possession of the military fortress of Ataranzas, by the port. On August 17th, the Progressive General Juan Prim arrived at Barcelona, but was not allowed to enter the Ataranzas fortress. Prim, nonetheless, tried to work out a compromise with the radicals, declaring that the day of September 1st should be a holiday in order to commemorate the revolution of September, 1840, which had led to the fall of María Cristina and the rise of the Progressives. There were banquets and celebrations in all the taverns and cafes of the city on that day; on the same evening Prim went to talk with the Militia at Ataranzas, but was met with cold indifference³². Later that night a battalion of volunteer troops from the province entered Barcelona and took possession of the Plaza of San Jaime. They set up formal military defences, being supplied with artillery by the "batallón de la blusa".

On the next day the city awoke to the shouts of groups preparing for combat. The numerous National Militia appeared to support the rebel forces in the Plaza de San Jaime. As a result, by midday, the Progressive authorities of the municipal government and General Prim retired to the fortress of "la Ciudadela", on the periphery of the city. The rebels formed a Popular Temporary Commission to lead the insurrection; two days later it was transformed into the Supreme Provisional Junta of Barcelona³³. The members were practically all republicans, the president being Antonio Baiges. On September 3rd the troops of the "Ciudadela" fired on the rebels. On the 4th there was a violent clash between the Army soldiers, led by Prim, and the revolutionary Militia. There was substantial artillery fire; several warehouses by the port burned to the ground. Antonio Baiges was killed in the combat, and was replaced by Rafael Degollado as head of the Junta. By this time, there was a generalised panic among the Barcelona bourgeoisie. They left the city in droves, taking as many possessions as they could with them in carts and carriages or on the backs of their servants.

From September 5th onwards, the Junta began to organize the formal defence of the city. It ordered all the shops and wholesale stores to remain open all day and to charge the same prices current on September

³² See the excellent *Diario de los sucesos de Barcelona en septiembre, octubre y noviembre de 1843*, por un testigo presencial (Barcelona, December 1843), pp. 3-5.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-7.

1st³⁴. But most of the shoekopers were already leaving the city. Several more members were added to the Junta, including representatives of the National Militia, as well as two lawyers, an architect, and a peasant-farmer. There continued to be skirmishes with the Army troops, which had installed themselves in the fortress of "la Ciudadela" and in the fortress of Montjuich, the large hill overlooking the port. On September 9th and 10th several batalions of Army troops from the province, led by the radicals Juan Martoll and Narciso Ametller, entered the city and declared their support for the Junta. They shouted "Death to Narvez", "Death to Concha" (the Moderate General), and "Death to the tyrans". On September 12th Ametller left Barcelona with 2,000 troops to raise the banner of insurrection in the rest of the towns of the province.

Up until the end of September, the Madrid government did not give firm orders to the Army to crush the rebellion, but from the 20th onwards there were bloody fights in many of the Catalan towns. On October 1st the artillery of Montjuich and "la Ciudadela" began to fire on the strongpoints of the Militia in the city. The port was simultaneously blockaded by French and Spanish war ships. There soon began to be food shortages, but the revolutionary spirit of the artisans and factory workers ran high. Their most popular song was called "la Cancion de la Paella", and among its verses were the following: "Death to the aristocracy, enough evil it has caused already. The people want to rule. I vow by God it shall"³⁵. Another popular couplet went as follows:

"Ay! Ay! Catalans;
Que bombas, bombas venen.
Ay! Ay! Catalans,
Que bombas, bombas van"³⁶.

During the whole month of October the artillery duel was intense. The Army poured their lethal fire on all sections of the city, but the rebel Militia responded with their own artillery. By the 13th of October there was widespread hunger in Barcelona. A witness of the events reported that the workers had begun to eat the cats in the streets. The Junta took over the distribution of food, expropriating all available funds, taking possession of the stores, warehouses and markets. By the end of the month, a report stated that the Junta was providing daily soups to over 17,000 poor persons³⁷.

On October 22nd the artillery of the Army fortresses fired 1,351 projectiles and grenades on Barcelona; on the 23rd 644 projectiles; and on the 24th 2830³⁸. The Militia replied with 400 shot on this last day; they had their own small munitions and powder factory. By the 4th of November, however, the Junta had lost hope of holding out much longer and

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³⁵ J. VICENS VIVES, *Cataluna en el siglo XIX*, p. 384.

³⁶ *Diario de los sucesos de Barcelona...*, p. 53.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-80.

began negotiations with General Prim; but these did not go well. For over two weeks, while the fighting went on and the artisans and workers of Barcelona almost starved, the negotiations went on. Finally on November 19th the Junta capitulated and signed a formal surrender to the Army. On the following day some 5,000 troops entered the devastated city. The rebellion was over.

Several foreign observers who described the city after the surrender noted the tremendous resistance that the Barcelona workers and artisans had put up, and the fact that only sheer starvation had driven them to capitulate. A correspondent of the London Times reported that :

“Our private advices... mention that when the Junta of Barcelona agreed to capitulate, the insurgents had not more than 140 lbs. of gunpowder left and were reduced to their last 300 dollars. Having 15,000 paupers and upwards of over 6,000 combattants to support, they deemed it impossible to prolong the defence of the city, which from the strength of the works they had erected, would have required 50,000 men to carry it by storm...”³⁹.

Another contemporary English observer described Barcelona after the siege. He wrote :

“Never was there a more melancholy prospect than that presented by Barcelona, when the capitulation was signed and ratified in November, and the gates thrown open to the population of Spain. To whatever side the eye was turned in the leading streets of this ancient capital, no sight could be obtained but of houses entirely or partially destroyed, churches and public edifices riddled with cannon-ball, roofs thrown off and walls struck down by the destructive explosion of shells and grenades. In the streets barricades were thrown up in every direction- not slight and flimsy structures such as were hitherto known in the partisan warfare of cities, but substantial erections, constructed of solid masonry in stone and lime- a new and original device suggested by the sad exigencies of Spanish domestic strife”⁴⁰.

The same writer also commented :

“Modern civil warfare in Spain is so practiced in the means of defense and demolition, that all the other nations of Europe may upon occasion borrow a leaf from her book. The science of temporary barricades has been closely studied in France, but brought to nothing like the perfection of the adjoining kingdom; and in Barcelona the streets were built across by solid Titanic walls. More than one infernal machine had been planted in the houses of the Calle de San Pedro, to be exploded in the event of the town being taken by assault; and an enormous mine was constructed at the entrance of the Plaza de San Jaime to be sprung amid general destruction against charges of hostile cavalry...”⁴¹.

After the Army troops had entered the city, there began a widespread repression of workers and revolutionaries. There were numerous summary

³⁹ *London Times*, December 2, 1843, p. 5.

⁴⁰ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. I, p. 200.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208.

executions and arrests. Many rebel leaders fled to France. The workers of Barcelona would not recover from their defeat in November, 1843, for many years.

The defeat of the revolutionary Junta of Barcelona marked the real end of the three years of Progressives government that had begun in September of 1840. At that time, Espartero and the Progressives had begun a populist experiment in government which they did not know how to control or direct. There had developed intense divisions between 1840 and 1843 within the Progressive party and the Spanish bourgeoisie, caused by economic difference between protectionists and free-traders, by factional fights, and by the menace of the increasing radicalization of the artisans, workers, and peasants, led in many places by the republicans. These divisions eventually led to the revolt against Espartero and his fall, and later to the gradual rise of the Moderates, captained by conservative generals like Narváez. The crushing of the Barcelona insurrection of 1843 ended the last major popular resistance against the rising tide of reaction and repression.

THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION OF 1844

During the last weeks of 1843 and the first months of 1844, the Moderate party effectively took control of the government and carried out a widespread repression. The leaders of the conservative reaction were the Prime Minister González Bravo and the Army chief Narváez. "Arrest without warrant, and shooting without trial, were amongst their ordinary means of government"⁴². They brutally crushed several rebellions that broke out in Figueras, Alicante and Cartagena. They arrested even relatively conservative Progressive leaders like Manuel Cortina and Pascual Madoz, and forced hundreds of others into exile. They closed all newspapers opposed to the new administration, disarmed the Militia, and purged the municipal governments. Thus began the Moderate regime which was to last, almost uninterrupted, for 25 years.

The new Prime Minister, González Bravo, was an extremely vain individual, who had initially made his reputation as the editor of a satirical political sheet called *El Guirigay*. As a deputy in Congress, he transferred his sarcastic talents from the press to the orator's tribune, winning the applause and support of a large group of young and inexperienced parliamentarians. His rise to power was chiefly determined by his unscrupulousness in forming alliances with former enemies in a period of crisis and bitter party fights. He was willing to betray his old comrades of the Progressive party and to sell himself to the Moderates in order to obtain political power and to further his own pecuniary interests. In this sense, he used people for his own ends, but seen from a distance, it is clear that he was actually but a puppet who was used by the Moderates, by

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 223.

Narváez, and by French interests to further their own plan of establishing a conservative pro-French government.

During the months December, 1843 to April, 1844, however, Narváez and González Bravo shared executive power equally. In a conversation with the French ambassador in early December, González Bravo explained the plans of the Moderates, and described the conflicting political forces in Spain upon the fall of Olózaga. He stated:

"There are only three (forces) in Spain: The Cortes, the Army, and the Municipalities.

We do not know to whom the Cortes belong to yet...

The Army, it is ours. All the doubts previously held about the possible divisions among its leaders have been dissipated for the moment.

The Municipalities are theirs- but the municipal governments alone cannot make a revolution in a day... they must prepare it carefully..."⁴³.

The first problem for the new Moderate Cabinet was then to crush all signs of popular rebellion and to stifle the municipal governments. In order to control the municipalities, González Bravo issued a decree on December 30, 1844, reestablishing the Municipal Law of 1840, which stated that the mayors of the large cities would be selected directly by the Minister of the Interior, and those of the towns by the provincial political governor, (who was himself named by the Minister of the Interior). This new law caused popular unrest; consequently in February the Cabinet ordered the National Militia to be disarmed all over the country. But these measure were not sufficient to suffocate the radical spirit of the Militia of southern towns like Alicante and Cartagena.

The crisis caused by the insurrections in Alicante and Cartagena demonstrated that the principal pillar of the new Moderate regime had to be the Army, which was now under the control of Narváez. Since even a disarmed Militia could overthrow a government if it were resolutely bent on doing so, Narváez decided to increase the size of the Army. At the close of 1843, the military forces had totalled about 50,000 men, "one half of whom, in accordance with the violent policy pursued by Narváez, were concentrated in Madrid". Orders were subsequently given to carry out a new enlistment of 50,000 men, so that by mid 1844 the Spanish Army totalled over 100,000 men. The troops sent to Alicante and Cartagena in March were ordered to ruthlessly crush the rebellion. According to a contemporary writer:

"General Roncali shot thirty-one prisoners in the back at Alicante, upon the mere recognition of their identity... It was not the General's cruelty alone that led to this horrible slaughter; the act was in obedience to the peremptory orders of the Government to execute without consideration or delay all who might be concerned in the revolt. Roncali was officially com-

⁴³ *Ministère d'Affaires Etrangères*, Correspondance Politique de l'Espagne, vol. 816, letter from Decaze, French Ambassador at Madrid, dated December 3, 1843.

plimented for 'having stifled the sentiments of his heart', an unwarrantable assumption that he had a heart to stifle..."⁴⁴.

All told at least 200 persons were executed at Alicante, and a similar number at Cartagena. Narváez ordered a policy of repression in other provinces as well. He ordered a state of siege in Madrid, and he named the ruthless Baron de Meer to serve as Captain-General of the insurrectionary province of Barcelona. On the 1st of April, 1844, the government also ordered the creation of the Civil Guard, a professional military-police force that was intended to replace and (repress) the National Militia and to guarantee order in the rebellious towns of southern Spain.

At the same time as the Army was crushing the last popular resistance, the Moderate party at Madrid re-affirmed the role of the monarchy in the State, re-constituting the Court as it had been before 1840. The correspondent of the *London Times* reported the changes at the Palace. He wrote:

"In short- the Palace of Isabel II is to be remodelled by the returned Moderate exiles, who pretend to taste in these things... The Duke of Bailén (General Castaños)- selects 25 ladies of honor to her Majesty, as many 'camaristas', or ladies of the bedchamber, 35 'caballerizos', or Royal equerries, and a crowd of chamberlains, stewards, pages, and other attendants on Royalty, all selected from the families of 'los grandes de España', and all highly flattered to resume even the most menial offices in the Palace, from which the revolution has so long exiled them"⁴⁵.

One of the most conservative leaders of the Moderates, Donoso Cortés, left Madrid in December for Paris, his purpose being to encourage the former Queen-Regent, María Cristina, to return to Spain to assume the preeminent position at the Court, but with one provision, namely, that she bring with her 10 million francs, a fraction of her whole fortune, which was valued at 150 million francs (about 600 million "reales")⁴⁶. María Cristina hesitated for several weeks, but finally in late March she returned to Spain.

The conservative reaction of 1844 had been completed. No longer threatened by any radical or Progressive movements, General Narváez discarded González Bravo, and took power himself, assuming the offices of Prime Minister and Minister of War. He gave the other Cabinet posts to trusted Moderate allies. By April, 1844, therefore, the main supports of the previous Progressive government of 1841-43 had been dismantled: the National Militia, the democratic municipalities, the Progressive and republican press and clubs. These were replaced by the conservative pillars of the Moderate regime: the aristocratic Court, the Army under Narváez, the Civil Guard, and the centralized Ministry of the Interior, which controlled all municipal and provincial politics. The Court, the Army and the

⁴⁴ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. I, p. 223.

⁴⁵ *London Times*, November 21, 1843, p. 5.

⁴⁶ *London Times*, December 21, 1843, p. 4.

Ministry of the Interior wielded the real power in the government, using and misusing the parliamentary system for their own ends. This regime was supported by the majority of the Spanish bourgeoisie, by the Catalan industrialists, by the financiers of Madrid, by the richer merchants of many cities, and by the extensive Andalusian and Castilian landowning classes. A foreign observer noted in 1844:

“It is an undoubted fact (and recent events remarkably tend to prove it) that the bulk of the substantial and moneyed classes of Spain and Portugal, of the influential portion of Peninsular society, is attached in politics to Moderado opinions. The Progresistas... have been more noticeable of late years because they have been noisier; but democratic opinions have enlisted no large portion of the wealth or weight of the community, and the profound indifference with which the simultaneous arrest of the Progresista leaders in Madrid and Lisbon, and the high-handed proceedings of Narváez and Costa Cabral (the Portuguese dictator) have been generally regarded, are sufficient to attest the fact”⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ F. M. HUGHES, *Revelations of Spain*, vol. I, p. 230.

X

The Hegemony of the Spanish Bourgeoisie: 1844

The decade 1834-44 had brought fundamental political and economic changes to Spain. There was now a modern parliamentary State instead of an absolute monarchy. There were important political parties and a powerful newspaper press which directed public opinion. The economic power of the Church had been partially broken; there were no more monasteries, although many nuns' convents continued to exist. There was also now a new "bourgeois" society at Madrid and other Spanish cities. The urban Spanish wealthy classes dressed and looked like their counterparts in London, Paris, or Berlin, although there were clearly, fewer rich Spaniards than rich Frenchmen, Englishmen, or Germans. Aristocrats, landowners, merchants, industrialists, important military officers, former and present Ministers of State, well-known parliamentary politicians, all formed a part of the new Spanish "bourgeoisie". This class exercised political hegemony in the sense that no other class was allowed significant political participation after 1844. The Moderates were determined to utilise the Army, the Civil Guard, and the Ministry of the Interior to suffocate all efforts by artisans, factory workers, or peasants to disturb the new order.

The ruling class of the new Moderate regime after 1844 was based on an alliance between the landed oligarchy and the commercial/industrial bourgeoisie. The alliance was an unequal one, however, for the predominant group was the landowning sector. The commercial/industrial sector was quite clearly the junior partner in this relationship. The dominance of landed capital over commercial or industrial capital was socially manifested in the "aristocratic" pretensions of the leading members of Moderate society. Rising industrialists, famous Generals, successful financiers and ambitious politicians all aspired to a noble title. The owners of old aristocratic titles and the new meritocracy mixed regularly at the concerts and dances in the Royal Palace¹. The rich offspring of Madrid financiers inter-married with the sons or daughters of noble or even the Royal families. The daughter of the wealthy Army provisioner and financier, Jaime Ceriola, married into the aristocratic family of the Flaquers. The daughter of the Catalan banker Remisa took as her spouse the brother of Fernando Muñoz, the husband of María Cristina, former Queen-Re-

¹ Among the individuals who frequented the Royal Court in 1844 there were 34 persons with noble titles; of these 21 aristocratic titles dated from the 19th century, 16 of them conceded after 1833. See JOSÉ LUIS COMELLAS, *Los Moderados en el Poder, 1844-54* (Madrid, 1970), p. 65.

gent². The fusion of aristocrats and new rich produced a bastard nobility that was the social "creme de la creme" of the new bourgeois society of 19th century Spain.

Unlike France or Germany where a similar social process occurred within the context of a dynamic and increasingly industrial economy, in Spain the economic basis of the new ruling class was much less dynamic and more backward. The patterns of land tenure had not changed in Spain, but become even more accentuated. Agricultural production was increasing, although slowly and not because of any important technical improvements or capital investments; the tendency was rather for an extension of agriculture on formerly uncultivated lands, frequently poor land. Industry had been hard hit by the effects of the Carlist War, and only began to firmly recover after 1840. Even in Catalonia most factories remained quite small and the rate of capitalization and mechanization was slower, for instance, than in the developing industry of the German Zollverein.

There were other non-economic factors which contributed to the backwardness. The level of food consumption of the average Spaniard was low, while disease and crime were high in proportion to other European societies³. Educational levels were appallingly poor. Only 10% of the Spanish population in 1843 could read and write, (plus an additional 5% that could read, but not write)⁴. This was unquestionably the lowest literacy rate in all of Europe in the 1840's. This was not only the result of the wars and political disruptions, but also, and more profoundly, the consequence of the historical custom of the monarchy of letting education remain in the hands of a Catholic clergy which had no real interest or motive to improve educational standards. Secondary and technical schools, as well as the universities were improving in the 1840's, but these also suffered from an acute backwardness. The lack of interest in education by all previous governments made the Spanish middle classes the least technically prepared to adapt to modern economic society of practically all the European nations. Scientific instruction, (much less research), was virtually non-existent in early 19th century Spain. An index of this was the fact that from 1823 to 1837 there were literally no students of mathematics at the University of Madrid, the most advanced center of learning in the country, (along with the University of Barcelona)⁵. There were no students of experimental physics until the year 1839. There were no students of political economy until 1838-40, when a grand total of

² JOSÉ MARÍA SANZ GARCÍA, *La Banca y los banqueros madrileños en el siglo XIX* (C.S.I.C., Madrid, 1961), a long pamphlet of some 60 pages.

³ In 1843 there were 2,691 individuals accused of homicide in the 13 "audiencias" of Spain. This large number is an index of the high criminality rate. See PASCUAL MADDOZ, *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico e histórico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar*, vol. XV (Madrid, 1848), p. 306.

⁴ These statistics are from *Estadística moderna del territorio español*, Barcelona, 1843, imprenta del *Imparcial*, p. 160. There are also some incomplete statistics on literacy levels in the *Guía Oficial de España de 1837*, p. 270.

⁵ All information on the University of Madrid is taken from the remarkably complete report published in P. MADDOZ, *Diccionario...*, vol. X, pp. 808-812.

three students were enrolled in those courses at the University. Up until 1840, therefore, the traditional pattern of Church controlled education dominated the university, as well as the secondary and primary school levels. Law and Theology were the main professional careers. After 1840, and particularly after 1845, the Madrid University began to produce more doctors in medicine, more pharmacists, and some professors in the humanities and sciences, but still appallingly few compared to any other major European nation.

The Spain of 1844 was backward and yet it had changed. The changes were more obvious and more profound in the cities than in the countryside. They were evident in the new buildings and parks, in the new urban habits and dress, and in the social and political consciousness of the city residents. The changes were manifest, most importantly, in the growth of a small but powerful class, the capitalists. Never before in Spanish history had a group of non-aristocratic individuals had such large personal fortunes. The situation in the countryside contrasted with that in the city. Although there had been changes in the rural areas, they had not improved, and almost certainly worsened the relations between peasant and landlord. More land was concentrated in the hands of the aristocracy and financial speculators than ever before. Many peasants were evicted from lands their fathers and grandfathers had worked before them. Only a few were able to increase and improve their small holdings. The gulf between city and countryside had grown not diminished, as compared to the 18th century.

THE LANDED OLIGARCHY: A NEW ARISTOCRACY

The sale of the Church properties accentuated the concentration of land in the hands of a small class of great landowners⁶. The traditional aristocracy acquired more property than before, and numerous wealthy financiers and merchants bought up large chunks of rural property, themselves becoming members of the landed oligarchy. This pattern of concentration was visible in the area of the greatest estates, Andalusia. Research on the sale of Church properties in the province of Seville demonstrates that land formerly owned by the Church had been cultivated by 6,000 peasant families in 1835. After the sales in 1845, only 460 families cultivated these same lands⁷. The new owners evicted many small tenants and leased the land to small number of farmers who hired day

⁶ All recent scholarly studies tend to demonstrate this. See studies by Francisco Simón Segura, Alfonso Lazo. For a bibliography of some of these studies see GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, "La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868", in *Ensayos sobre la Economía española a mediados del siglo XIX*, pp. 247-48.

⁷ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, "La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868", p. 251. Anes quotes study by ALFONSO LAZO, "La desamortización eclesiástica en Sevilla (1835-45)".

laborers. The result was a reinforcement of the traditional "latifundia" structure of property. As the historian Gonzalo Anes has said:

"This brought with it a change in the attitude towards such measures (sale of Church lands), for the peasants began to fear the process of transfer of Church properties to new owners, who imposed much stricter control over the leases; there are numerous instances of petitions by the peasants asking that the Church properties be given to the town councils for collective use (instead of being sold to private individuals)"⁸.

The conditions for the sales of the nationalized properties, which were stipulated in the law of the *Desamortización* of 1837, favored the wealthy buyers over the middling or poor peasants. The law stated that a large part of any individual piece of property to be sold could be paid for with bonds of the internal debt ("vales reales"). In this way the State eliminated its debt and reestablished its credit. Many wealthy persons had large quantities of bonds and if they did not, they could easily buy them up at low prices on the Madrid stock exchange. The bonds usually sold at 30-40% of their nominal value, but were accepted at face value—that is 100%—by the government in exchange for the Church properties which it was selling. The result was that with 10,000 "reales", a buyer could acquire bonds worth 30,000 "reales" at face value, and then exchange them for an equivalent amount of Church property sold by the State. Small peasants and artisans, on the other hand, were generally incapable of acquiring bonds, nor even of understanding these complicated commercial operations. They would have to pay in hard cash if they wished to buy. But liquid cash was a scarce commodity in early 19th century Spain, and there was an extreme dearth of it in the countryside. Furthermore, few peasants could save any spare cash; they were poor to do so.

The result was that a large number of wealthy landowners, merchants and financiers bought up most of the Church properties. The speculation in the land business in the 1840's was terrific. The effect of this large investment of capital in rural and urban real estate, however, was not positive for Spanish economic development. As the historian Tomás y Valiente has recently suggested:

"In a period when capital was needed for infant industries; in a period, like the middle decades of the 19th century, in which Spanish capital was insufficient to finance the national railroad construction, it seems clear that the great business of buying up disentailed lands attracted the bourgeoisie more than the more risky industrial ventures. Giralt i Raventós has demonstrated this fact in relation to the Valencia region, and it appears probable that this affirmation can be more generally applied"⁹.

The sale of Church lands did stimulate production somewhat by raising the value of formerly unproductive lands, which now began to be culti-

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ F. TOMÁS Y VALIENTE, *El marco político de la Desamortización en España* (Barcelona, 1972), p. 167.

vated. But it is also clear that the agricultural expansion had begun years before the disentailment, particularly in the wheat areas of the northern and central regions of the peninsula. In the 18th century Spanish wheat production had been inadequate to supply the whole internal market. After the Napoleonic War much more wheat began to be produced. The increases came from extension of the cultivated land, not from more intensive or modern agriculture. By 1830, Spain was able to export one million "fanegas" of wheat to England, although later during the 1830's production dropped off severely¹⁰. In the early 1840's there was another wave of expansion. In 1842 a Progressive deputy declared in the parliamentary chambers that Spain now produced almost 110 million "fanegas" per year, 90 of which were sufficient to cover national consumption, and 20 of which could therefore be exported¹¹. He also said that the national wheat prices had dropped phenomenally, making Spanish wheat more competitive in the foreign markets. The deputy may have over-exaggerated somewhat, but the general trend was clear. The Castilian wheat producers were increasing their harvests rapidly. The agricultural center of gravity of Spain was gradually shifting from wine and fruit/rich Andalusia to wheat/rich central and northern Castile.

Despite these developments, the Andalusian landed aristocracy did not lose any national political power, for two main reasons. In the first place, the sales of the Church lands reinforced their huge economic holdings. Secondly, many aristocratic Andalusians took up political or military careers. Wealthy 19th century Andalusians had a penchant and a gift for parliamentary politics and for the continual power struggles at Madrid during the reign of Isabel II. Old Cádiz Liberals like Javier Istúriz and Alcalá Galiano, as well as party ideologues like Andrés Borrego and Joaquín Francisco Pacheco gave the Moderate Andalusian parliamentarians intellectual respectability. The Andalusian deputies often formed compact groups in the Congress and Senate. As aristocrats many had access to the daily life of the Court and maintained close relations with the Castilian Grandees, most of whom had large properties of their own in Andalusia anyway. Prominent in the Army were wealthy Andalusians like General Narváez and General O'Donnell who dominated military affairs for 25 years. The proof of the political predominance of the Andalusians throughout the reign of Isabel II can be found in the statistics of the regional origins of the Ministers of the government. There was a total of 202 different Ministers between 1833 and 1854; of these 68 were Andalusians, 22 from Old Castile, 17 from the Basque provinces, 16 from Galicia, 13 from Extremadura, 11 from Asturias, 11 from Catalonia, and the remainder from

¹⁰ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1831-32, vol. XXXIV, pp. 307, 319-325.

¹¹ See speech by PEDRO MATA of April 6, 1842, in *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura 1841-42, p. 2250. Also see speech by Gil Sanz in which he states that Spain produces 110 million "fanegas" of cereals, 70 millions of "cantaros" of wine, and one and a half million pounds of raw silk, *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes*, Legislatura de 1841, p. 1297.

the several other regions of Spain¹². The Andalusians thus produced more than a third of the Ministers in the period.

Between 1844 and 1868, the great landowners of Andalusia played a role comparable, in some respects, to the Junkers of Prussia, dominating the State apparatus, the Army, and much of the Court life. They were also closely linked to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. But the Andalusians were only a sector (the most powerful sector) of the landed oligarchy of mid-19th century Spain. This new aristocracy exercised political hegemony because the social and economic structure of rural Spain had not fundamentally changed, and the rural economy remained the dominant characteristic of the peninsula. An index of this was the fact that in the year 1851 the 52 leading tax payers of the land or property tax included the following: 13 Dukes, 15 Marquis, 15 Counts, and 9 non-nobles¹³. Some of these titles were of recent origin, but many belonged to the traditional aristocracy. Through its control of the purse strings of the State, its control of the Army and Church, and its pervasive influence throughout the countryside, the Spanish landed oligarchy continued to dominate the nation. This continuity, nonetheless, did not contradict the fact that there were significant economic and political changes. The landowners adapted, although very slowly, to the growth of a new capitalistic economy. They intermarried with the new rich of the financial and industrial groups. The Queen created many new noble titles for powerful generals or capitalists, and the traditional nobility slowly incorporated them into their own ranks. The aristocratic facade was retained, but behind it there was a gradual transformation of the Spanish upper classes.

THE CITIES AND THE NEW CAPITALISTS

The appearance of the Spanish cities in 1844 had changed markedly from that in 1834. There were new buildings, plazas and squares, markets, retail stores, schools, more paved streets, sidewalks, and in cities like Madrid, even gas illumination in the elegant quarters. Among the principal reasons for these innovations was the sale of large quantities of urban real estate, formerly belonging to the Church. When the religious building went on sale, the buyers bid for them; well-situated and solid properties sold for high prices. The sales drove up the value of all urban real estate, making construction and improvements more worthwhile. The speculation in Church properties flooded the market with cash and commercial paper. The Madrid stock-exchange, the financiers, and those real-estate dealers who had connections with the government prospered. Most important, formerly unproductive urban properties, which had been occupied by

¹² C. SINIBALDO DE MÁS, *La unión Ibérica* (1853), p. 60. In the second edition of this rather peculiar book, the author includes a list of the generals from 1833 to 1851, with data on their regional origins. We have not been able to consult that edition.

¹³ GONZALO ANES ALVAREZ, *La Agricultura española desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta 1868*, p. 247.

monks and nuns, now began to be used fruitfully by the State for public buildings and offices, by industrialists for their factories, by merchants for shops, by the universities for classrooms.

A brief description of the uses that the Madrid monasteries and convents were put to, after they were sold, suggests the kinds of changes occurring in the cities. (There is much information on this same process in other cities like Seville and Barcelona in the extraordinarily detailed and informative *Diccionario Geográfico, Estadístico e Histórico de España* of Pascual Madoz, in 16 volumes, published in 1845-48.) A total of 672 urban properties of the clergy were sold between 1836 and 1845 in the province of Madrid¹⁴. Among these were about 30 monasteries and 30 convents in the capital. The monastery of Portaceli and that of the "clerigos menores del Espíritu Santo" had been levelled. In their place in 1845 was being constructed the new building for the Spanish Congress. In the same year the Senate and all of its dependencies were installed in the former monastery of "Dña. María de Aragón". The monastery of "Carmen calzado" was being used by the officers of the Bureau of Public Debt. The monastery of the "mercenarios descalzos" was sold to the capitalist José Bonaplata, who had installed in it his new iron foundry and metallurgical factory. The Jesuit monastery of the "Colegio Imperial" had been ceded to a private school called San Isidro. The Jesuit monastery of the "Noviciado" was given to the University for classroom space. The monastery of the "Mostenses de San Norberto" was demolished and in its place was constructed a market and a public walk. One former monastic establishment was now occupied by the State Lottery Office; another by the Madrid Stock Exchange. The monastery of the "Trinitarios calzados" was given to the Academy of Arts, which used it for a museum and for art classrooms. Several nuns' convents and monasteries were given by the State to aristocrats like the Duque de Medinaceli, and the Marqués de Legarda, whose families had originally given the properties to the Church, (sometimes centuries before). Other rich aristocrats like the Marqués de Casa Riera bought monasteries; Casa Riera demolished the convent he had bought, which was next to his personal palace, and turned it into a large private garden.

Many monastic properties were also sold in the small towns near Madrid. In 1845 most of the former monasteries in these places were used as garrisons by the infantry of the Army or by the Civil Guard. Others were sold to private individuals or served as hospitals. One monastery in the town of San Martín de Valdeiglesias was occupied by the offices of a small mining company called "Fraternidad". The same process of reconversion of monastic properties into useful public or private establishments occurred throughout the peninsula, in all the principal cities and in all the provinces. The sale of the Church properties freed a great amount of real estate capital and put it to productive use. This was, undoubtedly, extremely important in the development of Spanish capitalism.

¹⁴ All information on Church sales in Madrid from P. MADUZ, *Diccionario*, X, pp. 570-80, 650-55.

But the information on these sales also suggests another historical fact; namely, that up until 1834, the Spanish Church had immobilised so much urban and rural property that it had seriously impeded modern economic growth. The hurdles over which Spanish capitalism had to leap only to get started in the race for industrialization were great; the obstacles to modernization were much greater in Spain than in France, England, or Germany.

The slow pace of capitalist development in Spain meant that there were few financial or industrial fortunes until the 1840's. Even then, the important Spanish capitalists were but a dozen or two. These new rich had made their fortunes chiefly in financial speculation, industry, and commerce. Many of these capitalists lived at Madrid, although some were also to be found in Barcelona, Málaga, Cádiz and Bilbao. A brief description of some of the outstandingly wealthy or enterprising individuals of this group may help to understand some of the characteristics of capitalist development in the 1840's, before the great period of railroad construction, (in the 1850's and 1860's), when large quantities of French and English capital were invested in Spain.

There were six particularly prominent individuals among the important financiers or industrialists whose careers are worth summarizing briefly. These six were Manuel Heredia, José Buschental, José Salamanca, Gaspar Remisa, José Bonaplata, and José Safont, (the last three being of Catalan origin). Each in their own way represented a different method of acquiring and managing a large fortune in the Spain of the 1830's and 1840's.

One of the most enterprising industrialists of this period was Manuel Heredia, a native of Málaga, where he remained until his death¹⁵. His fortune was originally based on merchant capital. He was amongst the first merchants to reestablish commerce between Spain and the newly independent South American States in the 1820's, but in these same years he also invested large amounts of money in the creation of two large iron foundries, one at Málaga and the other at the nearby town of Marbella. These two establishments were the first and most modern of their kind in Spain. Heredia imported steam-powered machinery from England and used mostly vegetable coal. At their height in the 1840's, these factories provided employment for some 2,500 workers. Heredia did not limit himself to iron production; in 1829 he had a small soap factory in Málaga, and in the 1840's he established a small chemical factory, which produced mostly sulphuric acid. Furthermore, he joined with another Málaga merchant, José Larios, (a specialist in the winetrade), and together they built a large textile factory which utilized modern machinery and produced cotton goods. In the 1840's Heredia even had established a coal company in northern Asturias to supply his Málaga iron firms. Shortly

¹⁵ For information on MANUEL HEREDIA see JORDI NADAL, "Los comienzos de la industrialización española (1832-68); la industria siderúrgica", in *Ensayos sobre la Economía española a mediados del siglo XIX*. Also see P. MADDOZ, *Diccionario...*, XI, pp. 89-91, and the article in volumen XI on "Mieres".

before his death in 1846, he attempted to set up a bank at Málaga, but he was dissuaded by contrary government pressures.

One of the most prominent Madrid financiers was José Buschental, a Brazilian merchant who had settled in the Spanish capital in 1836¹⁶. He continued his extensive trans-Atlantic commercial ventures between Spain and the South American nations, but he became increasingly involved in finances, lending money to the Spanish government and operating in the Madrid stock exchange. A contemporary writer, Fernández de Cordova, declared that Buschental was the first Spanish "prototype of the modern businessman... To him are due the initiation of the great economic projects... which others continued afterwards". There are also frequent references to the principal financiers linked to the Spanish government in the personal correspondence of the Conde de Ofalía in 1838. Among those mentioned were Aguado, Lafitte, Rothschild, (all three of whose banking houses were at Paris), and Buschental. In the 1840's Buschental made much money in government contracts, and in 1844, together with José Salamanca he founded the Bank of Isabel II at Madrid, which had an initial capital of 50 million "reales". Buschental later entered into the financing of railroad construction. In the 1850's he became involved in the finances of the Argentine confederation and attempted to promote the building of railroads there.

One of Buschental's business disciples and partners was José Salamanca, who eventually became much wealthier than his mentor¹⁷. Salamanca was born in Málaga, the son of a doctor; he was also, by chance, the brother-in-law of the Málaga industrialist Manuel Heredia. In 1836 Salamanca was elected as a Progressive deputy to the Spanish parliament, but he did not attend many legislative sessions. He spent much of his time learning the ropes of financial speculation at the stock exchange and establishing important contacts. His first financial ventures were made jointly with the Madrid banker Carriquirri, but later Salamanca became a close friend of José Buschental; they speculated together. He soon became a member of the more respectable Moderate party and frequented the aristocratic Casino of Madrid. His greatest stroke of luck came in 1841 when he convinced the Finance Minister Surrá y Rull to give him and his wealthy friends the salt monopoly contract. The other partners with Salamanca in this immensely profitable business venture were none other than José Buschental, Manuel Heredia and José Larios. The salt contract allowed them to monopolise the entire national market in this basic product for several years. Salamanca soon became immensely rich. He became heavily involved in banking, the financing of railroad construction, and finally in urban real estate and construction. The large elegant quarter

¹⁶ For information on JOSÉ BUSCHENTAL see JOSÉ ANTONIO TORRENTE FORTUÑO, *Salamanca, Bolsista Romántico* (Madrid, 1969), pp. 40-45; F. HERNÁNDEZ GIRBAL, *José de Salamanca, Marqués de Salamanca* (Madrid, 1963), pp. 164-170; H. S. FERNS, *Gran Bretaña y Argentina en el siglo XIX* (Buenos Aires, 1966), pp. 314, 318, 327, 344.

¹⁷ For information on Salamanca see first two books listed in previous footnote.

in Madrid called "Salamanca" was his creation. He was considered the wealthiest Spaniard in the reign of Isabel II, and he was awarded the title of Marqués de Salamanca.

The small but powerful financial/industrial group formed by Salamanca, Heredia, and Buschental was counterbalanced by a group of Catalan financier/industrialists centered at Madrid, who had businesses spread throughout the peninsula. Among these Catalans were Gaspar Remisa, José Bonaplata, and José Safont. The oldest of these was Gaspar Remisa¹⁸. He had originally made a small fortune by provisioning the city of Barcelona during the Napoleonic War. In the 1820's he became the official provisioner of the Spanish Army and was named head of the Office of the Royal Treasury by the Finance Minister Ballesteros. During the last years of the absolute monarchy, he was able to expand his business by obtaining the exclusive contracts for the silver mines of Guadalcanal and the rich copper mines of Río Tinto, in which he invested much capital. He was an intimate friend of the Queen-Regent, María Cristina, who consulted him for advice on her own multiple business ventures, (which included the lucrative slave trade with Cuba, coal mines in Asturias, and others, although eventually she invested most of her huge fortune in France). Remisa was the chief representative at Madrid of Catalan industrial interests. In 1839 he financed the newspaper *El Corresponsal*, which advocated protection for Spanish industry. His banking house was probably the most important single private financial establishment in Madrid in 1842. Its capital was 50 million "reales" in that year, and it had almost as many deposits as the official *Banco de San Fernando*. Remisa had installed the offices of his merchant bank in a large building, which also contained the offices of the Río Tinto Company and of the company of the Canal of Castille. In this same building he had his own private residential apartments and his collection of more than 400 paintings.

Another important Catalan businessman of the period was José Bonaplata¹⁹. He had originally made his fortune in textile factories at Barcelona. In 1831 he visited England and studied the metallurgical and machine factories there. He then asked the Spanish ambassador in London, Cea Bermúdez, to help him in his plan to set up an equivalent factory in Barcelona to supply the local textile industry with modern machinery. Cea Bermúdez wrote to the Finance Minister, Ballesteros, who agreed to advance a sum of 1,300,000 "reales" in government funds for the construction of this new industrial establishment. Bonaplata also got several textile industrialists to become his partners, and by 1833 the great factory of Bonaplata, Vilaregut, Rull y Cía. was producing large quantities of modern textile machinery. It was one of the largest enterprises of its kind in all

¹⁸ For information on GASPAR REMISA see J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Industrials i Polítics* (Barcelona, 1960); JOSÉ MARÍA SANZ GARCÍA, "La Banca y los banqueros madrileños en el siglo XIX".

¹⁹ For information on Bonaplata see references in MADDOZ, *Diccionario...*, in volumes which contain articles on Barcelona, Madrid, and Seville. Also see J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Industrials i Polítics*.

Europe, employing some 6,000 workers. Unfortunately, it was burnt down in 1835 by the radical artisans and workers of Barcelona. After the end of this establishment, Bonaplata was convinced by Gaspar Remisa to come to Madrid to try out his luck there. Bonaplata and his brothers established metalurgical factories both at Madrid and Seville, although quite small establishments compared to their former great factory. In 1845 the Madrid factory employed about 90 workers; it was essentially an iron foundry. The Seville factory was somewhat larger, employing over 150 men. It produced textile machinery, steam-powered machinery, and motors for the few steamboats on the Guadalquivir River; it also produced iron for the construction of a bridge across that same river.

Another Catalan businessman established at Madrid was José Safont. He dealt mostly in financial speculation, and was a large lender to the government. Already in September of 1836 he had lent the government 35 million "reales" at a single blow. But Safont did not disdain industrial enterprises. In 1844 he established a machinery factory and foundry at Madrid which employed 95 workers, under the general direction of a French expert. Safont also bought up huge quantities of real estate (former Church properties) in the 1840's²⁰.

Heredia, Buschental, Salamanca, Remisa, Bonaplata, and Safont were the prototypes of the new Spanish capitalists. Some had originally made their money in international commerce (export/import trade), others in industry or financial speculation. The outstanding fact about their rise to prosperity was the fact that most were closely linked to the State finances, in one way or another. Remisa, Safont, and Buschental lent much money to the State. Salamanca, Heredia and Buschental got the lucrative salt monopoly contract from the State. Even Bonaplata was aided financially by the government. Most of them also bought up large amounts of nationalised Church properties, sold by the government. The role of the State, particularly after 1834, (in its new form as a liberal parliamentary State), was of importance in the development of Spanish capitalism and of key significance in the area of finances and banking.

The economic importance of the State explains why most of the first Spanish banks were established at Madrid rather than elsewhere. Madrid was not by nature an agricultural, commercial or industrial center. As Pascual Madoz said in 1845, the economic existence of Madrid would be a fiction if it were not for the fact that the Spanish administration were centralized there²¹. And yet between 1840 and 1847 there was an extraordinary financial boom in Madrid, which led to the creation of a considerable number of commercial, financial and industrial companies, many of them the first of their kind in Spain. Salamanca, Buschental and Remisa, profited from this boom, as did other capitalists whom we have not men-

²⁰ For information on JOSÉ SAFONT see J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Industrials i Politics*; MADDOZ, *Diccionario*, X, article on industry of Madrid; and *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes de 1836-37*, 2nd appendix to no. 300, pp. 5799-5801.

²¹ MADDOZ, *Diccionario...*, X, 639.

tioned. Among them were, for instance, Juan Manuel de Manzanedo, a Spaniard who had made his fortune in Cuba and had established himself later at Madrid²². He continued his profitable trans-Atlantic trade in sugar, tobacco, and hides, but also got involved in finances. Another was the Duque de Osuna who imported guano from Perú, and who invested heavily in commercial/financial ventures. Then there was the banker Weisweiler, agent at Madrid for the powerful Rothschild banking house. In 1845-47 Weisweiler was engaged in exorbitant speculations in government bonds along with José Salamanca. General Narváez was also personally involved in these deals to the tune of ninety million "reales". They so undermined the credit of the Finance Minister Alejandro Mon that he was almost forced to resign²³.

The extreme financial speculation in Madrid during the 1840's brought with it a panic and depression in 1847. There was simply too much commercial paper in the market, and too little liquid capital or fixed industrial capital to back it up. Many young companies went bankrupt. In mid 1847 there remained actively functioning 7 insurance companies, 6 industrial companies, 6 transport companies, and 3 banks at Madrid though a few of these disappeared after 1878. The largest bank was the *Banco de Fomento y Ultramar*, which dealt in the financing of mines, canals, and perhaps most important, the colonial trade with Cuba and Puerto Rico²⁵. It provided shipping insurance, and controlled much of the sugar imports, as well as financing the slave trade. (Remisa and other Catalan financiers were probably heavily involved in this bank, for Catalonia controlled much of the Cuba trade.) The second largest bank was the *Banco de Isabel II*; it was the official government bank. It was the product of the fusion of the old State Bank of San Fernando and the new Banco de Isabel II, founded in 1844 by José Salamanca and José Buschental. The third and smallest bank was the *Banco agrícola peninsular*, which provided loans for enterprising farmers.

Among the transport companies registered at Madrid, four were involved in mail and passenger transport, (carriage transport), and two were dedicated to railroad construction; one was building the short railroad between Madrid and Aranjuez; the other was building a railroad in Asturias to provide an outlet to the sea for some of the coal mines there. The insurance companies were involved mostly in fire, life and shipping insurance, although some also provided credits for farmers. Finally, among the industrial establishments, two were carriage construction

²² JOSÉ MARÍA SANZ GARCÍA, «La Banca y los banqueros madrileños en el siglo XIX».

²³ BERTRAND GILLE, *Histoire de la Maison Rothschild*, I, 329-331.

²⁴ All information on these companies comes from MADDOZ, *Diccionario...*, X; volume X is exclusively dedicated to a description of Madrid.

²⁵ The original Banco de Fomento was founded by the Madrid financiers Rivas, O'Shea, Murga and Jordá to finance road construction contracts with the government. But later much capital from other sources was added to the Bank, which, however, disappeared late in the crisis of 1847-48. See MADDOZ, *Diccionario...*, X, p. 952.

companies, two were involved in financing textile manufactures, one was a paper factory, and the last a metalurgical firm.

Outside of Madrid, the other important economic centers of developing Spanish capitalism were to be found chiefly in the South and East. The most notable industrial area was, of course, Catalonia, but there was also textile production in Valencia and Seville, as well as many new mining companies in Andalusia. In the north, there were some coal companies in Asturias, and some industry, mostly ship-building at Bilbao. A brief review of the economic establishments in these regions will provide a more well-rounded picture of Spanish capitalist development in the 1840's.

THE MINING INDUSTRY

A key factor in the industrial development of all the European nations was the increase in production of mineral products, particularly coal and iron. The first was a prime source of energy and the second the essential factor in the development of metalurgical industries, without which there is no heavy industry. In Spain in the 1840's there were ample sources of iron in the Basque provinces and coal in Asturias, but mining in both areas was hardly developed compared to the production of the coal and iron mines of England, France, Germany or Belgium. There were also lead, copper and mercury mines in southern Spain, and these were, relatively speaking, somewhat more productive. A number of French and English capitalists invested some capital in exploration and mining in this region in the 1840's. Our brief description of the Spanish mining industry in this period will therefore go from south to north.

Most of the lead, copper, and silver mines were to be found in Andalusia, particularly in Huelva, Jaén and Granada. In Huelva there were 222 mines registered between 1841 and 1848, of a total of 327 claims²⁶. Most of these mines were not, however, particularly productive. An exception was the large copper mine of Río Tinto, subcontracted to the financier Gaspar Remisa. This was a large establishment with 3 blast furnaces and 40 small metal forges. In the late 1840's some 2,300 men worked there. Remisa payed the State some 300,000 "reales" per year for the contract. According to Pascual Madoz, the mine produced some two and a half million "reales" worth of copper per year, so the business was quite profitable²⁷. In the province of Granada there were 125 registered mines in this period, producing lead, iron and copper, although all were small establishments. In Jaén there were important lead mines; those of Sierra Morena produced some 2,000 tons per year. Somewhat to the north in Ciudad Real, there was the Almadén mercury mine, which produced some 25 million "reales" worth of mercury per year, mostly for export. This establishment had been leased by the government to the

²⁶ S. G. CHEPCKLAND, *The Mines of Tharsis* (London, 1967).

²⁷ MADDOZ, *Diccionario*, XIII, 496.

Rothschild bankers, through their agent Weisweiler since 1835, but late in the 1840's the contract was rescinded.

Perhaps the most important mining centre in southern Spain was the Sierra de Almagrera. There were some 9,000 workers employed there in various lead mines, which in turn permitted the creation of a large number of metalurgical factories, some owned by English or French capitalists²⁸. Most of the lead produced was destined for export. The total production of the lead, copper, mercury and silver mines of southern Spain was estimated to be worth approximately 100 million "reales" in the year 1843²⁹; this may have doubled by the year 1850.

The chief coal deposits of the nation were in northern Spain in Asturias. Already in the 18th century a number of small coal mines had been established there. The principal mines in the 1840's were near the towns of Langreo, Tudela, Mieres, Santofirme, Nava and Torazo. In Langreo there was a large coal mining establishment owned by the Parisian banking house of Alejandro Aguado³⁰. It had a small railroad to the port of Gijón, which had a daily transport capacity of 250 tons. of coal. The coal production of Asturias increased between 1835 and 1847 but not very rapidly; and almost half of it was destined for export. In 1835, 7,000 tons. had been exported; by 1846, the exports had risen to 25,000 tons.³¹ The total production of Spanish coal, however, could not have surpassed 100,000 tons by 1850. This was a miserable showing compared to the contemporary coal production of German, England, France or Belgium. In that same year of 1850, Germany was producing some 5 million tons of coal per year, France 7 million tons, Belgium 3.4 million, and England, the industrial leader, 37 million tons³². The Spain of 1850, therefore, was producing but 1% of the French coal production, and even less when compared to England.

Spanish iron production made a somewhat better showing in the 1840's than coal. Most of the iron mines were concentrated in the Basque provinces, particularly in Vizcaya. The largest and oldest establishments were those of Somorrostro, which produced some 40,000 tons of iron ore per year in the mid-1840's³³. These mines supplied ore for the iron foundries and small metalurgical factories of the Basque provinces, Navarre, Castile and Asturias. The total Spanish production of pig iron in the 1840's, nonetheless, did not surpass some 30,000 tons, at most. (Accurate statistics are hard to come by.) The total pig iron production of German in 1850 was 212 thousand tons, of Belgium 145 thousand tons, of France 406 thousand

²⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, 49-57.

²⁹ See *Memoria del Ministerio de Gobernación de la Península durante la administración de don Mariano Torrente y Solanot* (Madrid, 1843), pp. 29-35.

³⁰ MADUZ, *Diccionario...*, XI, pp. 436-38.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² DAVID S. LANDES, *The Unbound Prometheus, Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 194.

³³ MADUZ, *Diccionario...*, XIV, 440.

and tons, and of England 2.2 million tons³⁴. Spain was behind, but an increase in the national demand for iron and steel could lead to a rapid increase in output. The construction of the railroads in the 1850's and 1860's provided such an opportunity, but the railroads were mostly built with foreign capital, and the foreigners (mainly French and English), preferred to import rails, cars, and locomotives in order to stimulate their own domestic iron industries. Spain would not be able to significantly increase iron production until after 1870.

This brief description of the Spanish mining industry in the 1840's suggests that although iron mining and production was not well-developed, this fact did not in itself impede industrial development. On the other hand, the terribly low production of coal, the prime energy source for 19th century manufacturing industries, was a major obstacle. Most Catalan steam-powered machinery, for instance, were powered by imported coal, which was more abundant and cheaper than Asturian coal. The iron factories of the province of Málaga also consumed mostly imported coal or local vegetable coal from nearby forests. One of the factories, "La Constancia", consumed some 20,000 tons of coal per year. The metalurgical firms of the Sierra de Almagrera also used imported coal. Only a large increase in the production of Asturian coal and a decrease in its costs would have allowed Spain to have become self-sufficient in coal in this period. That this did not occur was a sign of backwardness. One of the causes was lack of technology. There were few Spaniards technically prepared to improve the methods of mining. According to an official report, the government had only been able to train 20 employees in the techniques of mining by the year 1843, although the State school had provided free training in this branch for eight years³⁵. The difficulties caused by the lack of coal were multiplied by the fact that there were few alternate sources of energy, such as water power. In France, Germany and England, water power was important as a cheap source of energy for textile mills and other manufacturing establishments. In Castile, however, as in Andalusia, there were simply too few rivers to allow their energy to be successfully harnessed for most industrial or (indeed) agricultural purposes. The lack of both coal and water power, as well as the lack of technically trained personnel were factors that seriously impeded Spanish industrial development.

THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

Spanish manufacturing industry was more advanced than mining in the 1840's. The Catalan textile industry, in particular, was a dynamic sector which could be favorably compared with the other major textile producing regions of continental Europe. In the rest of Spain there was

³⁴ DAVID S. LANDES, *The Unbound Prometheus...*, p. 194.

³⁵ *Memoria del Ministerio de Gobernación de la Península*, durante la administración de don Mariano Torre y Solanot, pp. 29-35.

no single area which could boast of a comparable industrial development, and none had a parallel industrial infrastructure in the rural areas surrounding the urban productive centers. Indeed, throughout the whole of the central tableland of Spain, known as Castile, there were practically no centers of industry except Madrid, (to a limited degree). Practically all manufacturing production was concentrated in the provinces bordering the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. A quick panoramic view of Spanish industry in the 1840's can therefore be obtained by going around the peninsula by sea. We shall go clockwise and begin at Valencia, later passing through Alicante, Murcia and Cartagena, visiting Málaga, Seville and Cádiz, and then turning north to Asturias and the Basque provinces, and finishing with Catalonia.

Valencia was a city of some 70,000 inhabitants in the mid-1840's and noted for its extensive silk manufacturing industry. In this period, there were in the city 174 independent silk manufacturers who owned relatively small establishments³⁶. There were also 4 medium-sized factories, each employing about a hundred workers, and equipped with steam-powered machinery. There continued to be a good deal of putting out textile production as well as a large number of artisanal shops. The artisans produced mostly leather goods, glass, soap, combs, candles, etc. They supplied the rich agricultural vallies near the city. There was one large State-owned tobacco factory, the largest establishment in the city, employing over 3,000 persons, mostly women. Finally, there was one investment company called the *Sociedad Valenciana de Fomento*, founded in 1846 with an initial capital of 10 million "reales".

Somewhat to the south of Valencia on the Mediterranean coast is the city of Alicante. This was primarily a commercial centre with some 100 merchant houses in the 1840's. There was a large tobacco factory employing about 2,200 women. There was also one metalurgical factory founded by a group of British capitalists called "la asociación británica". About forty kilometers to the west of Alicante in the hilly interior of the province was the small but dynamic industrial town called Alcoy. Here there were plentiful mountain streams which provided water power for numerous textile and paper mills. Alcoy had already been a manufacturing center in the 18th century. Now in the 1840's it had expanded and had a population of almost 30,000, chiefly factory workers. The textile factories produced wool products for sale to various provinces. The paper mills produced most of the paper used by Madrid newspapers and printing shops. The majority of the mills were quite small and owned by different entrepreneurs. Some of these local capitalists, however, had joined together in an association of manufacturers called "La Fábrica" and in 1841 they had imported modern Belgian textile machinery for their factories³⁷.

To the south of Alicante are the provinces of Murcia and Almería, where most local industry was based in the smelting of mineral products

³⁶ All information on Valencia from MADOZ, *Diccionario...*, XV, pp. 423-425.

³⁷ MADOZ, *Diccionario*, I, pp. 473-474.

and some metalurgical firms. In Murcia there were 19 small smelting establishments that utilized the silver and lead that were locally mined. In Almería the majority of the industrial firms worked the lead from the Sierra de Almagrera. The chief port, Cartagena, annually exported some 7,000 tons of lead, (as metal, not ore), and imported 10,000 tons of coke ("carbon kok") for the metalurgical factories of the province³⁸. The city of Cartagena had a population of 35,000 and had 4 large metalurgical factories, 2 Spanish-owned, 1 French, and 1 English. There was an extremely small middle class in this city, consisting only of 11 lawyers, 10 notaries, 12 doctors, 7 pharmacists, 7 primary school teachers, and 80 merchants or retailers. To the north was the Sierra de Almagrera, where there were 7 smelting factories which employed almost 2,000 workers. The largest factory was owned by the Spanish capitalist Ramón Orozco, who employed 250 workers, trained by 18 technically prepared English workmen who lived within the grounds of the factory. There was also one factory owned by an Englishman who had wittily titled his company "Contra Viento y Marea".

Further to the west, in Andalusia, there was also some industry. In Málaga there were 5 important textile factories, 3 metalurgical firms, 1 small chemical factory and numerous smaller industrial establishments. The metalurgical factories employed some 3,000 workers³⁹. The principal local capitalists who had initiated these firms were Manuel Heredia, the Larios brothers, and one or two others. In the interior of Andalusia there was industry only in the city of Seville. Despite the fact that this city was the centre of a rich agricultural region, there were only a few factories. The State tobacco factory employed some 4,500 workers in the 1840's⁴⁰. Several small artillery and munitions factories supplied the Spanish Army with weapons. There was some ship-building; three steamboats had been constructed there, and played the Guadalquivir River between Seville and Cádiz. The Catalan capitalist Narciso Bonaplata had a medium-sized metalurgical firms, which we described previously. An English capitalist named Carlos Pickman had a large ceramics factory which employed 57 English and 500 Spanish workmen in the 1840's; Pickman had established the company in collaboration with several local Spanish capitalists. Finally, there were three large textile factories, together employing about 1,000 persons.

To the south and west of Seville is the city of Cádiz. In the 1840's this city remained a commercial centre, reluctant to transfer commercial capital to industrial enterprises. There was only one small textile factory, despite the fact that Cádiz remained the second most important commercial port in Spain after Barcelona throughout the 1830's and 1840's. But Cádiz preferred to import English textile goods rather than create manufacturing industry. The predominantly artisanal and commercial character of the city was characteristic of most Spanish towns in these de-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, V, pp. 590-91.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, XI, pp. 89-90.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, XIV, pp. 335-406.

cafes. There were in Cádiz in the mid-1840's: 9 cafes, 15 restaurants, 200 shoemakers, 104 barbers, 92 carpenters, 106 grocers, 152 wine and liquor stores, 40 pastry shops, 176 bread or fruit shops, 35 silversmiths, 12 watchmakers, 42 milk-sellers, 30 pharmacists, etc.⁴¹ There were also 500 spinners who worked at home. Clearly commerce and artisanal production predominated. This same pattern was repeated on a smaller scale in all the numerous Andalusian towns of 5 to 10,000 inhabitants, as well as many towns in other regions.

Turning to the northern provinces, we find that there was extremely little industry except in Asturias and the Basque provinces. In Asturias local industry was mainly based on the small mining sector. There were a few iron forges and an artillery factory. There was, however, practically no urban textile production. In the Basque provinces there were considerable numbers of small iron foundries, a few metalurgical factories, and fairly important ship construction. According to Pascual Madoz both foreign and Spanish capitalists had invested some funds in textile, paper and metal-working shops, which employed an average of some 200 workers in the mid-1840's a total of 72 ferrerias, rather primitive iron foundries and metal-working shops, which employed an average of some 200 workers each⁴². The city of Bilbao was an industrial centre to a certain degree. Its principal industry was the ship-building sector, composed of three large establishments owned by Ripo, Olaveaga, and Zorroza. Between 1830 and 1846, they had constructed 300 ships. Pascual Madoz calculated that the total capital value of the ship-building industry of Bilbao in 1846 was worth about 80 to 90 million "reales"⁴³. The evidence suggest that this ship-building industry was of great importance not only in making Bilbao the second most important port in Spain by the 1860's, but also in stimulating the later development of the steel industry there.

Catalonia provided a contrast with the rest of Spain. Here there was formidable and modern textile production, as well as the beginnings of metalurgical and ship-building industry. In Barcelona and the towns of Reus, Mataró, Vich, Sabadell, etc., there were great numbers of cotton, wool and silk textile factories, many with the most modern steam-powered machinery. According to parliamentary deputies in the early 1840's, the Catalan industry covered more than 50% of the national textile market. A good part of the rest was supplied by (mostly contraband) English and French textile goods. (Of course, the national market was still limited in size by the fact that much of the peasantry produced much of their own clothing.) Throughout the rest of the century and on into the twentieth century Catalonia has remained the preeminent textile producing region of Spain.

The concentration of both the cotton and wool manufacturing industries in this one region of Spain differentiated it from France or Germany where 19th century textile production tended to be more dispersed.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, V, pp. 174-186.

⁴² *Ibid.*, XI, pp. 96-97.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 320-326.

But growth rate patterns were similar. In fact, by 1850, the volume of Catalan cotton cloth production was almost equivalent to that of the entire German Zollverein. In Catalonia growth had been slower in the 1830's, but faster in the 1840's than in the Zollverein. In 1832 the consumption of raw cotton in the German Zollverein was 2,422 tons. In Catalonia in the same period of 1827-1835, cotton consumption averaged 2,500 tons. In 1842 the Zollverein consumed some 12,000 tons, whereas Catalonia only absorbed somewhat over 4,000 tons. But in 1845 the Zollverein imported 17,000 tons versus Catalonia's 16,000⁴⁴. This demonstrates that the great leap forward in Catalan production came in the 1840's, in spite of the extremely destructive political conflicts of 1842 and 1843. The dynamic Catalan textile industry was able to overcome the intense foreign competition as well as the temporary crises created by political insurrections, and within a matter of decades had imposed a virtual textile monopoly over the entire peninsula, (by the 1870's).

From a technical point of view the Catalan textile industry improved rapidly. In 1840, of 25,000 cotton looms in Barcelona only 231 were mechanical; by 1850, of 37,000 looms 4,100 were mechanical, plus some 1,460 jacquards. Most of the steam-powered machinery was imported, chiefly from England or France. There were in 1850 a total of 160 registered textile companies in Catalonia, with a capital of over 115 million "reales"⁴⁵. Among the leading factories were those of the capitalists Coma, Saury, Beurel y Cía., Güell, Sert Hermanos y Solá, Aranyó, Batlló, etc. The total number of workers employed by cotton industry was almost 100,000.

Much of the cotton textile industry was concentrated in the city of Barcelona, but there was also extensive cotton, wool, silk and linen production in numerous smaller cities, as well as considerable putting-out industry. Some 30,000 workers (mostly women and children) were employed in producing silk lace goods in the putting out industry located in the coastal towns of Catalonia⁴⁶. There were also some 12,000 workers who produced hemp an linen products; they were scattered throughout the province of Barcelona. In the town of Mataró there were 10 large cotton spinning factories, 7 with steam-powered machinery, which employed 700 workers⁴⁷. There were an additional 1,200 spinning looms in the city. Other local manufacturing included 21 small canvas cloth factories, 9 leather, 13 ceramics, 9 brick and 7 liquor producing establishments. In the city of Reus there were 80 (mostly small) cotton textile factories; one large establishment was that of Vilá, Sutirá y Cía. which employed 600 workers and had a 75 horsepower machine⁴⁸. The town of Olot specialized in the production of caps and hats, which, according to Pascual Madoz, were rapidly replacing the traditional caps worn and made by the

⁴⁴ The statistics on consumption of raw cotton in the GERMAN ZOLLVEREIN are from D. S. LANDES, *The Unbound Prometheus*, pp. 164-65.

⁴⁵ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, pp. 82-84, 88.

⁴⁶ MADOZ, *Diccionario...*, III, p. 427.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, XI, p. 303.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, XIII, pp. 432-433.

Catalan peasantry. This was a clear indication that the Catalan urban industry was conquering the rural markets. In the city of Manresa there were also many large textile factories. The factory of Pablo Miralda employed 250 workers, and that of Prat Badía y Fusted used 40 imported English machines⁴⁹.

The wool industry of Spain also tended to become concentrated in Catalonia, although more slowly, and principally in the towns of Sabadell and Tarrasa. This process of concentration occurred despite the fact that traditional Spanish wool textile manufacturing was extremely dispersed in Aragón, Castile, and Galicia. "The proximity of the port of Barcelona, the abundance of water for the washing of the woold and for hydraulic power for the mills (above all in Sabadell), and a businesslike determination made possible the beginning of the concentration in Catalonia of the ancient Spanish wool manufacturing industries." In 1832 there were 23 wool and 28 cotton factories in Sabadell; by 1851 there were 58 and 53 establishments, respectively⁵⁰.

Catalonia did not only have a large textile manufacturing sector, in the 1840's, but also the beginnings of metalurgical and shipbuilding industry, generally located in the city of Barcelona. The first machine factory had been established by Bonaplata in 1832, although it was later burned down in 1835. The Bonaplatas established a new plant in 1839 in the old convent of Santa Bárbara. Other capitalists, like Valentín Esparó, had establishments specializing in the repair of textile machinery. The most important metalurgical factory was "La Barcelonesa", first established in 1839. The chief ship-building company was the "Nuevo Vulcano", which launched its first steamboat in 1836⁵¹. These companies faced great difficulties because of the lack of nearby coal or iron deposits and because of the lack of technicians. The fact that they later prospered was a result primarily of the increasing prosperity of the textile manufacturing sector of the city and region.

The Catalan industrial development was a unique phenomenon in the Spain of the 1840's. No other region had a fraction of the factories or industrial workers employed there. As the century progressed, Catalan textiles were able gradually to monopolise the Spanish market, pushing out the competitive English and French cloth imports. But Catalan industry was not able to diversify rapidly or successfully. Its metalurgical industry continued to be relatively small, and it did not develop a significant chemical producing sector. Textiles remained the dominant area of manufacturing production. In the 1840's Catalonia was a large industrial island within a predominantly rural and backward nation. The development of a more modern and better balanced national economy would come in later years with the construction of the railroad, with the expansion of the Castilian wheat production, with the development of the banking

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, XI, p. 185.

⁵⁰ J. VICÉNS VIVES, *Cataluña en el siglo XIX*, pp. 85-87.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-93.

system, and finally with the establishment of the steel industry in the Basque provinces in the last quarter of the century.

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY

The political transformations of 1834-44 had not produced an industrial revolution. The Spanish economy of 1844 continued to be predominately agrarian and in many respects backward. But the political changes had effected a type of social revolution. The end of the absolute monarchy broke the power of the aristocratic ecclesiastical alliance that had ruled Spain for centuries. The rise of the parliamentary State allowed heretofore uninfluential social forces, such as the commercial/industrial bourgeoisie and the artisans to become major political forces, and thereby oblige the landed oligarchy to adapt itself to "bourgeois" rather than aristocratic values and practices. The turbulent decade of transition (1834-44) was a period of such upheaval and so many social conflicts that it was not until 1844 that the new ruling alliance between landed oligarchy and industrial bourgeoisie could firmly consolidate itself. Throughout the Moderate regime of 1844-1868 this new alliance of Andalusian landowners, Castilian wheat producers and Catalan industrialists exercised political hegemony. They ruled the nation by virtually excluding all the other existing or potential socio/political forces.

One key to the Moderate system of government was a conservative-military alliance which guaranteed that the social and political elite would dominate both legislative chambers. After 1844 the Senate became a closed preserve of generals, archbishops and bishops, the richer Grandees, members of the Royal family, and a number of elder Moderate statesmen. According to the new conservative Constitution of 1845, the King personally appointed all Senators, who then served for life. The Army steadily increased its influence in the upper chamber; by 1853 there were 93 generals out of a total of 314 members of the Senate. The members of the Chamber of Deputies, on the other hand, were not appointed but were elected by a small number of electors. After 1844 the Moderate Ministers drastically reduced the number of electors from the high levels that had been common under the Progressive governments of 1840-43. Furthermore, from 1848 onwards the Ministers of the Interior made a concerted effort to pressure the few eligible voters to return "ministerial" deputies, that is to say, individuals who would approve of all the policies of the ruling Cabinet Ministers. Developed as a system of electoral manipulation and corruption, this practice became known as "caciquismo", and remained the predominant form of Spanish electoral politics throughout the 19th century, particularly in the rural regions.

The fact that there was a great decrease in the degree of popular participation in electoral politics after 1844 is demonstrated by the electoral statistics. Already in 1837 there had been over 250,000 eligible voters, a number which steadily increased during the years of 1840-43. In the last year of Progressive government, in September 1843, it was estimat-

ed that there almost 600,000 electors, of whom, nonetheless, only 40% went to the polls⁵². The large number of voters was significant in that it demonstrated that in 1843, under a Progressive regime, Spain had a considerably more democratic political system than its neighbor France. In Spain approximately 1 in 25 persons could vote for deputies and senators in 1843, whereas in France only 1 in 160 had the same rights⁵³. This changed rapidly when the Moderates took charge of the government in 1844, emphatically reducing the number of voters. In the elections of 1846 there were only 97,000 electors allowed to vote; in 1850 121,700; in 1857 147,000, and in 1858 160,000⁵⁴. That is to say that fifteen years after the fall of Espartero, only one-fourth as many electors had the right to vote as in 1843. In addition, the elections in the 1850's and 1860's were generally manipulated by the Ministry of the Interior, while in the period 1834-44 the political parties, Progressives, Moderates and Republicans had had great liberty and had determined the elections themselves.

The Moderate Ministers of 1844-68 therefore controlled both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, they controlled the municipal governments by directly appointing all the local mayors, and they used the Army and the Civil Guard to repress any popular rebellions. The Moderate regime became more and more closely related to the French political system and to French capitalism, particularly after 1850. The ultra-conservative Prime Minister Juan Bravo Murillo attempted to impose a Bonapartist political solution on Spain in 1851. The powerful French financiers, the Rothschilds and the Perreire brothers, invested huge quantities of capital in the construction of railroads in the Iberian peninsula. The Spanish military imitated and cooperated with the French imperial minded Army officers in their colonialist expeditions and wars in Morocco and Mexico. But Spain was no mere dependency of France. It had its own independent political system and growing autonomous economic forces, particularly the protectionist Castilian wheat producers and Catalan textile industrialists. If the Moderates adopted French practices, sought French capital, and participated in common imperialist ventures, it was because the Spanish ruling classes believed these policies to be in their own best interests. They desired that Spain should become one of the members of the club of capitalist nations of Europe, and they expected to profit from it.

That the Moderate regime of 1844-68 was not popular is not surprising, considering the previous political history of the period 1834-44. There were numerous insurrections in the 1850's, most of which were quickly crushed. Only in 1854 did a popular rebellion gain sufficient military support to topple the Cabinet and reestablish a brief period of Progressive

⁵² J. TANSKI, *L'Espagne en 1843 et 1844*.

⁵³ For information on the French electoral system, see SHERMAN KENT, *Electoral Procedures under Louis Philippe* (Yale Univ. Press, 1937).

⁵⁴ LUIS MARÍA PASTOR, "Las elecciones, sus vicios, la influencia del Gobierno, estadística de la misma", in *Revista Ibérica*, vol. 6, no. 4, February 28, 1863. For more electoral information see ANDRÉS BORREGO, *El Libro de las Elecciones* (Madrid, 1874).

government. But after less than two years of indecisive rule, the Moderates and the Army once again imposed a conservative solution, persecuting all radicals, imposing strict press censorship, etc. In the 1860's more and more of the old centrist Progressives reconciliated themselves with their former opponents, the Moderates, and even obtained seats in the Chamber of deputies. They abandoned all pretences of radicalism, putting their own economic and political ambitions above their loyalty to their former supporters, the artisans, the shopkeepers and middling merchants, the town lawyers and doctors, the old Militia officers. The political leadership of the latter groups came to fall almost exclusively in the hands of the more radical Progressives and particularly the republicans, who called themselves "democrats". On occasion they were capable of staging a brief comeback as in the first days of the revolution of 1854, but they were soon pushed back to the sidelines of the political field of action and power. It was only in 1868 that they were able to avenge themselves against the 25 years of Moderate rule.

The Revolution of 1868 closed and opened another cycle in modern Spanish history. The sons and daughters of the radical professionals and merchants, of the politicized artisans of 1834-44 became federal republicans; hundreds of thousands of shopkeepers, workers, and peasants shared their sympathies and elected the first republican government of Spanish history, the Republic of 1873-74. Soon this democratic experiment was also toppled by the military and conservative politicians of the Spanish bourgeoisie. But once again the republicans went to work, and more important, the first authentic workers' and peasants' political organizations began to grow. The political history of modern Spain is a history of revolution and of reaction, the result of the profound social contradictions of Spanish society. The social complexity of modern Spain has given rise to political movements that swing like a pendulum from the past to the future. The revolutionary decade of 1834-44 was one of the first stages of that history, a history which forges ahead in a new form today, in contemporary Spain, and the swing of the pendulum moves now from the past towards the future, a brighter future.

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
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